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FOREWORD
Claudio Grossman*
International criminal law attempts to sanction crimes that
have a global nature and impact. After World War II, the
international community came together to begin addressing
important international issues, including preventing future war and
non-war related atrocities and crimes. From the International Military
Tribunals established in the wake of World War II to the world’s first
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), a number of
international bodies, treaties, and statutes have been formed in an
effort to effectively administer criminal justice on an international
level. Yet the administration and application of international criminal
justice has faced significant hurdles and there are numerous opinions
on the proper application, scope, and import of international criminal
law.
This important issue of the Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs (JLIA) examines the evolution and future of the
role of international criminal justice in international relations, as well
as the structural challenges facing the ICC and other global
* Claudio Grossman, Dean, Professor of Law, and Raymond Geraldson
Scholar for International and Humanitarian Law, Washington College of Law,
American University. Dean Grossman is currently the Chair of the United Nations
Committee against Torture. The views expressed herein are those of Dean
Grossman and not necessarily those of the Committee against Torture. Dean
Grossman is also President of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and
member of the International Objectives Committee of the Association of American
Law Schools. He was a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights from 1993-2001, where he served in numerous capacities including
President (1996-97; 2001), the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women (19962000), and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Populations (20002001).
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institutions in the coming decades. Contributors to this edition
include academics and practitioners intimately involved in the field of
international criminal justice.
In the first article, entitled No Witness, No Case: An Assessment
of the Conduct and Quality of ICC Investigations, Dermot Groome, Senior
Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
Distinguished Fellow of International Criminal Law at the Dickinson
School of Law, Pennsylvania State University, reviews the
performance of ICC prosecutors. Mr. Groome discusses five
problem areas that have been identified with respect to investigations
conducted by ICC prosecutors. These issues include (1) the failure of
prosecutors to fully discharge their obligation to conduct
investigations fairly under Article 54 of the Rome Statute establishing
the ICC, (2) the brevity of investigations, (3) the poor quality of
evidence presented in court, (4) the improper delegation of
investigative functions to intermediaries, and (5) the failure to fully
analyze and disclose exculpatory material. The article details these
problems and the impact that they have had on numerous
investigations and on the ICC’s reputation as a whole.
In the next article, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the
International Criminal Court Engage with Consequentialist Aspirations?,
Shahram Dana, former Associate Legal Officer also in the Office of
the Prosecutor at the ICTY and currently a professor of law at The
John Marshall Law School, argues that in an effort to achieve an
“awesome array of goals” – including, inter alia, retribution,
deterrence, punishment, rehabilitation, reconciliation, incapacitation,
and restoration – international criminal law has overreached and
contributed to the politicization of the international judicial process.
After examining in particular the application of reconciliation and
deterrence in international sentencing proceedings, Professor Dana
concludes that the attempt to implement these goals has actually
perverted international criminal sentencing outcomes such that they
do not reflect the culpability of the individual. In light of this,
Professor Dana concludes that international prosecutors and judges
should focus on more modest goals in order to preserve the ICC’s
core responsibility of punishing those responsible for international
atrocities.
ii
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In the third article, Yaël Ronen, the Senior Lecturer at
Sha’arei Mishpat College, Hod Hasharon, Israel, addresses the impact
that the ICTY has had on domestic courts in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Professor Ronen’s article, The Impact of the ICTY on
Atrocity-Related Prosecutions in the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
identifies and explains the impact that the ICTY has had on rates of
prosecution, trends in sentencing, and the adoption and application
of criminal law norms.
In the fourth article, The Arab Spring’s Four Seasons: International
Protections and the Sovereignty Problem, authors Jillian Blake and Aqsa
Mahmoud identify the various international legal protections used
during the revolutions in Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and Libya
after the Arab Spring in 2010. The authors argue that international
law did not provide a uniform degree of protection to civilians and
combatants in each case. Some post-Arab Spring states are relatively
peaceful and have had more international assistance, while others,
most pointedly Syria, are still facing internal conflicts. The authors
argue for a uniform standard of protections for all populations
affected by armed conflict, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In
particular, the authors provide recommendations for limiting what
they argue are outdated sovereignty norms and eliminating unjustified
subjective distinctions in the international legal system, using lessons
from the Arab Spring.
The final article, by Patrick Keenan, Professor of Law at the
University of Illinois College of Law, entitled International Institutions
and the Resource Curse, moves beyond international criminal law and
addresses the role of international institutions more generally by
examining how international institutions could mitigate the “resource
curse.” Academics have almost always identified reforming domestic
institutions as the only way for developing states to overcome the
corruption, inequality, and lack of development that often
accompanies the discovery of rich natural resources. Professor
Keenan advocates for the intervention of international institutions
when domestic institutions have failed or when reform is unlikely.
International institutions can play an important role in providing
information as well as preventing access to international markets as
an incentive to force public officials to work for the domestic good.
In this way, the international community can have a direct impact on
iii
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developing states that could otherwise potentially succumb to the
“resource curse,” and thus also prevent widespread corruption and
human rights violations.
Through the numerous articles submitted by leading experts
in the field of international criminal law, this volume addresses the
real and substantial challenges facing the international community as
it moves forward to effectively administer international criminal
justice. Despite the numerous challenges facing the international
community, the importance of preventing international atrocities and
crimes cannot be overstated, and the voices and opinions of all the
stakeholders must continue to be considered.

iv
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NO WITNESS, NO CASE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDUCT
AND QUALITY OF ICC INVESTIGATIONS
Dermot Groome*
INTRODUCTION
The Prosecution’s conduct of investigations has come under
increasing scrutiny and criticism from judges on the International
Criminal Court. Criticisms are directed at some of the investigative
methods used as well as the quality of some of the evidence
presented at proceedings.
To date, the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”, “the
Prosecutor”, “the Prosecution”) has completed investigations into
seven situations resulting in requests for 30 arrest warrants or
summonses.1 The charges against 15 accused have been the subject
of confirmation proceedings pursuant to Article 61 of the Rome
Statute. Judges have confirmed the charges against ten individuals
* Dermot Groome, Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Distinguished Fellow of International Criminal Justice at the Dickinson School of
Law, Pennsylvania State University. He currently leads the prosecution of the case
against Ratko Mladić. He is the author of The Handbook of Human Rights
Investigation (2d ed. 2011) and teaches at the Institute of International Criminal
Investigation. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily
reflect the official position of the United Nations. The author is grateful to Grace
Harbour, Ruben Karemaker, Guénaël Mettraux, Milbert Shin, and Alex Whiting for
their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecution can request
either an arrest warrant or a summons to appear. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 58, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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and have declined against four on the grounds of insufficient
evidence.2 In one case, the confirmation hearing was adjourned for
additional investigation after the Chamber found the evidence
presented was insufficient to sustain the charges.3 The inability to
sustain any of the charges at the standard required for confirmation
in itself indicates infirmities in the investigation.4 Of the ten
confirmed cases, one accused has been acquitted after trial and the
Prosecution withdrew charges against another citing the loss of
several witnesses.5 Recently, the Prosecution notified the Kenyatta
Chamber that it was removing a key witness from its case after
2 Accused against whom charges have been confirmed: Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC): Lubanga (1/29/2007); Katanga and Chui (9/30/2008);
Sudan: Abakaer Nourain and Jerbo Jamus (3/7/2011); Central African Republic
(CAR): Bemba (6/15/2009); Kenya: Ruto, Sang, Kenyatta, and Muthaura
(1/23/2012). On March 18, 2013 the Prosecution withdrew the charges against
Muthaura. Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted after trial. Chambers declined to confirm
the charges against the following accused: DRC: Mbarushimana (2/16/2011);
Sudan: Abu Garda (2/8/2010); Kenya: Kosgey, Hussein Ali (1/23/2012).
3 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision
Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute (June 3, 2013), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf [hereinafter Gbagbo Adjournment Decision].
The Chamber directed the Prosecution to file an amended Document Containing
the Charges (“DCC”) by November 15, 2013 with resumption of the confirmation
hearing to follow.
4 The legal standard of sufficiency for the issuance of an arrest warrant is
“reasonable grounds” that a crime under the Rome Statute has been committed.
The standard for confirmation of the charges is “substantial grounds to believe,”
something more than reasonable grounds but less than “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber explicated this standard as requiring the
Prosecutor to “offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of
reasoning underpinning its specific allegations” against an accused. The Chamber
must “[a]fter an exacting scrutiny of all the evidence, . . .determine whether it is
thoroughly satisfied that the Prosecution’s allegations are sufficiently strong to
commit [the accused] for trial.” Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 39 (Jan. 29,
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF.
5 See Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-0109-02/11, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges against Francis
Kirimi Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ICC-01-0902-11-687.pdf [hereinafter Muthaura Notice].

2

2014

Groome

3:1

learning he had fabricated his evidence. It also asked for a delay in
the start of the trial to consider whether it could sustain its burden at
trial.6
On my first day as a prosecutor in the Manhattan District
Attorney’s Office, my bureau chief, Warren J. Murray Jr., began our
training by introducing us to a few of his well-known prosecutorial
maxims or “rules.” Rule number one, his first and most important
was: “No witness—no case.” He was making the somewhat obvious
but often forgotten point that the most essential aspect of a
prosecutor’s work is to identify and secure evidence (most often in
the form of eyewitness testimony).7 Credible and reliable evidence is
the foundation of a criminal case; it underlies each and every aspect
of the case that follows an arrest. Without it, there is no viable case.
The goal of a criminal investigation is to identify and collect evidence.
Investigations must be thorough, conducted methodically using
recognized procedures and methods, and must explore all
investigative avenues, including those that suggest innocence as well
as guilt. A successful investigation requires trained and experienced
staff, a clear investigation plan, and access to where such evidence
may be located.
Article 42 of the Rome Statute charges the Office of the
Prosecutor with the responsibility of receiving and examining
information of crimes and initiating investigations when appropriate.8
Articles 53 to 56 set out general principles regarding the conduct of
investigations. Investigations can be initiated upon the request of a
State Party or by a referral from the U.N. Security Council exercising
its Chapter VII authority. OTP can also initiate preliminary
investigations on its own initiative pursuant to its authority under
Article 15.

6 See Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11,
Notification of the Removal of a Witness from the Prosecution’s Witness List and
Application for an Adjournment of the Provisional Trial Date (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1703998.pdf.
7 In this essay, I will use the word “evidence” to include all types of
proof accepted in court proceedings, including physical evidence, witness
testimony, documentary evidence, video, audio, and metadata.
8 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 42(1).
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Article 54 sets out the basic structure of an investigation and
the principles upon which it should proceed. Most notable is
subsection 1(a) which charges OTP with the duty to investigate “all
facts” to determine criminal responsibility and to “investigate
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.” The ICC Rules
of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) and the Prosecutor’s
Regulations expound on the conduct of investigations.9
Most prosecutors learn the vital importance of a good
investigation early in their career, hopefully with a minor crime. A
prosecution will not succeed if the investigation underlying it is
seriously flawed. OTP’s failure to adhere to “rule number one” has
drawn criticism from the Court and resulted in the faltering of some
of its prosecutions, and the failing of others.
THE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE ICC JUDGES
To date, judges at the ICC have leveled criticism and
expressed concern with respect to several aspects of the OTP’s
investigative practices:


The failure to adequately discharge the Prosecution’s
obligation under Article 54 to investigate exculpatory
information equally.



The timing and length of investigations.



The quality of the evidence collected during the investigation
and presented in court.



The inappropriate delegation of investigative functions; i.e.,
the use of intermediaries.



The failure to properly analyze evidence and disclose
potentially exculpatory material.

Rules 46 to 50 elaborate the Prosecution’s authority under Article 15.
See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-0109, (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD640B5-9CDA-792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf.
9
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In the remainder of this essay I will address and analyze each
of these criticisms in turn.
A. The Failure to Adequately Discharge the Prosecution’s
Obligation Under Article 54 to Investigate Exculpatory
Information Equally
Defense counsel have regularly asserted that OTP fails to
conduct its investigations in accordance with Rule 54.10 The Pre-Trial
Chamber tasked with considering the charges in the Kenya situation
was troubled by evidence indicating the Prosecution had not met its
obligation to conduct a fair investigation. The Chamber, in declining
to confirm the charges against Callixte Mbarushimana in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) situation, expressed its
concern regarding interview techniques used by investigators which
“seem[ed] utterly inappropriate when viewed in light of the objective,
set out in Article 54(1)(a), to establish the truth by ‘investigating
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.’”11 The
Chamber was concerned with how the transcripts of investigative
interviews repeatedly demonstrated that the investigators conducting
the interviews relied heavily on leading questions, belying their theory
of events, and showing “resentment, impatience or disappointment”
when witnesses did not provide the answer they had hoped to hear. 12

10 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/0502/09, Confirmation Hearing, T.72 (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc773555.pdf; Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case
No. ICC-01/09-02/11-728, Decision on Defense Application Pursuant to Article
64(4) and Related Requests, para. 112 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf [hereinafter Kenyatta Article 64 Decision].
11 Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 51 (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1286409.pdf [hereinafter Mbarushimana
Confirmation Decision]. The Chamber went further to state “[T]he Chamber
cannot refrain from deprecating such techniques and from highlighting that as a
consequence, the probative value of evidence obtained by these means may be
significantly weakened.”
12 The Chamber noted that the conduct of the investigators was “hardly
reconcilable with a professional and impartial technique of witness questioning.” Id.

5
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The Chamber noted the objectionable practice in the interviews of
three witnesses.13
A witness interview is a process of carefully recording a
witness’s factual observations, ordinarily through employing openended and non-leading questions.14 The process described by the
Chamber indicates that investigators may have been suggesting the
Prosecution’s case theory to witnesses rather than asking neutral
questions and objectively recording their evidence. This objective
process should have continued by verifying the veracity of the
information provided and allowing the case theory to emerge from
the totality of reliable evidence. Experienced professional
investigators know that the type of interview described by the
Chamber should rarely, if ever, be conducted. If a witness is truly
adverse or is being deceptive, the investigator may decide to conduct
a second interview to follow-up on the initial non-leading interview
by confronting the witness with some of the inconsistencies in the
first interview or with some of the trusted evidence that contradicts
his or her account.15 If the methods described by the Chamber are
pervasive, and not simply the work of a few inexperienced
investigators, OTP must urgently reconsider how it conducts witness
interviews.
B. The Timing and Length of Investigations
Judges have also been concerned with the continuation of
investigations long after the commencement of proceedings. Some
defense teams have accused the Prosecution of changing their case
theory in response to newly acquired witnesses and evidence late into
the case.16 While the Prosecution must always seek the most reliable
Id. (discussing “utterly inappropriate” techniques of the Prosecution’s
investigators).
14 For a detailed explanation of the purpose and method of conducting a
witness interview, see DERMOT GROOME, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INVESTIGATION 173-205 (2011).
15 This two-step approach can also be incorporated in the same interview
by separating the interview into two parts.
16 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta, Case No.
ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum to Observations on the Conduct, Extent and
Impact of the Prosecution’s Investigation and Disclosure on the Defence’s Ability
13
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evidence and should not ignore important investigative leads, this
goal must not undermine the right of the accused to know the
charges against him or her and to prepare a defense.
The short interval of time spent investigating cases before
seeking arrest warrants is perhaps one of the causes of this
phenomenon. The Prosecution’s case theory will inevitably develop
in response to new evidence and commencing a case on a limited
understanding of events is likely to result in an evolving theory that
departs from the original hypothesis.
Conducting an international criminal investigation is a time
consuming endeavor. The crimes are both serious and complex and
require detailed and careful investigation. The investigation of the
actual crime itself (i.e., the victim, the direct perpetrators, and the
primary crime scene if available) must be conducted as carefully as,
and to the same high standards as, those applied by professional
national police services. Often central to an international criminal
investigation is the question of whether senior officials participated in
the crime. These cases require investigators to perform the additional
task of investigating and determining which officials within the chain
of command structure bear responsibility. This task adds levels of
complexity rarely found in domestic crimes. It is a task that requires
careful study of the legal relationships between senior officials, the
direct perpetrators, and all those who lie in a chain of causality
between the two. As such, investigators must conduct a timeconsuming process of accessing and analyzing archival material which
may shed light on the governmental structures used in the
commission of the crime.
International prosecutors also have the burden of establishing
the contextual or chapeau elements of international crimes. For
example, establishing that a crime against humanity was perpetrated
requires that the subject crime was part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population. As such, investigations into

to Prepare for Trial with Confidential Annex A, Public Annex B, Public Annex A1
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1556211.pdf [hereinafter
Kenyatta Corrigendum].

7

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

crimes against humanity require probing into not only the subject
crime, but also into the other crimes forming the relevant context.
In addition to these conceptual differences, there are
significant operational challenges faced by international investigators.
Witnesses are most often located in places far from The Hague. If
they are still living in their homes, they are likely to be in a place that
is insecure and polarized about the work of the investigators. Very
often victims and witnesses will have fled their permanent residences,
sometimes seeking refuge in countries far away. Locating these
witnesses and obtaining permission to interview them from the
government where they currently reside adds an unavoidable delay to
the process.
Before investigators can work effectively they must inform
themselves about the historical precursors to the conflict as well as
the culture and practices of the people they will interview.
Investigators may also be unable to speak the language of the victims
and witnesses and may need to identify and train competent
interpreters.
Before an investigation arrives at its final conclusions, it has
undergone a cyclical process in which evidence is gathered, verified
and analyzed, and tentative theories formed, which are in turn tested
through additional investigation. New evidence is gathered with an
increased focus, guided by a growing base of verified facts. Nascent
factual and legal theories may be contradicted, confirmed, or refined
by successive trips to the field to interview additional witnesses and
collect more evidence. Over time, the focus of the investigation
sharpens in a process that is driven by the evidence itself. Eventually
the credible and reliable evidence excludes all hypotheses but one. At
this point, additional legal analysis is required to determine whether
each element of the possible crimes (including contextual elements)
can be established beyond reasonable doubt. In most cases, it will be
necessary to conduct further investigation to locate specific evidence
necessary to corroborate an important witness or to more firmly
establish a particularly important point. I have supervised numerous
investigations of international crimes over the course of my career as
an international prosecutor—each took a minimum of one year.
8
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In light of these challenges, it is surprising that OTP
requested arrest warrants in the Côte d’Ivoire situation only 22 days
after commencing the investigation, and only after 74 days in the
Libya situation.17 While recognizing the importance of interrupting
ongoing crimes by taking high-level perpetrators into custody, it is
difficult to imagine even the most rudimentary international
investigation being completed within these time frames.
In the Côte d’Ivoire situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber spent
more time evaluating the evidence than the OTP spent collecting it.
The Prosecution received authorization to commence an
investigation on October 3, 2011 and applied for an arrest warrant on
October 25, 2011. A warrant was issued on November 23, 2011 after
the Pre-Trial Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that
Laurent Gbagbo had committed international crimes. Gbagbo
surrendered to the Court two days later.
The infirmities of this apparently hurried investigation was
the subject of scrutiny by the Pre-Trial Chamber considering whether
to confirm the charges. After a considerable delay, caused in part by a
defense application asserting that Gbagbo was unfit to stand trial, the
In the Côte d’Ivoire situation, OTP opened its investigation on
October 3, 2011 and requested an arrest warrant on October 25, 2011. In the Libya
situation, OTP opened its investigation on March 3, 2011 and requested an arrest
warrant on May 16, 2011. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11,
Warrant of Arrest for Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, paras. 2-3 (Nov. 23. 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276751.pdf; Prosecutor v. Muammar
Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11/11-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif AlIslam Gaddafi and Abdulla Alsenussi, para. 3 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf.
In fairness to the Prosecution, there are indications that it was
receiving information and conducting preliminary inquiries in the Côte d’Ivoire
situation as early as April 2009. See Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor of the Int’l
Criminal Court, Statement on an Overview of Situations and Cases Before the ICC
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CF9DFD80-5E15-4AA8BA0D-7E728F0D86DF/280265/140409Capetown.pdf. See also Luis MorenoOcampo, ICC Prosecutor’s Speech to the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8statements-OTP-ENG.pdf.
17
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confirmation hearing was held in February 2013. The legal standard
for confirming charges against an accused is somewhat elevated from
the “reasonable grounds” standard for an arrest warrant, but still well
below the standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” at trial.
Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to
determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the
crimes charged.”18 This standard serves a gate-keeping function,
ensuring that only those charges which merit a full trial are allowed to
proceed to one. Article 61(7) gives a pre-trial chamber three options:
a) to confirm the charges; b) to decline to confirm the charges; or c)
to adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecution to provide
additional evidence or amend the charges.19
The Chamber, having assessed the evidence, came to the view
that the Prosecution’s case was insufficient to meet the substantial
grounds test. It reasoned that although the evidence was insufficient
it did not “appear to be so lacking in relevance and probative value
that it leaves the Chamber with no choice but to decline to confirm
the charges under Article 67(7)(b).” The Chamber decided that the
proper course of action was to adjourn the case and request that the
Prosecution conduct more detailed investigations.20 The Chamber
could “not exclude that the Prosecutor might be able to present or
collect further evidence and is therefore, out of fairness, prepared to

18 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3. See supra note 4, for the
definition of “substantial grounds” articulated in Lubanga. The Appeals Chamber
has stated that, in the application of this standard, a “Pre-Trial Chamber may
evaluate ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence or doubts
as to the credibility of witnesses.” Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No.
ICC-01.04-01/10 OA 4, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 Dec. 2011 entitled “Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges” (Mar. 3, 2012).
19 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 61(7).
20 The Chamber in applying the gate-keeping threshold of Article 61(7)
considered that the Prosecution must have presented its strongest case resulting
from a largely completed investigation. Thus, the appropriate course of action was
to adjourn the case for additional investigations. Gbagbo Adjournment Decision,
supra note 3, at para. 25.
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give her a limited amount of additional time to do so.”21 The
Chamber enumerated the avenues of investigation the Prosecution
should pursue.22 The Chamber gave the Prosecution five months to
continue its investigation and present a new Document Containing
the Charges (DCC).23
It is clear that OTP’s practice of initiating criminal
proceedings prior to substantially completing its investigation has
resulted in extensive investigations continuing after an arrest warrant
was requested, and, in some cases, after the confirmation of the
charges. In Mbarushimana, the Chamber criticized the Prosecution’s
broad language in the DCC, which, when specifying the location of
crimes used the language “include but are not limited to . . . .”24 The
Chamber expressed its concern that this was an attempt by the
Prosecution to keep open the possibility of broadening the case
should additional evidence become available later as a result of
continued investigations. The Chamber assessed the phrase as
meaningless.25
The Defense in Kenyatta recently took issue with the large
number of new witnesses that were identified by the Prosecution
after the confirmation hearing, asserting that they resulted in

21 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 37. The
Chamber went on to find that giving the Prosecution this opportunity did not
unduly infringe on Gbagbo’s right to be tried without due delay.
22 Regulation 35 of the Prosecutor’s Regulations requires a series of
planning documents before investigative activities commence. These planning
documents, taken together, would form a comprehensive investigation plan.
23 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 23. It is
important to note that one member of the Pre-Trial Chamber I wrote an articulate
and persuasive dissent from the majority’s decision. Judge Silvia Fernández de
Gurmendi took the view that the majority’s decision was based on an erroneous
understanding of the applicable evidentiary standard for the confirmation of
charges. She went further to take issue with the Chamber’s application of the
evidentiary standard to the contextual elements of crimes against humanity. Finally,
Judge Gurmendi found that the majority’s request to the Prosecution to deal with
specific “questions” and “issues” was both irrelevant and inappropriate.
24 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at paras. 82-83.
25 Id. at paras. 79-83.
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“radically altered” allegations.26 The Chamber in large part rejected
this assertion and reaffirmed that the Prosecution was not required to
rely on the same evidence at trial that it had adduced during the
confirmation process.27 Nevertheless, the Chamber expressed its
concern regarding the “substantial volume of new evidence that was
gathered by the Prosecution [after confirmation].”28 The Chamber,
citing the Mbarushimana Appeal Decision, reminded the Prosecution
that the investigation should be largely completed by the time of the
confirmation hearing.29 Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her concurring
opinion, was particularly troubled by the large number of witnesses
who were identified as such only after the confirmation hearing. She
stated that “there are serious questions as to whether the Prosecution
conducted a full and thorough investigation of the case against the
accused prior to confirmation.”30 The Kenyatta Chamber introduced
the legal requirement that all investigations that could have
reasonably been completed before confirmation must be. The
Chamber went further stating that the defense will have remedies
available with respect to failures to do this.31 It remains to be seen
whether the unspecified remedies referred to by the Kenyatta

26 Kenyatta Corrigendum, supra note 16, at para. 11 (“The nature of the
Prosecution’s ongoing and protracted investigation and the manner in which the
Prosecution has sought to disclose its evidence have required the Defense to
expend considerable investigative resources in order to attempt to deal with an
ever-shifting case…”).
27 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at paras. 110-11.
28 Id. at para. 112.
29 Id. at para. 119 (“The Prosecution should not seek to have the charges
against a suspect confirmed before having conducted a full and thorough
investigation in order to have a sufficient overview of the evidence available and
the theory of the case.”).
30 Id. at Anx 2, para. 1 (Van den Wyngaert, J., concurring).
31 See Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at para. 121. However,
the Majority is of the view that the Prosecution should not continue investigating
post-confirmation for the purpose of collecting evidence which it could reasonably
have been expected to have collected prior to confirmation. If a Trial Chamber
finds that this has occurred, it would need to determine the appropriate remedy
based on the circumstances of the case.
Although the Chamber does not limit the application of this principle
to inculpatory evidence, that is likely what it intended. It would be inconsistent with
general principles of justice and fairness for the Prosecution’s obligations under
Article 54 to cease upon the confirmation of charges.
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Chamber will have the teeth to compel a change in the OTP’s
investigative practices, but the Prosecutor is certainly on notice that
in the future Chambers are likely to be less forgiving when
investigations prove to be inadequate or tardy.
While the concerns addressed by the Kenyatta Chamber
focused on the procedural unfairness caused by an investigation that
continues after confirmation, a failure to adequately investigate a case
before commencing a criminal process risks a case that is flawed and
that may ultimately have to be withdrawn.
This precise situation arose for Kenyatta’s co-defendant,
Francis Muthaura, for whom charges were also confirmed in January
2012. On March 11, 2013, OTP filed a notice withdrawing all charges
against Muthaura.32 In the filing, OTP informed the Chamber that
having considered all of the available evidence, “there is no
reasonable prospect of conviction in the case.”33 When explaining the
underlying reasons for the withdrawal, the Prosecution pointed to the
fact that several witnesses had died, were killed or had become
uncooperative.34 It informed the Chamber that one witness recanted
his testimony after receiving bribes from representatives of the
accused.35 It is difficult to assess the extent to which these problems
were foreseeable and could have been overcome by identifying
additional witnesses and evidence during the investigation.
One clearly troubling aspect of the Prosecution’s submission
is its explanation that one reason the case collapsed was that the
Kenyan government “failed to assist it in uncovering evidence that
would have been crucial.”36 This suggests that the Prosecution may
Muthaura Notice, supra note 5. The Statute and Rules are silent on
whether the Prosecution can withdraw charges without leave during the interval
between the confirmation of charges and the start of trial. On March 18, 2013, the
Trial Chamber decided that the leave of the Chamber was required and granted the
Prosecution permission to withdraw the charges.
33 Id. at para. 9.
34 Id. at para. 11.
35 To date, there has been no public record of Article 70 proceedings
(Offenses Against the Administration of Justice) having been instituted against the
person who allegedly bribed the witness.
36 Muthaura Notice, supra note 5, at para. 11.
32

13

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

have known at the time of confirmation that it had insufficient
evidence for conviction, but proceeded in the hope that such
evidence would come into its possession before the start of trial.37
Many national jurisdictions charge the prosecutor with the
responsibility of assessing the probability of conviction on the
evidence in its possession prior to committing significant public
resources to a prosecution.38 This requirement not only minimizes
Id. The Prosecution had acknowledged in a public statement that there
were ongoing efforts to undermine its work in Kenya. See Fatou Bensouda, ICC
Prosecutor, Statement on ICC Witnesses Undergo Rigorous Tests (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85B705E7-5E3A-43C0-A4737B52CA120951/282930/Kenya.pdf. In a related case, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul
pointed out the significant risks that are occasioned by such an incremental
investigation:
[S]uch an approach, as tempting as it might be for the
Prosecutor, would be risky, if not irresponsible: if after the
confirmation of the charges it turns out as impossible to gather
further evidence to attain the decisive threshold of “beyond
reasonable doubt,” the case in question may become very
difficult or may eventually collapse at trial, and then with many
serious consequences, including for the entire Court and the
victims who have placed great hopes in this institution.
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al., Case No. 01/09-01/11, Decision on
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to art. 67(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
para. 47 (Jan. 23, 2012) (Kaul, J., dissenting), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf.
38 See,
e.g., PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE COMMONWEALTH:
GUIDELINES FOR MAKING DECISIONS IN THE PROSECUTION PROCESS § 2.5,
(Austl.)
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/ProsecutionPolicy.pdf
(last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
When deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the
institution or continuation of a prosecution the existence of a
bare prima facie case is not sufficient to justify the
prosecution. . . .[I]t is then necessary to give consideration to the
prospects of conviction. A prosecution should not proceed if
there is no reasonable prospect of a conviction being secured.
See also NAT’L DIST. ATT’Y ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 53 (3d
ed.),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20
Commentary.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
While commencing a prosecution is permitted by most ethical
standards upon a determination that probable cause exists to
37
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the waste of public resources on prosecutions that are unlikely to
result in convictions, but also protects those accused from facing the
jeopardy of a trial based on flimsy evidence. Given the significant
resources implicated by an international criminal case and the
jeopardy it places upon an accused, a decision to proceed in the
hopes of acquiring “crucial” evidence demonstrates poor
prosecutorial judgment.
In both the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire situations there were
legitimate international interests in conducting expedient
investigations and securing the arrest of men believed to be still
perpetrating crimes. Using the ICC as a means of interrupting
ongoing crimes brings with it the risk that hastily investigated and
constructed cases will ultimately fail.
International criminal investigations in conflict areas are
unique in that evidence that was unavailable at the start of the
investigation may become available as time passes and the conflict
subsides. Changes in security, disposition towards the court, and
reaction to court proceedings can all prompt new witnesses to come
forward. Over the course of a case there may be better access to
witnesses, crime scenes, and archives.39 Although the Prosecution
must always seek the most reliable and probative evidence, this goal
must be balanced against the accused’s right to know the case against
him and to prepare a defense.

believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant
has committed it, th[is] standard prescribes a higher standard for
filing a criminal charge. To suggest that the charging standard
should be the prosecutor’s reasonable belief that the charges can
be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial is recognition of
the powerful effects of the initiation of criminal charges.
Pursuant to the prosecution’s duty to seek justice, the protection
of the rights of all (even the prospective defendant) is required.
39 During the trial of Slobodan Miloševič, it was a frequent occurrence
for previously unknown witnesses to come forward and identify themselves in the
ICTY’s field offices in response to something they saw in the broadcast of the trial.
See Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice
Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323 (2009).
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ICTY judges have developed criteria to help strike the
appropriate balance between these competing concerns whenever the
Prosecution seeks to add evidence after it has filed its witness and
exhibit lists. These criteria include:


The relevance and importance of the new evidence;



Whether there is good cause for the late addition of the
evidence;



Whether the Prosecution exercised due diligence in
identifying the new evidence; and



Whether allowing the use of the new evidence will result in
prejudice to the accused.

Trial Chambers consider and balance these factors to
determine whether the interests of justice are best served by the
either allowing or disallowing the new evidence.40
Judges are correct in imposing a standard requiring that the
investigation ordinarily be substantially complete before the
confirmation of the charges. If substantial investigations continue,
the Prosecution should have the obligation of explaining why the
evidence was previously unknown or unavailable, and the burden of
establishing that the interests of justice are best served by permitting
the use of the new evidence.

See Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT03-69-T, Decision on Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Prosecution Motions for
Leave to Amend its Rule 65ter Exhibit List (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/100210.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-09-91-T, Decision Granting in
Part Mićo Stanišić’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Rule 65ter Exhibit List (July
19, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tdec/en/110719.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Defense Motion
to Amend 65ter List and Second Bar Table (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/101201a.pdf.
40
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C. The Quality of the Evidence Collected During the Investigation
and Presented in Court
Commencing a prosecution before completing a
comprehensive investigation directly impacts the quantum and quality
of the evidence available to a chamber. One of the criticisms of the
Gbagbo Chamber was the Prosecution’s heavy reliance on anonymous
hearsay. Criticisms noted the lower probative value of such evidence
as well as the implications for the right of an accused to know who is
providing evidence against him or her.41 The Chamber also took issue
with the Prosecution’s reliance on documentary and summary
evidence, such as press articles and reports from non-governmental
organizations, and noted that unless the Prosecution was to conduct
additional investigations there was little prospect of the evidence
being accepted at trial.42 The Chamber expressed its “serious
concern” about the quality of the evidence presented during the
confirmation hearing.43
The Mbarushimana Chamber also indicated that the
anonymous hearsay evidence contained in Human Rights Watch
reports would, as a general rule, be “given a low probative value.” 44
The Garda Chamber followed a similar approach with respect to

41

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67 (addressing Rights of the

Accused).
42 The Gbagbo Chamber stated: “In light of the above considerations, the
Chamber notes with serious concern that in this case the Prosecution relied heavily
on NGO reports and press articles with regard to key elements of the case,
including the contextual elements of crimes against humanity.” Gbagbo
Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 35.
43 Id. at para. 35. In addition to the four separate incidents charged by the
Prosecution, it also relied on 41 other incidents to establish the contextual or
chapeau elements of crimes against humanity. The Chamber found that for the
majority of these 45 incidents, the only evidence adduced during the confirmation
hearing was anonymous hearsay from NGO reports, U.N. reports, and press
articles.
44 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at para. 78. This
is in keeping with law in many national courts, which are reluctant to find probable
or reasonable cause based on anonymous information alone. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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anonymous evidence and summary statements that the Prosecution
tendered in support of its case.45
Anonymous hearsay can be of great assistance in the early
stages of an investigation by providing important leads to identify
witnesses and evidence as well as providing background to orient
investigators to the context and nature of the crimes. Many of the
investigations at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) were commenced after a review of reports from
the media and non-governmental human rights organizations.46 The
ICTY also had the benefit of the Bassiouni Commission, an ad hoc
commission established by the U.N. Security Council to conduct
preliminary non-judicial investigations into some of the allegations of
crimes that occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia.47
By contrast, anonymous hearsay should rarely, if ever, be
adduced as proof to sustain the Prosecutor’s burden at any stage of a
criminal proceeding. It inherently lacks sufficient reliability and is
very often factually inaccurate. Many international crimes occur
during conflicts in which propaganda is a frequently used tool by all
sides. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, a great many fantastic
and false stories were spread anonymously in an effort to cause

45 Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Public Redacted Version), para. 52 (Feb.
8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf [hereinafter Garda
Confirmation Decision].
46 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: WAR
CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (vol. I 1992); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR
CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: BOSANSKI SAMAC, SIX WAR CRIMINALS
NAMED BY VICTIMS (1994), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1994/bosnia/;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT WAR CRIMES IN RACAK
(1999). See also AMNESTY INT’L, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: “TO BURY MY
BROTHERS’ BONES” (1996),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR63/015/1996/en/8a8a95e2-eaf811dd-aad1-ed57e7e5470b/eur630151996en.pdf.
47 Comm’n of Experts’ Final Report, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27,
1994),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994
_en.pdf.
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panic.48 The anonymity of the information also makes it impossible
for a chamber to assess the credibility and reliability of the person
providing the information. OTP’s heavy reliance on anonymous
hearsay deprived pre-trial chambers of the ability to check the
information against other known sources. A chamber that must
evaluate evidence that is predominantly anonymous is unable to
cross-check the evidence because it is difficult to assess whether
seemingly corroborative evidence is truly corroborative, or simply
another formulation of the same information from the same
anonymous source.
A competent investigation requires more than aggregating
several sources of such hearsay and presenting it to the court.
Investigators must find the source of the hearsay and conduct their
own independent interview and assessment of the witness.
Equally important is the necessity of investigating the
credibility and reliability of known witnesses.49 Ultimately, a chamber
will consider the evidence they provide in light of its assessment of
that witness’s credibility and reliability. Many of the problems that
occurred over the course of the Lubanga trial were the result of the
Prosecution’s failure to verify the information provided by
witnesses.50 An important part of any comprehensive witness
One of the more egregious reports intended to enflame passions that
was proven to be false was a claim that Serb babies were being fed to the lions in
the Sarajevo zoo. The original broadcast by Rada Djokić can be seen on Youtube at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzUqQxNb8qw. Borislav Herak, one of the
early infamous perpetrators of crimes in the Sarajevo area, claimed that he was
motivated in part by the reports of Serb babies being fed to the lions at the zoo.
Politics of Rape: Brutal, degrading act a powerful weapon in violence that rends former
Yugoslavia, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR
4848763.
49 Credibility is whether a witness is being honest and telling the “truth.”
Reliability is whether the facts described by a witness are accurate. This is an
important distinction in the case of a witness who is honestly mistaken. For
example, a witness may be honestly mistaken in their identification of a perpetrator.
In such a case, the witness is credible but unreliable.
50 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 483 (Mar. 14 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf
[hereinafter
Lubanga
Judgment]. The Chamber in referring to the evidence of nine witnesses who
48
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interview is to gather information that can assist a chamber in
evaluating the witness’ credibility and reliability.51
In addition to the poor quality of some evidence, ICC judges
have expressed concern over the paucity or complete lack of
evidence on important aspects of the Prosecution’s case. For
example, the Gbagbo Chamber found that the Prosecution’s evidence
left an “incomplete picture” with respect to the structural links
between Gbagbo and the “Pro-Gbagbo Forces” which committed
the crimes.52 There was insufficient evidence to support the
Prosecution’s inferences with respect to the asserted liability that
flowed from the direct perpetrators, to Gbagbo’s inner circle, and to
Gbagbo himself.53
In the Lubanga Judgment, the Chamber was critical of the
Prosecution’s failure to adequately investigate the age of alleged child
soldiers—something of central importance to the case.54 Similar
criticisms were echoed in Ngudjolo, another case from the DRC.
Despite the fact that the Ngudjolo Chamber recognized that the
Prosecution faced significant challenges in conducting investigations
in the DRC, it chided the Prosecution for its failure to adequately
investigate the background of key witnesses.55
Evidence presented by the Prosecution in Mbarushimana was
also found to be lacking. The Chamber declined to confirm the
claimed to have been conscripted as children, “[t]he prosecution’s negligence in
failing to verify and scrutinize this material sufficiently before it was introduced led
to significant expenditure on the part of the Court.”
51 HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 14, at
190-96.
52 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 36. The
Chamber also noted the lack of evidence regarding the activities of the opposing
forces, something it considered relevant to its inquiry.
53 Id. at para. 36.
54 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 175 (“Whilst acknowledging
the difficult circumstances in the field at the time of the investigation, this failure to
investigate the children’s histories has significantly undermined some of the
evidence called by the Prosecution.”).
55 Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 121 (Dec. 18 2012)
[hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment].
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charges relating to alleged attacks in three villages, finding the
evidence related to them to be sparse, inconsistent and insufficient to
sustain the charges.56 In some cases, the only evidence offered in
support of an alleged attack was U.N. reports containing vague
summaries of the events.57 In Garda, the Chamber characterized the
Prosecution’s evidence regarding some allegations as “scant and
unreliable.”58 The Chamber remarked that in some cases the evidence
adduced not only failed to support the Prosecution’s allegations, but
instead supported the accused’s contention that he did not participate
in the alleged attacks.59 The Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s
arguments and declined to confirm the charges against Garda.60
The Prosecution must give greater focus to the quantum and
quality of evidence it is producing before the court. Consideration
should be given to each element of the crimes charged ensuring that
the Prosecution can confidentially meet its burden at each stage of
the criminal process.
D. The Inappropriate Delegation of Investigative Functions
While the reliance on NGO reports has been criticized as an
improper delegation of a prosecutorial function, the use of
intermediaries has caused considerable debate over the
appropriateness of employing external intermediaries to perform key
investigative functions. This issue came dramatically to the fore when
the first witness in the Lubanga case returned after the lunch break
and recanted his earlier testimony that he had been abducted on the
way home from school and conscripted into the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC).61 His recantation cast immediate suspicion on those
involved in bringing him forward as a witness.

Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at para. 120.
Id. at para. 120.
58 Garda Confirmation Decision, supra note 45, at para. 179.
59 Id. at para. 228.
60 Id. at para. 236.
61 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, para. 7 (May 31, 2010) http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc881407.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Intermediary Decision].
56
57
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In Lubanga, the Prosecution employed people to assist it in
identifying and interviewing witnesses. An OTP investigator
identified as P-583 gave evidence at trial that the use of
intermediaries was deemed to be the only way to gain access to
knowledgeable witnesses given the security situation that existed at
the time and the fact that OTP does not have its own police force.62
The Prosecution relied on seven different intermediaries to secure the
evidence of approximately half of the witnesses it called at trial.63
The integrity of the intermediaries and the role they played in
the investigation was a central issue at trial. The Defense brought a
motion at trial seeking a permanent stay of the proceedings based on
alleged misconduct of these intermediaries. The Chamber denied the
motion finding that it would be able to reach final conclusions
regarding the intermediaries and their impact on the integrity of the
case during the trial.64
In its final judgment, the Chamber focused on the conduct of
four of the seven intermediaries and set out its detailed analysis of
each of them. Intermediary 143 (I-143) was a paid intermediary who
introduced the Prosecution to 21 witnesses and another intermediary
(P-031). Five of these witnesses were called at trial. The Defense
argued that the witnesses were suborned by I-143.65 The Chamber
found that inconsistent statements by witnesses P-007, P-008, P-010
and P-011 as well as evidence that contradicted their evidence,
rendered the witnesses unreliable. The Chamber further concluded
that its findings reflected negatively on the integrity of I-143 and
established that “it is likely that as the common point of contact he
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 167, 181. For a detailed
description of the investigation and the problems it encountered, see Lubanga
Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 124-77.
63 The Prosecution informed the Chamber that it had relied on a total of
23 individuals and organizations in its investigation. See Lubanga Intermediary
Decision, supra note 61, para. 3.
64 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Redacted Decision on the “Defense Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the
Proceedings,”
para.
198
(Mar.
7,
2011),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.03.07_Prosecutor_v_Luba
nga2.pdf.
65 Lubanga Intermediary Decision, supra note 61, at para. 16.
62
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[I-143] persuaded, encouraged or assisted some or all of them [the
witnesses] to give false testimony.”66
Intermediary 316 (I-316) was under contract with OTP, even
though the Prosecution was aware of his close ties with the
Congolese intelligence service.67 The Chamber noted with particular
concern that OTP employed an intermediary who was employed by
the very same government that had originally referred the case to the
ICC.68 I-316 not only introduced OTP staff to witnesses but also
helped arrange interviews. The Chamber considered that it was
inappropriate for someone who lacked both independence and
impartiality to essentially become a member of the prosecution
team.69 The Chamber was sufficiently concerned with the integrity of
I-316 and his impact on the case that it instructed the Prosecution to
produce him as a witness.70 The Chamber found him incredible,
citing among other things his claim that his assistant (“Individual
183”) and his family had been murdered, when in fact the
Prosecution conceded that his assistant was still alive.71 The Chamber
concluded that I-316 had “persuaded witnesses to lie” and dismissed
the entirety of the testimony of one witness (P-015) and some of the
testimony of another (P-038).72
P-321 was another paid intermediary who acted on behalf of
OTP for more than a year and introduced investigators to eight
witnesses, four of whom testified in the Lubanga trial. The Chamber
found that all four of these witnesses gave materially false evidence
and that there was a “significant possibility” that P-321’s improper
influence over the witnesses was the cause.73

Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 291.
In addition, the Chamber noted that at least one other member of the
Congolese intelligence assisted I-316 in his work. Id. at para. 368.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 369-74.
72 Id. at para. 374.
73 Id. at para. 450.
66
67
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P-031 was recruited as an intermediary with the assistance of
I-143 and worked for OTP between 2005 and 2008.74 The Chamber
found that while the evidence before it was insufficient to conclude
that P-031 had persuaded witnesses to give false testimony, it found
the evidence sufficient to require caution with respect to the evidence
of witnesses who had contact with him.75
The Chamber concluded that “the Prosecution should not
have delegated its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries
. . .notwithstanding the extensive security difficulties it faced.”76 The
Chamber criticized the Prosecution’s reliance on these intermediaries
and that it had permitted them to work with important witnesses
essentially unsupervised. The Chamber further noted the significant
time it expended to scrutinize this practice and the evidence it
yielded.77 The Chamber used the judgment to inform the Prosecution
that at least two of the intermediaries may have committed Crimes
Against the Administration of Justice under Article 70 of the Rome
Statute and reminded the Prosecution of its obligation to initiate an
investigation into the matter.78
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Chamber ultimately
concluded that children were recruited and conscripted into the
UPC/FPLC79 and deployed in hostile actions based on other credible
testimonial and documentary evidence.80
The Chamber is correct in its criticism of OTP’s use of
intermediaries. Their functional role in the investigation went far
beyond helping investigators contact potential witnesses. They
became paid agents of OTP, to whom the Prosecution delegated
important investigative functions. Using intermediaries to make initial
Id. at para. 453.
Id. at para. 477.
76 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 482.
77 Id.
78 Id. at para. 483. At the time this article was written, there was no public
record that such an investigation had been undertaken.
79 The FPLC is the French acronym for the Patriotic Force for the
Liberation of the Congo, the military wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots
(UPC).
80 Id. at paras. 911-16.
74
75
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contact with witnesses is an acceptable way of working in a hostile
environment. In some situations making direct contact with witnesses
may jeopardize their safety and give the impression that investigators
are unprofessional and insensitive to their security. However, the
intermediary should only be used to convey a request to speak with a
potential witness and not in the selection of witnesses themselves. 81
They should not be involved in any interviews or exchange of
substantive evidential information between the investigators and
witnesses. If intermediaries are to be used, the investigator must
carefully consider whom to use. Knowingly employing an intelligence
operative to act as an intermediary, particularly in the setting of the
Lubanga case, was fraught with danger from the outset. The
Prosecution has the responsibility to control all aspects of the
investigation and vigorously protect its integrity.
Even if the use of intermediaries to identify and interview
potential child soldiers was necessary in Lubanga, the Prosecution
does not appear to have taken the steps necessary to verify the
information gathered in this way. Investigators with the Lubanga
Defense obtained and tendered school and other records, which
established that some of the Prosecution witnesses claiming to have
been child soldiers were too old for this to be true. Given that the age
of a victim/witness at the time he or she was inducted into combat
was a central issue in the trial, the Prosecution had an important
responsibility to independently verify the age of these witnesses
before advancing their evidence in court. Had the Prosecution done
so, the true age of the victims would have been apparent and many of
the problems during the proceedings would have been avoided.
E. The Failure to Properly Analyze Evidence and Disclose
Potentially Exculpatory Material
The handling of evidence gathered during the investigation
has also been an issue to the extent that it has had implications for
OTP’s proper discharge of its disclosure obligations. During its
investigation into the situation in Kenya, the Prosecution sought and
In Lubanga, it is reasonably possible that paid intermediaries whose job
it was to locate witnesses would have considered that payment would cease unless
they continued to “find witnesses.”
81
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received documents from a provider under the condition that they
would not be disclosed. After the Lubanga confirmation hearing, the
Prosecution recognized that some of this material required disclosure
under Article 67(2).82 Proceedings came to an abrupt halt when the
Prosecution initially failed to receive permission to disclose the
material. The Trial Chamber found that during the course of its
investigations,
[T]he Prosecution has incorrectly used Article 54(3)(e)
[confidentiality agreements] when entering into
agreements with information-providers, with the
consequence that a significant body of exculpatory
evidence which would otherwise have been disclosed
to the accused is to be withheld from him, thereby
improperly inhibiting the opportunities for the
accused to prepare his defense . . . .83
The Chamber further found that the Prosecution’s actions
had also effectively prevented the Chamber from being able to review
the material and determine whether the non-disclosure of the
material would constitute a breach of the accused’s right to a fair
trial.84 The Prosecution’s error of accepting exculpatory material on
the condition that it would not be disclosed nearly resulted in a
termination of the ICC’s first trial. The trial was only able to continue

Article 67(2) provides in relevant part:
[T]he Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the
defense evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control
which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence
of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which
may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.
83 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Urgent Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials
Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, para. 92 (June 13, 2008),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICC/Stay_the_Proceedings.html.
84 Id.
82
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after the conditions of the original agreement with the provider were
re-negotiated.85
In Kenyatta, there is also evidence to suggest that, at least in
one instance, the Prosecution was unaware of all of the evidence
generated during the investigation, including clearly exculpatory
material. In that case, the credibility of Witness 4, a witness originally
deemed of great significance, was undermined when the Prosecution
disclosed an affidavit containing a contradictory account of his
evidence.86 Due to an oversight, the affidavit was not disclosed to the
defense prior to the confirmation hearing.87 The Defense alleged that
the Prosecution acted in bad faith and characterized the disclosure
breach as a “clear and systematic failure involving senior Prosecution
lawyers with respect to the procedures applied during its
investigations.”88
While the Chamber rejected the defense assertion of bad
faith, it did express its “serious concern” with respect to the failure to
disclose the affidavit and the “deficiencies in the Prosecution’s
internal structure.”89 In her concurring opinion, Judge Van den
Wyngaert accused the Prosecution of being negligent with respect to
its responsibility to verify the trustworthiness of its evidence.90

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/061644, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, para. 10 (Jan. 23
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf.
86 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at paras. 24-31.
87 Id. at paras. 24-26.
88 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted
Version of the “Defense Reply to the Confidential Redacted Version of the 25
February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defense applications
under Article 64 of the Statute to Refer the Confirmation Decision back to the PreTrial
Chamber”,
para.
29
(Mar.
8,
2013),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1565107.pdf. The Defense asserts that in good
investigative practice would have required that the statement in question be
reviewed: i) upon receipt, ii) prior to the re-interview, iii) prior to making oral
submissions at the confirmation hearing.
89 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at para. 94-95.
90 Id. at Anx 2 paras. 3-4 (Van den Wyngaert, J., concurring).
[T]here can be no excuse for the Prosecution’s negligent attitude
towards verifying the trustworthiness of its evidence. [. . .]
85
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International criminal investigations often involve many
investigators and analysts working on different aspects of the
investigation. Systems must be put in place to ensure that the
evidence gathered is organized and referenced in a way that allows
the investigative team to easily access all relevant information related
to individual witnesses. Equally, prosecutors and investigators must
be extremely careful when entering into confidentiality agreements
under Rule 54(e). It is difficult to make a decision about the risks
involved when entering a confidentiality agreement during the course
of the investigation. The legal obligation to disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence is a broad one. Entering into confidentiality
agreements carry a high risk of the problems experienced in Lubanga.
Ideally, OTP should include a clause in all agreements that should
potentially exculpatory material be found, the Prosecution is
authorized to submit it for an ex parte review by a chamber and a
commitment from the provider to abide by a chamber’s decision on
whether such material should be disclosed to the defense.
CONCLUSION
The competency and integrity of investigations conducted by
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC have been called into
question in several of its cases. The criticisms are valid and should be
carefully considered by the Prosecution. The cornerstone of every
criminal prosecution is the quality and integrity of the investigation
underlying it. OTP must ensure that it has competent, professionally
trained staff who conduct its investigations according to generally
accepted principles and in keeping with all of the requirements of the
Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A failure to
improve the quality of ICC investigations and to take measures to
ensure investigations are concluded earlier in the process risks not

[T]here are grave problems in the Prosecution’s system of
evidence review, as well as a serious lack of proper oversight by
senior Prosecution staff. Clearly, thorough and comprehensive
due diligence with regard to the reliability of the available
evidence is an ongoing obligation of the Prosecution under
article 54(1)(a), which is as important as the collection of that
evidence itself.
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only continued criticism in individual cases but risks undermining the
credibility of the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC itself.
The maxim of that seasoned Manhattan prosecutor, “No
witness—no case” reminds prosecutors of the fundamental
importance of conducting an effective investigation and gathering
credible and reliable evidence in a process that is fair. This important
lesson is as true for those who prosecute crimes against humanity as
it is for those who prosecute misdemeanors.
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“Men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish.”
- Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958)
INTRODUCTION
Ten years after its statute came into force, the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) completed it first trial, issued its first verdict,1
and sentenced its first perpetrator.2 The prospect of a permanent
mechanism to bring to justice perpetrators of gross human rights
violations has captured the imagination of ordinary people, victims,
human rights advocates, and even celebrities. Angelina Jolie, actress
1 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
2 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062901, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, paras. 92-99 (July
10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf.
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and Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, was in the court gallery to hear firsthand the judgment against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.3 He was found
guilty of war crimes for conscripting and enlisting children under the
age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities.4 As
a result, countless children died and those who survived will suffer
continued psychological, emotional, and physical trauma for many
years to come. For these grave crimes, Lubanga was sentenced to
fourteen years of imprisonment.5 It was a significant day capping
many “firsts” in the nascent life of the world’s first permanent
international criminal justice mechanism: the first guilty verdict of the
ICC, the first international trial to focus exclusively on child
soldiering,6 and the first international trial to allow victims to
participate directly in the trial proceedings.7 Nevertheless, important
milestones and the successful prosecution of Lubanga are not likely
Ben Child, Kony 2012: Angelina Jolie calls for Ugandan warlord’s arrest, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/mar/12/kony2012-angelina-jolie; Angelina Jolie attends ICC hearing to witness Lubanga Decision,
AFRICANEWSWIRE.NET,
Mar.
14
2012,
http://www.africanewswire.net/story.php?title=angelina-jolie-attends-icc-hearingto-witness-lubanga-decision. See Angelina Jolie in court as ICC finds Congo warlord
Thomas Lubanga guilty of using child soldiers, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 14, 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticre
publicofcongo/9143254/Angelina-Jolie-in-court-as-ICC-finds-Congo-warlordThomas-Lubanga-guilty-of-using-child-soldiers.html, for a video of Ms. Jolie’s
statements following the verdict.
4 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74,
supra note 1, at para.1358. See also Kai Ambos, The First Judgment of the International
Criminal court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12
INT’L CR. L. REV. 115, 138-39 (2012); Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 812 (2012).
5 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 99.
6 See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2012), for a reinvigorating and provocative
examination of child soldiering.
7 David Smith, Congo Child Army Leader Thomas Lubanga Found Guilty of
War
Crimes,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Mar.
14
2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/congo-warlord-thomas-lubangaicc?intcmp=239; Faith Karimi, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty in its first verdict, CNN
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/14/world/africa/hague-first-iccruling/index.html?_s=PM:AFRICA.
3
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to end the debate any time soon over the merits of the ICC and the
role of international criminal justice mechanisms.8 Hours after the
court sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years, negative reactions
populated the media and the internet.9 For ICC Presiding Judge
Adrian Fulford to stare down at Lubanga and forcefully declare that
his crimes are “undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the
international community as a whole[,]”10 but then impose a
punishment that is less then half of the maximum term penalty
available under the ICC Statute must have been perplexing, even for
supporters of the Court.11 Human rights observers criticized the
punishment as “a rather low sentence in relation to the crimes that he
8 Criticisms have targeted both the ICC model as a viable justice
mechanism post-atrocity and the way Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC Prosecutor,
conducted the investigations and trial. See Joshua Rozenberg, Delay in Lubanga
judgment demonstrates ICC weaknesses, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 14 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/delay-lubanga-weaknesses-iccmodel.
9 See Rob Williams, The Thomas Lubanga Trial – Dangerous for Children,
THOMSON
REUTERS
FOUND.
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.trust.org/item/?map=the-thomas-lubanga-trial-dangerous-forchildren (“The handing down of such a paltry penalty will surely give ammunition
to the courts critics and represents a difficult moment in the history of efforts to
stop the culture of impunity around gross abuses of human rights.”). See also
Thomas Escritt, Congo warlord jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REUTERS, July 10,
2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/us-warcrimes-lubangaidUSBRE8690C320120710; Mike Corder, Comments to Congolese Warlord To Prison
For 14 Years, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (last updated, July 10, 2012, 5:36 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/10/thomas-lubanga-sentencedinternational-criminal-court-congo_n_1661028.html (reader reactions include the
following. “14 years is not long enough.” “Should have received life.” “Not long
enough.” “Should have got 14 years per child.”). See Comments to Congo warlord
jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REDDIT WORLD NEWS,
http://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/wbqzs/congo_warlord_jailed_f
or_14_years_in_landmark/, for further reactions from readers.
10 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 37.
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. The maximum imprisonment for a specific number of years
is 30 years. Life sentence is permitted only “when justified by the extreme gravity of
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Id. at art.
77(1)(b). See also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 175, 224 (2012) (arguing that Lubanga’s low sentence can be
attributed to a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct).
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committed.”12 The Congolese government likewise agreed that
Lubanga should have received a higher sentence, even though some
punishment is still a “positive signal” for peace in the region.13
Although Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment,
he will receive six years credit for time served during the trial. Thus,
Lubanga will be out of prison in less than eight years. 14 Moreover, if
the ICC follows the practice of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals of releasing perpetrators after they have served two-thirds
of their sentence, Lubanga will be released in a little more than five
years.
More significantly, despite all the ceremony and controversy15
surrounding the Lubanga trial, the sentencing judgment presented the
ICC judges with a significant opportunity to clarify the function and
purpose of international criminal law (“ICL”). Its first sentencing
judgment offered a seminal opportunity for the Court to elucidate the
role of the world’s first permanent criminal court with global reach.
Such clarity regarding the foundations of international justice is
essential to the operation of the court from start to finish, from
providing a vision to guide the work of the ICC and its Prosecutor to
facilitating consistency in punishment. It would also facilitate better
understanding of the Court’s decisions among communities and
individuals impacted by the crimes.

12 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, BBC, July 10,
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726; David Smith, Thomas
Lubanga sentenced to 14 years for Congo war crimes, THE GUARDIAN, July 10, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/10/icc-sentences-thomas-lubanga-14years.
13 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, supra note 12.
14 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 107-8. Lubanga is currently being detained at
the Detention Centre in The Hague. Situations: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-CPI.INT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%20
0104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20o
f%20the%20congo.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
15 See Joshua Rozenberg, supra note 8. See also William A. Schabas, Victor’s
Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal Court, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L.
REV. 535 (2010).
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Unfortunately, the ICC’s first sentencing judgment is
disappointingly perfunctory regarding the fundamental pillars of the
system, leaving open a deeply divisive question that could jeopardize
the legitimacy and success of this endeavour. Moving towards clarity
on this question is the main goal of this article. It permeates every
critical decision of the ICC: the Prosecutor’s selection of cases and
defendants;16 decisions about the scope of the indictment and
witnesses called;17 the manner in which the trial proceedings are
conducted; judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s decisions and
conduct;18 and the determination of a just punishment. Thus, the
questions and critiques addressed here will have continued
significance to both practice and theory in ICL. The experience of
the ad hoc tribunals indicates that both the defendant and the
prosecutor frequently challenge the trial chamber’s sentence on
appeal, and the Lubanga case is no exception. Thus, the reflections
offered in this article about the primary role and function of
international criminal justice has immediate and long-term
implications for Court’s work.
Drawing on the experience of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), this article argues that
idealism about what international criminal justice mechanisms can
achieve has lead to ideologically-driven judicial decision-making in
international criminal law.19 ICL idealism manifests itself in the belief
that international criminal prosecutions can achieve a wide range of
aspirations and goals, both international and local.20 According to the
See generally Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012).
17 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE,
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS, 162-64 (2012) (discussing
the tension between the Prosecutor and judges at the ICTY regarding the scope of
indictments based on competing visions of the role of the Tribunal).
18 See generally Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, supra note 11; Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1
(2010).
19 As used herein, ideology refers to a normative view that shapes an
actor’s goals, expectations and actions.
20 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, paras. 38-39, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
16
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Secretary General of the United Nations, international criminal
tribunals pursue a number of aims including “bringing to justice
those responsible for serious violations of human rights and
humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing
their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing
a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, reestablishing the rule of law and contributing to restoration of
peace.”21 Idealism about the institutional capacity of international
tribunals also found expression in the reports of Judge Antonio
Cassese, the first President of the ICTY and ICTR.22 Among the
institutions’ “Future Priorities,” Judge Cassese confidently stated that
the Tribunals were establishing an unassailable “historical record . . .
thereby preventing historical revisionism,” which he lauded as “a
most important function of the Tribunal.”23 In the case of the ICTY
in particular, Cassese added that in their judicial proceedings
international judges endeavored “to establish as judicial fact the full
details of the madness that transpired in the former Yugoslavia.”24
2004), http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (identifying deterrence,
prevention, historical record, reconciliation, and reestablishing the rule of law and
peace as objectives) [hereinafter UNSG Report on Transitional Justice]; U.N.
Secretary-General, Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, para. 296, U.N. Doc. A/53/219S/1998/737 (Aug. 10, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualRepo
rts/annual_report_1998_en.pdf (identifying prevention historical revisionism as “a
most important function of the Tribunal”) [hereinafter ICTY President’s Fifth
Annual Report]. See also Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal
Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008) (discussing interpretation problems when
ICL becomes “imbued with utopian aspirations”).
21 UNSG Report on Transitional Justice, supra note 20, at para. 38.
22 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296.
23 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, para. 296. Cf.
Patricia Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age:
Some Observations on the Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.
LAW & POL’Y 87, 116-17 (2001) (noting that “the findings of judges may not
produce the best approximations of history”). However, the factual accuracy of the
historical record established by international tribunals has been challenged. See
NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010).
24 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296
(emphasis added).
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Furthermore, canvassing the discourse surrounding international
criminal courts, the following ambitions are often associated with
ICL: retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, restoration, historical recording building, preventing
revisionism, expressive functions, crystallizing international norms,
general affirmative prevention, establishing peace, preventing war,
vindicating international law prohibitions, setting standards for fair
trials, and ending impunity.25 Ironically, such ambition, although
usually well intended, has actually contributed to the politicization of
the international judicial process.26

25 See e.g. SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES, supra note 17, at 96;
DRUMBL, REIMAGINING, supra note 6, at 151; Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in
International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and the Applicable Method for the
Determination of the Sentence, 4 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001); GARY
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 284 (2000); Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 18; Minna Schrag,
Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004); Jean
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 (2009);
Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L
L. J. 837, 857 (2005); Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 908
(2005); Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 4 (2002); Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International
Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 926, 994.
26 This is especially true when judges rely too much on reconciliation
ideology to justify their rulings. See Valery Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in
Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Gap Between People and Politics, in RECONCILIATION(S):
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 207, 208 (Joanna R. Quinn
ed., 2009) (stating that “‘[r]econciliation’ is a word rarely mentioned in good faith in
political discourse.”). See also Statements on the Rome Conference Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 105th Congress (July 23, 1998)
(statements of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large, War Crimes Issues, Head
of U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a
Permanent
International
Criminal
Court),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USScheffer_Senate23July98.pdf; Silvia A.
Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175,
181 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without
Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 583 (2007).
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My argument is that idealism about what international
prosecutions can achieve has distorted the condemnation of highranking perpetrators and just distribution of punishment among the
actors responsible for mass atrocities. This idealism sometimes
manifests in the socio-political context, such as the conviction that
international prosecutions will ipso facto lead to reconciliation. Other
times this idealism reflects traditional criminal law consequentialism. I
develop this thesis by examining the application of the goals of
reconciliation and deterrence when sentencing of perpetrators of
atrocity crimes. My conclusion is that, while both reconciliation and
deterrence are laudable aspirations, these ideologies have perversely
impacted sentencing such that the punishment too often does not
reflect the culpability of the individual.
These ideologies have been interchangeably described as the
purpose, aim, or objectives of international prosecutions,
justifications for international criminal punishment, or sentencing
rationales in international criminal law.27 Through unpacking the
sentencing jurisprudence, this paper breaks new ground by advancing
a theory on the relationship between ICL and consequentialist
aspirations. Thus, the article’s findings are also instructive to
international judges and others in the field for understanding how
aspirations such as reconciliation and deterrence have influenced the
severity of punishment at international criminal tribunals. The scope
of this paper does not permit a full treatment of retributive
approaches to ICL.28 It focuses primarily on a normative analysis of
27 See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 417 (2001) (stating that
sentencing standards remain ill-defined); Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International
Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
191, 253 (2006) (calling tribunal sentences “breathtakingly light”).
28
For a discussion of retributive justification for ICL, see Jean
Galbraith, The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
799, 809-12 (2012). See generally Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of
International Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 373 (Goran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds.,
2009); Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgements & International Crimes: The Disutility of
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012). See Adil Ahmad Haque, Retributivism: The Right
and the Good, 32 LAW & PHIL. 59 (2013) and Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the
Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIM. & JUST. 55, 59-63 (1992), for broader discussions
on retributive theory.
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consequentialism, supported by an empirical and jurisprudential
examination of its influence on sentencing.
The perverse effects of this consequentialism frequently
surface in the sentencing jurisprudence, giving critics an easy target to
denounce international law as a political tool of powerful countries.
In particular, ICL’s opponents target the apparently erratic sentences,
the incoherent justifications, and the schizophrenic self-image of
international criminal courts as evidence that international justice
remains elusive in the current international paradigm, which is still
largely the product of power.29 In a trial process that frequently
appears opaque to outsiders because of complex facts, extraordinary
crimes, and unfamiliar procedural rules, the sentence is one feature
that is readily accessible to the affected communities. Unfortunately,
as illustrated by local reactions and criticized by observers, the
sentencing practice appears unprincipled, political and unjust.30
Sentences imposed by international criminal courts are slowly
becoming the system’s Achilles’ heel.31 This raises concerns even
29 See Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 610 (2005) (observing that
international criminal law sentencing “still remains confusing, unoriginal,
unpredictable, and without the ordering benefits of a viable heuristic”) [hereinafter
Drumbl, Collective Violence]; OLAOLUWA OLUSANYA, SENTENCING WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 139 (2005) (describing sentencing at the
ICTY as a “lottery system [where] penalties are picked randomly” and as “a game
of Russian roulette . . . entirely dependent on a particular judge”); Ralph Henham,
Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 81,
82 (2003) (discussing “substantive irrationality and an absence of penological
justifications for international sentencing praxis”); Dirk van Zyl Smit, Punishment by
International Criminal Tribunals: Ideal Example for National Criminal Justice or Parody of a
Penal Process?, presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Denver, USA (2003).
30 Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27, at 193 (concluding that
international sentencing is “marked . . .by discretion and uncertainty”). See also
Danner, supra note 27, at 501 (criticizing the “coherency of international justice at
the ICTY and ICTR); Berislav Jelinić, Kevin Parker – The judge who freed the villains of
Vukovar,
NACIONAL
(Oct.
2,
2007),
http://www.nacional.hr/en/clanak/38490/kevin-parker-the-judge-who-freed-thevillains-of-vukovar.
31 See generally Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A
Theory on the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM.
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among supports of international criminal tribunals. Yet, there has
been insufficient scholarly attention on ICL sentencing in academic
literature.32 This paper thus responds in part to this paucity.
Specifically, this article explores the impact of
consequentialist ideologies on international criminal justice, and in
particular on sentencing of perpetrators.33 Part I elucidates the
sentencing objectives advanced by the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.34 Here the goal is twofold: first, to gain initial clarity on
what international judges purport to be the purpose of sentencing in
international prosecutions, and second, to track trends and shifting
methodologies by which judges construct this purposive narrative.
Two objectives appeared most frequently in the early jurisprudence:
retribution and deterrence.35 Reconciliation subsequently gained
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 857 (2009) [hereinafter Dana, Beyond Retroactivity]; Mirko
Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27.
32 Many thoughtful scholars have called for greater attention to be given
to the developing a coherent theory for sentencing atrocity perpetrators. See, e.g.,
Robert Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ of
Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 713,
733-34 (2007) (noting that sentencing has not yet become an integral part of
international criminal justice, but continues to be treated as an afterthought);
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (lamenting under-theorization on
this subject and calling for the need for evaluative research on international
sentencing).
33 They could also be understood as utilitarian rationales. Other decisions
influenced by one’s ideological vision of international prosecution include selection
of situations, cases, defendants, and charges; presentation of evidence at trial; and
punishment of perpetrators.
34 Referring to the ICTR and the ICTY, which were established by U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 955 and 827, respectively. See S.C. Res. 955, para. 1,
49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, 48th Year,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
35 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, Vol. 3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim.
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Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
15,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para.
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, paras. 142-50;
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
31,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
24,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 761-62 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
14,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 58, 64 (Int’l Crim.
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considerable traction, especially after the sentencing of Biljana
Plavšić,36 correlating with the coming of age of plea-bargaining at
international tribunals.37 What started out as an ill-fated justification
for plea-bargaining genocide morphed to a general aim of
international prosecutions.38
Part II examines more closely the influence of deterrence and
reconciliation ideologies. The analysis demonstrates how these
consequentialist ideologies lead to injustice and perverse results in
sentencing. I argue that reconciliation should be abandoned as a
rationale for sentencing purposes, and deterrence should be limited in
its influence on the final sentence. Punishment influenced by these
two ideologies often distorts the individual perpetrator’s culpability.
This is not to say that international criminal justice cannot contribute
to these aspirations, but rather that such aspirations should not be as
influential in sentencing judgments as they have been thus far. As
Hannah Arendt concluded regarding criminal trials for mass
atrocities, after observing the prosecution of a former Nazi SS
Lieutenant Colonel: “The purpose of a trial is to render justice and
nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes . . . only detract

Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
29,
1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
11,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj991111e.pdf).
36 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, paras. 66-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
37
See NANCY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2007) [hereinafter
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS], for further discussion on plea-bargaining at international
tribunals.
38 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T,
Judgment
and
Sentence,
para.
754
(Jan.
22,
2004),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kamuhanda/decisions/220104.p
df; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 288
(Dec.
10,
1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/furtj981210e.pdf.
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from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against
the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.”39
I. SENTENCING OBJECTIVES ADVANCED BY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
What justifies international criminal justice mechanisms like
the ICC and its recent predecessors like the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia? This is a question that the ICTY and ICTR never really
settled. Over time, they advanced an impressive array of “functions”
of international criminal courts.40 Some of these functions are similar
to justifications for punishment found in domestic systems, such as
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.41 Others are proffered as

39 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 253 (1964).
40 See supra, notes 19-20. See Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary
Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857-58; Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The
Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM.
RTS. Q. 908, 908 (2005); Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law,
supra note 25, at 92-97. For a critique of sentencing rationales in international
criminal law, see generally the following: Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments &
International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 640 (2012); Mirjan
Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
329, 353 (2008); Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2007). For arguments on how the approach of the ICTR
to jurisprudential issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation,
see Jean Marie Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and
National Reconciliation: the Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115, 121-24 (2003).
41 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).
See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case
No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, paras. 108-09 (Mar. 14, 2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganira/judgement/050314.p
df; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence,
para. 28 (Sept. 4, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kambanda/decisions/kambanda.
pdf.
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“special” or “unique” to international criminal law, such as
reconciliation and preventing revisionism.42
The vision of international criminal justice that is prioritized
will crucially shape the character of the ICC. Identifying a primary
justification for international criminal law, of course, does not mean
that ICL cannot make a meaningful contribution to other goals.
However, it is imperative that the ICC coalesces around a primary
justification for its work and set modest expectations. An idealism
that avoids prioritizing goals and eagerly pursues them all can only
delay the inevitable choice, as the experience of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals reveals, because some of these objectives are in
conflict. Eventually international judges are forced to prioritize. This
article hopes to inform that decision-making process by evaluating
the consequences of that choice through an examination of the
sentencing jurisprudence and practice of international tribunals.
A. Developing a Framework: Paucity of Positive Law
Almost exactly fifty years to the day, a three judge trial
chamber of the ICTY issued the first sentence by an international
criminal tribunal for atrocity crimes since the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East punished military and political leaders of
the Empire of Japan following World War II. When the three judges,
who were from France, Costa Rica, and Egypt, gathered in The
Hague, in a building that formerly housed an insurance company, to
deliberate on a just punishment for a war criminal, they found that
“[n]either the Statute nor the Report of the Secretary-General nor the
Rules elaborate on the objectives sought by imposing such a
sentence.”43 In identifying justifications for punishment and aims of

42 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 474-75 (2009).
43 Prosecutor
v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing
Judgement, para. 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf. See also Uwe
Ewald, ‘Predictably Irrational’ – International Sentencing and its Discourse against the
Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT’L CRIM.
L. REV. 365, 379 (2010) (“The rather thin normative framework provided by the
sentencing provisions of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
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sentencing in international criminal law, international judges have
drawn largely from four sources: (1) the preamble of the Security
Counsel Resolution establishing the ICTY and ICTR; (2) penal
theories from national law; (3) the Nuremberg legacy, and (4) human
rights norms.
The preamble provisions of Security Council Resolutions
establishing the ICTY and ICTR are primarily intended to set forth
the legal basis for Security Council action under Chapter VII
pursuant to the U.N. Charter.44 It is doubtful that they were intended
as instructions for judges at the time of sentencing. Nevertheless, the
methodology of the International Tribunals has been to turn to these
provisions in their respective constitutive Resolutions to formulate
objectives of international sentencing.45 This methodology assumes
that the conditions required to trigger the Security Council’s powers
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would suffice for developing
the justification and purpose of punishment of perpetrators of
atrocity crimes.46 It also assumes that the reasons supporting
international prosecutions are one and the same as the rationales to
guide its sentencing practice. In connection with establishing the
ICTY, Security Council Resolution 808 states:
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who
are responsible for them,

ICTY does not offer a consistent philosophical approach to international
sentencing.”).
44 While there is a natural overlap between the justification for
international prosecutions and the object and purpose of international sentencing,
they cannot be assumed to be identical. Unfortunately, this distinction and its
relevance to international sentencing cannot be pursued in the short context of this
contribution. See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2d ed. 2008). See also Margaret M.
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16, at 288-89 (making a distinction
between justifications for the establishment of the International Criminal Court and
rationales to guide case selection).
45 E.g. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38,
at paras. 753-54.
46 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, at
paras. 753-54.
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Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the
former Yugoslavia the establishment of an
international tribunal would enable this aim to be
achieved and would contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.47
Likewise, Security Council Resolution 955, establishing the
ICTR, states:
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who
are responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of
Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law
would enable this aim to be achieved and would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation
and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.48
Both Resolutions speak to the Security Council’s
determination “to put an end to” international crimes, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and “to bring to
justice” the perpetrators. Furthermore, the Resolutions proclaim the
Security Council’s conviction that international prosecutions “would
enable this aim to be achieved.” Presumably, “this aim” refers to
what was mentioned in the previous paragraph: “to put an end to
such crimes” and “to bring to justice the persons” responsible. Thus,
in the opinion of the Security Council, international prosecutions
would “put an end to” international crimes and “bring to justice” the
perpetrators. Moreover, the Security Council is also convinced that
prosecution “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.” While some ICTY judges have relied on this particular phrase
to claim that the court’s purpose is to promote national

S.C. Res. 808, 48th Year, S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). See also S.C. Res.
827, supra note 34. .
48 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2.
47
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reconciliation,49 it is doubtful that this was the intent. This language is
boilerplate and appears in every resolution that invokes Security
Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII. It is necessary to
set for the legal basis of the Council’s use of Chapter VII.
Interestingly, while Resolutions 808 and 827 are silent regarding
reconciliation, Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR explicitly
mentions “national reconciliation” as part of the ICTR’s mandate.50
Although Tribunal judges routinely turn to their respective
resolutions to formulate sentencing rationales, their judgments do not
address important differences in the texts of these resolutions.51
B. Extraordinary Crimes, Ordinary Objectives: Retribution and
Deterrence
Although the sentencing jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals
has never adequately distinguished between a justification for
punishment versus the aims of punishment, the initial cases identified
two primary purposes: retribution and deterrence.52 A number of
years later, the Blaškić Trial Chamber added rehabilitation and
protection of society to the primary purposes of ICL sentencing, but
49 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43,
at para. 58; Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 79.
50 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2.
51 There is some concern that the judges may not have even noticed
these differences. For example, Judge Inés Monica Weinberg de Roca opines about
the “identical formulation” of resolutions establishing the ad hoc Tribunals. See Inés
Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008).
52 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras. 79 (stating that “retribution and deterrence serving as the primary purposes of
sentence”); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 38, at para. 288. For more recent
cases, see Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, para.
142 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar 30, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/tjug/en/sj-040330e.pdf (concluding that
the “[f]undamental principles taken into consideration when imposing a sentence
are deterrence and retribution”). For cases from the ICTR, see also Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 455 (Dec. 6,
1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 20 (Feb.
5,
1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Serushago/decisions/os1.pdf.
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it did so without explanation or analysis.53 These “four parameters” –
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society –
mirror the rationalizations for sentencing found at the national
level.54 However, scholars contest the applicability and relevance of
these rationales to international criminal justice.55 As the sentencing
jurisprudence developed, retribution and deterrence emerged as the
primary rationales in ICL punishment.56 Some observers criticize
See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2007); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction,
Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575-77 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010);
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute supra note 16, at 301-12; Damaska,
What is the Point, supra note 40, at 339-40; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 50-51; Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality,
Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002); Nemitz, The Law of
Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25.
56 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v.
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T,
Trial Judgement, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26,
2009); Prosecutor v Delić, Case No 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial
Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007);
Prosecutor v Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik,
Case No IT-00-39&40-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No 1T-03-68-T, Trial
Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No
IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v Blagojević, Case No IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para.
817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 142-50; Prosecutor v.
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T
Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22,
53
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ICL’s focus on retribution and deterrence, hallmarks of a national
system’s response to ordinary crimes, as an unimaginative and
unoriginal response to atrocity crimes.57 Modesty, however, may be a
safeguard for a nascent international justice system. Ambitious social
engineering in the wake of mass atrocities is wisely left to other social
processes and institutions. Legalism has its limits, and those limits
should be respected. Its formality, rigidity, and obligation to protect
the rights of parties make it a limited agent of social change. These
meta-juridical goals require a matrix of social and spiritual institutions
working together to rebuild the fabric of society post-atrocity. When
other institutions and agents of society share this responsibility,
international criminal justice can play a modest but important role.
Of course, this is not intended to suggest that deterrence or
retribution are easy goals, but they are more familiar to a criminal
justice mechanism. According to the Tribunal, the goal of general
deterrence implies that “[t]he sentence imposed must also be
sufficient in order to dissuade others from committing the same
crime.”58 Individual deterrence, on the other hand, “refers to the

2001); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v Kupreškić, Case
No IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 43, paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing
Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 402 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
22,
2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/celaj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment,
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.
57 See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610.
58 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Trial Sentencing Judgment,
para. 136 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT 95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 30

49

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

specific effect of the sentence upon the accused” sitting in judgment
before the court.59 The “sentence should be adequate to discourage
an accused from recidivism.”60 In other words, the punishment
should discourage an accused from re-offending after the sentence
has been served and the accused has been released.61
The general jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber affirms
that the objective of deterrence, both general and specific, may
influence the sentence.62 However, it has also cautioned: “this factor
must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of
the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the
International Tribunal.”63 ICTY trial chambers recognize both
specific and general deterrence have “an important function in
principle” and serve “an important goal of sentencing.”64 Some trial
chambers have applied the term “individual” deterrence when
referring to specific deterrence.65 Other trial chambers rejected the
applicability of specific deterrence in international criminal justice.
For example, although the Trial Chamber in the Dragan Nikolić case
recognized that specific deterrence “has an important function in
principle and serves as an important goal of sentencing,”66 it
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tjug/en/tod-tj010731e.pdf.
59 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 135.
60 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2A, Appeals Sentencing
Judgment, para. 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005).
61 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 134.
62 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis,
Appeal Sentencing Judgment, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asj000126e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 185
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra note 60, at paras. 45-46.
63 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at
para. 48.
64 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 134.
65 Id. at paras. 134-35.
66 Id. at para. 134.
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nevertheless found that specific deterrence had no relevance in the
case before it.67 The court did not elaborate on why it found that
specific deterrence has no relevance to the punishment of Dragon
Nikolić. The judges perhaps concluded that the aim of specifically
deterring Nikolić from committing crimes against humanity is moot,
assuming the circumstances that provided an opportunity for these
crimes to be committed, namely war, will not be present when the
accused is released.
Outside the tribunals, opinions are split on whether
international prosecutions have any deterrent value. Professor Payam
Akhavan argues that mass atrocities are the product of “eliteinduced” violence aimed at the acquisition or preservation of
power.68 Leaders are making calculated choices and trade-offs and
engaging in an immoral cost-benefit analysis. Akhavan makes a
compelling case that political power gained through fomenting ethnic
hatred resulting in mass violence can be discouraged. Threat of
punishment and international stigmatization “can increase the costs
of a policy that is criminal under international law.”69 According to
Akhavan, this can in turn impact the calculations of leaders
contemplating engagement in criminal policies such as ethnic
cleansing, genocide, or crimes against humanity as a viable policy for
sustaining power.70 Most supporters of deterrence in ICL
acknowledge that some individuals may not easily be dissuaded from
committing crimes when surrounded by routine cruelty. However,
they maintain that punishment can be an effective deterrent in
preventing such deviant contexts prior to their occurrence, or
recurrence, in post-conflict situations.71

Id. at para. 135.
Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2001).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Generally see the following: Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68;
Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE, 211-36 (Roy S. Lee ed.,1999); Dominic McGoldrick, The
Permanent International Criminal Court: An End to the Culture of Impunity?, CRIM. L.
REV., Aug. 1999, at 627; M. Cherif Bassioiuni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice:
67
68
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Others are much more skeptical about the deterrent capacity
of international prosecutions.72 Professor Jan Klabbers, for example,
takes the position that ICL will not play a significant deterrent role
because human rights violators cannot be deterred.73 He argues that
the cost-benefit analysis underlying the deterrence argument
advanced by Akhavan and others cannot be applied to human rights
violators because they act mainly for political reasons. Because they
willfully engage in mass murder for political motives, Klabbers
considers them undeterrable. But there is no reason to assume that
political motivations are beyond deterrence. As Professor Isaac
Ehrlich observes, “willful engagement in even the most reprehensible
violations of legal and moral codes does not preclude an ability to
make self-serving choices.”74 In sum, while the scholarship is divided
on the deterrent capacity of international criminal law, tribunal judges
nevertheless consider deterrence as a central purpose of international
prosecution and claim that it is an influential factor in their
sentencing decisions.
C. The Lip Service to Rehabilitation
One sentencing purpose proffered by international criminal
tribunals that appears to have no impact on sentencing allocations is
rehabilitation. International human rights treaties encourage
rehabilitation considerations in national penology.75 While the focus
of these treaties appears to be on the administration of prisons and
the Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996), for support of
deterrence in ICL.
72 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International
Criminal Law, 7 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L. 249 (2001) (disagreeing that human rights
violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (claiming
that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters perpetrators of mass
atrocities).
73 Klabbers, Just Revenge?, supra note 72, at 253.
74 Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON.
PERSP. 43, 43 (1996).
75 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3),
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
(“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation”); U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., cmt., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992); American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 5(6), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
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the manner of enforcement of a sentence,76 the ICTY has purported
to consider such provisions when determining the length of the
sentence itself.77
In the early sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY, several
trial chambers stated that rehabilitation is one of the “four
parameters” that guide international sentencing.78 However, it is fair
to say that rehabilitation was never highly significant79 in the
determination of a sentence and did not act as a meaningful
“parameter” to limit the sentence. This was made apparent in the
Trial Chamber’s judgment of General Blaškić.80 Despite
acknowledging “rehabilitation” as one of the parameters guiding its
determination of Blaškić’s sentence, and despite its own factual
finding strongly indicating the possibility of rehabilitation in the case
of General Blaskic, the Trial Chamber nevertheless decided to not
give these factors any weight, and certainly its forty-five-year sentence
leaves little trace of rehabilitation considerations, especially since
Blaskic was forty years old when he was sentenced.81 Such a sentence
suggests that the Tribunal was eager to send a strong signal of
deterrence, and that this ideology predominated its sentencing
considerations, even to the extent, some would argue, of trial
chambers distributing exemplary sentences or exemplary justice and
placing that foremost in their considerations. Taking caution that this
practice did not go too far, the Appeals Chamber stated in one of its
judgments that “this factor [deterrence] must not be accorded undue
76 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, 241-54 (Kehl am Rheine ed., 2d rev. ed. 2005).
77 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Appeals Judgment, paras.
805-06 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf.
78 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment para. 761, 765
(Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf
(discussing rehabilitation).
79
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT 96-22-Tbis, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj980305e.pdf.
80 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762.
81 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762. See
Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing
Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CR. L. REV. 321 (2004), for a critique of the Trial
Chamber’s sentencing analysis in the Blaškić case.
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prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences.”82 It has
likewise explicitly pronounced that “rehabilitation should not be
given undue weight, confirming what was already implicit in the
sentencing practice of earlier cases.”83
D. The Rise of Judicial Idealism: Enter Reconciliation & Social
Engineering
The U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY
does not mention “reconciliation” as such. Neither does the ICTY
Statute or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). Likewise, the
preamble and statute of the ICC avoid incorporation of reconciliation
as a goal of international prosecutions. Furthermore, reconciliation
ideology is virtually absent in the early practice of the ad hoc
Tribunals.84 Even in the first few cases involving guilty pleas and plea
bargains, international judges did not justify sentencing discounts in
terms of promoting reconciliation.85 The practice of justifying plea
deals in terms of reconciliation became popular only much later. This
is not to be confused with judicial unawareness of the potential
contribution that international prosecutions and just punishments
could make towards reconciliation in a post-conflict society.86 The
82

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at

para. 48.
See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 806
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf
(stating
that
“although rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards)
should be considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given
undue weight”).
84 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note
41; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-958-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/tjug/en/sik-tsj011113e.pdf.
85 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43;
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v.
Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84.
86 In the first annual report to the Security Council, the ICTY President
Antonio Cassese noted that international criminal justice mechanisms can promote
reconciliation and restore “true peace.” See President of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1st Ann. Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
83

54

2014

Dana

3:1

initial judges of the ad hoc Tribunals were mindful of this potential,
but did not consider it as a differential principle for the purpose of
allocating punishment.87 This is most likely because reconciliation is
largely unmeasured, slow building and aspirational.88 Successful
reconciliation requires the mobilization of diverse elements of social
and legal order. Justice through criminal prosecution of violators of
community norms is merely one step towards that goal.
Although reconciliation is an important goal,89 the first
generation of international criminal law judges understood it could
not be captured by legalism or transformed into an operational rule
or principle.90 The very nature of mass atrocities problematizes
achieving grand ambitions like reconciliation because the widespread
participation in atrocity crimes creates deep complicity that is not
easily overcome through the narrow lens of judicially constructed
narratives via international criminal justice mechanisms. Moreover,
international judges were initially hesitant to act as arbiters of history
or to develop judicial narratives of the background to the conflict
that would serve as a platform for reconciliation.91

Yugoslavia in Accordance with Article 34 of Security Council Resolution 25704 annex (1993),
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, paras. 14-18, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007 (Aug.
29, 1994) [hereinafter Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY]; See also Wald, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23
(discussing reconciliation through judicial adjudication).
87 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras.
57-66 (discussing factors influencing sentence allocation but not treating
reconciliation as a sentencing factor). See also Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117.
88 See Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 207, 208 (Joanna R.
Quinn ed., 2009).
89 See Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY, supra note 86, at para. 16.
90 See Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117 (concluding that “‘adjudication’ by ICTY of who
started, prolonged, or ended the war and why in the context of criminal
proceedings without the states themselves having input is basically unfair, or at
least does not contribute to future reconciliation”). See also Prosecutor v.
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 84.
91 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998),
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Reconciliation subsequently gained traction in the Tribunals’
jurisprudence when an increasing number of convictions were
secured by plea bargains. However, with plea bargains, the historical
narrative of “what happened” was no longer constructed in open and
public courts by documentation and witnesses to the atrocities, as
was done at Nuremburg,92 but behind closed doors in negotiations
between perpetrators and international lawyers.93 In sentencing
judgments following a guilty plea or plea bargain, reconciliation
became a useful ideology to legitimize plea deals and justify
sentencing discounts.94 While actors within the system view
sentencing reductions as a normal outcome of plea bargains,95 local
populations, especially where plea bargaining is foreign to the
domestic legal culture, view the sentencing reduction as political
favoritism to a particular ethnic group, unwillingness of elites to hold
other elites accountable, failure to acknowledge the suffering and

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf. (stating that
the “Trial Chamber does not consider it necessary to enter into a lengthy discussion
of the political and historical background to these events, nor a general analysis of
the conflict”).
92 Notwithstanding the fact that the “role of criminal tribunals as arbiters
of historical truth has been contested since the first serious efforts of international
justice, at Nuremberg and Tokyo.” See SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES,
supra note 17, at 157.
93 For concerns that plea-bargaining distorts the historical record, see
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37, at 67, 207.
94 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
2,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/acjug/en/bra-aj070402-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
7,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf.
95 Tribunal lawyers from civil law countries were initially concerned
about the practice of plea-bargaining. See Nancy A. Combs, Copping a Plea to
Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 139-41, 53
(2002) (reporting that judges and lawyers from civil law countries were
uncomfortable with plea bargaining at international tribunals).
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injustice inflicted on victim communities, or secretive deal-making.96
Thus, the entrenchment of reconciliation ideology in ICL
jurisprudence is largely a reactionary effort to legitimize the practice
of plea bargaining in the face of mounting criticism.
Crucially, for this push back to be successful, the goal of
reconciliation needed to be firmly anchored in the Tribunal’s
mandate. The problem facing the judges, however, was that Security
Council Resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, did not position
reconciliation as a teleological imperative.97 In fact, the resolution
does not even mention the word “reconciliation,” thus calling into
question whether reconciliation ideology should be considered as part
of the Tribunal’s mandate.98 Nevertheless, some ICTY judges took it
upon themselves to inject the goal of reconciliation into the court’s
mandate through a flawed interpretation of Resolution 827 that, even
if well intended, was beyond the Tribunal’s mandate and institutional
capacity. They attempted to situate the Tribunal’s role in promoting
reconciliation within Resolution 827’s reference to “contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace.”99 Unfortunately, this
methodology suffers from over dependence on the unlikely
assumption that, by such preambular declarations, the Security
Council intended to articulate a philosophy to guide international
sentencing.100 Even if we accept the assumptions necessary for this
interpretation, this language fails to justify the emphasis given to the
notion of reconciliation in ICL sentencing practice, resulting
frequently in perversely lenient sentences. Arguably, restoration and
maintenance of peace, in this context (i.e. criminal justice forum),
require the realization of justice by accountability for crimes and fair
punishment for wrongdoing. Thus, even assuming that reconciliation
is part of the Tribunal’s mandate, a difficult question follows: what
Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658–60 (2010).
97 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34.
98 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of
international criminal justice mechanisms).
99 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at 1.
100 The assumption also requires us to ignore the more obvious and
immediate purpose of such declarations in the preamble, namely to trigger the
Security Council’s coercive powers under Chapter VII.
96
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impact, if any, should the aim of reconciliation have in the
determination of a sentence for international crimes?
The complexities and difficulties of advancing reconciliation
ideology as part of the core mandate of the Tribunal were not fully
appreciated when it gained traction as a justification for the
increasing practice of plea-bargaining. Nevertheless, the notion of
reconciliation now appears frequently, but largely perfunctory, in
sentencing judgments.101 Despite its absence from the court’s
constitutive documents, the extant practice among ICTY judges is to
cursorily identify “promoting reconciliation” as part of the Tribunal’s
mandate. Thus, romanticism about international tribunals
“promoting reconciliation” persists even though it remains elusively
conceptually and pragmatically.102 While the Tribunals have clarified
how concepts such as “retribution” and “deterrence” are to be
understood in the context of international criminal justice, the notion
of “reconciliation” has remained undefined. Tribunal judges have
struggled to coherently develop and integrate this concept in their
decision-making and sentencing judgments.103 The lack of clarity on
what “reconciliation” means for international criminal justice,
however, has not inhibited trial chambers from relying on it when
allocating a sentence. Unfortunately, they have misapplied the notion
of reconciliation in their sentencing judgments. As discussed in detail
below, the ICTY’s method of realizing reconciliation appears to
contradict the aim of combating impunity, which is explicitly part of
the Tribunal’s mandate.
101 Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
29,
2004),
http://icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Banovic,
Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003), http://icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/bansj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj040331.pdf.
102 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of
international criminal justice mechanisms).
103 See Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice, supra
note 40, at 121-24, for arguments on how the ICTR’s approach to jurisprudential
issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation.
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E. Didactic Function of International Prosecutions: Affirmative
Prevention
Some of the objectives of punishment for atrocity crimes as
articulated by the ad hoc tribunals mirror those found at the national
level, such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and protection of
society.104 In addition, other considerations influence sentencing
allocations in the international context such as national reconciliation,
preserving history, and maintaining peace.105 Another important
consideration in the international context is reinforcing the values of
the international community.106 The work of international courts
contributes to internalizing norms, values, and interests protected by
international law in the consciousness and culture of national and
international actors. An important step in the evolution of the global
legal order is the crystallization of universal norms as more than mere
soft law provisions, but rather as binding law backed by punishment
for violations, especially norms embedded in human rights treaties,
international humanitarian law conventions, and the Genocide
Convention.
Referred to by some commentators as the didactic
function,107 in the context of international criminal justice this

Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 331, 339. See also
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
31,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf.
105 See Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment,
para. 600 (Feb. 27, 2009),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRukundo%5C090227.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1802 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
6,
2011),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tjug/en/110906_judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 163.
106 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note
58, at para. 139; Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at
95, 118-19, 127, 132.
107 Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 347. Related to didactic
function is the expressive function. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note
55, at 173-76; Luban, Fairness to Rightness, supra note 55, at 569, 576-77; Amann,
Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 95; Margaret M.
104
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translates into building awareness of the distinction between legal and
criminal conduct during war or armed conflict, whether international
or non-international in character. At first blush, this aim may appear
rather simplistic. After all, the line between legal and criminal
conduct is rather obvious when considering murder, rape, torture,
and other such crimes that occur in the context of armed conflict.
However, crimes committed in these situations are often precipitated
by direct and implicit indoctrination that dehumanizes the victim.
Coupled with the awareness that war crimes historically go
unpunished, these forces converge to disease belligerents with a
“culture of inverse morality”108 where killing, raping, and terrorizing
civilians becomes an accepted part of the warfare itself.
An individual’s inner sense of morality and repulsion towards
such brutality is overridden by peer pressure from immediate
comrades and superiors, and reinforced by inflammatory rhetoric of
national leaders. The perversity can reach a point where, far from
being considered wrongful, violence against “the other” is considered
a righteous deed. Thus, an educational or didactic function as an
objective of sentencing is particularly significant in the context of
international law.109 Moreover, it approaches the notion of deterrence
from a positive perspective of crime prevention. In addition to
building awareness of international law, international sentencing may
also help reinforce specific values that the international community
seeks to advance such as tolerance or the immorality and
wrongfulness of persecution of peoples on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity or nationality. At this same time, it is interesting to
contemplate the moral dilemma and paradoxes of sustaining morality
in war. The evils that inhere in war problematize achieving a didactic
function through legalism, as does our extant framework. We outlaw
aggressive war, but once that rule is violated, we say killing of a
combatant by a combatant is lawful and killing of civilians is
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 70-71.
108 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7, 10, 12.
109 See Tom J. Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal
Law Help?, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 90, 91-92 (2000); Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent
International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998).
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unlawful. It is a position that is morally problematic, a legal fiction
that struggles to survive the realities of war.
Some international judges, notably Judge Wolfgang
Schomburg, have advanced the didactic function of international
sentencing for atrocity crimes.110 In sentencing a perpetrator to
twenty-three years of imprisonment for persecution as a crime against
humanity, Judge Schomburg opined that punishment by an
international criminal court “is intended to convey the message that
globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody.” 111
He further added: “this fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of
these laws and rules in the minds of legislators and the general
public.”112 According to this ideology, “influenc[ing] the legal
awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, the
witnesses and the general public” and “reassur[ing] them that the
legal system is implemented and enforced” is one of the main
purposes of international punishment.113 Criminologists and criminal
law scholars have likewise embraced the “general affirmative
prevention” function of international criminal prosecutions.114
While international criminal prosecutions can contribute to
this educational or didactic aim, it is unclear how this rationale can
serve a differential principle to guide sentencing allocations. Even
international judges who embrace didactic aims accept this limitation

110 See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58,
paras. 139-40; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, para.
902, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149.
111 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139.
112 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139. Other trial chambers have also followed this approach. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149.
113 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139.
114 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7; Damaska, What is the
Point, supra note 40, at 334-35, 339, 345; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International
Criminal Law, supra note 25.
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of the didactic function.115 Expressivism thus becomes a potential
consequence of international punishment for atrocity crimes, but not
a factor for allocating sentence severity. The ICTY’s leading
proponent of the expressive potential of ICL, Judge Schomburg,
prioritized retributivism over expressivism for the purposes of
sentencing.116 Expressivism operates under the umbrella of
retributivism. In fact, absent a firm grounding in retributive
justification, the expressive function loses its meaning and moral
force. The “culture of inverse morality”117accompanying atrocity
crimes does not take root for lack of awareness of the wrongfulness
of the conduct. Rather, the absence of accountability and punishment
in the face of pressures and orders from fellow soldiers and superiors
sufficiently weakens the individual’s moral resistance and motivation.
F. Judicial Schizophrenia? Between Punitive and Restorative
Approaches
As reconciliation ideology gained traction in the
jurisprudence, it challenged the tribunal’s rhetoric that retribution and
deterrence are the primary goals of sentencing for atrocity crimes.118
The jurisprudence, however, is unsettled as to which ideology is the
primary rationale in international punishment and which ones are
secondary. Consequently, inconsistency, indeterminacy, and
confusion persist from case to case when attributing priority and thus
115 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 123 (ruling that “the individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the
sentence”).
116 Id.
117 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 10.
118 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, para.
402 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-94-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
24,
2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf.
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the influence of these rationales in sentencing allocations.119 This
results not only in the appearance of unfair sentences but also in
arbitrary advancement of sentencing rationales. Thoughtful scholars,
like Professor Mark Drumbl, Jan Nemitz, and Professor Mirjan
Damaska, have observed that under-theorization and lack of clarity
among international judges regarding the purpose of international
criminal prosecutions has undermined the court’s integrity and
credibility.120 Nemitz criticizes international judges for engaging in “ex
post facto justification” designed to legitimize a pre-determined end.121
His “ex post facto” criticism merits further consideration, especially
regarding the advancement of reconciliation as both a grounds for
justifying the practice of plea-bargaining and as a mitigating factor.122
Likewise, Drumbl argues that the ad hoc tribunals “vacillate”
between retribution and deterrence, that is, between deontological
and consequentialist approaches to punishment.123 Closer
examination of the jurisprudence of the tribunals, however,
challenges this finding. In fact, both tribunals have been remarkably
consistent in proffering deterrence and retribution as the primary
aims of international punishment.124 International judges do not
ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 167 (Andrew Ashworth et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2009) (arguing that identifying a priority among sentencing rationales is
essential to achieving consistency and justice).
120 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 330 (arguing that
“current views on the objectives international criminal courts are in disarray”);
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 593; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in
International Criminal Law, supra note 25.
121 Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note
25.
122 See infra note 133.
123 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-61.
124 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jun. 10, 2010),
http://icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1141, 1145-46 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol.3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v.
119
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appear to vacillate between retribution and deterrence ideologies.
They do, however, vacillate between retribution and deterrence
together on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other. Thus, I
build on Drumbl’s theory and push the discussion forward by
Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008),
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case
No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec.12, 2007),
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2007),
http://icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case
No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007), http://icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Orić,
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
June
30,
2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para.
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. Blagojević,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla050117e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras.
142-50; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT 96-23/1-A, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
20,
2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Aleksovski, Appellate Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 185; Prosecutor v. Blaškić,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/blatj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor
v.
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9.

64

2014

Dana

3:1

focusing on vacillation between reconciliation on the one hand and
the two joint factors of retribution and deterrence on the other hand.
In other words, the tension is between restorative and
punitive approaches. A number of factors have led me to prefer this
explanation. First, almost every sentencing judgment of the ad hoc
tribunals identifies both retribution and deterrence as the main
rationales of international sentencing.125 Thus, to argue that
international judges vacillate between retribution and deterrence
requires us to focus on one or two outlier judgments and ignore the
bulk of the jurisprudence. The argument is advanced by creating
three markers on a vacillation continuum: (1) judgments that treat
retribution and general deterrence equally, (2) others that cite
retribution as the “primary objective”, and (3) a third group that
considers “deterrence as probably the most important.”126
The problem is that these markers do not carry the same
weight or significance. When one plots all the cases on a continuum,
the overwhelming majority of cases fall into group one. Only a few
cases fall in groups two or three. Drumbl’s research confirms this.127
For example, only one case (the Čelebići Trial Judgment) can be found
to hold the space of the third marker, making it in my opinion more
of an exception rather than a true vacillation. Additionally, the Čelebići
Trial Chamber doesn’t even fully commit itself: it states “deterrence
probably is the most important factor.”128 Moreover, on appeal the
Appeal Chamber distances itself from this notion by explicitly ruling
that deterrence should not be given undue prominence in the
determination of a sentence and suggesting that retribution and

Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment
para. 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002) (stating that
“The Trial Chamber is cognisant of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which
supports deterrence and retribution as the main general sentencing factors.”),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf. See also
supra note 58.
126 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-62.
127 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560 et seq.
128 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 799
(emphasis added).
125
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deterrence are equal considerations.129 Thus, any value that the trial
judgment potentially offered for the retribution-deterrence vacillation
argument has been overruled by the Appeals Chamber.
The majority of judgments do not explicitly prioritize
between retribution and deterrence. Instead, they appear to treat
them as “equally important.”130 The following has become a standard
formulation found in these judgments (or language very similar): “the
main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and
retribution.”131 Of course, whether these rationales in fact influence
sentencing allocations is another question entirely. However, I would
advance Drumbl’s thesis by focusing on vacillation between
reconciliation on the one hand and the two joint factors, retribution
and deterrence, on the other hand. This vacillation is more
problematic for ICL because it exerts a more substantial, yet
unpredictable, influence on the sentence.
Furthermore, it highlights the serious and real tension
between traditional criminal law functions (retribution and
deterrence) and broader aspirations such as reconciliation and
building a historical record. The vacillation argument takes new life
when we unpack the impact of reconciliation ideology on the
determination of a sentence. In fact, making more transparent the
role of reconciliation in atrocity sentencing may help identify factors
129 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 801
(citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48
(holding that deterrence “must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall
assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the
International Tribunal”). See also Prosecutor v. Alekovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,
Appeals Judgment, para. 185. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24,
2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
2,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf.
130 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sep. 15, 2008),
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case
No.
ICTR-98-41A-A,
Appeals
Judgment
(May
8,
2012),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNtabakuze%5CJudgemen
t%5C120508.pdf.
131 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806.
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that contribute to seemingly incoherent sentences in international
criminal law. Granted, establishing this link is immensely more
challenging as reconciliation ideology is more influential in sentencing
judgments following plea bargains, thus introducing a whole set of
additional factors that complicate the sentencing matrix.
Nevertheless, as elaborated more fully below, the introduction of
reconciliation ideology into the determination of a sentence has
considerably increased indeterminacy and confusion in international
penology.
Before moving on to Part II, which focuses on deterrence
and reconciliation, I acknowledge that there are many other factors
that have been proffered as aspirations of international
prosecutions.132 As noted above, these include restoring peace,133
preserving a historical record of the atrocities to prevent
revisionism,134 ending impunity, protecting the rights of the accused
with exemplary standards for fair trials,135 halting active armed

132 See, supra text accompanying note 25. See also Zoe Pearson, Nongovernmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of
International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 271-81 (2006). See generally Vojin
Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before International Criminal Courts, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FROM DISSEMINATION TO APPLICATION (Jonas Grimheden
& Rolf Ring eds., 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920807.
133 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note
34, at pmbl.; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at
292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at
857.
134 Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 2070 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)). However, the ICTY
seems to recognize that this function should not dominate the proceedings and is
not first and foremost among the objectives of international criminal prosecution.
Moreover, it likewise acknowledges that the criminal justice process is not ideally
suited for this function. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note
52, at para. 135 (noting that the “Tribunal is not the final arbiter of historical facts.
That is for historians.”).
135 See Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, supra note
20, at 926; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at
294.
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conflict,136 providing reparations to victims,137 denouncing racist
ideologies, disarming urges for revenge,138 establishing a narrative that
culpability is individual and not collective,139 and vindicating
international law.140 Many have been explicitly accepted by
international judges as part of the mandate of international criminal
tribunals.141 This overburdening of ICL has complicated the task of
international judges. It is beyond the scope of this article to address
all of these aspirations, given that many of the above objectives are
better understood as aims of trial proceedings rather than principles
for the purpose of sentencing allocations. Therefore, the following
sections address deterrence and reconciliation because they appear
frequently in the sentencing judgments.
II. PROBLEMATIC ENTANGLEMENT WITH DETERRENCE AND
RECONCILIATION
A common criticism of ICL sentencing is that the proffered
rationales for punishment are ill suited to atrocity crimes and that
136 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34,
at pmbl.; Ruti Teitel, Symposium: Milosevic & Hussein on Trial: Perspective on
Transnational Justice: Collective Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology
of Leadership: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 837, 857 (2005).
137 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292.
138 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91.
139 See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at para. 1; Pejic, Creating a Permanent
International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of
Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857.
140 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34,at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34,
at pmbl. See also Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292.
141 See Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment , para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf
(finding
that
“restoring peace,” “establishing a historical record,” “countering denials,” and
providing victims with “some form of closure” are part of the mandate of
international criminal tribunals); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 58, at para. 233 (Tribunal has the task to contribute to the “restoration
and maintenance of peace” and to ensure that serious violations of international
humanitarian law are “halted and effectively redressed”).
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they do not in fact guide sentencing allocations at international
criminal courts. Per the statutes of their respective courts,
international criminal law judges, who come from diverse countries,
cultures, and legal systems, enjoy wide discretion in sentencing. This
is also true for the International Criminal Court.142 Compared to its
predecessors, the ICC statute is more detailed, more rigid, and more
procedural in nearly every aspect of the court’s functioning,143 except
sentencing.144 The wide discretion in sentencing matters afforded to
judges at the ad hoc Tribunals failed to produce a unified articulated
vision on punishment in the context of international criminal justice.
The ICC might well draw important lessons in this regard. ICTY and
ICTR judges have been accused of first sticking their arrow in the
wall and then subsequently painting a bulls-eye target around it. In
other words, international judges have a predetermined penalty in
mind and simply mine among the rationales available to them under
their wide discretion until they find one most convenient to their
intended end. Although this may occur in some cases, it does not
fully explain the sentencing practice. In the following sections,
however, I will seek to offer a more comprehensive explanation.
A. Deterrence
The effectiveness of deterrence through punishment has been
well debated at the national level. Many are skeptical of this function
of punishment in the domestic context and have repeated their
skepticism in the context of international criminal justice.145 Professor
Tom Farer has noted that “[b]elief about the potential efficacy of
penal sanctions as vehicles for enforcing international law is a fairly
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77 (b)(1), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544.
143 Judge Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to
Kampala, 43 J. MARSHALL L. Rev. 515, 519 (2010).
144 Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi-xxvii (2010). See Dana, Beyond
Retroactivity, supra note 31, at 905-08.
145 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in
International Criminal Law, 12 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L., 249-67 (2001) (disagreeing that
human rights violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at
609-10 (2005) (claiming that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters
perpetrators of mass atrocities).
142
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straightforward extrapolation from the collective appreciation of law
enforcement at the national level.”146 He cautions, however, that
“[c]onfidence in this extrapolation is not universally shared.”147 Any
fair observer would have to concede that it is too early to judge
whether international criminal justice can have an effective deterrent
quality.148 If we consider Farer’s reminder that “[o]ne widely accepted
dictum of domestic law enforcement is that a high probability of
punishment generally deters more effectively than a very severe
sanction rarely applied,” then the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court can contribute to increasing the
probability that instigators and prime movers of mass atrocities will
be punished. International criminal law has long lacked the necessary
enforcement mechanisms to give relative certainty to punishment for
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.149
Moreover, with the current international criminal justice system
remaining dreadfully dependent on voluntary cooperation of states,
questions still remain whether the international system, in its present
state, can sustain a credible threat of certain punishment so as to
deter potential violators. Full treatment of these questions is beyond
the scope of this article, but we may begin the discussion by focusing
on a narrower question: to what extent does the objective of
deterrence actually influence sentencing considerations of
international judges? The aim here is not simply to consider the
rhetoric employed by international judges in their discussion of the
sentence, but to go beyond the rhetoric and examine the practice
itself.
All trial chambers without exception state that deterrence is
one of the primary objectives in international sentencing.150 Several of
Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 92.
Id.
148 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 608 (noting that
international criminal law “is still relatively young” and “in a nascent stage”).
149 See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002).
150 For rulings by the ICTY Appeals Chamber see, for example,
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806 (“[T]he
Appeals Chamber (and Trial Chambers of both the Tribunal and the ICTR) have
consistently pointed out that two of the main purposes of sentencing for these
crimes are deterrence and retribution.” (internal citations omitted)). For ICTY trial
146
147
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the early sentencing judgments even considered deterrence to be “the
most important factor” in determining a sentence for international
crimes.151 Sending a strong message that the international community
will not tolerate the perpetration of international crimes by political
leaders and senior military officials has been considered as part of the
Tribunals’ mandates from the very start. Particular importance was
attached to effectively deterring the so-called “masterminds” and
“architects” of genocidal policies and crimes against humanity.
However, deterrence is sometimes proffered as more than an
objective of international sentencing. According to some ICTY
judges, it is also the justification for punishment in international
justice. As a justification, it operates as the prime determinant of the
appropriate length of punishment. Thus, it is a factor that influences
the trial chambers’ determination of the length of the sentence.
Whether the goal of deterrence meaningfully influences ICTY
sentences can be challenged; nevertheless the sentencing judgments
ostensibly claim sentencing allocations to be deterrence orientated.
For example, in the Dragan Nikolić case, the Trial Chamber held that
deterrence was among the “[f]undamental principles taken into
consideration when imposing a sentence”.152 Thus, the objective of
deterrence was a factor that influenced the length of Dragan Nikolić’s
chambers, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 52, at para. 142 (concluding that the “[f]undamental principles taken into
consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence and retribution”). For cases
from the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment
and Sentence (Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence (Feb. 5, 1999),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-9839/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-98-39-S.htm.
151 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 1234 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998),
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf
(stating
that
“[d]eterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of
appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”);
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
152 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para.
132 (emphasis added).
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sentence. This was not the first time that an “objectives orientation”
towards sentencing was adopted by an ICTY trial chamber to fix a
sentence.153 Both the Blaškić case and the Todorović case express the
view that the goal of deterrence may legitimately influence the
sentence. In fact, the sentencing jurisprudence of international
tribunals generally recognizes the “importance of deterrence as a
consideration in sentencing for international crimes.”154 The Todorović
Trial Chamber understood this to mean that the goal of deterrence is
relevant to determining whether an individual’s punishment should
be in the high or low end of the penalty range.155 Punishment
“imposed by the International Tribunal must, in general, have
sufficient deterrent value to ensure that those who would consider
committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so. 156 The
Blaškić Trial Chamber likewise adopts an objectives-orientated
approach, namely general deterrence, to sentencing. But do these trial
chambers in fact follow it? In other words, do the results (i.e. the
sentence impose) resonate with deterrence philosophy? What, if any,
impact did deterrence have on the sentence of Todorović and
Blaškić?
Todorović’s crimes included murder, sexual assaults, beatings,
ordering and participating in the unlawful detention and cruel and
inhuman treatment of non-Serb civilians, ordering subordinates to
torture a person, ordering and participating in deportation and
forcible transfers, ordering and issuing directives violating the rights
of non-Serb civilians to equal treatment under the law, and infringing
on their basic rights.157 He was convicted of persecution as a crime
against humanity. He also participated in the forcible take over of the
non-Serb towns and villages in the municipality of Bosanski Samac.158
Todorović was the Chief of Police in Bosanski Samac and also a

See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 326.
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30 (citing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment,
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
155 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30.
156 Id.
157 Id. at para. 9
158 Id. at paras. 12, 35.
153
154
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member of the Serb Crisis Staff.159 The Todorović Trial Chamber
considered “his abuse of such a superior position” and the “particular
cruelty” and “duration” of the beatings as an aggravating factor.160 As
mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber held that Todorović’s guilty
plea, expression of remorse, and substantial cooperation with the
Prosecution merited reduction in the penalty.161 For his crimes, the
Prosecution recommended a sentence of five to twelve years; the
Trial Chamber sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
In comparison with penalties at the national level,162
Todorović’s punishment is notably lenient: ten years for a murder,
multiple lengthy and brutal beatings, and sexual assaults. Thus, while
recalling the Appeals Chamber’s rulings that deterrence is a legitimate
consideration when fixing a penalty, the actual sentencing imposed by
the Todorović Trial Chamber—ten years—suggests that deterrence had
little impact on the penalty. The Todorović Trial Chamber appears to
concede as much: “while the Chamber recognises the importance of
deterrence as a general consideration in sentencing, it will not treat
deterrence as a distinct factor in determining sentence in this case.”163
Apart from the general and indeterminate nature of this ruling, it
raises a more serious concern. In essence, the Todorović Trial Chamber
takes the position that it is free to ignore deterrence as a
consideration when fixing its penalty, despite the pronouncements of
the Appeals Chamber. Moreover, it gives no explanation for why it
chooses to not factor deterrence rationale into its sentence in this
case. The Trial Chamber may have a good reason for not giving
much weight to deterrence, but this reason is not made transparent.
The lack of transparency, in turn, can lead to criticism that the
Tribunal’s sentencing practice is unjust and arbitrary. Such criticism
calls into question the legitimacy of international sentencing and
undermines its expressive value. In subsequent sections, this article

Id. at para. 60.
Id. at paras. 59-62.
161 Id. at paras. 67-95.
162 See generally THE PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (Ulrich Sieber ed., vol. 2 2004)
(citing punishment reports of various countries).
163 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30.
159
160

73

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

advances a theory that arguably explains the Trial Chamber’s
approach here.164
What about the Blaškić Trial Chamber?165 If the Todorović case
serves as an example of a trial chamber paying lip service to the
objective of deterrence but not following that ideology in its actual
sentencing, what example does the Blaškić case provide? General
Blaškić was the first high-ranking figure to appear before the ICTY.166
At the start of his trial, the Tribunal had a meager eight alleged war
criminals in its custody. War criminals to prosecute were hard to
come by and the dockets where empty despite the fact that the Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) had publically issued indictments for
seventy-five individuals.167 Among those in custody, Blaškić was not
only the highest-ranking defendant, but also the only one of any
significance.168 The Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of
persecution as a crime against humanity for ordering attacks on
towns and villages, murder, destruction of property and institutions
dedicated to religion or education, inhuman treatment, and forcible
transfer of civilians.169 He was also convicted of war crimes, but the
underlying acts overlapped almost entirely with the crimes against
humanity charges.170 In other words, due to the different
Arguably, the circumstances of Todorović’s case necessitated
powerful pragmatic considerations, leading to a plea agreement between the
accused and the Prosecutor. However, the low sentence is not fully explained by
them. After all, the Trial Chamber could have given a higher sentence (that of 12
years) and still satisfied the terms of the plea agreement.
165 The Trial Chamber was composed of Judge Claude Jorda (Presiding),
Judge Almiro Rodrigues, and Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen.
166 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 4 (2000).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 267.
The trial lasted more than two years. The Prosecution opened the trial on 24 June
1997 and completed its case-in-chief on July 29, 1998. Presentation of evidence by
the Defense commenced on September 7, 1998. Following a period of recess after
the Defense rested, the Trial Chamber heard closing arguments from July 26 to 30,
1999.
170 See ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, VOLUME IV: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-2000, 659-66. (André Klip & Göran Sluite eds., 2002),
for further analysis of General Blaškić’s criminal responsibility.
164
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jurisdictional elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes,
the alleged criminal acts were charged as both.171 I have elsewhere
criticized the Blaškić Trial Chamber’s analysis of modes of liability,172
which was subsequently overturned on appeal in large part.173
For the judges in the Blaškić case, the key to determining a
“fair” and “just” sentence was not the gravity of the offense but the
“objectives sought” by international prosecutions and punishment.174
In their estimation, the main objective of international prosecutions
is deterrence.175 The commitment of the judges to deterrence is
asserted several times and unequivocally increased General Blaškić’s
sentence: “The Tribunal’s mission is to put to an end serious
violations of international humanitarian law.”176 In order to achieve
this objective, deterrence became “the most important factor in the
assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international
humanitarian law.”177 Thus, the international judges here are clearly
adopting a consequentialist approach towards General Blaškić’s
punishment. The result was forty-five years of imprisonment; the

See William Fenrick, A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities
Offenses: Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir
Blaškić, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 931 (2000), for a discussion on the Trial Chamber’s
findings on the charge of unlawful attacks and its relation to persecution as a crime
against humanity.
172 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81. See also Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at paras. 267-70.
173 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 502.
174 Id. at para. 761.
175 Id. at para. 762.
176 Id.
177 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761
(quoting Prosecutor v. Delalić “Čelebići”, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)). Moreover, the Blaškić
Trial Chamber considered both specific deterrence and general deterrence as
relevant factors in allocating a punishment: “Apart from the fact that the accused
should be sufficiently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever contemplating
taking part in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should
similarly be deterred from resorting to such crimes.” Id. (quoting the Čelebići Trial
Judgment at para. 1234).
171
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most senior figure in the court’s custody received the highest
punishment ever imposed by the ICTY at that time.178
The influence of deterrence in increasing Blaškić’s
punishment is demonstrated not only by court’s consequentialist
philosophy and severe sentence, but it is also illustrated by its
treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors and its
marginalization of factors relevant to individualizing the sentence. 179
In the Trial Chamber’s own words, in light of the deterrence
“mission of the Tribunal, it is appropriate to attribute a lesser
significance to the specific personal circumstances.”180 From the
perspective of the Trial Chamber’s ideology, this makes perfect sense.
It is a logical extension of its ideology because such factors are less
relevant to the goal of deterrence. The Blaškić Trial Chamber’s
treatment of “personal factors” and “the rehabilitation parameter”
only serve to underscore its deterrence ideology. The court’s own
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
21,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (sentenced
to 10 years); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para.
191 (sentenced to 7 years); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 62, at para. 76 (3) (sentenced to 20 years); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT95-10-A, Judgment, para. (7) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf (sentenced
to 40 years); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment,
paras. 439, 466 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf (Josipovic
and Santic were sentenced to 12 and 18 years, respectively); Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 1, 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf (The Trial
Chamber acquitted Papic. The Kupreskic brothers were sentenced to 6, 8 and 10
years, but all three were acquitted on appeal). See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No
IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf.
179 In one way or another, the Blaškić Trial Chamber found reason to
reject the following mitigating factors: voluntary surrender (Prosecutor v. Blaškić,
Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 776); remorse (Id. at para. 775); lack of
direct participation in the crime (Id. at para. 768); duress (Id. at para. 769); material
context of armed conflict, i.e. disorder ensuing from a state of armed conflict (Id. at
para. 770); and co-operation with the Prosecutor (Id. at para. 774).
180 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 765.
178
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findings strongly indicate that Blaškić is well suited for rehabilitation:
he had no prior criminal record;181 assisted victims;182 was a dutiful
and professional soldier,183 and demonstrated “exemplary behaviour”
throughout the entire trial.184 The Trial Chamber even went so far as
concluding that it was “evident” that Blaškić’s “character is
reformable.”185 In sum, the Trial Chamber stated that rehabilitation is
a factor “to be taken into account in fixing the length of the
sentence”186 and further found, after detailed accounting, that the
defendant before them was reformable.187 Then, in what can only be
described as a 180, judges abruptly decide to do just the opposite of
the principles and finding they just laid out, declaring that these
factors will not be taken into account and are “non-existent” for the
purposes of fixing Blaškić’s sentencing.188
What is objectionable, even bizarre, about the judgment
authored by Judge Claudia Jorda (France) is not its rejection of
rehabilitation. In fact, I agree that rehabilitation is not a relevant
factor in fixing punishment for war criminals, although their
punishment may have that outcome. But if you are not going to take
rehabilitation into account when allocating sentences, then why make
a big show of it in the first place? Why declare that rehabilitation is a
relevant to sentencing allocation? Why engage in a lengthy discussion
that the defendant is reformable? Given this detailed analysis, we
would have expected the judges to provide a similarly detailed
explanation of why it is rejecting its own analysis. Instead, in a single
sentence, the Trial Chamber summarily concludes that factors
indicative of Blaškić’s reformability are “non-existent when determining
the sentence.”189 It is as though by the time the Trial Chamber

Id. at para. 780.
Id. at para. 781.
183 Id. at paras. 765, 780.
184 Id. at paras. 765, 780.
185 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 781.
186 Id. at para. 761.
187 Id. at para. 781.
188 Id. at para. 782.
189 Id. at para. 782 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber gave two
reasons to justify its positions here: the “serious” nature of the case and the fact
that “many accused share these personal factors” Id. at para. 782.
181
182
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reaches the end of its analysis, it has forgotten the principles it set up
at the start.
Thus, although the Trial Chamber sets-out “four
parameters”,190 it appears only seriously interested in deterrence.
Nevertheless, despite the criticisms that may be levied against the
Blaškić Trial Judgment,191 it must be noted in its favor that, unlike the
Todorović Trial Chamber, it remains faithful to its espoused ideology.
It takes the position that sentences must reflect the object of
Tribunal’s mandate. It identifies deterrence as the main objective, and
it imposes a sentence commensurate with that objective.
In sum, both the Todorović and Blaškić trial chambers overtly
state that deterrence is one of the primary goals of international
sentencing and as such may influence the sentence. However, the
resulting penalty in the Todorović case suggests that the goal of
deterrence did not have much of an impact on the sentence whereas
it appears to have a substantial influence on the Blaškić Trial
Chamber’s sentence. The apparent inconsistency here is only
exacerbated by the Todorović Trial Chamber’s admission that it opted
not to consider deterrence ideology in fixing the penalty, adding a
degree of arbitrariness to the inconsistency. Why was Blaškić not so
fortunate to benefit from a suspension of the penalty enhancing
effects of deterrence ideology? I will argue that the both trial
chambers “got it right” intuitively, even if they could have done
better to articulate their approaches. Below I will offer a theory that
both explains the sentencing decisions of international judges and
also guides the application of deterrence in international criminal
justice. Before doing so, allow me to briefly identify two challenges in
general to realizing deterrence in international criminal prosecutions.

190 They are retribution, protection of society, rehabilitation and
deterrence. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761.
191 For example, it has departed in both ideology and practice from the
general sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR that treat “gravity” of the
crime as the primary factor in determining a sentence. Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić,
supra note 81, at 330-32.
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1. Challenges to realizing deterrence
a. Practical challenges to realizing deterrence. – As noted above,
effectively deterring future “masterminds” and “architects” of
atrocity crimes constitutes a primary mandate of international
tribunals. In the early days of the ICTY, the main challenge to
realizing this mandate was that those in custody were not the
masterminds. They were low-level soldiers like Dražan Erdemović192
and Duško Tadić. High-ranking political and military leaders like
Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Rakto Mladić, and Biljana
Plavšić who bear the greatest responsibility for the Yugoslavia
atrocities, were at that time beyond the reach of the ICTY.193 Nor
was there any prospect that these men would ever see trial and
punishment at the ICTY. The most senior ranking accused in the
custody of the ICTY in the early days was Tihomir Blaškić, who had
just been made a colonel at the time of the war. Although Blaškić was
by no means a “mastermind” of the policies that lead to the
atrocities, nor even among the high-ranking decisions makers within
the Bosnia Croat or Croatian power structure, he was nevertheless
the highest-ranking person before the ICTY. If the ICTY wanted to
send a message of deterrence through severe punishment of senior
political and military officials, who lead the masses of people into a
bloodbath, then the Tribunal would need to impose a severe sentence
on Blaškić. It did so without hesitation.

192 Croat is First to be Convicted by Balkan War Crimes Panel, N.Y TIMES, June
1,
1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/01/world/croat-is-first-to-beconvicted-by-balkan-war-crimes-panel.html.
193 Milosevic was surrendered to the Tribunal on June 28, 2001.
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan
_en.pdf. Karadzic was surrendered on July 30, 2008. RADOVAN KARADZIC CASE
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf. Mladic was
surrendered on May 31, 2011. RAKTO MLADIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L
CRIM.
TRIB.
FOR
THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf. Biljana Plavšić
voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY on January 10, 2001. BILJANA PLAVSIC CASE
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/cis/en/cis_plavsic+en/pdf.
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b. Theoretical challenges to realizing deterrence. – To further examine
the role and relevance of deterrence to international sentencing at the
individual level, it may be helpful to place perpetrators of atrocities
crimes in two broad categories of offenders: low-level perpetrators
and high-level perpetrators. Regarding the former, contextual
considerations, such as a culture of inverse morality as noted by other
authors,194 challenges the appropriateness and effectiveness of
deterrence. Although here, the didactic function of ICL or
“affirmative general prevention” can play a role in preventing such a
culture from taking root.195 Deterrence, however, may be better
suited to sentencing in relation to the latter group of high-level
perpetrators. If we assume the model of the “rational calculating”
criminal, then from a utilitarian perspective, punishment can have a
deterrent effect by tipping the scales on the cost-benefit analysis196 so
that “crime does not pay.” Naturally, more contextual and factual
research needs to be preformed in order to firm up this
proposition.197 But there is a sufficient basis, grounded in facts and
the realities of the rise of such atrocities, to say that many of the
high-level leaders, who are responsible for instigating the
circumstance that lead to such dire calamities and cataclysms,
deliberately and calculatedly promulgated doctrine of racial hatred or
extreme nationalism and cynically propagated such divisive currencies
to ascend to political power. Punishment of such persons can
demonstrate that there is a cost, in terms of a severe penalty, for
those that seek to gain political power through tactics that endanger
the stability of society. The punishment must outweigh any political
gains.
2. Perpetrator hierarchy and deterrence
Even if one disagrees with this approach, it may explain what
the Tribunals are doing. As demonstrated above, some ICTY trial

See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7.
Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note
25, at 90, 110-11.
196 See generally, Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 8.
197 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 2001 (disagreeing that human rights
violators can be deterred).
194
195
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chambers took a consequentialist approach towards punishment of
human right violators, focusing on deterrence. While the rhetoric on
deterrence is bold and broad, the practice reveals a more subtle and
sophisticated nuance. There is some evidence that international
judges weigh the relevance of deterrence in determining the penalty
for a particular perpetrator based on that person’s position of
authority. This is illustrated through the examples of the punishment
of Blaškić and Todorović. Both trial chambers declare the objective
of deterrence to be a factor in their sentencing approach. The Blaškić
Trial Chamber in particular appears wholly fixated on deterrence, but
a closer reading reveals that its myopic consequentialism is induced
by the presence of a high-ranking perpetrator. It even declares that
“the Tribunal was set up to punish according to the accused’s level of
responsibility.”198 Thus, the judges in the Blaškić case approached the
deterrence factor with regard to the Blaškić’s role and position in the
overall hierarchy that was responsible for the atrocities.
Moreover, regarding the influence of general deterrence on
punishment, with a few exceptions, ICL sentencing practice indicates
that the objective of general deterrence will increase the sentence of a
high-ranking perpetrator, but generally has little affect on the
sentence of rank and file soldiers, unless they demonstrated notorious
cruelty or exceptional brutality. This explains to some extent why
Todorović received a very low sentence. Boiler plate rhetoric aside,
international judges do not actually seem to be very convinced that
deterrence is relevant or effective in the case of rank and file, low
level perpetrators. A more cynical view attributes Todorović’s low
punishment to the embarrassing situation the ICTY found itself in
when the United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping force, S-FOR,199
refused to comply with the Court’s order to turn over documents
relevant to his arrest and transfer to The Hague.200 This perspective,
however, does not entirely account for how low the Trial Chamber
went with Todorović’s sentence because the judges could have given
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 808.
S-FOR stands for “Stabilization Force” which was led by NATO but
established by United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1088 on
December 12, 1996.
200 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-22; See discussion infra
Section II(B)(2).
198
199
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a higher sentence and still remained within the scope and terms of
the plea agreement.
Moreover, the point can be established by other examples less
tainted by cynicism. Consider for example the ICTR’s punishment of
Mikaeli Muhimana, the conseiller of the Gishyita secteur.201 The Trial
Chamber found that he “occupied a position of influence in the
community” and that instead of using his position to protect the
defenseless, he actively participated in the attacks against Tutsi
civilians seeking refuge in churches and hospitals. Muhimana raped
and killed women who he believed to be Tutsi in the most gruesome
and brutal manner.202 In sentencing him to imprisonment for the
remainder of his life, the Trial Chamber found a host of aggravating
factors such as his position of influence,203 the fact that the victims
were seeking refuge,204 the young age (fifteen years old) of one of the
rape victims,205 presence of others during the rapes,206 intentionally
increasing the suffering of the victim,207 public humiliation,208
savagery,209 and the fact that the victim was pregnant.210 Some of
these aggravating factors could arguably be characterized as factors
pertaining to the gravity of the offense. In fact, in its recent
201 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Summary of
Judgment,
paras.
3,
4
(Apr.
28,
2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMuhimana%5Cjudgement
%5C280405summary.pdf.
202 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and
Sentence,
paras.
606-15
(Apr.
28,
2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Muhimana/decisions/muhimana
280505.pdf. (In one incident, Muhimana “used a machete to cut the pregnant
woman Pascasie Mukaremera from her breasts down to her genitals and remove
her baby, who cried for some time before dying. After disembowelling the woman,
the assailants accompanying Muhimana then cut off her arms and stuck sharpened
sticks into them.”).
203 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
para. 604.
204 Id. at para. 605.
205 Id. at para. 607.
206 Id. at para. 609.
207 Id. at para. 610.
208 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
para. 611.
209 Id. at para. 612.
210 Id. at para. 612.
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sentencing judgment, the ICC treated similar factors as relevant only
to its assessment of “gravity” and rejected them as aggravating
factors, which was how the ICC Prosecutor characterized them.211 In
the context of the ICTR’s sentencing provisions, which give
international judges “unfettered discretion” in fashioning a penalty,
the distinctive functions of “gravity of the offense” and “aggravating
circumstances” are somewhat marginalized, so long as the trial
chamber is careful to not consider the same factor twice. However,
the lack of doctrinal and theoretical clarity on the intersection
between and distinctiveness of “gravity” and “aggravating
circumstance” will prove more problematic for the ICC because, inter
alia, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) require the
existence of at least one aggravating circumstance before the court
can impose life imprisonment.212
Both the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber position
Muhimana as a “conseiller” and “businessman.”213 The Trial Chamber
found that the defendant’s status in the society where he lived
constituted an aggravating factor.214 Generally speaking, persons in
positions of public authority who abuse their positions and the
powers entrusted to them to commit or advance mass atrocities merit
greater punishment because such perpetrators are more dangerous in
that they cast a wider net of harm and destruction. The enhanced
punishment is also justified because they have breached a sacred trust
by employing their position and the machineries at their disposal to
victimize those to whom they had a duty to serve and protect. These
factors have a direct impact on the criminality. The jurisprudence of
the ICTY and ICTR recognizes these principles by holding “superior
position,” or in some cases, “abuse of authority” as an aggravating
factor. The ICTR Trial Chamber viewed Muhimana as a high-level

211 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 92-9.
212 INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (3) (2003).
213 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
paras. 596, 604.
214 Id. at paras. 595-96.
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and influential person and, like the ICTY’s Blaškić Trial Chamber,
imposed a severe punishment.215
In Muhimana case, however, the Defense should have
challenged the Prosecutor’s submission that his status should be an
aggravating factor. In this case, it is unclear how his “status”
aggravated his criminality. The Prosecution does not argue that
Muhimana held any political position or that his “status” lead to an
abuse of authority. The Prosecution only submits that “his close
associations with senior civil servants and prominent business people,
and his popularity . . . further enhanced his ‘status’.”216 The Trial
Chamber accepted this argument and aggravating his penalty because
of his “status.”217 However, while his associations and popularity may
have enhanced his “status,” the Trial Chamber does not explain how
it enhances his culpability in relation to his crimes. The Muhimana
Trial Chamber found no mitigating circumstances,218 and the Defense
surprising made no submissions on this point.219
In sum, international judges at the ad hoc Tribunals boldly
proclaim the deterrent function of international criminal
prosecutions.220 They demonstrate confidence in the deterrent
capacity of international courts, and state that the goal of deterrence
influences their determination of penalties.221 This obtuse rhetoric
215
216
217
218

Id. at para. 618.
Id. at para. 596.
Id. at para. 604.
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at

para. 616.
Id. at para. 602.
See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 441
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf.
See
also
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 891, 900, 902 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
31,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf.
221 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at
para. 24; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, paras. 775-77
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf. See also Prosecutor v.
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
219
220
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obfuscates the actual sentencing practice, which demonstrates greater
nuance. The general sentencing jurisprudence reveals that the goal of
deterrence has little impact on increasing the penalty of low-level war
criminals. Deterrence plays a more significant role in enhancing the
penalty for a high-level perpetrator or those that had significant
power or influence. This unspoken distinction mirrors the position of
some observers that rank and file common persons cannot be easily
deterred when surrounded by the chaos of systematic criminality
during war.222 Instead, the goal of deterrence should focus ICL’s

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761; Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept
15,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, para. 1144 ( Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/tjug/en/090720_j.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
10,
2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Case No. 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
November.
30,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Orić, Case No. 1T-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras.
7-9; Prosecutor v Kupreški, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
14,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
222 However, this is by no means universal. In the both the Yugoslav and
Rwandan atrocities, there are a number of examples of great human moral courage
resisting the systematic criminality. See Bernard Muna, The ICTR Must Achieve Justice
for Rwandans, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1481 (1998).
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punitive sting for leaders who used their power and influence to
execute criminal policies.
B. Reconciliation
One unresolved question regarding the primary role of
international criminal justice mechanisms is to what extent the ICC
should allow reconciliation ideology to influence its decision-making.
Prioritizing reconciliation (a restorative focus) over retribution and
deterrence (punitive focuses) may alter decisions by the ICC
Prosecutor at the front end, for example in case and situation
selection, as well as decisions by judges at the back end, for example
when sentencing. The experience of the ICTY shows that the
absence of a coherent theoretical underpinning for the application of
reconciliation ideology has lead to some troubling results. To
illustrate this we may consider the following cases: Erdemovic,223
Jelišić,224 Sikirica,225 Plavšić,226 Bralo,227 and Nikolić.228
Since 2001, the practice of plea-bargaining increased
exponentially in international prosecutions.229 At the same time,

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43;
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
7,
1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf.
224
Prosecutor v. Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 5, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jelaj010705.pdf.
225 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 84.
226 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
227 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor
v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94.
228 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor
v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
4,
2005),
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/acjug/en/nik-jsa050204e.pdf.
229 See COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37.
223
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reconciliation ideology gained traction among international judges.230
To appreciate this phenomenon, it is necessary to start with the early
practice at the Tribunal in relation to both plea-bargaining and
reconciliation. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that guilty
pleas at international tribunals come in two varieties: “unilateral”
guilty pleas and bargained-for guilty pleas. The latter consists of
situations where the defense engages in negotiations with the
Prosecutor for the defendant’s admission to the certain charges in
exchange for the Prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss other charges
and/or allegations from the indictment (charge reduction), and/or to
recommend a lenient sentence, or to refrain from seeking a particular
(high) penalty (sentence reduction). It excludes situations where the
accused accepts his or her criminal responsibility and enters a guilty
plea without negotiating for charge or sentence reduction. In these
guilty pleas, no bargaining or negotiating is needed to secure the
defendant’s admission. In other words, not all guilty pleas are the
result of plea-bargaining.231
1. Early practice: reconciliation ideology has no influence on sentencing.
In the first ten years of the ICTY’s operations, only two cases
were disposed of by plea bargaining: the Todorović case and the Sikirica
case.232 Each contained some element out of the ordinary. A third
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 233; Prosectuor v. Mrða,
Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj040331.pdf; Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment,
para. 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004),
http://icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 146 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
8,
2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/rajic/tjug/en/raj-tj0060508e.pdf.
231 An illustrative example is the case of Dražan Erdemović and his
immediate plea of guilt at his initial appearance. See Erdemović, Dražen, HAGUE J.
PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6096 (last visted Oct.
13, 2013). See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43. .
232 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 11 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
1999),
230
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case—against Goran Jelišić, a camp commander—involved the
accused pleading guilty to all counts but one—genocide—and the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) continued to trial on the remaining
count. Thus, his plea does not appear to have been bargained for. All
three cases underscore an OTP policy against plea-bargaining,
especially when the accused has been charged with genocide.
Reconciliation ideology is virtually non-existent as a sentencing factor
in these early cases.233
In the Jelišic case, a camp commander pled guilty to thirty-one
individual counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The
only charge that Jelišić refused to accept responsibility for was a
single charge of genocide.234 Given that the OTP had substantial
evidence to prove genocide, it refused to drop the charge from the
indictment. Much to the disappointment of the judges, the
Prosecution insisted on proceeding to trial against Jelišić for the
single count of genocide, even though Jelišić was already facing a very
severe prison sentence resulting from his guilty plea to very serious
crimes, including multiple murders committed in the most chilling
and wicked manner. The tension between the ICTY judges and the
Prosecutor was plainly evident during the course of the trial. The
judges were frustrated at what they considered wasteful expenditure
of time and resources on a trial of a relatively minor figure that had
already pled guilty to crimes against humanity and war crimes grave
enough to merit a forty-year sentence. The OTP was equally
determined to try Jelišić for genocide so that the record would reflect
what it believed was the true scope of his culpability. The policy
behind the OTP’s uncompromising stance was the idea that the
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf (pleading guilty on
October 29,1998); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 5 (pleading guilty on December 13, 2000); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing
Judgment, supra note 84, at paras. 12-15 (pleading guilty on September 19, 2001;
September 19, 2001; and September 4, 2001, respectively). As explained above, the
Erdemović case is not included among these cases because Erdemović pled guilty
at his initial appearance.
233 See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43.
234 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, “Brcko”
Indictment: Goran Jelisic Pleads Guilty to the Majority of the Charges in the
Second
Amended
Indictment,
JL/PIU/357-E
(Oct.
29,
1998),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7624.
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crime of genocide carries too much significance to be dropped simply
because the accused has accepted responsibility for other crimes. The
Jelišić case demonstrates the OTP’s unwillingness to provide the
accused with any concession by way of charge or penalty reduction
for his guilty plea. As noted above, however, it would be incorrect to
characterize Jelišić’s guilty plea as a plea bargain. Jelišić sua sponte
accepted responsibility for all the charges against him except the
crime of genocide.235 No bargaining or negotiating was needed to
secure his admission to the other crimes.
Stevan Todorović and Biljana Plavšić, on the other hand,
represent cases of carefully crafted plea bargains. Todorović muscled
a highly favorable plea deal out of the Prosecutor. His Defense team
successfully obtained an order from the ICTY directing the NATO
led S-FOR to cooperate with the defendant by producing documents
and making senior officials available as witnesses for his hearing
challenging the lawfulness of his arrest, detention, and transfer to
The Hague by S-FOR. Todorović was living comfortably in his
hometown in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and woke up
one morning to find himself hooded and handcuffed in a helicopter
on his way to S-FOR’s Tuzla Air Force Base.236 One version of the
events attributes his capture to four bounty hunters.237 According to
Todorović, his kidnapping was a clandestine operation orchestrated
by S-FOR in which he was hooded, beaten, kidnapped, and taken to
the boarder of Bosnia Herzegovina to be subsequently transferred by
S-FOR to the ICTY.238
Claiming that his arrest was illegal and violated fundamental
human rights, Todorović sought to compel S-FOR to hand over

Id.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision
on Todorovic’s Motion For Judicial Assistance, XT/ P.I.S./ 636-e (Oct. 20, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7811.
237 See, Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118.
238 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-19. See also Susan Lamb,
Illegal Arrest and the Jurisdiction of the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 27-35
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the events surrounding Todorovic’s
arrest and transfer to the ICTY).
235
236
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documents and witnesses to support his allegations.239 The trial
judges ordered the North Atlantic Council, thirty-three individual
States, and S-FOR itself to disclose specific documents. In a bold
move, they also ordered the Commanding General of S-FOR, Eric
Shinseki of the United States, to appear as a witness in his individual
capacity at the hearing. All parties promptly refused to comply with
the order, citing possible security risks to an on-going military and
peacekeeping operation.240 The standoff was an embarrassment to the
United Nations and the ICTY—a U.N. created peacekeeping force
flatly refused to comply with an order of a U.N. judicial body. Would
power submit to the law? NATO’s non-compliance with the ICTY
order seemly contradicted the principle that all must obey the law.
The ICTY—in fact the entire enterprise of international criminal
justice—was predicated on the notion of accountability and that no
one was above the law. It was a direct challenge to the authority of
the court from an unexpected source, something ICTY defendants
had been doing since the first time the court asserted jurisdiction.241
With his motion threatening the legitimacy of the ICTY if
NATO were to continue to disobey the order, Todorović gained
leverage in his negotiations with the Prosecutor. NATO, the U.S.,
and other states appealed the decision and the Appeals Chamber
stayed the Trial Chamber’s order pending the outcome of the appeal.
Meanwhile, ICTY lawyers scrambled behind the scenes. While the
appeal was pending, the OTP and the defendant filed a joint and
confidential ex parte motion, submitting to the court a negotiated plea
agreement.242 Todorović agreed to plea guilty to the crime of
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds as a crime

See Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119.
Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119.
241 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense
Motion on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tdec/en/100895.htm.
242 See Prosecutor v. Simic, Simic, Tadic, Todorovic, and Zaric, Case No.
IT-95-9-PT, Judicial Supplements, Decision on (1) Application by Stevan
Todorovic to re-open the Decision of 27 July 1999, (2) Motion by ICRC to ReOpen Scheduling Order of 18 November 1999, and (3) Conditions for Access to
Material (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp12-e/simic.htm.
239
240
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against humanity.243 Tellingly, the plea agreement specifically required
him to withdraw: (1) all pending motions regarding his arrest; (2) all
factual allegations that his arrest was unlawful; and (3) all claims that
NATO or SFOR participated in any unlawful activity in connection
his arrest.244 To secure the deal, the OTP withdrew the remaining
twenty-six counts and recommended a prison sentence of five to
twelve years.245
The Sikirica case involved three defendants: Duško Sikirica,
Damir Došen and Dragan Kolundžija.246 All three were charged with
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of
war. However, Sikirica was also charged with genocide. The
defendants all entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to
trial.247 After the close of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief, Sikirica filed
a Rule 98bis motion to dismiss the genocide count, which was
granted. Then, to everyone’s surprise, during the presentation of the
defense rebuttal, one of Sikirica’s co-defendants changed his plea and
pled guilty to crimes against humanity. With the code of silence
broken, the remaining defendants also sought the Prosecutor for a
plea bargain. The plea agreement between Sikirica and the OTP made
clear that the Prosecutor would not have accepted his plea while the
charges of genocide were still pending against him.248 This reluctance
towards plea-bargaining is in line with the OTP’s policy in the Jelisić
Count 1 of the indictment. Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5.
244 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the
Prosecution Motion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion
to Withdraw Pending Motions, para. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tdec/en/10226DC515095.htm;
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5.
245 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to
Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending
Motions, supra note 244, at para. 2; Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 58, at para. 4.
246 Sikirica was the most senior ranking of the three.
247 See William Schabas, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, VOLUME VIII: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001-2002 1078-82 (André
Klip & Göran Sluite eds., 2005), for a commentary on this case.
248 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84, at para. 24.
243
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cases. The ICTY Prosecutor manifested complete aversion toward
any type of bargaining or deal making that would require her to
withdraw a genocide charge.
While the Prosecution refused to bargain in the Jelisić case, it
did not have to in the Erdemović case—he comprehensively and
immediately accepted responsibility to the entire indictment against
him. The Erdemović case challenges the ICTY’s current ideological
narrative constructed around reconciliation. Extant sentencing
judgments declare reconciliation as an ideology—something more
than mere ex post facto rationalization of an expanding plea bargaining
practice and lenient sentences, but as a principled justification for
mitigating penalty. However, the judges do not advance such a view
of reconciliation in the Erdemović sentencing judgment, even though
the facts of the case offered an opportunity to establish this platform.
Erdemović did not attempt to negotiate a deal behind the scenes. He
plead guilty to all crimes charged at his first hearing, expressed
genuine remorse, and fully cooperated with the Prosecution in bring
to light what happened. Although in subsequent cases, notably the
Plavšić case, these factors are considered relevant to determining the
accused’s contribution to reconciliation and thus a reduction in
punishment, the Erdemović Trial Chamber did not consider
contribution to reconciliation per se as a sentencing factor. In fact,
“reconciliation” is mentioned merely twice in passing in the entire
judgment.249 It is not discussed in relation to Erdemović’s acceptance
of guilt, nor do the international judges appear to be particularly
interested in the possibility that his unreserved admission of
responsibility for his share in the atrocities will foster reconciliation.
Compare this to the twenty-seven times the ICTY judges
discuss reconciliation in the Plavšić case and their unbridled
enthusiasm about how her narrowly crafted and limited admission
will have a significant impact on reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia. It comes as no surprise that the notion of reconciliation
overwhelms the analysis of the sentencing judgment in the Plavšić
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at para.
58. In comparison, in the Plavšić case, the concept of reconciliation appears no less
than 27 times in the sentencing judgment. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 36.
249
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case, but is non-existent in the Erdemović case. The latter did not
bargain his plea, made no demands for charge reduction, made no
effort to limit the factual basis of his admission (i.e. he did not limit
the historical record), and did not insist on first obtaining the
Prosecution’s agreement to recommend a reduced sentence.
Therefore, I argue that the rise of reconciliation as an ideology in
international criminal law has less to do with the goal of
reconciliation and more to do with rationalizing plea-bargaining.
Reconciliation gained notoriety in cases where the accused bargained
for a less comprehensive factual record and a reduction in charges or
punishment.250 But this deal making in the face of grossly
unspeakable crimes required a counterweight. Enter reconciliation. It
is an apology for plea-bargaining atrocity crimes, an attempt to recast
plea deals as an ally of truth and history rather than cutting the legs of
public and accurate record building. These matters are addressed in
greater detail in the next section.
To summarize the background materials, the ICTY’s early
jurisprudence and practice seems to indicate that reconciliation was
not a central issue in sentencing and that the Prosecution was
unwilling to bargain away the charge of genocide. The Plavšić case
reversed the trajectory on both matters. It was the first time the
Prosecutor willingly dropped the charges of genocide against an
accused in return for her guilty plea. Moreover, it marked the coming
of age of “reconciliation” as it proved an influential force in
mitigating Biljana Plavšić’s sentence.
2. The coming of age of reconciliation ideology
The Plavšić case marks a turning point in the ICTY’s legacy.
The rise of reconciliation ideology as a justification for the practice of
plea-bargaining251 and as a mitigating factor in sentencing can trace
their origins to this case. Prior to the Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, only
250 Janine Natalya Clark, Plea-Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and
Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 415, 416 (2009) (arguing that reconciliation is
“seriously undermined” by plea-bargaining and reduced prison sentences).
251 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 341 (concluding that
the only viable justification for plea bargaining is efficiency), for a critique of
various justifications for plea-bargaining.
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three cases in the ICTY’s ten-year history had been disposed of by
plea-bargaining. In sharp contrast, following the Plavšić judgment, the
first twelve months alone witnessed at least seven cases disposed of
by way of plea-bargaining.252 These plea bargains occasioned
“unseemly” lenient sentencing recommendations by the OTP.253
Likewise, the practice of dismissing the charge of genocide can trace
its origins to the Plavšić case. Plavšić was initially indicted for the

Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-2-S, Sentencing Judgment,
paras. 9-16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf (pleading
guilty on May 13, 2002); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S,
Sentencing Judgment, paras. 10, 12-21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
May
21,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obrsj031210e.pdf (pleading guilty on May 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić,
Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf
(pleading
guilty on May 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj-040331.pdf (pleading guilty on July
24, 2003); Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras.
7-14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf (pleading
guilty on Aug. 27, 2003); Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003)
(pleading
guilty
on
June
26,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/ban-sj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 5, 14 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
18,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf (pleading
guilty on Sept. 4, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/cesic/tjug/en/ces-tj040311e.pdf (pleading guilty on
Oct. 8, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras.
18-19 (pleading guilty on Sept. 30, 2003); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
29,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf
(pleading guilty on Jan. 27, 2004); Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf (pleading guilty on
July 19, 2005).
253 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes:
The Limited Influence of Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 93 (2006).
252
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crime of genocide and complicity in genocide.254 Departing from its
practice in the past, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
subsequently made a deal with Plavšić to withdraw the counts and
allegations specifically pertaining to genocide and complicity in
genocide and also all remaining crimes, with the exception of
persecution as a crime against humanity. In return, Plavšić would
plead guilty to one count for the crime of persecution.255
She was the first defendant for whom the Prosecution
willingly withdrew the genocide charges from the indictment in
exchange for a plea. Ironically, this first time willingness came in a
case were the defendant was most likely among the more culpable for
the allegedly genocidal policies from among those charged with the
crime.256 Given the magnitude of the case, the high ranking and
profile of the accused, the gravity of her crimes (as originally alleged),
and the fact that the Chief Prosecutor herself appeared at an
accused’s sentencing hearing, which she rarely did, the people of
Yugoslavia and the international community rightfully expected an
accounting for Del Ponte’s decision to drop genocide from the
indictment. However, she offered no explanation in the public forum
of an international courtroom. Nor did the judges press her for one.
If there was a good reason for the compromise, it did not appear in
the Court’s official records or sentencing judgment.

254 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-40-I, Indictment, para. 19 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/ind/en/pla-ii000407e.pdf. The counts were:
Count 1(Genocide) and Count 2 (Complicity in Genocide).
255 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT, Plea Agreement
(Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4/en/020930plea_en.pdf. This was
filed ex parte confidential and under seal. This document is available and on file with
the author.
256 In her published memoirs, Del Ponte describes Plavšić as a “close
associate” of the notorious Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik. Del Ponte
further claims that Plavšić “participated at the highest political levels in the
campaign to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnically cleanse large
swaths of its territory.” See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY 160 (2008).
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If the judges genuinely believe that the goal of reconciliation
is central to the Tribunal’s mandate, that International Tribunals have
the capacity to contribute to reconciliation, and that substantial
sentencing reductions actually promote reconciliation, then they must
account for why genocide was removed from the scope of Plavšić
liability and why a prison sentence of eleven years supports rather
than undermines the goal of reconciliation. The absence of
transparency regarding the circumstances resulting in a factual record
narrower than the original indictment undermines reconciliation and
truth finding. Rather than address difficult questions about
responsibility and punishment that are crucial to the goal of
reconciliation, international sentencing judgments idealize
reconciliation as vague aspirations of ICL while remaining
impervious to factors that undermine it. The judgments mistake
acceptance of responsibility and apology (often short lived) for
reconciliation. Del Ponte has even admitted that Plavšić’s admissions
and apologies offered nothing towards reconciliation.257 The Plavšić
Trial Chamber’s discussion and analysis of reconciliation raises three
concerns in relation to sentencing.
a. Is reconciliation itself mitigating? – Certain post-crime actions by
the accused, such as expression of remorse, truth-telling, cooperation
with the Prosecutor, and genuine and sincere acceptance of
responsibility have been accepted as appropriate reasons to mitigate
the punishment of a convicted person precisely because these factors,
inter alia, potentially contribute to the aim of reconciliation. However,
the Plavšić Trial Chamber appears to go beyond this and treat
reconciliation itself as an independent mitigating factor.
The problem with treating reconciliation as an independent
ground for sentence mitigation lies in the limitations of criminal
justice legalism. Reconciliation is better understood as a slow
rebuilding process, not an event. While judicial institutions are quite
capable of determining whether a war criminal “voluntarily
surrendered,” they are not particularly apt at predicting future events.
Whether the accused has “contributed to reconciliation” is usually
difficult to measure with legal certainty. It cannot be put sufficiently
257

See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at

161.
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beyond the realms of speculation so as to satisfy the Tribunal’s legal
standards or the requirements of law.258 Some factors relevant to
assessing a defendant’s contribution to reconciliation are admittedly
less speculative such as an accused who goes door to door
apologizing to specific families that he has victimized, or volunteers
for demining operations, or helps victims identify locations whether
murdered family members have been hidden or buried. But the
contribution to reconciliation of factors, such as a general apology,
on which the Plavšić Trial Chamber relied, is highly speculative.
Moreover, they can be undone in a way that concert action (such as
the above list) beyond mere words cannot be. Thus, as is the case
with other consequentialist aims, the court treads in dangerous
territory when judges allow reconciliation to influence its sentencing
allocations.
For example, Plavšić gave an interview to Banja Luka ATV
on March 11th, 2005, that undermines her purported contribution to
reconciliation based on her apology and public statement that the
judge used to justify mitigating her penalty to eleven years
imprisonment.259 Barely two years after her public remorse and
apology in the courtroom of the ICTY, she denied all responsibility
for her role in the atrocities to the viewing public back in the former
Yugoslavia. With thousands, if not tens of thousand, of persons
whose lives she victimized, she emphatically claimed: (1) she only
pled guilty because witnesses that would establish her innocence were
afraid to come forward; (2) smug international judges sitting in The
Hague far away from the realities of the conflict could not
comprehend that a high ranking person in her position, removed
from the battlefield, may not know what is going on at the ground
level; (3) Western powers accept that the real culprits of the conflict

258 While aggravating circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, mitigating circumstance need only be proved on a balance of probabilities.
See Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras.
39-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf.
259 Interview by Banja Luka ATV with Biljana Plavšić (Mar. 11, 2005),
http://www.atvbl.com/home.php?id=billjanaintervju. An unofficial translation
into English by the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo is available on file with the
author.
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where the Bosnians that wanted independence in the first place.260 To
the victims, her statements most likely came across as: (1) I am not
responsible; (2) the Bosnian Serb leadership is not responsible; and
(3) the victims got what they deserved. Perhaps Del Ponte and the
international judges had no reason to suspect that Plavšić would so
fantastically and publically unravel the foundations of her mitigated
penalty. Nevertheless, the experience illustrated why the ICC should
not entangle with consequentialist aspirations. At least, judges should
not allow the goal of reconciliation to influence sentencing
allocations.
b. Failure to link lack of cooperation to sentencing discounts based on
purported contribution to reconciliation. – The sentencing law of
international criminal courts and tribunals recognize cooperation with
the Prosecutor or Court as a mitigation factor.261 Under the ICTY
rules in particular, it is the only mitigation factor explicitly provided.
Plavšić firmly refused to cooperate with the ICTY OTP, despite
several interventions by Del Ponte and her team to get Plavšić to
reverse course.262 When Del Ponte tried to include in the plea
agreement a condition that Plavšić agree to be a witness in the cases
of persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities such
as Radovan Karadzić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Ratko Mladić, Plavšić
flatly refused and the Chief Prosecutor backed down.263 Del Ponte
would later write in her memoirs that Plavšić had deceived her into
thinking that she would cooperate.264
If part of the justification for the Prosecution to engage in
plea-bargaining lies in the theory of “breaking the circle of silence”
among the leadership, then her guilty plea wholly deprived
international justice of any such benefit. In fact, she appears to go out
of her way to insulate them and protect them from the atrocities she
See id.
INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (2)(a)(iii) (2003); INT’L CRIM. TRIB.
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA R. P. & EVID. 101 (2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_
Rev43_en.pdf.
262 See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at
161-62.
263 See id. at 161.
264 See id.
260
261
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acknowledges took place. She expressly stated that the responsibility
for the crimes to which she bore witness are hers and hers “alone”
and do not “extend to other leaders who have the right to defend
themselves”.265 Her failure to cooperate should have been factored in
to the weight given to her “contribution to reconciliation.” I am not
suggesting that the court do what the Blaskic Trial Chamber did when
it treated non-cooperation as an aggravating factor.266 The
international sentencing jurisprudence correctly rejects such an
approach.267 Nevertheless, failure to cooperation with international
justice is relevant to assessing the accused’s “contribution to
reconciliation.” Plavšić’s conduct and statements carefully avoid
implicating her co-perpetrators Karadžić and Krajišnik in the
atrocities and cast doubt on her commitment to reconciliation.
Loyalty to her fellow nationalist over accounting for crimes
perpetrated against other ethnic groups does little to defuse ethnic
tensions. The judges noted expert testimony that “full disclosure in
confessions is vital for the reconciliatory process.”268 Again, we see
another example of the international judges failing to meaningfully
analyze the accused’s conduct and factors relevant to punishment in
relation to what they earlier identified as the purpose of sentencing,
in this case, reconciliation. Plavšić’s failure to disclose the role of
other high-ranking Serbs in atrocity crimes to the full extent of her
knowledge undermines the goal of reconciliation. The judges should
have weighed the potential adverse impact this has on their
purported goal, especially because they used reconciliation ideology
to justify a lower sentence.269

Dragan Stanimirovic, Plavsic’s Guilt Trip, TRANSITIONS ONLINE (Dec.
23, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Factual Statement in
Support of Plea (2000).
266 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 774. See
Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 327.
267 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 328.
268 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 77
(emphasis by Trial Chamber).
269 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at paras.
66-81. In the Trial Chamber’s own assessment, “these circumstances make a
formidable body of mitigation”. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra
note 36, at para. 110.
265
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Local reactions support my argument. Sefko Alomerović,
President of the Helsinki Board in Sandzak at the time of Plavšić’s
sentencing, also drew attention to her failure to “bring into question
the state policy that led towards the extinction of the Bosnian people,
in which she played an important role.”270 Although the Trial
Chamber expressly disagreed with the Prosecutor’s evaluation of the
weight to be accorded to this factor in mitigation,271 in light of the
foregoing, the Prosecutor’s assessment seems to better capture the
extent of her contribution to reconciliation. The OTP recommended
a prison term of fifteen to twenty-fix years.272 The Trial Chamber
sentenced her to eleven years.273 This was not the first time a trial
chamber imposed a sentence lower than the Prosecutor’s
recommendation, but it was the first time the Prosecutor did not
appeal a low sentence outside its recommended range.
c. Superior position results in paradoxical boost for mitigation. –
Generally, sentencing discounts for guilty pleas are justified on the
grounds of their functional utility, namely that plea bargains can
result in efficiency benefits by saving costs and Tribunal resources
related to investigation, counsel fees, trial costs, etc. The Plavšić Trial
Chamber, however, attempts to offer more than a functional
justification for plea bargains that result in large sentencing
reductions by arguing that they substantially contribute to the
Tribunal’s presumed mandate. In the Plavšić case, the judges
characterized Plavšić’s negotiated and carefully contrived guilty plea
as a genuine expression of remorse that contributed to reconciliation,
rather than a self-interested maneuvered that resulting in limiting her
criminal liability and punishment.274
Apparently, the Trial Chamber was guided in this direction by
the Prosecutor who amplified the mitigating value of Plavšić’s
contribution to “reconciliation” and “expressions of remorse” based
270 See Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. OF WAR
& PEACE REPORTING (July 24, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/hague-dealsreduce-impact.
271 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para.
130.
272 Id. at para. 128.
273 Id. at para. 132.
274 Id. at para. 70.
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on her superior position as a high-ranking and high-profiled member
of the Bosnian Serb war leadership.275
The Trial Chamber noted: “[t]he Prosecution states that this
expression of remorse is noteworthy since it is offered from a person who
formerly held a leadership position, and that it ‘merits judicial
consideration.’”276 Thus, the Plavšić Trial Chamber endorsed the
notion that expressions of remorse have added value for the
purposes of reconciliation when offered by high-ranking defendants,
and thus are deserving of greater reduction in sentence.277 This
position, however, is at odds with basic principles of justice and the
ICTY’s own jurisprudence, which has long held that the superior
position of the accused is a factor that aggravates, rather than
mitigates, the accused’s punishment.
Unfortunately, the Plavšić precedent favoring high-ranking
perpetrators when it comes to mitigation of penalty based on
contribution to reconciliation is having a pernicious influence on the
subsequent cases. In some cases, it appears that both the Prosecutor
and the judges award less sentencing reduction for low-level
defendants who contribute to reconciliation.278 Citing the Plavšić
ruling, some defense counsels even appear convinced that their
client’s potential contribution to reconciliation is only worth arguing
if the client is a person of high rank.279
3. The perverse effects of reconciliation
As noted above, reconciliation was not a significant factor in
sentencing in the early practice of the ICTY. However, since the
Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, it has received frequent consideration by
trial chambers when addressing sentencing. In the Plavšić case, it
Id. at para. 70.
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70
(emphasis added).
277 Id. at para. 70.
278 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94. This
case is discussed in detail below.
279 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 110 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf.
275
276

101

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

exerted a significant influence in mitigating her punishment. Many
commentators consider Plavšić’s eleven-year sentence to be very
lenient in both absolute terms and in symbolic terms.280 As it has
done with other factors such as deterrence and rehabilitation, the
Appeals Chamber should likewise encourage a cautious approach
towards awarding significant reduction of the penalty on the basis of
“contribution towards reconciliation.” Caution here is justified on
both moral and practical basis. The Plavšić case illustrates why.
During Plavšić’s sentencing hearing, I observed, first hand,
defense counsel argue to the judges that her remorse and acceptance
of responsibility was a more significant contribution to reconciliation
than had the same come from a lower ranking perpetrator. Defense
counsel boldly declared: “what greater contribution do you have to
your mandate than my client’s—a person at the very top of the
Bosnian Serb leadership—admission of responsibility.”281 Never
mind that her limited acceptance of responsibility was known to the
judges or that her remorse proved to be ostensible. Nonetheless, all
this coming from the Defense was largely expected. The real surprise
was that Chief Prosecutor Carla de Ponte, in a rare court appearance
at a sentencing hearing, made the same argument but even more
emphatically.282 She argued that as a high-ranking figure and former
leader, her remorse and contribution to reconciliation is particular
noteworthy and merits special consideration.283 Thus, in advancing a
framework for how reconciliation should influence sentencing
allocations, the Chief Prosecutor advocates for greater sentencing
reductions for those in high-ranking positions, thereby turning upside

See Nancy A. Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes, supra
note 253, at 98; Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for
Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 688-9, n.21 (2007). See also Daria
Sito-Sucic, Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavšić Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003;
Amra Kebo, Regional Report: Plavsic Sentence Divides Bosnia, INST. OF WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (Feb. 22, 2005), http://iwpr.net/report-news/regional-report-plavsicsentence-divides-bosnia.
281 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing
Hearing Transcript, para. 649 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17,
2002).
282 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70.
283 Id.
280
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down the relationship between superior position and punishment.284
The judges agreed, finding that Plavšić’s position at the very top of
the Bosnian Serb Presidency gave “significant weight” to her
contribution to reconciliation. Because the Trial Chamber accepted
the goal of reconciliation as a relevant factor for fixing a sentence, it
was able to justify substantial reduction of prison time.
Accordingly, greater contributions to reconciliation merit
greater reduction in punishment. Unfortunately, ICTY judges and the
Chief Prosecutor appear to weigh the value of an accused’s
contribution to reconciliation based largely on his or her rank. Under
their approach, high-ranking offenders, who accept responsibility for
their wrongdoings, deserve more sentencing reduction than low-level
individuals merely because of their status. The perverse effect of this
consequentialist approach towards punishment is that the leaders
who are most culpable for the atrocities receive greater sentencing
discounts, as demonstrated by how the ICTY subsequently dealt with
the punishment of low-level perpetrators.285 Adding to a sense of
injustice is the fact that their purported “contribution to
reconciliation” is in relation to sufferings and atrocities that the
leaders themselves created.
Therefore, the logical conclusion of the reconciliation
ideology adopted by the Plavšić Trial Chamber is that less culpable
and lower ranking perpetrators will not receive the same degree of
mitigation, resulting in higher penalties. If so, this would be elitism at
its worst and consequentialism at its most perverse. In order to test
this hypothesis, I examined the ICTY sentencing judgments to
identify cases similar to Plavšić. Two cases—the prosecutions of
Miroslav Bralo and Dragon Nikolić—shared several factors in
common with the Plavšić case. Both involved plea-bargained guilty
pleas, convictions for crimes against humanity, underlying crimes that
included killings and murder, and in both cases, the trial judges found
reconciliation to be a mitigation factor in sentencing.
Superior position is an aggravating factor in the ICTY jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at
para. 95; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, § X
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf.
284
285
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In the Bralo case, a Croatian defendant—a relatively minor
figure in the conflict—was initially only charged with war crimes.286
Because of his complete self-effacing cooperation with the
Prosecutor, Miroslav Bralo exposed himself to further criminal
liability for persecution as a crime against humanity. The Prosecution
mercilessly moved to amend the indictment to expanded Bralo’s
individual criminal responsibility to include the crime of
persecution.287 Bralo did not oppose the motion. In fact, he did not
challenge or dispute any charge or allegation in the extended
indictment and pled guilty to all charges.288 The trial judges
considered his unexpurgated acceptance of criminal responsibility as
an unequivocal sign of sincere remorse and willingness to be held
accountable.289
As noted above, the process leading to an accused’s
admission to his or her participation in atrocity crimes and ethnic
violence impacts the goal of reconciliation. Plavšić and Bralo stand in
sharp contrast. The former machinated to limit and diffuse the scope
and gravity of her crimes, successfully minimizing her criminal
responsibility. Her plea deal included charge reduction with the
removal of genocide from the record, thereby alternating the
narrative of the conflict and degree of victimization. Bralo, on the
other hand, showed unabridged acknowledgement of his moral
blameworthiness and took full responsibility for his wrongful
conduct. While Plavšić bargained down her responsibility, Bralo
accepted responsibility beyond the initial charges against him.
Working from the ICTY premise that reconciliation is an
appropriate goal of sentencing for international crimes, Bralo’s
contribution to reconciliation arguably merits greater mitigation.290
The Trial Chamber found that Bralo apologized to victims in person
and through personalized letters, identified previously unknown

286 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment
against Miroslav Bralo Made Public, JL/P.I.S./902-e, (Oct. 13, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/sid/8352.
287 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 62.
288 Id. at paras. 5-6.
289 Id. at para. 60.
290 Id. at para. 72.
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locations of mass graves allowing survivors to carry out funerals for
their departed in accordance with their religion and customs, in some
cases exhuming the body from the mass grave himself, and
participated in de-mining operations.291 This may be understood as
direct reconciliatory acts. It is more tangible to individual victims than
Plavšić’s prescribed general apology. Although the Tribunal held that
Bralo contributed to reconciliation,292 it did not afford Bralo’s acts as
much weight in mitigation as was awarded to Plavšić. Has the ICTY’s
reconciliation ideology turned the significance of superior position or
authority as an aggravating factor upside down? Plavšić’s punishment
was imprisonment for eleven years. Bralo received a prison sentence
of twenty years,293 nearly twice as much as Plavšić, despite the fact
that she was in the very highest echelons of the Bosnian Serb
leadership prosecuting the war, second only to Radovan Karadzić.294
At the time of her sentencing, she was the highest-ranking figure on
any side of the conflict to be punished by the ICTY.295 Bralo was a
relatively low ranking figure, a Croatian foot soldier in a notorious
military unit with little or no command authority.296 Dragon Nikolić,

Id. at paras. 66-71.
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, para. 71.
293 Id. at para. 95.
294 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10.
See also Nancy A. Combs, nternational Decisions: Prosecutor v Plavsić, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
929, 930 (2003) (“From 1990 through 1992, Plavsić was the Serbian representative
to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, serving for
a time as the acting co-president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and later as a member of the collective and expanded Presidencies of
the Republika Srpska. Known as the ‘Serbian Iron Lady’ as a result of her hard-line
nationalism and rabidly anti-Muslim views, Plavsić was a close ally of Radovan
Karadzić.”); CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at 16061.
295 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10;
Combs, International Decisions, supra note 295, at 930; CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME
PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at 160. When Plavsić was sentenced, the other senior
figures who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities were either not in
custody or their trials were ongoing.
296 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94, at
para. 2.
291
292
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also a relatively low level perpetrator, was sentenced to 23 twentythree years of imprisonment.297
Plavšić’s low sentence compared to higher penalties for Bralo
and Nikolić is inconsistent with the Tribunal’s sentencing practice
and legal rulings that superior position or authority is an aggravating
factor. By this measure, Plavšić should have received a more severe
punishment, all other material factors being equal—and they
generally are. Similarly, the difference in the distribution of
punishment does not square with Tribunal sentencing law in that
cooperation with the Prosecution is a significant mitigating factor, if
not the most significant. The trial judges found that Bralo and
Nikolić substantially cooperated with the Prosecutor, a mitigating
factor that was absent in Plavšić’s case. Compounding the disparity,
one could reasonably conclude that cooperation with the Court or
the Prosecutor itself constitutes “contribution towards
reconciliation.” Likewise, it would have been reasonable for the trial
chambers to treat intentional non-cooperation as diminishing the
value of an accused’s asserted contribution to reconciliation. In sum,
analyzing the court’s treatment of the two sentencing factors—one
aggravating factor (superior position/authority) and one mitigating
circumstance (cooperation with the Prosecution)—reveals perverse
results where judges attempt to reflect the goal of reconciliation in
sentencing allocations. Plavšić, who used her superior position to
perpetrate grave crimes and offered no cooperation with the OTP,
received a very lenient penalty, while other defendants, who were
low-level perpetrators and cooperated with the Prosecution, received
significantly harsher sentences. Reconciliation ideology was so
influential that it resulted in misapplication of two well entrench
sentencing principles in international criminal law.
Judging by the fact that low-level offenders were punished
twice has harshly as high-ranking perpetrators, the ICTY
disproportionately awards more penalty reduction for reconciliation
to the latter. Interestingly, the Bralo Trial Chamber stated that if there
were no mitigating factors, it would have imposed a prison sentence

Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 60, at paras. 2, 4.
297
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of twenty-five years.298 Thus, Bralo received a sentencing reduction of
5 five years that accounts for all the mitigation factors found in his
case. His contribution to reconciliation amounts to something much
less than a 5 five-year discount, significantly lower than the discount
given to Plavšić’s.
Unfortunately, the perverse effects of consequentialism
permeate the entire ICTY institution beyond the international judges.
Consequentialism in the decision-making of the ICTY Prosecutor
influenced its presentation of the case during oral arguments, its
application of sentencing factors, and finally its sentencing
recommendation. It argued that Plavšić’s contribution to
reconciliation based on her “expression of remorse is noteworthy
since it is offered from a person who formerly held a leadership
position, and that it ‘merits judicial consideration.’”299 Thus, the
Prosecutor links the mitigating value of an accused’s contribution to
reconciliation to her superior position. Similarly, in cases where
reconciliation is a factor, the OTP exercises its discretion to
recommend sentences that offer greater penalty reduction to highranking perpetrators. The court typically follows the OTP’s
recommendations in plea bargains.
For example, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
recommended a prison sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for
Plavšić. She represented to the Court that if Plavšić had not pled
guilty she would have recommended life imprisonment.300 Typically,
the ICTY grants early release after the defendant has served twothirds of the sentence.301 Accordingly, when the OTP recommends a
prison term of twenty-five years, it is effectively asking for a sentence
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 95.
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 70
(emphasis added).
300 Id. para. 59. See also CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra
note 256, at 161.
301 Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and
Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 50-51 (2008) (“At the
ICTY, early release is determined by the implied powers of the President, which is
particularly instructive when examining the case of the eight ICTY-convicted
persons granted early release, after serving approximately two-thirds of their
sentence.”).
298
299
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of a little more than sixteen-and-a-half years. Thus, its low-end
recommendation of fifteen years in the Plavšić case is effectively a
recommendation for ten years. The Trial Chamber gave Plavšić
eleven years, which meant she was out in seven years and a few
months.
The OTP’s discretion was exercised more harshly when
recommending a sentencing for Bralo. Although it initially asked for
a prison sentence of twenty-five years, at the sentencing hearing the
OTP stated that it was in fact seeking a “mandatory minimum” of
twenty-five years.302 Thus, accounting for the two-thirds approach
outline above, the OTP recommendation was effectively a prison
sentence of thirty-seven-and-a-half years. The OTP’s policy towards
reconciliation and mitigating factors indicate that it assigned less
value to Bralo’s contribution to reconciliation because he is a low
profile perpetrator, in other words, because of his status.303 Its policy
manifested an aggressive recommendation for a harsher penalty for
the low level perpetrator because he is a low level person, despite his
cooperation with the Prosecution. The ICTY’s reconciliation
ideology is driving this recommendation.
A final point of interest here concerns Plavšić’s release from
prison. She reserved her prison time at a women’s prison called
“Hinseberg” located in Frövi, Örebro County, Sweden. The inmates
call it “the castle” because it is a mansion overlooking a lake.304 The
prisoners can engage in artistic activities, enjoy saunas, bake for
leisure, and even ride horses.305 In 2009, after serving two-thirds of
her sentence, she applied to the ICTY for early release.306 Although
her application for early release was made after her repudiation of
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 90.
Id. at para. 62.
304 Luxury prison for Bosnia’s Iron Lady, TELEGRAPH, June 7, 2013,
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030607/asp/foreign/story_2044806.asp.
305 Id.
306 See generally President of the Int’l Trib. Judge Patrick Robinson, IT-0039 & 40/1-ES, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or
Commutation of Sentence of Mrs. Biljana Plavšić (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/presdec/en/090914.pdf [hereinafter Plavšić
Pardon Decision].
302
303
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responsibility on public television, something she repeated again for a
local newspaper,307 ICTY President Judge Patrick Robinson granted
her motion for release finding that she was “rehabilitated.”308 No
mention was made of her renunciation of responsibility, her slide
backwards towards justifying her criminal behavior, or her complete
nullification of her apology, which was central to mitigating her
sentence.309
CONCLUSION
With the creation of the ICC, international criminal justice
gained a permanent mechanism with potentially global reach. The
potential latent in such an international court has fueled high
expectations.310 Yet, the growing list of objectives and goals has
resulted in unrealistic expectations of international prosecutions of
atrocity crimes. Consequently, fulfilment of the core functions of
international criminal justice has been jeopardized. The pressure to
chase aggrandized ambitions comes not only from politicians, or
special interest groups, or media frenzies. Actors within the system,
particularly international judges, have to some extent bought into
romanticized notions that their legal institutions can achieve an
awesome array of societal goals, even when some of those objectives
are in direct conflict with each other. This overreach has had a
negative impact on the sentencing of perpetrators of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Judges at international criminal
courts have elaborated a smorgasbord of ideological objectives for
international criminal prosecutions, resulting in perverse and
confusing justifications for individual sentences.

Carrie Schimizzi, Bosnia war crimes victims submit evidence against former
Serbian
officials,
JURIST
(Apr.
8,
2011),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/bosnia-war-crimes-victims-submitevidence-against-former-serbian-officials.php; Iva Martinović, Outcry at Plavsic’s
Belgrade Welcome, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://iwpr.net/report-news/outcry-plavsics-belgrade-welcome.
308 See Plavšić Pardon Decision, supra note 306, at para. 8.
309 See id.
310 Although, significantly, it is lacking its own law enforcement regime to
carry out basic police tasks, or a standing “police force” so to speak.
307
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The ad hoc tribunals have drawn on a wide range of sources
when identifying the sentencing rationales for international criminal
justice. Although deterrence and retribution appear most frequently
in the tribunal’s sentencing judgments, international judges appealed
to a much wider range of justifications, legal and political, to
legitimize their sentences, in particular sentences that would
otherwise appear to be extremely lenient. This toggling at will
between punitive and restorative approaches to punishment has
opened the work of international criminal tribunals to criticism of
bias, politicization, and victor’s justice. International idealism defeats
itself. There are many learning lessons here for the ICC and pitfalls to
avoid.
This article’s findings caution against international criminal
justice mechanism becoming too entangled with idealistic aspirations,
such as reconciliation or producing a historical record, at the cost of
their primary function to punish perpetrators of atrocity crimes. By
analyzing the tribunals’ jurisprudence, this article demonstrates how
international judges often veer off course away from their primary
role in light of the realistic capacity of international criminal courts
when attempting to achieve other well-meaning goals that are beyond
the institutional capacity of international criminal courts. This results
in problematic rulings, distortion of responsibility or accountability,
and ultimately failure to achieve the desired aspirations because of
institutional and structural limitations.
Arguably, international judges cannot commit to serious
punitive measures and simultaneously prioritize pragmatic
considerations, as weak institutions must—such as, incentivizing
voluntary surrender or encouraging cooperation. Perhaps they are
unwilling to impose meaningful penalties out of misplaced idealism
that their leniency will bring other high-ranking perpetrators, those
who bear the greatest responsibility, to the table. This strategy failed.
None of the remaining most wanted perpetrators followed Plavšić’s
suit in either surrendering to the court or admitting responsibility.
Krajišnik maintained his innocence and opted for a trial.311Karadzić
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para.
888 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf.
311
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and Mladić refused to surrender.312 Vojislav Šešelj defiantly denounce
the ICTY as an “illegal tribunal” and his court appointed counsel as a
“spy” for Western imperialism.313
An analysis of the sentencing jurisprudence suggests that
international judges pick and choose, without principled justification,
an ideology to follow in a particular case that serves the desired result
they have in mind for that case. In subsequent cases, that ideology
may be abandoned or marginalized, without explanation, if it proves
to be an obstacle to their desired sentence. This is particularly true in
the case of the ICTY where the sentencing jurisprudence lacks
commitment to prioritizing a principle to guide sentencing
allocations. In order words, ICL sentencing lacks commitment to a
general principle that will influence its determination of a sentence.
Another observation that may be made, aside from failure to
identify a primary sentencing philosophy, is that quite often the
proffered rationales are inconsistent with the actual sentencing
results. Under-theorization and the absence of scholarly examination
of the sentencing jurisprudence of international criminal courts has
left us with an ad hoc approach to sentencing for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. In the absence of a guiding theory,
the wide discretion given to international judges in sentencing has
failed to produce a rational and consistent international sentencing
practice. To the contrary, certain ideologies resulted in injustice in
sentencing. This is particularly so when reconciliation ideology
influenced the sentence, and therefore it should be abandoned or
given very limited weight. A possible unfortunate legacy of the
ICTY’s sentencing jurisprudence is that high-ranking perpetrators in
leadership positions receive more reduction in prison sentence than
foot soldiers where both are found to have “contributed toward

312 Ed Vulliamy, Twelve years on, a killer on the loose, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
1, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/02/warcrimes.edvulliamy1.
313 Serb
nationalist rejects UN court, BBC, Nov. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084506.stm; Serb ultranationalist disrupts ware
crimes trial, REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2006, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/01/ukwarcrimes-seselj-idUKL0146563020061101.
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reconciliation.”314 Those most responsible for atrocities, in particular,
have benefited the most when reconciliation was advanced as a
rationale for mitigating punishment. They have received significantly
reduced sentences, often lower than their subordinates, thus
trivializing their culpability for the atrocities. Moreover, in general,
most utilitarian aspirations associated with international criminal
prosecutions should be abandoned as sentencing rationales because
they distort the individual perpetrator’s culpability.
This paper’s analysis demonstrates that when international
judges give undue weight to utilitarian aspirations in their sentencing
judgments, they distort and diminish the culpability and just
distribution of punishment among the various actors’ responsibility
for atrocity crimes in a situation. Moreover, the goals they seek to
achieve with their sentencing reductions, like reconciliation, are
beyond the immediate capacity of criminal courts. International
prosecutions should assume a more modest posture regarding its
capabilities, lest it damages its core responsibility of punishing
perpetrators of atrocities crimes. This is not to say that international
criminal justice cannot contribute to these aspirations, but rather that
it should not be given weight as a factor in sentencing.

See generally Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94.
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THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY ON ATROCITYRELATED PROSECUTIONS IN THE COURTS
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Yaël Ronen*
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of international criminal tribunals since the
1990s has been part of a general move by the international
community toward a clear condemnation of atrocities and an
expression of a collective determination to end impunity. Yet the
international tribunals cannot achieve these goals by themselves.1
Domestic courts are an essential component in the enforcement of
international criminal law because they help to ensure that
accountability does not remain the lot of an exclusive few while
thousands of perpetrators walk free. Without large-scale domestic
action, the international community’s message of ending impunity, as
expressed in the establishment of international tribunals, would be
severely undermined. This holds true for the era of the International
* Yaël Ronen, Senior Lecturer, Sha’arei Mishpat Law School, Hod
Hasharon, Israel. This article was written as part of the DOMAC Project, a
research program funded by the Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities
Programme of the Seventh Framework Progamme for E.U. Research (FP7), 20082011. Sources include personal interviews conducted by DOMAC researches in
2008 with professionals in the ICTY and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The identity of
interviewees has been kept confidential; transcripts and related information are on
file with the author. Section IV.B draws, inter alia, on an early DOMAC report by
Alejandro Chehtman, later published as Developing Bosnia and Herzegovina´s Capacity to
Process War Crimes Cases: Critical Notes on a “Success Story,” 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 547
(2011). I am grateful to Judge Shireen Avis Fischer, Thorbjorn Bjornsson, Rotem
Giladi, Yuval Shany, Harmen van der Wilt, and the anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on earlier versions.
1 Yuval Shany, How Can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact
upon National Criminal Proceedings? Lessons from the First Two Decades of International
Criminal Justice in Operation, 46 ISR. L. REV. 431 (2013).
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Criminal Court no less than for the experience of its ad hoc
antecedents.
The international and the domestic arenas are not isolated
from each other. They interact both intentionally and implicitly,
including through judicial bodies. The latter interaction naturally
varies from one instance to another depending on the particular
circumstances. Yet because the shift in emphasis from international
to domestic enforcement of international criminal law is a recurring
one, the question arises whether there are characteristic patterns in
the institutional interaction that allow for lessons to be learned as to
best practices, or, on the other hand, as to potential pit falls in future
processes. This article concerns the experience in effecting this shift
from international to domestic enforcement of international criminal
law with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), namely the
interaction between the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the courts of BiH.
In the case of BiH, the distinction between international and
domestic institutions is not self-evident. While the ICTY’s
international character is beyond dispute, as is the domestic character
of the ordinary courts of BiH, the classification of the federal-level
BiH court dealing with international crimes is less straightforward. It
was set up while BiH was under international administration, and it
employs international, as well as national, judges and prosecutors.
However, the source of authority of the court is domestic law; it
applies domestic law, and, ultimately, will employ only national
personnel.2 Thus, while at present it is best characterised as a hybrid,
its terms of reference envisage an entirely domestic mechanism. For
the purposes of the present article, institutions within BiH,
irrespective of their provenance and composition, are therefore
regarded as domestic, although the hybrid character of the federallevel BiH court will be analyzed in context.

Cf. Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 709, 713-14 (1999) (defining an
international tribunal as one which must have been established by an international
legal instrument and resorts to international law).
2
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Sections I to III of this article are introductory and therefore
brief. Section I provides a historical and institutional background to
the situation in BiH; Section II recalls the international response to
the mass atrocities in BiH, namely the establishment of the ICTY;
and Section III reviews the domestic judicial response of BiH to the
mass atrocities. Section IV constitutes the heart of the article and
considers the impact of the ICTY on the domestic response to warrelated crimes through qualitative, quantitative, and normative
parameters. The article concludes with a tentative characterization
and assessment of the ICTY’s impact on the domestic response.
This article does not purport to provide a comprehensive
study of the international involvement in BiH, the significance of
which cannot be overstated in the context of addressing war-related
crimes. Important international processes and actors other than the
ICTY, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the
European Union (E.U.), have undoubtedly affected the policy and
practice in BiH, arguably to an even greater extent than the ICTY.
While this article is nonetheless limited to the potential trickle-down
effect of the ICTY in its direct interaction with the domestic legal
system, there is no doubt that political stances toward the
international involvement have had an impact on the reception in
BiH of the ICTY and, accordingly, on its ability to impact domestic
institutions—particularly the judiciary. Arguably, whatever success
the ICTY has had in influencing BiH institutions was the result of the
tight control that the international community has exercised over the
country, and, correspondingly, limited to the state of BiH, where it
enjoyed such control.
I. BACKGROUND
BiH’s descent into ethnic war in 1992 was the culmination of
over seven decades of pent-up ethnic animosity among Serbs, Croats,
and Bosnians, nurtured by forced political union under Yugoslav
statehood in its various forms. In fact, the establishment of the
Republic of BiH under Tito’s Yugoslavia was itself a tool of ethnic
management, aimed at maintaining a balance between the two
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dominant ethnicities in Yugoslavia, the Serbs and the Croats, both of
which lay claims to the territory of the Republic.3
Tito’s death in 1980, combined with the end of Cold War
rivalry and the decline of communist ideology in the rest of Europe
in the 1980s, led to the severe weakening of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)’s crucial unifying factors. The
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991-92 came as no surprise. In BiH the
process was fashioned by interethnic disputes and heavy involvement
of Serbia and Croatia, both acting in pursuit of their territorial
aspirations. When BiH declared independence on March 3, 1992,
large-scale violence had already erupted within it with the support of
the kin states.4
At the outset, the BiH conflict was predominantly between
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats backed by Croatia on one side,
and Bosnian Serbs backed by Serbia on the other side. By the end of
May 1992, two thirds of BiH territory, including the soon-to-benamed Republika Srpska, was in Bosnian-Serb hands. The second
stage of the war began in May 1993 with the collapse of cooperation
between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. This conflict lasted
until the spring of 1994, when the combined territory held by the
Croat and Bosnian-Muslim government forces was united into the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the number of warring
parties in BiH was again reduced to two. The last stage of the
conflict, from early 1994 on, was marked by NATO’s military
intervention. It culminated in May 1995, when, in reaction to Serb
refusal to comply with a NATO ultimatum to withdraw heavy
weaponry from around sieged enclaves, NATO forces launched air
strikes on Serb targets in BiH and in Serbia. Further air strikes led to

See Dusko Doder, Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds, 91 FOREIGN POL’Y
3, 12 (1993).
4 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1, Judgment,
para. 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf.
3

116

2014

Ronen

3:1

U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995,
which produced the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.5
Estimates as to the number of victims of the war vary
enormously, ranging from 25,000 to 329,000.6 Former ICTY
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte endorsed a finding of 103,000 lives lost.7
Reliable data suggests that about two-thirds of the victims were
Muslim, over a quarter Serb, and the remaining eight percent Croat.8
Approximately one million BiH citizens became refugees during the
war, and another one million were internally displaced. Over a third
of pre-war residential dwellings were destroyed and the technical and
social infrastructure was significantly damaged.9 As a consequence,
the ethnic composition of entire regions was affected. In the territory
of the present-day Federation of BiH, which is predominantly
Muslim-Croat, the share of non-Serbs had increased by over forty
percent, while in the Serb-populated area that now forms the
Republika Srpska, the share of non-Serbs had fallen by over eighty
percent.10

5 Paula Pickering, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/700826/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2014).
6 Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21
EUR. J. OF POPULATION 187, 192 (2005).
7 CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY 39 (2008).
8 PATRICK BALL, EWA TABEAU & PHILIP VERWIMP, HOUSEHOLDS IN
CONFLICT NETWORK (HICN), THE BOSNIAN BOOK OF DEAD: ASSESSMENT OF
THE DATABASE (FULL REPORT) 29 (2007), http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/rdn5.pdf.
9 OSCE MISSION TO BOSN. & HERZ., HUM. RTS. DEP’T, WAR CRIMES
TRIALS BEFORE THE DOMESTIC COURTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES 3 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE 2005].
10 Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavisić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf;
HELSINKI
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. IN REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, MINORITY RIGHTS IN REPUBLIKA
SRPSKA (1999), www.minelres.lv/reports/bosnia/bosnia-rs_NGO.htm (estimating
20,000 Muslims in RS in 1999).
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The Dayton Peace Accords outline the new constitutional
design of BiH. The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or “the
state”) comprises two administrative divisions (“entities”): the
Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian/Croat Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and the internationallysupervised Brčko district. The RS is a unitary entity dominated by
Bosnian Serbs, while FBiH is itself also a federal entity, with power
shared between Bosnian Muslims and Croats.11 The Dayton Accords
established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to facilitate
the implementation of the Accords. BiH has hosted a number of
peacekeeping forces. Since 2004, the E.U. has been responsible for
peacekeeping operations, while NATO maintains a headquarters in
Sarajevo to assist the country with defense reform.12
The BiH Constitution attached to the Dayton Agreement13
delineates the division of competences between the entities and the
state. The state is vested with comparatively few powers and
competences,14 and residual competences lie with the entities.15 The
entities exercise a wide measure of independence, and the
relationship between their governing bodies and those of the state,
including judicial bodies, is hardly hierarchical. Indeed, in some
respects, BiH and FBiH are as foreign to RS as BiH is to Croatia or
Serbia. Moreover, the judicial institutions of the state of BiH are
eminently affected by the international administration of the country

11 EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMM’N),
OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AND THE POWERS OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, CDL-AD(2005)004, 7 (Feb.
22, 2005),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2005
)021-e.
12 NATO ends SFOR Mission, NATO (last updated Dec. 6, 2004),
www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm.
13 U.N. Secretary-General, General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Nov. 30, 1995),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgr
eement.pdf, [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
14 CONSTITUTION OF BOSN. & HERZ., Dec. 14, 1995, art. III.1,
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372
[hereinafter
BIH
CONSTITUTION].
15 Id. at art. III.3.
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since 1995, whereas the impact of the international administration on
the courts of FBiH and RS has been much more limited.
BiH has been experiencing an uneasy peace since the
conclusion of the Dayton Accords. It receives extensive international
assistance, but the economy remains weak. No less importantly,
political paralysis plagues the country’s institutions; more than one
senior official has suggested the country was “dysfunctional,” with its
constituent entities disagreeing on fundamental structural questions.
This dynamic has prevented necessary constitutional reform.16
Dissatisfaction with the constitutional structure of the country is
particularly forceful in RS, where the possibility is occasionally raised
of taking steps toward secession.17 As will be demonstrated, this lack
of unity has had an impact on the interaction between institutions
and on the sense of a commitment to act jointly toward the
achievement of common goals.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE MASS ATROCITIES:
THE ICTY
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 827 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, establishing
the ICTY and adopting the Tribunal’s Statute.18 The Tribunal’s
subject-matter jurisdiction extended to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.19 Resolution 827 made particular reference

16 Progress Hostage to Political Blockages in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
NATO Parliamentarians Hear in Balkans, NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY (June
28, 2010), www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2168.
17 Sabina Niksic, Bosnian Serbs Adopt Controversial Referendum Law, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbsadopt-controversial-referendum-law; Political deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina ahead of
key meeting, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.dw.de/politicaldeadlock-in-bosnia-herzegovina-ahead-of-key-meeting/a-5279682.
18 U.N Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.
19 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 5, Annex to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/sid/135[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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to BiH as the site of reported widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law.20
The establishment of the ICTY was accompanied by
statements on the need for justice, deterrence, promotion of the rule
of law, reconciliation, and maintenance of peace.21 But it was also
motivated by less-articulated political goals, such as appeasement of
international public opinion and avoidance of military intervention.22
It is not clear that the judicial role of the Tribunal was taken seriously
by Security Council Members at the time.23
Domestic prosecutions did not feature prominently on the
agenda of the drafters of the ICTY Statute, but it was clear from the
outset that the bulk of cases related to the mass atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia were to be handled eventually by national courts.
Only at a relatively late stage was it recognized that only if the ICTY
succeeds in sustaining its action locally would it really meet the
expectations of the Security Council’s resolutions.24
At the same time, in light of the ongoing armed conflict and
the deep-rooted animosity among the various ethnic and religious
groups which initially made domestic courts unlikely to be willing or
S.C. Res. 827, preambular para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres827.html.
21 See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May
25, 1993), for the comments made by Security Council members upon the adoption
of Resolution 808 (Feb. 22, 1993) and Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993), which
established the Tribunal.
22 YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 146 (1999); Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making
Peace: Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World
Politics, 6 TULANE J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 46-49 (1998); STEVEN R. RATNER,
JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-14 (3d ed. 2009); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 326 (2d ed. 2008).
23 David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 185, 187 (Roger S.
Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996).
24 See Frederic Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its
Actors and Observers, 4 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 1011, 1030 (2011) (quoting
former ICTY President Pocar).
20
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able to conduct fair trials,25 ICTY Statute Article 9(2) provides the
Tribunal with primacy over domestic courts, of which it has made
only infrequent use.26 The majority of indictments before the ICTY
have been for crimes committed on the territory of BiH, and the
majority of indictees have been Serbs and Bosnian-Serbs.27
In 2003 the Security Council adopted the ICTY-devised
“completion strategy,” aimed at ensuring that the Tribunal conclude
its mission in a timely way and in coordination with domestic legal
systems in the region.28 The completion strategy required that the
ICTY focus its efforts on “the most senior leaders suspected of being
most responsible for crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”29 and
transfer “intermediate and lower ranked accused” to competent
domestic jurisdictions,30 while ensuring that basic human rights
standards and procedural safeguards are met. In fact, ICTY President
Pocar has noted that the Completion Strategy was a strategy not so
much to “complete” the work of the ICTY as it was designed to
allow continuation by domestic actors of those activities that have

25 CASSESE, supra note 22, at 339; PAUL R. WILLIAMS AND MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 96-98 (2002).
26 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
para. 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (taking over at the
investigative stage from Germany); Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Mladić & Stanišić, Case
No. IT-95-5-D, Trial Chamber Decision on the Bosnian Serb Leadership Deferral
Proposal (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 16, 1995) (taking over
from BiH); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović, Case No. ICTY-IT-96-22-T,
Sentencing Judgment, para. 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29,
1996) (taking over from FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)).
27 Over two thirds of the indictees are of Serb ethnicity. Over three
quarters of the indictments filed until 2000 were of Ethnic Serbs. YAËL RONEN,
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF SHARON AVITAL & OREN TAMIR, PROSECUTIONS AND
SENTENCING IN THE WESTERN BALKANS, DOMAC/4, graph 6.2.2 (2010),
http://www.domac.is/media/domac/DOMAC-4-2010.pdf.
28 S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res.
1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
29 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 28, at preambular para. 7.
30 Id. at preambular para. 8.
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been initially put in motion by the ICTY.31 Altogether, thirteen cases
have been referred from the ICTY to domestic jurisdictions. Of
those, eleven were referred to BiH. The ICTY also sent back to
domestic jurisdictions cases that had been investigated by the OTP
but in which no indictment was filed in the ICTY by the deadline set
at the end of 2004.
III. THE DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO THE MASS ATROCITIES
The post-conflict treatment of international crimes in BiH is
unique among the countries of the former Yugoslavia. First, the
volume of potential cases relating to BiH is immense, because the
overwhelming majority of crimes were committed on its territory and
against its population. Second, international crimes are addressed
today principally at the level of the federal state, which is
characterized by a weak central government in comparison with the
strong entity structures (the FBiH and RS). Not unique, but
significant for the analysis of domestic practice, is the fact that the
legal system in BiH is relatively new, containing both institutions and
norms that were only put in place in 2003.
In the immediate aftermath of the armed conflict, the
appointment process for judges in the two entities continued to be
controlled by the ruling political parties. There were frequent
accusations of partiality, corruption, and judicial incompetence.
Judges were often forced to supplement their meagre salaries with
“outside” work. This not only deprived judges of time that should
have been devoted to judicial duties, but it also risked compromising
the judges’ independent decision-making abilities.32 In addition, the
system lacked basic infrastructure. The weakness of the judiciary was
compounded by complexities in the legal framework and
inappropriate procedural laws to effectively prosecute and defend
alleged war criminals, a lack of qualified defense attorneys, and an
31 Fausto Pocar, Completion or Continuation Strategy? Appraising Problems and
Possible Developments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY, 6 J. OF INT’L CRIM. L. 655, 661
(2008).
32 Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an Embattled Region - Creating and
Implementing the “Rules of the Road” for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1,
5-6 (1999).
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inability to monitor trials or summon witnesses. Other obstacles were
poor case preparation by prosecutors, ineffective witness protection
mechanisms,33 and lack of cooperation between the entities.
The international community did not intervene in the reestablishment of law enforcement institutions.34 The Constitution of
BiH, annexed to the Dayton Accords, only re-established the
Constitutional Court. Until 1997, administration of justice was under
the exclusive responsibility of the entities (with the exception of a
BiH-level Constitutional Court). In 1997, a new Ministry of Civil
Affairs and Communications was established at the BiH level, which
was given responsibility for dealing with “international and interentity criminal law enforcement,” including international legal
assistance.
Most law enforcement, including the domestic prosecution of
war-related crimes, was left to the entities.35 Only in the early 2000s
did the OHR initiate a comprehensive reform of the legal system in
BiH. This included restructuring and downsizing of courts and
prosecutors’ offices and replacing all judges and prosecutors36 in an
effort to secure the independence of the judiciary and establish an
appropriate balance of judges of different ethnicities. In 2003, a
Ministry of Justice was created at the BiH level, which by then

33 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: THE WAR CRIMES
CHAMBER
IN
BOSNIA
AND
HERZEGOVINA
(2006),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/02/07/looking-justice [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 2006].
34 Interview with NGO researchers in The Hague, BiH, and ICTY (Jan.
2009). Interviewees were selected based on their seniority and familiarity with the
relevant justice systems. They included senior officials in various the ICTY units,
international and domestic judges and prosecutors, E.U. and OSCE officials, and
local NGOs. Since many of the interviewees did not want the information they
provided to be attributed to them, they are referred to in generic terms.
35 William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of
the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 286-87
(2008).
36 E.g., Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative, Speech to the U.N.
Security
Council
(Sept.
5,
2000),
http://www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/pressa/default.asp?content_id=3236; OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 9.
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included the State (federal) Court and State (federal) Prosecutor’s
Office.37
Until 2005, trials for war-related crimes were held only in the
courts of the entities. In FBiH, jurisdiction over war-related crimes
lies with ten cantonal courts, where 174 individuals, mostly of Serb
ethnicity, have been indicted from 1992 to September 2009. Of these,
146 have received final verdicts. In RS, jurisdiction lies with 5 district
courts, and forty-five individuals have been indicted and eventually
received a verdict by 2009, the overwhelming majority of whom were
of Serb ethnicity. All but five of the indictments in RS were
submitted in or after 2003. Appeals on these courts’ judgments are
heard by the Supreme Court of the respective entity. Since 2005, warrelated crimes have also been tried at the War Crimes Section (WCS)
within the State Court of BiH (State Court).38 The WCS employs
both domestic and international judges39 and exercises primary
jurisdiction over war-related crimes, namely genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, through both trial and appeals chambers.40
It retains cases or transfers them to entity courts depending on their
complexity and sensitivity.41 By September 2009, 139 individuals had
been indicted for war-related crimes before the WCS at the State
Court, most of them of Serb ethnicity. By the end of the same period,
seventy-two of the defendants had received a final verdict.42

37 BIH PUB. ADMIN. REFORM COORDINATOR’S OFF., FUNCTIONAL
REVIEW OF THE BIH JUSTICE SECTOR (2005), parco.gov.ba/?id=408.
38 BALKAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK (BIRN), PURSUIT
FOR JUSTICE: GUIDE TO THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER OF THE BIH COURT 7 (vol.
II) (hereinafter BIRN, PURSUIT OF JUSTICE).
39 For a discussion of this policy, see infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
40 CRIM. PROC. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art. 315.
41 For a discussion of this policy, see infra text accompanying notes 14046; NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR WORK ON WAR CRIMES CASES (2008),
www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/file/Projekti/Drzavna%20strategije%20za%20rad%20n
a%20predmetima%20RZ.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. See also
NATIONAL
WAR
CRIMES
STRATEGY
(2008),
www.adhgeneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/War-Crimes-Strategy-f-18-12-08.pdf, for an English
translation of NATIONAL STRATEGY.
42 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graphs 2.2A.1.1,
2.2A.4.1.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY ON DOMESTIC COURTS
A. Introduction
When the ICTY was established in 1993, no thought was given
to cooperation with, or even assistance to, domestic jurisdictions in
the former Yugoslavia.43 The ICTY had specific tasks to perform—
arrests and trials.44 It was busy strengthening its judicial capacity,
developing procedures, and ensuring that the international
community provided the necessary cooperation in gathering evidence
and arresting indictees.45 Fostering the ability of domestic authorities
to address international crimes was not considered one of the
Tribunal’s goals,46 and no resources were allocated toward it.
Moreover, war was still raging in the region during the first years of
the Tribunal’s existence, making geographical and legal remoteness
inevitable. But remoteness was also a policy choice, which continued
to maintain hold after the termination of the armed conflict. The
Court regarded impartiality as requiring it to maintain and display its
distance (geographically, linguistically, politically, and legally) almost
to the extent of indifference to political reality on the ground. In
addition, cooperation with the domestic jurisdictions was considered
a potential threat to the integrity of the international process because
the rule of law remained suspect in all these states.47

43 Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and
Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crime Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 547, 561 (2005).
44 Louise Arbour, The Crucial Years, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 396, 397 (2004);
DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 1.
45 Refik Hodžić, Bosnia and Herzegovina - Legitimacy in Transition 4,
Presentation at Building a Future on Peace and Justice Conference, Nuremberg
(June 25-27, 2007).
46 David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5, 12-16
(2002),
http://dialogueonfreedom.org/rol/publications/ceeli_icty_tolbert_fletcher_forum
_2002.pdf.
47 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009). Del Ponte points out that ICTY prosecutors intentionally remained
uninformed about the conflict, ostensibly so as not to compromise their
impartiality. DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 125.
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From the outset, the ICTY suffered from a negative
reputation among the various domestic constituencies in the Western
Balkans, including BiH. Entity institutions in particular often regard
the ICTY as a hostile political body.48 The antagonism toward the
ICTY has been attributed to ignorance among domestic
constituencies as to the Tribunal’s operation as well as to the
dissatisfaction with its perceived bias over whom it chooses to indict.
The popularity of the Tribunal throughout the region is inversely
proportionate to the number of indictees hailing from the majority
ethnic community in question,49 while the minority within each state
has a more positive view of the Tribunal. The only exception is in
FBiH, where the Muslim majority has a better opinion of the
Tribunal than the Croatian minority.50 Nonetheless, the Muslim
community is frustrated with the small number of indictments, the
slowness of the trials, and the perceived leniency of sentences.51 To
counter this phenomenon, ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, with the cooperation of prosecutor Louise Arbour,
established in 1998 the Outreach Programme within the Tribunal to
encourage engagement with domestic authorities52 and to
communicate directly with the people of the former Yugoslavia. The
main focus of the Outreach Programme is to provide information to
key regional stakeholders and the wider public about the work of the
Tribunal to, inter alia, facilitate the transfer of expertise to national
judiciaries.53 Despite these efforts, opinions regarding the ICTY have
not changed dramatically.54 It has been suggested that the Outreach
48 Interview with NGO researcher in Sarajevo (January 2009); Mirko
Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 89, 96 (2009).
49 Hodžić, supra note 45, at 4.
50 Klarin, supra note 48, at 91-92.
51 Id. at 90.
52 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); Arbour, supra note 44, at 401.
53 Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, Pres. of ICTY,
annexed
to
U.N.
Doc.
S/2009/589,
(Nov.
13,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionS
trategy/completion_strategy_13nov2009_en.pdf. See also infra § IV.B on capacity
building.
54 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 467, 484 (2009);
Klarin, supra note 48, at 92.
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Programme, as well as the legal officers of the ICTY,55 do not
sufficiently acknowledge the influence of the domestic Serb and
Croat political, academic, and cultural elites,56 who propagate the
view that the ICTY is a politically-motivated Western project intent
on undermining Serb and Croat independence.57 This opposition to
the international project of state-building in BiH is reflected in
animosity not only toward the ICTY itself, but also toward
institutions of the state, including judicial bodies. For example, the
unwillingness of entity courts to take the cue from the State Court of
BiH is driven in part by its perception as an internationally imposed
puppet institution.
The completion strategy of the ICTY has nonetheless
brought about a sea change in the relationship between the ICTY and
domestic jurisdiction. The ICTY developed a strong interest in
enhancing the capacity of domestic legal systems to uphold relevant
criminal standards. It engaged more proactively with the
establishment of the War Crimes Chamber (WCS) within the State
Court of BiH, with a view to facilitate the domestic exercise of
criminal justice powers following transfer of cases under Rule 11bis58
and domestically-initiated cases.59 The completion strategy also played
a part in the adoption of new criminal codes and criminal procedure
codes. Regardless, even as late as 2008, there were doubts in the
ICTY, and the international community more generally, about
whether domestic institutions were capable of administering justice
for war-related crimes effectively and in accordance with
international standards.60 This may explain the reluctance on the part
Klarin, supra note 48, at 96.
DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 49-50.
57 Clark, supra note 54, at 483. For conflicting views on the Outreach
Program, see Mégret, supra note 24, at 1037-40.
58 Rule 11bis allows the ICTY to refer cases to domestic courts in the
region of the former Yugoslavia.
59 Interviews with official from ICTY Prosecutor’s Office and with
official from the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo (January 2009);
Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo (January 2009).
60 Judge O-Gon Kwon, Discussion: Capacity Building under Time Pressure, 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 682 (2008); William Schabas, Discussion: National v.
International Jurisdiction, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 707 (2008); Thomas Weigend,
Discussion: National v. International Courts, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 704 (2008).
55
56
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of the ICTY to relinquish specific cases or to actively promote
domestic courts (an endeavour which is also constrained by the
ICTY’s limited capacity). Interaction with domestic institutions has
therefore been informed by the acknowledgement of the necessity of
the completion strategy, combined with skepticism as to the viability
of domestic processes and resource limits on both sides. The
following sections examine the normative, quantitative, and
qualitative impact of the ICTY in domestic courts in BiH.
B. The Qualitative Impact of the ICTY—Capacity of Courts
1. Establishment of the WCS
The most fundamental development in capacity enhancement
in BiH with respect to domestic proceedings relating to international
crimes was the establishment of the WCS. The proposal to transfer
cases from the ICTY to the states of the former Yugoslavia was first
tabled by ICTY President Jorda in May 2000.61 However, for a long
time, such relocation was perceived as premature. It was envisaged
for a later stage, when the judicial systems of the relevant states were
reconstructed on democratic foundations, so that they could
accomplish their goal with total independence and impartiality and
with due regard for the principles of international humanitarian law
and the protection of human rights. This would have entailed
international involvement and support in training.62
By late 2002, when President Jorda presented the Security
Council with a further report outlining the completion strategy, the
transfer of cases involving mid- and low-level accused to national
courts had become an essential component of the strategy.63 The
most important condition that national courts were required to satisfy
was the ability to handle transferred cases “effectively and
consistently with internationally recognized standards of human
61 Report on the Operation of ICTY, Identical Letters(Sept. 7, 2000)
from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly Pres. and SCOR Pres., U.N.
Doc A/55/382-S/2000/865, Annex I, para. 42 (May 12, 2000).
62 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4429th mtg. at 4-5, 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4429
(Nov. 27, 2001).
63 Sarah Williams, ICTY Referrals to National Jurisdictions: a Fair Trial or a
Fair Price?, 17 CRIM. L. F. 177, 182 (2006).
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rights and due process.”64 The judicial system of BiH was nonetheless
still considered inadequate. The report therefore called for the
creation of a special war crimes chamber in BiH, a concept which
was endorsed by the Security Council.65
The initial reaction to the establishment of the WCS by BiH
officials was lukewarm. BiH officially “welcome[d] the ICTY
initiative to process some of the cases by the domestic judiciary
structures under the auspices of the ICTY,” but added that “the
prosecution and trial of the indicted war criminals in the region
should continue to be a United Nations responsibility.”66 This
position reflected a common refrain in domestic BiH politics,
according to which the ICTY alone was an adequate solution,
although certain elements of domestic society did push for greater
activity by domestic courts in the late 1990s.67 Domestic approval of
the WCS was nonetheless fuelled by the misinformed yet prevalent
conception that, as a result of the various Security Council
Resolutions endorsing the completion strategy, BiH was obliged to
accept defendants that would be transferred from the ICTY in the
future,68 even though the entities were not yet in a position to provide
the accused with a fair trial.69 In addition, frustration with the ICTY
increased, and the state government regarded a special war crimes
chamber as an opportunity to prove to both national and
international audiences that the state institutions in BiH were capable
of performing even the most demanding criminal prosecutions and
64 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated June 17, 2002 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678
(June 19, 2002).
65 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 28; S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 28.
66 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4429, supra note 62, at 18.
67 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 316.
68 Fidelma Donlon, Rule of Law: from the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia to the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF
LAW IN POSTWAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 257, 280 (Dina Francesca Haynes
ed., 2008).
69 Letter dated May 21, 2004 from the President of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Enclosure II, para. 34, U.N. Doc. S/2004/420 (May 24, 2004).

129

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

that BiH had effectively recovered from the conflict. Simultaneously,
the special war crimes chamber would enable state-level officials to
wrest power away from entity-level institutions under a stamp of
approval by the ICTY. The result was a new and powerful domestic
interest block in BiH pushing for general enhancement of domestic
judicial institutions and for a state-level war crimes court in
particular.70
FBiH representatives, too, were generally supportive of a
special court to deal with war-related crimes as a means of raising
confidence in domestic institutions and awareness of the overall
issues involved.71 In contrast, the RS was resistant to endowing the
State Court with jurisdiction over war-related crimes, as there was
strong concern that the State Court would be biased against Serbs.72
Perhaps a more cynical reason for whatever support was voiced by
either entity’s officials was their interest in preventing ethnicallycharged cases from landing on their own doorsteps.73 The strength of
domestic interests in favor of a state-level war crimes chamber
eventually made possible the adoption of the necessary legislation in
the BiH legislature in November and December 2004.
The procedures and policy of the State Court avoid many of
the shortcomings of the ICTY. These include strictly-imposed
deadlines for trial length; geographical proximity; the absence of a
language barrier; a willingness and intention to investigate and
prosecute crimes committed against Serbs with the same dedication
as all other crimes; and a comprehensive outreach effort, inter alia
adopting the models of communication used by the ICTY.
Burke-White, supra note 35, at 332.
Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prosecution
from the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L. F. 59, 69 (2003).
72 Marija Jandric, EUROBLIC, “They do not trust to the Court in Sarajevo”;
“They do not trust to judges”, cited in OHR BiH Weekend Round-up (July 31- Aug. 1,
2004),
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/roundups/print/?content_id=33044; EUROBLIC, “Judge Miso is a nationalist”, cited in OHR
BiH Media Round-up (Jan., 30 2003), www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-mediarep/round-ups/print/?content_id=29143; Glas Srpski, “Open a court in Jasenovac”,
cited in OHR BiH Media Round-up, (Jan. 30, 2003), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=29143.
73 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 330.
70
71
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2. Transfer of know how
A common means of transferring know how and expertise
among institutions is joint work, either within the transferring
institution or within the receiving one. In the relationship between
the ICTY and institutions within BiH, the former form of interaction
was almost completely absent. As part of the ICTY’s initial attitude
of detachment from the region, it was regarded inappropriate to
recruit professionals from the former Yugoslavia, particularly as
judges, on the ground that this would make it difficult to maintain
sufficient distance and neutrality.74 Security concerns were also a
powerful disincentive for hiring nationals of the region.75
This general policy was revised, not as a result of a conscious
decision to develop domestic capacity, but due to the need to speed
up the processes pending before the ICTY. First, the OTP
considered it crucial to acquire knowledge of the conflict and its
background, and to be able to perform in relevant languages. Further
steps were triggered by the notion that most of the work would have
to be done in the region and by the fact that the few people from the
region who went to work at the ICTY proved to be good
professionals.76 However, this change in policy did not make a
substantial contribution to the actual transfer of knowledge and skills
to BiH, at least not in the short term, because people from the region
who started working at the ICTY were unlikely to return to the
region—at least not immediately.77
In contrast, the employment of former ICTY personnel at
the domestic level, mainly at the state level,78 as was the extensive
Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers at The Hague
(January 2009).
75 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers, Victims and
Witnesses Section, Prosecutor’s Office, and others, at The Hague (January 2009).
76 ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, DEVELOPING LOCAL CAPACITY FOR WAR
CRIMES TRIALS: INSIGHTS FORM BIH, SIERRA LEONE AND COLOMBIA 23-24
(2011), http://www.domac.is/media/domac/Domac-9-AC-Final-Paper.pdf.
77 This is also true of locals working in victims and witness support.
Interview with official from the ICTY Victims and Witnesses Section at The Hague
(January 2009).
78 Interviews with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
74
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advice offered by other administrative ICTY officers in connection
with the setting up the Court of BiH, have been important elements
of the transfer of knowledge from the ICTY to BiH. This overall
policy appears to have been motivated at least partly by the need to
ensure that the domestic processes satisfy the ICTY’s requirements,
in order to enable the transfer of cases under Rule 11bis,79 rather than
out of direct concern for the development and future of domestic
institutions.80
The international presence within the State Court of BiH
encompasses all units from the judiciary itself to administrative
support. The need for this international participation was
acknowledged even by the RS.81 One of the positive contributions of
this participation has been in deflecting the suspicion and mistrust of
the domestic public toward the domestic judiciary, which had been
seen as unprofessional, corrupt, and biased against members of the
“other” side. Foreign professionals may also be more familiar with
international crimes and jurisprudence and with applying
international standards of due process.
At the same time, it was recognized from the start that the
State Court had to be run and seen to function as a BiH institution,
with domestic actors taking responsibility for early its success. The
appointment of domestic practitioners to lead positions82 gave the
institution a BiH face and identity. One aspect of this is the exclusion
of international judges from presiding over panels. However, this
policy has been controversial. Some suggest that a rotation in panel
presidency could have had a positive impact on the effectiveness and
celerity of the Court, in particular if international judges were to
introduce efficient case management techniques.83 Originally, each
panel was comprised of two international judges and a presiding
domestic judge. At the time of writing, the WCS trial section first-

79 Declaration by the PIC Steering Board, PEACE IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL
(June 12, 2003), http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=30074.
80 Interviews with officials from the BiH Court Registry in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
81 Bohlander, supra note 71, at 68.
82 Law on the Ct. of Bosn. & Herz., art 65.
83 Interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
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instance panels comprise four judges each, one international
and three domestic. As a rule, the domestic judge is the president of
the panel. The appellate division of the WCS consists of one panel
composed of two international judges and a presiding domestic
judge.84 The participation of international judges was intended to be
phased out by 2009,85 but in December 2009 the OHR extended that
mandate of the international judicial and prosecutorial staff for three
years,86 despite strong objection by RS.87
A more fruitful aspect of the informal transfer of knowledge
is the working relationships established between judges and their legal
officers. The younger legal professionals are also usually more
receptive to mentoring and are often better able to adapt to the new
legal framework.
Many other elements nonetheless undermine the process of
transferring knowledge and skills between international and domestic
court officials. One is the selection process of international judges
and prosecutors for the WCS, which has been heavily criticized for
resulting in the appointment of insufficiently qualified professionals. 88
The situation has allegedly improved with the transfer of the
selection process to the domestic High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council.89 A related problem is the short duration of international

84 STATE COURT OF BIH,
www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=3&id=3&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 6,
2014).
85 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 7.
86 Dzenana Karabegovic, On Dayton Anniversary, Spirit of Accord Eludes
Bosnia, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/On_Dayton_Anniversary_Spirit_Of_Accord_Elude
s_Bosnia/1903958.html.
87 Id.
88 Interviews with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
To this, some locals would add “their unfamiliarity with the domestic system, with
the historical context, with the constitutional structure of BiH, and with its political
context.” Interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
89 DAVID TOLBERT & ALEKSANDAR KONTIC, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES (ICLS) EXPERTS ON THE SUSTAINABLE
TRANSITION OF THE REGISTRY AND INTERNATIONAL DONOR SUPPORT TO THE
COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF
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judges’ tenure, and the resultant lack of familiarity with the complex
nature of cases and the cultural and political background within
which they took place.90
Several domestic judges consider the influence of their
international counterparts as generally positive.91 Experienced
domestic judges have not always been willing to be “chaperoned” by
international colleagues.92 Because there has been no institutional
policy regarding the transfer of expertise, interaction between
international and domestic judges, in the form of regular debates over
both substantive and procedural issues, drafting of guidelines by the
international judges, and special training sessions,93 has always been
the product of the commitment of particular judges.
In the prosecution, the mix of international and domestic
professionals in case teams was also viewed as a good method for
domestic legal professionals to increase their knowledge about the
applicability of international instruments on human rights and to
ensure compliance with international standards. The contribution of
international staff to the capacity of domestic legal professionals is
especially important in light of the breadth and complexity of war
crimes cases. Recent reform of the BiH criminal procedure code that
has made the criminal justice system in BiH more adversarial94 and
thus less familiar to domestically-trained professionals, has made
capacity building even more critical. However, a reported lack of trust
and goodwill toward international prosecutors on the part of the first
BiH Chief Prosecutor,95 combined with a post-communist

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 2009 31, 37 (2008), www.iclsfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/icls-bih-finalreportwebsitecorrected.pdf.
90 Interview with a Prosecutor in Sarajevo (January 2009).
91 E.g., interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January
2009).
92 Interview with a judge from the BiH Court and with an official from
the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office at The Hague (January 2009).
93 Interview with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 10.
95 Interview with an official from the Office of the Prosecutor of the BiH
Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).

134

2014

Ronen

3:1

institutional culture of reluctance to share information,96severe time
constraints, and heavy workload, obviously affected peer
relationships and the possibility of knowledge- and informationsharing. At the time of writing, there is only one international serving
prosecutor.97
3. Transfer of information
Transfer of cases from the ICTY to domestic courts entailed
an enormous transfer of information and evidence to the domestic
courts. This required the ICTY to provide mechanisms to liaise with
domestic authorities to obtain further relevant information.
Accordingly, for instance, ICTY RPE Rule 75(H) was added in 2007
to allow domestic courts, prosecutors, and defence counsel to obtain
confidential ICTY material.98 This process contributed to interaction
between the ICTY and the domestic courts, particularly the WCS.99
The two tribunals developed a greater sense of horizontal
collaboration and partnership in a common task.100 The ICTY OTP

Interview with an official from the Office of the Prosecutor of the BiH
Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
97 Prosecutors of Department I, THE PROSECUTOR’S OFF. OF BOSN. & HERZ.,
http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/?id=63&jezik=e&kat=15&opcija=sadrzaj (last
visited Dec. 4, 2013).
98 Interview with an ICTY judge at The Hague (January 2009); Pocar,
supra note 31, at 662; Serge Brammertz, The interaction between international and national
criminal jurisdictions: developments at the ICTY, in CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND
SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 173, 174-75 (Morten Bergsmo
ed., 2009).
99 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers at The Hague
(January 2009). This meant signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and the Special Department for War Crimes
of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. BIH PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE BRIEFING BOOK
(2009).
100 This collaboration also meant that the local courts would be able to
voice their needs in a useful way. A judge from the State Court of BiH, for
instance, suggested that the Registry create a web page with instructions on how to
file a request for assistance, something which was taken on board at the Hague.
Interview with official from the ICTY Court management at The Hague (January
2009).
96
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perceived this collaboration as “healthier” since the authorities in the
region are the ones that need to finalize the cases.101
Until 2004 the admissibility in courts in BiH of evidence
collected in ICTY proceedings was unclear to domestic
prosecutors.102 In 2004, BiH adopted a Law on the Transfer of Cases
from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH and the
Admissibility of Evidence Collected by the ICTY in Proceedings
before the Courts. This law permits the use of evidence collected in
accordance with the Statute and the ICTY RPE in proceedings
before the courts in BiH. Borrowing from ICTY RPE 94(b), the
WCS has developed criteria for using ICTY evidence and proven
facts.103 Thus the courts may accept as proven those facts that are
established by legally binding decisions in proceedings by the ICTY
and may accept documentary evidence from proceedings of the
ICTY relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings.104
However, BiH courts may not base a conviction solely, or to a
decisive extent, on the prior statements of witnesses who did not give
oral evidence at trial.105
A perusal of judgments reveals extensive use by the WCS of
evidence from the ICTY regarding, for example, the existence of the
requisite elements of a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population;106 the intent by the Serb forces at Srebrenica to
101 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office at The
Hague (January 2009).
102 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 31.
103 Prosecutor v. Vaso Todorović, Case No. X-KRŽ-06/180-1, First
Instance Verdict, 6 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Oct. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Momčilo
Mandić, Case No. X-KR-05/58, First Instance Verdict, 52-59 (Ct. of Bosn. &
Herz. July 18, 2007); Prosecutor v. Momčilo Mandić, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/58,
Second Instance Verdict, para. 40, n.2 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Sept. 1, 2009).
104 Law on the Transfer of Cases from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s
Office of BiH and the Admissibility of Evidence Collected by the ICTY in
Proceedings before the Courts in BiH, art. 4 (Bosn. & Herz),
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/zakoni/en/BH_LAW_ON_TRANSFER_
OF_CASES_-_Consolidated_text.pdf.
105 Id. at art. 3(2).
106 Prosecutor v. Vuković & Another, Case No. KRŽ-07/405, First
Instance Verdict, 9-10 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Feb. 4, 2008) (basing decision on the
ICTY’s Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23& IT-96-
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destroy the protected group;107 the determination that genocide
occurred in the enclave of Srebrenica during the time specified within
the indictment;108 the existence of armed conflict in BiH after April 6,
1992;109 and the fact that genocide occurred in BiH.110 The use of the
2004 Law is not without its own challenges. For example, the
material arrives in English, and its abundance sometimes challenges
domestic prosecutors’ ability to locate relevant evidence.111
Where the entities are concerned, language barriers and
hostility to the ICTY are obstacles to cooperation. The ICTY’s
proactive engagement has almost completely overlooked the courts
of the entities (as have other international bodies). The absence of a
conscious effort to empower domestic institutions does not mean
that the ICTY had no effect at all on the latter, although in view of
the circumstances, such effect was not necessarily positive. For
example, a 2000 Survey in BiH revealed that domestic professionals
felt that the international community saw them as “intellectual
inferiors who did not understand the relevant law.”112 Noting that

23/1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) and
Prosecutor v. Kronjelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002)).
107 Prosecutor v. Miloš Stupar et al., Case No. X-KR-05/24, First
Instance Verdict, 103 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 29, 2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Krstić,
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
19, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007)).
108 Prosecutor v. Petar Mitrović, Case No. X-KR-05/24-1, First Instance
Verdict, 94 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 28, 2008) (citing Krstić, supra note 107 and
Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107); Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić, Case No. X-KR07/386, First Instance Verdict, 84-86 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Oct. 16, 2009) (citing
Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107).
109 Mandić, supra note 102, at 57 (basing decision on Prosecutor v. Galić,
Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
30, 2006)).
110 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 223-29 (basing
decision on Krstić, supra note 107 and Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107).
111 DIANE ORENTLICHER, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE
IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 121 (2010).
112 HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC (UNIV. OF
CAL., BERKELEY AND SARAJEVO), JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION 36, 41 (2000),
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ICTY officials failed to keep them informed of the status of the
investigations even in response to direct inquires, these professionals
viewed the ICTY as unresponsive and detrimental to the ability of
BiH courts to conduct national war crimes trials.113 With respect to
the transfer of ICTY evidence, difficulties are exacerbated by the fact
that entity officials do not know which material is available.114 In
contrast to the interaction between the ICTY OTP and the BiH
prosecutor, which takes place on a daily basis,115 requests for
assistance from entity courts number no more than 5-6 a year, mostly
for evidence.
4. Summary
The ICTY was influential in bringing the WCS into existence
and has been involved in its routine operation. This involvement was
facilitated by, and indeed had a part in inducing, the hybrid character
of the WCS. In contrast, the ICTY has displayed disinterest in entity
courts, leading the latter to reciprocate and even to express
resentment toward the Tribunal and a reluctance to take guidance
from it.

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Justice_Accountability_and_Social_Re
construction.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); Interview with official from the ICTY Transition Team at The
Hague (January 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL WAITING: BRINGING
JUSTICE FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S CANTONAL AND DISTRICT COURTS 29-30 (2008),
www.hrw.org/en/node/62137/section/1 [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
2008]; U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), SOLVING WAR CRIME CASES IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA - REPORT ON THE CAPACITIES OF COURTS AND
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICES WITHIN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO INVESTIGATE,
PROSECUTE AND TRY WAR CRIMES CASES 16 (2008).
115 Interview with official from the ICTY Transition Team at The Hague
(January 2009).
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C. Quantitative Impact of the ICTY
1. Prosecution rates
The prevailing view is that had it not been for the ICTY,
there would not have been domestic prosecutions even at the limited
volume in which they exist.116 Yet a quantitative attempt to assess the
impact of the ICTY on prosecution rates and sentencing in the BiH
jurisdictions has proven difficult because the number of cases is too
small for statistically significant findings. In other words, there are no
statistically significant findings on trends in the volume of cases in
domestic jurisdictions, let alone trends that can be attributed to the
relationship of these jurisdictions with the ICTY. An examination of
prosecution rates from 1992 to 2009 nonetheless reveals a few
tentative patterns. The rate of indictment in the WCS has remained
more or less constant since it began to operate in 2005.117 However,
in FBiH and perhaps in RS, a number of waves are discernible that
may be linked to changes in the direct or indirect working
relationship with the ICTY.
2. Impact of the Rules of the Road (RoR) procedure
In FBiH, there was a drop in indictments from 1997 to 2000,
picking up again in 2001.118 In RS there were a handful of indictments
until 1997, and none again until 2003.119 At least in FBiH, this gap
may be related to the Rules of the Road (RoR) procedure introduced
in 1996 (the paucity of indictments in RS prior to 1997 makes it
impossible to identify a similar drop or gap).
The RoR marked the ICTY’s first involvement in domestic
administration of justice in BiH. It was based on an agreement
among BiH, Croatia, and Serbia,120 and responded to unchecked
issuances of indictments for war-related crimes by entity prosecutors.
116 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
117 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 2.2A.1.1.
118 Id. at graph 2.2B.1.1.
119 Id. at graph 2.2C.1.1.
120 In Rome Agreement, BiH-Croatia-Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, Feb. 18,
1996.
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The policy of entities prosecuting war crimes without oversight
became particularly problematic as elections in BiH neared and
people traveling to their respective voting places were easy prey for
unmerited arrests, abuse, and restrictions on movement. The RoR
procedure introduced a requirement of ICTY clearance for
prosecutions by the entity authorities. If either of the BiH’s entities’
authorities wished to make an arrest where there was no prior
indictment by the ICTY, they had to send evidence to the RoR Unit
established at the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in order
for the Unit to advise whether or not the available evidence was
sufficient by international standards to justify either an arrest or
indictment.121 The ICTY OTP was not enthusiastic about
undertaking the review of files and questioned whether it was within
the Tribunal’s mandate to do so. The OTP was also concerned that it
lacked the resources to undertake this type of activity and preferred
to focus efforts on potential indictments within its own
jurisdiction.122 Yet, after considerable pressure from states supportive
of the Tribunal, the OTP reluctantly agreed to review the cases
submitted to its office.123 The RoR procedure undoubtedly reduced
the incidence of arbitrary arrests in BiH124 and contributed to the
active participation of displaced people and candidates in the early
elections.
Cases reviewed by the OTP were returned to domestic
authorities with a marking A through H, indicating their suitability for
further investigation or trial. The most common category
designations by the ICTY OTP were A (the evidence was sufficient
by international standards to provide reasonable grounds for the
belief that the accused may have committed the specified serious
violations of international humanitarian law); B (evidence was

121 Agreed
Measures – Rome, 18/2/96, OFF. OF THE HIGH
REPRESENTATIVE, para. 5 (June 18, 2006), www.ohr.int/other-doc/fedmtng/default.asp?content_id=3568.
122 LARA J. NETTELFIELD, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA: THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL’S IMPACT IN A POSTWAR STATE 243
(2010).
123 Ellis, supra note 32, at 7-8.
124 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 6.
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insufficient); and C (the ICTY was unable to determine the
seriousness from available evidence).125
Lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the RoR and the
failure to disseminate the rules to relevant entity officials led to
confusion among domestic authorities. As such, a significant number
of cases were heard by entity courts in disregard of the RoR
procedure. In some cases, such discrepancies were resolved by a
retrospective designation as category A by the ICTY OTP or by
prisoner exchanges and early releases from prison.126
The OTP ceased the RoR review on October 1, 2004 in
anticipation of the closure of the ICTY.127 OTP staff reviewed 1,419
files involving 4,985 suspects between 1996 to 2004. Approval under
Category A was granted for the prosecution of 848 persons.128 Of
those, fifty-four (eleven percent) had reached trial stage in domestic
courts by January 2005.129
Some commentators argue that the effect of the RoR was to
stifle domestic courts. The ICTY was notoriously slow in reviewing
cases, in large part due to staff limitations and competing priorities.
The files that the ICTY received were in the local language and were
organized in a way that was entirely alien to international OTP
The significance of the various categories has not been made public.
According to various sources, Category D meant that the ICTY would have
precedence over that individual as a witness. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, WAR CRIMINALS
IN BOSNIA’S REPUBLIKA SRPSKA: WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN YOUR
NEIGHBOURHOOD?, 8 (2000),
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%2039.ashx). Category G
indicated that the ICTY OTP determined that the evidence for the specified
serious violation of international humanitarian law was insufficient, yet it was
sufficient for a different violation of international humanitarian law. OSCE 2005,
supra note 9, at 5.
126 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 47-48 (citing specific cases).
127 Since 2005, the BiH prosecutor has reviewed war-related cases. This
review, which is sometimes mistakenly mentioned as the continuation of the RoR,
concerns not the quality and sufficiency of the evidence but the allocation of cases
to state or entity instances.
128 Working with the Region, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/96 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2013).
129 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 314.
125
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officers.130 More than 2,300 of almost 6,000 cases sent to the ICTY
were never reviewed and were lost in administrative limbo.131 The
slow processing of other cases and the unsystematic return of
decisions on reviewed cases to the domestic authorities stalled
momentum in the domestic jurisdiction.
ICTY statistics indicate that less than a quarter of the
individuals whose files were reviewed by the OTP were categorized
under classification A, i.e. “evidence sufficient to proceed to arrest
and indictment.” These figures may indicate that, in the majority of
cases, the authorities in BiH were prepared to proceed with the
detention of individuals when the evidence was deficient and basic
international standards were not met. This supports the contention
that the RoR were necessary and met their political objectives. It is
also possible, however, that under-investigated files were deliberately
submitted in some cases in order to exonerate certain individuals.132 It
could be argued that the RoR was conducive to the interests of the
legal authorities in BiH in the sense that they relieved them further of
the responsibility of conducting effective prosecutions,133 which they
tended to regard as falling within the ICTY’s prerogative.134
The small number of cases adjudicated in FBiH from 1997
until 2001 and the complete absence of cases in RS from 1998 until
2003 may also indicate insufficient resolve among prosecutors, police,
and courts to see the cases through.135 But a more nuanced view of

130 Interview with an official from the ICTY Chambers and anonymous
interviewee at The Hague (January 2009).
131 Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in the Former
Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
219, 253-54 (2003); Burke-White, supra note 35, at 313-14.
132 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 48.
133 Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
134 BiH Media Roundup, OHR (Feb. 15, 2002), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=6933.
135 Marinko Jurčević, BiH Chief Prosecutor, Speech at the Third
Conference of Chief Prosecutors in BiH at Sarajevo (Nov. 21-22, 2007),
http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/files/docs/konferencija_novembarglavni_tuzilac.pdf; INT’L CRISIS GRP., WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA’S REPUBLIKA

142

2014

Ronen

3:1

the data is needed to account for the paucity of cases. For example,
war-related crimes have often been prosecuted as ordinary crimes,
particularly in RS.136 On the one hand, impunity is less rampant than
may appear at first sight, but this approach also reflects a refusal by
the local authorities to come to terms with the gravity of past
events.137
3. Progress of the completion strategy
In FBiH and RS, there were surges in indictments in 2001
and in 2003, respectively. This may have been a reaction to the
completion strategy of the ICTY and in anticipation of the
establishment of the WCS. Receipt of cases under the completion
strategy was a mark of prestige for domestic jurisdictions. 138
Therefore, as the completion strategy gained momentum, states in
the region became keen to show that they could administer justice in
accordance with international standards so as to ensure that cases are
transferred to them.139 The BiH government pushed strongly to have
cases referred to it, in part because it recognized the legitimating
effect of the referral. The ICTY’s “carrot” of a case transfer allowed
it to push domestic institutions to meet the benchmarks it had set for
the effectiveness of a domestic judiciary. This effort focused at the
state level, with the establishment of the WCS, but left a mark also in
the entities. In RS in particular, there was support for special courts
at the entity level rather than the establishment of a state level court
to follow up on the work of the ICTY.140 RS authorities argued that a
SRPSKA: WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD?, ICG BALKANS
REPORT N° 103, 2 (2000),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%2039.pdf.
136 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 2.2B.4.4.
137 Gordana Katana, Republika Srpska courts shy away from war crimes, BIRN
(undated), www.bim.ba/en/50/10/2316/?tpl=30.
138 Correspondence with Mirko Klarin (Sept. 13, 2010).
139 Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
140 RS President Dragan Čavić emphasized that the institutions dealing
with cooperation with the Hague Tribunal are making tremendous efforts to prove
they are fully functional and to regain trust. Dragan Jerinic, “We are making
tremendous efforts to prove our cooperation with the Hague,” Nezavisne Novine 4-5, cited in
OHR BiH Weekend Round-up (Oct. 30-31, 2004), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=33421.
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separate court beyond the current system would signal loss of
confidence in domestic courts.141 There was also a strong preference
in RS for jurisdiction to lie in the locality in which the crime took
place, and not where the victims resided at the time of trial.
4. Case channelling
A third tentatively-identifiable pattern in the practice of the
entity courts is the increase in indictments in 2006 in both FBiH and
RS. This increase chronologically followed the undertaking by the
WCS since 2005 to channel war-related cases to the entity courts
following a review of their sensitivity and complexity. The criteria for
determination were unclear at the outset.142 However, a National War
Crimes Strategy was formulated in 2008. The Strategy provides a
rationale for the channelling process that is similar to the completion
strategy: to prosecute the most complex and top-priority cases at
state level, with deadlines set at 2015 and 2023. The ICTY assisted in
the drafting of the complexity criteria for the 2008 National War
Crimes Strategy, and, incorporating standards that are a result of the
practice of the international criminal courts,143 the criteria used by the
WCS borrow directly from Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE.144 The State
Court tries “very sensitive cases,” which are considered the most
complex, taking into account the type and seriousness of the alleged
crime; the rank or political prominence of the defendant; and a
number of other factors, such as whether the case involves “insider”
or “suspect” witnesses, whether there is a risk of witness
intimidation, and whether political conditions are such that a fair trial
may be impossible.145 In another lesson learned from the ICTY, the
WCS opted for transparency of the selection criteria (in general
terms), to preclude accusations of ethnic bias. Some observers argue
Bohlander, supra note 71, at 68-69.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 111, at 128.
143 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 41.
144 BiH prosecutor, comment made at the Roundtable on the Impact of
International Criminal Courts on Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov. 19-20,
2009).
145 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 10-11; NATIONAL
STRATEGY, supra note 41, at Annex A; NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 41, based
on Orientation Criteria from 2004, reviewed in BIRN, PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra
note 38, at 9.
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that this review process has been instrumental in prompting entity
prosecutors to undertake prosecutions in a more serious and
concerted manner.146
5. Sentencing patterns
It is difficult to assess whether the sentencing patterns in the
BiH jurisdictions are related to those of the ICTY. The paucity of
cases is an obstacle to any quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the
range of sentences available to each of the courts is different. There
are no minimum sentences in the ICTY and the maximum sentence
is life imprisonment. In BiH, sentences may range from ten to fortyfive years of imprisonment, while under the Criminal Code of
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY CC), applied in the
entities, the sentencing range for the more severe war-related crimes
is five to twenty years of imprisonment and one to ten years of
imprisonment for certain other crimes against the laws of war.147
An examination of sentencing against the categories of crime
reveals that the average sentence for genocide-related acts in the
ICTY is twenty-four years imprisonment, compared with a sixteen
years average for crimes against humanity and a ten years average
imprisonment for war crimes.148 The notion of gradation in domestic
jurisdiction can only be examined with respect to the WCS because
only in that court have there been convictions for all three categories
of crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), and,
to a limited extent in FBiH, where there have been convictions for
genocide and war crimes. There is no scope for gradation in RS
because there are only convictions for war crimes. In BiH, there is a
very apparent difference in sentencing between an average of over
forty years of imprisonment for genocide-related crimes and an
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 11-12.
E.g., SFRY art. 142(1) (regarding war crimes against civilians); SFRY
art. 38 (regarding sentencing), discussed in Prosecutor v. Gojko Janković, Case No.
ICTY-IT-96-23/2PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11bis, para. 33-36
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 22, 2005).
148 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 6.4.4.
Arguably, sentences reflect the gravity of the acts rather than the formal offense for
which a person was convicted, which is often a matter of prosecution-defense
negotiations.
146
147
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average of 14.4 and 12.7 years of imprisonment for crimes against
humanity and war crimes, respectively.149 In FBiH, no gradation is
discernible,150 with the average sentence for genocide being 14.7 years
of imprisonment and twelve years for war crimes. The lack of
gradation in sentencing may be, however, a consequence of the fact
that the range of penalties available differs among the various
jurisdictions.151 The relative gravity of ICTY sentences152 may also be
related to the different levels of perpetrators brought before the
ICTY and the domestic courts.
Another factor distinguishing the sentencing patterns in the
domestic jurisdictions from those of the ICTY is that in the absence
of a stare decisis doctrine in BiH jurisdictions, a sentencing standard is
not apparent.153 However, in a lesson learned from the ICTY, the
WCS has adopted a sentencing template (based on BiH law) and has
been developing a reasoned jurisprudence on sentencing.154
6. Summary
There are many challenges in attempting to identify a
quantitative link between the national and international tribunals. The
small number of cases makes any assessment tentative at best, and
the looseness of the findings makes it difficult to establish any
substantive or temporal correlation. Similarly, the loose linkage with
respect to sentencing can be interpreted in conflicting directions. It
Id. at graph 2.2A.4.4.
Id. at graph 2.2B.4.4.
151 Ivan Ivanović, National Legal Advisor on War Crimes, OSCE
Mission to Serbia, Remarks at the Seminar on the Impact of International Courts
of Domestic Proceedings held in Belgrade (Nov. 19-20, 2009).
152 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
153 Judge David Re, State Court of BiH, and RS Judge Rudislav
Dimitrijević, Supreme Court of RS, Remarks at the Seminar on the Impact of
International Courts of Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov.19-20, 2009).
154 Prosecutor v. Niset Ramić, Case No X-KRŽ-06/197, First Instance
Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 17, 2007); Prosecutor v. Mitar Rašević & Savo
Todović, Case No X-KR/06/275, First Instance Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Feb.
28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Željko Lelek, Case No X-KRŽ-06/202, First Instance
Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. May 23, 2008); Stupar, supra note 107. See also Interview
with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (Jan. 2009).
149
150
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may reflect a true detachment of the domestic from the international
tribunals, or it may reflect the different perpetration levels considered
at the ICTY and in national tribunals. However, as other sections in
this article demonstrate, the domestic institutions are not oblivious to
the international one. In some contexts, such as prosecutorial policy,
the impact of the international judiciary may be less significant than
that of political institutions. Insofar as concerns sentencing, however,
the influence of the ICTY may be more significant. Whether the
ICTY standard is followed or not may depend on different legal
circumstances or on political objection.
D. Normative Impact of the ICTY—Criminal Norms
1.

Impact of the ICTY on legislation

During the period between 1991-1995, when most of the
war-related crimes adjudicated by BiH courts occurred, the criminal
code in force in BiH was the SFRY CC. In 2002, the OHR
commissioned a report on issues relating to war-crime prosecutions
that might take place in BiH155 as part of a general overhaul of the
judicial system156 and in order to meet the challenges of prosecuting
both domestically-initiated cases and cases referred to BiH by the
ICTY under Rule 11bis of its Statute. The report recommended that
existing domestic legislation should serve, as far as possible, as a basis
for new or amended legislation, and that where existing legislation
required revision, amendments should also take into account
developments in the law as applied in the ICTY.157
In 2003 BiH adopted a new Criminal Code (BiH CC), which
differs significantly from its SFRY predecessor. The BiH CC
establishes the offense of crimes against humanity, provides
comprehensively for command responsibility, and applies a different
range of penalties for international crimes from that which applies to

See Bohlander, supra note 71, at 66, 78 (describing the Report of May
27, 2007 in detail).
156 Interviews with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and from
the ICTY Transition Team in Sarajevo (Jan. 2009).
157 Bohlander, supra note 71, at 78.
155
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ordinary crimes under domestic law.158 The WCS regularly applies the
BiH CC also to pre-2003 cases on the ground that the latter codifies
customary international law.159
The influence of the ICTY on BiH law is noticeable in the
provisions on modes of individual responsibility which refer to
military commanders and civilian superiors.160 Like the ICTY Statute
(and contrary to the ICC Statute), the BiH CC does not expressly
provide for any joint criminal enterprise mode of responsibility. But
the 2003 BiH CC is informed not only by the ICTY’s jurisprudence;
the definition of crimes against humanity (BiH CC Article 172)
follows closely that of the ICC Statute Article 7 rather than the ICTY
Statute Article 5, foregoing a nexus of the act to an armed conflict
and drawing on the ICC Statute’s definitions of various terms
(although it should be recalled that the drafting of the ICC Statute
was itself influenced by ICTY jurisprudence). The provisions on war
crimes borrow from the SFRY CC.161
Unlike the BiH CC, the 2003 criminal codes of FBiH and RS
do not include crimes under international law at all. Consequently,
where the WCS decides not to exercise its primacy, it is not clear
which law should apply in entity courts. BiH institutions, as well as
the Constitutional Court, hold that cases channelled by the WCS to
entity courts carry with them the BiH CC and the entity courts must
apply the principles and safeguards incorporated in the BiH Criminal
Procedure Code, as well as the case law of the WCS.162 Entity courts

158 OSCE, MOVING TOWARD A HARMONIZED APPLICATION OF THE
LAW: APPLICABLE IN WAR CRIMES BEFORE COURTS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 5 (2008) [hereinafter OSCE 2008].
159 E.g. Stupar, supra note 107, at 138-41; Alfredo Strippoli, National
Courts and Genocide: The Kravica Case at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 577, 581 (2009).
160 CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ. art. 180.
161 Id. at arts. 173-75, 177-79, 181-83.
162 Maktouf, Constitutional Court Appeal No. AP-1785/06, Decision on
Admissibility and Merits, paras. 88-89 (Bosn. & Herz. Mar. 30, 2007). See also Denis
Dzidic, Slow Transfer of Cases Undermines War Crimes Strategy, BIRN Justice Report
(Jan.
5,
2010)
http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/wcpw_vol04issue21.html#bih1; NATIONAL STRATEGY,
supra note 41.
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dispute this and, for the most part, apply the SFRY CC163 on the
ground that BiH CC sentences are heavier and therefore more
detrimental to the defendant.164 In the absence of a formal disputesettling mechanism that is binding upon the entities, the matter
remains unresolved.165
The new criminal procedure codes of 2003 also differ
significantly from their SFRY predecessor. In particular, and in clear
connection with the ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE),
they replaced an inquisitorial with a composite inquisitorialadversarial system, introduced plea bargains,166 and replaced retrials
before the court of first instance by final determinations of cases by
the appeal instance.167 The BiH Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was
also very much guided by international standards and in particular by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).168 The adherence to
the ECHR169 is perhaps the least surprising in the drafting of BiH
legislation because the ECHR forms part of the Constitution of BiH
and enjoys priority over all other law in BiH.170

163 Courts in FBiH have in a limited number of cases applied the interim
1998 FBiH Criminal Code. OSCE 2008, supra note 158, at 10.
164 It is difficult to argue with the stance of the entity courts: as
defendants themselves acknowledge, they are better served by a law which permits
a sentence of 5-20 years’ imprisonment than by one which permits a sentence of
10-45 years’ imprisonment. The historical development of the former law, which is
regularly invoked by the State Court when explaining why its own sentencing range
is less severe than that of the entities’, is of academic, rather than practical,
significance.
165 Interview with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in
Sarajevo (January 2009).
166 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 12.
167 OSCE, TRIAL MONITORING REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE IN THE COURTS OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 2 (2004) [hereinafter OSCE 2004].
168 Office of the High Representative, Decision Enacting the Criminal
Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
No.
35/03,
preambular
para.
8
(Jan.
24,
2003),
www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=29094.
169 Silvia Borelli, Domestic Investigation and Prosecution of Atrocities Committed
During Military Operations: The Impact of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,
46 ISR. L. REV. 369 (2013) (on file with author).
170 BIH CONSTITUTION, art. II(2).
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2. Impact of the ICTY on jurisprudence
The 2002 OHR-commissioned report recommended that the
jurisprudence of the ICTY have persuasive authority in the judicial
interpretation of legislation—addressing both procedural and
substantive matters—at both the state and entity levels. However, it
was acknowledged that, in view of the differences between the
international and domestic legal systems, it would be infeasible for
domestic courts to fully follow the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The
report therefore recommended the adoption of a regulation stating
that the courts should take into account the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal.171
The BiH prosecution shared the view that reliance on ICTY
jurisprudence is an important element in providing for uniformity in
interpretation of principles and rules.172 Although the ICTY is not the
only international institution influencing the WCS in this fashion, it
has had the most pronounced impact.173 The library of the WCS
includes a complete collection of the ICTY’s jurisprudence and all of
the judges in the WCS have been instructed on the Tribunal’s
jurisprudence.174
The WCS has followed the spirit of the OHR-commissioned
report,175 relying on the jurisprudence of the ICTY to: (1) establish
that certain provisions in the BiH CC reflect customary international

Bohlander, supra note 71, at 78.
Ibro Bulić, State Prosecutor, Application of International Sources of
Law in BiH, Presentation at the International Conference on the Implementation
of International Humanitarian Law in National Systems, Budapest, 3 (Oct. 29-30,
2007),
www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/files/docs/Primjena_medjunarodnih_izvora_prava_u_B
iH.pdf.
173 BiH prosecutor, comment made in the Roundtable on the Impact of
International Criminal Courts on Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov. 19-20,
2009).
174 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 343.
175 Noted with respect to CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art.171 (genocide);
Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 53; CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art.
180, which duplicated ICTY Statute Art. 7; and Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra
note 108, at paras. 171-73, 205.
171
172
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law, thereby confirming its own jurisdiction ratione materiae;176 (2) to
characterize the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as international;177
and (3) to assist in the analysis of a great number of concepts and
elements of crimes.178 In some cases, rulings by the WCS do not
176 E.g. Prosecutor .v Kovacević, Case No. X-KR-05/40, First Instance
Verdict, at 41 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Nov. 3, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mirko Pekez &
Milorad Savić, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/96-1, Second Instance Verdict, at para. 37 (Ct.
Bosn. & Herz. May 5, 2009); Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at para.
172.
177 Prosecutor v. Abduladhim Maktouf, Case No. K-127/04, First
Instance Verdict, 9 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 1, 2005); Prosecutor v. Abduladhim
Maktouf, Case No. KPŽ-32/05, Second Instance Verdict, 9 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz.
Apr. 4, 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Kordić &
Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001)).
178 See Mitrović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 23 (citing the
ICTY’s Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177) (discussing “widespread”
and/or “systematic” attacks); Mitrović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 4750 (citing ICTY’s Krstić, Judgment, supra note 107; Blagojević & Jokić, supra note
107); Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 177-202 (citing Krstić,
Judgment, supra note 107; Blagojević & Jokić, Judgment, supra note 107; Prosecutor
v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007); and Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-200171-I (July 15, 2004), among others) (analyzing the elements of genocide);
Prosecutor v. Damir Ivanković, Case No. X-KR-08/549-1, First Instance Verdict,
at 10-11 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 2, 2009) (citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra
note 106; Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-9724-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006))
(analyzing the elements of crimes against humanity); Kovacević, First Instance
Verdict, supra note 176, at 44 (citing ICTY’s Kronjelac, Judgment, supra note 106);
Prosecutor v. Dragan Damjanovic, Case No X-KR-05/51, First Instance Verdict,
at 47-48 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Dec. 15, 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case
No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14,
2000) and Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004)); Mandić, First Instance Verdict,
supra note 103, at 133-34 (citing Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT98-34-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003))
(analyzing the elements of persecution); Pekez & Savić, Second Instance Verdict,
supra note 176, at para. 38 (citing Blagojević & Jokić, Judgment, supra note 107)
(discussing civilians); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 130, (citing
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (discussing protected persons); Damjanović, First Instance Verdict,
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mention the ICTY expressly but mirror its judgments so closely that
given that they concern identical events, it is probable that ICTY case
law influenced the decisions of the WCS. ICTY influence is also
visible with respect to procedural norms, such as when ruling on the
admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence.179 The ICTY has also had
some impact on the factors that inform sentences in the WCS. For
example, in Todorović, the WCS cited the ICTY judgments in Zelenović
and Erdemović to determine that a plea bargain constitutes a mitigating
factor in sentencing and the Erdemović judgment to determine that the
provision by the defendant of direct evidence for facts otherwise
requiring proof is a mitigating factor in sentencing.180 At the same
time, WCS judgments are also replete with references to international
law in general and to international tribunals other than the ICTY,
especially the ICTR but also the ICJ, the Special Court of Sierra
Leone, and even domestically-established courts, such as the U.S.

supra, at 44-45 (citing Naletilić & Martinović, Judgment supra) (discussing the
element of discrimination in crimes against humanity); Mandić, First Instance
Verdict, supra note 103, at 134 (citing Kronjelac, Judgment, supra note 106)
(discussing imprisonment as a crime against humanity); Pekez & Savić, Second
Instance Verdict, supra note 176, at para. 57 (citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra
note 106) (discussing the nexus between the defendant’s act and the armed conflict
as an element in war crimes); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 129
(citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra note 106; Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177;
and Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct 16. 2007)); Pekez & Savić, Second Instance Verdict,
supra note 176, at paras. 140-42 (citing Commentary to the Geneva Convention IV;
Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177; Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra note
106; Naletilić & Martinović, Judgment, supra) (discussing intentional infliction of
severe physical or mental pain); Damjanović, First Instance Verdict, supra, at 23
(discussing inhumane acts); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 102, at 13536 (citing Kuperskić, Judgment, supra; Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177)
(discussing inhumane acts); Ibro Bulić, State Prosecutor, Application of
International Sources of Law in BiH, supra note 172, at 4-5 (discussing elements of
ethnic cleansing and of various violations of the laws or customs of war, including
of rape and sexual abuse).
179 Prosecutor v. Zijad Kurtović, Case No X-KR-06/299, First Instance
Verdict, at 23 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Apr. 30, 2008) (relying on Kordić & Čerkez,
Judgment, supra note 177; Brđanin, Judgment, supra note 178); Mandić, First
Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 117-18 (relying on Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment,
supra note 177).
180 Todorović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 28-29.
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military tribunal at Nuremberg.181 With respect to procedural norms,
the European Court of Human Rights has also been influential.182
An area in which international jurisprudence and ICTY
jurisprudence in particular have played a significant role in the
jurisprudence of the WCS is command responsibility, which was not
regulated under the SFRY law which governed BiH until 2003. The
WCS has ruled that command responsibility has nonetheless been
regulated in some form by domestic law, and was criminalized under
customary international law at the relevant time.183 According to the
WCS, the new BiH CC’s Article 180(2), which codifies command
responsibility, derives from and is identical to ICTY Statute Article
7184 and must be interpreted in light of its international origins and its
international judicial interpretation and definitions.185 Although not
bound by the decisions of the ICTY, the WCS was “persuaded that
the ICTY’s characterization of command responsibility, and its
elements properly reflects the state of customary international law as
it existed at the times relevant to the [i]ndictment.”186 Accordingly it
found it “helpful to review the evidentiary factors” which “the ICTY,
and other international courts have found relevant to determining
whether the prosecution has successfully met its burden of
establishing liability under the principle of command responsibility, as
guidance in reviewing the evidence in the instant case.”187 The WCS
relied on ICTY judgments to establish the elements of “effective

181 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 177-202, (citing
Ndindabahizi, supra note 178; U.S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb et. al. (the High
Command Case), 12 LRTWC 1, 59 (1948)).
182 Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 116-18 (relying on
ECtHR’s Khan v. UK and PG and HJ v. UK); Prosecutor v. Dragan Damjanović,
Case No. X-KRŽ-05/51, Second Instance Verdict, 14 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Jun. 13,
2007).
183 Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 138-39, 141.
184 Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 151 (citing Halilović,
Judgment, supra note 178; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/t-A,
Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), and
others).
185 Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 135.
186 Id. at 141.
187 Id.
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control”188 and other elements of the doctrine.189 The jurisprudence
of the WCS also reflects the differences in views within the ICTY
with respect to certain elements of command responsibility, such as
whether responsibility as a commander for acts of genocide requires
a commander to share the special genocidal intent.190
The WCS also followed ICTY jurisprudence in accepting the
existence of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine,191 which, as noted
above, is not expressly established under either the ICTY Statute or
the BiH CC. It now co-exists uneasily with co-perpetration that is
expressly provided for in the BiH CC.192

188 Mandić, Second Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at paras. 106-09
(citing Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT96-21, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20,
2001); and Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment supra note 177).
189 E.g., Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 151-52 (citing
Mucić, Appeal Judgment, supra note 188; Halilović, Judgment, supra note 178;
Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177; Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177);
Mandić, Second Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at para. 109; Stupar, First
Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 140-41.
190 BiH prosecutor, comment at DOMAC Seminar (Nov. 19, 2009);
Strippoli, supra note 159, at 590-91. The WCS, too, avoided answering the question
definitively, noting that, in the circumstances, it had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact had the specific genocidal intent.
Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note107, at 162-63.
191 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at para. 205 (noting that
Article 180 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina duplicated ICTY
Statute Article 7, which has been interpreted as encompassing JCE); Strippoli, supra
note 159, at 586.
192 Strippoli, supra note 159, at 587 (citing Prosecutor v. Vuković &
Another, Case No. KRŽ-07/405, Second Instance Verdict, at 6, n.1 (Ct. Bosn. &
Herz. Sept. 2, 2008) and noting that no importance is given to the use of the word
perpetrating instead of committing). Interestingly, in Vuković, the Trial Chamber relied
on ICTY jurisprudence to establish joint criminal enterprise as a mode of criminal
responsibility in the context of Bosn. & Herz., Criminal Code, Art. 29 (2003),
which applies to all offenses, rather than in the context of Bosn. & Herz., Criminal
Code, Art. 180 (2003), which concerns modes of liability for crimes under
international law. Vuković, First Instance Verdict, supra note 106, at 20; Rašević &
Todović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 154, at 111; Prosecutor v. Rašević &
Todović, Case No. X-KR/06/275, Second Instance Verdict, at 26 (Ct. Bosn. &
Herz. Nov. 6, 2008). A further confirmation that JCE forms part of customary
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The impact of the ICTY jurisprudence in entity courts is
much less pronounced than in the WCS. While entity courts do not
consider themselves bound by ICTY jurisprudence, the ICTY is an
authority that they respect and to which they look.193 However, the
fact that ICTY jurisprudence was not, at first, translated to
Bosnian/Serb/Croat prevents it from being directly accessible to
entity courts.194 Parties and judges in the entity courts do not usually
cite international or foreign jurisprudence195 and the decisions of
these courts are often at odds with international jurisprudence on
issues as important as the validity of the superior responsibility
doctrine196 or whether a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
requires inhumane treatment to have resulted in “great suffering or
serious bodily injury” in order to be a crime under SFRY CC Article
142.197
3. Summary
The ICTY has had a limited impact on BiH legislation. This
may be explained by the development of applicable standards and
models in the period between the adoption of the ICTY statute and
the enactment of the BiH CC. In contrast, ICTY jurisprudence has
influenced the work of the WCS. In the entities, the ICTY has had
little impact on both law and jurisprudence.
Even where ICTY law has been incorporated formally into
the law of BiH and its entities, its implementation has often
experienced difficulties. Thus, it has been argued that certain aspects

international law is in Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 206,
211.
193 Judge Rudislav Dimitrijević, Supreme Court of RS, Remarks at the
Seminar on the Impact of International Courts of Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade
(Nov. 19-20, 2009).
194 Interview with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in
Sarajevo (January 2009).
195 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 21-22.
196 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 55-56 (citing Mirsad
Čupina, Verdict No. K-24/99 (Mostar Cantonal Ct. Jan. 24, 2007); Mirsad Čupina,
Verdict Number K-455/01 (S. Ct. of Federation BiH Sept. 11, 2003)).
197 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 21 (describing Čupina, Verdict by Mostar
Cantonal Ct., supra note 196).
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of the criminal procedure reform expedited the holding of trials and
enhanced the effectiveness of BiH’s legal system, particularly at the
State Court level.198 However, the new rules also created confusion
and frustration among domestic professionals,199 leading to
widespread resistance to their application.200 Much of this adverse
reaction was generated by the fact that several of the reforms were
entirely foreign to the domestic legal traditions, and the perception
that local legal traditions were not properly understood and regarded
with contempt by international institutions.201 Although the Criminal
Procedure Code was drafted by a team of BiH lawyers, the code in its
entirety was perceived as being internationally imposed,202 not least
because it was ultimately enacted by the OHR.
CONCLUSION
BiH is a good experimentation and observation ground for
modalities of interaction between international and domestic courts.
198 Interviews with a judge from the BiH Court and an official in the
Court of BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo (January 2009). See also Christopher
DeNicola, Criminal Procedure Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between Organic
Minimalism and Extrinsic Maximalism, DEPAUL RULE OF L. J. (2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=christopher
_denicola.
199 DeNicola, supra note 198, at 67. This confusion was certainly not
helped by the Council of Europe hiring local practitioners, trained in the
continental system, to draft the commentaries to these new procedural rules.
200 Interviews with NGO representatives in Sarajevo (January 2009). An
OSCE report based on the monitoring of over one hundred trials indicated that
over 25% of judges, prosecutors, and defence attorneys were ‘not accomplishing a
shift’ to the new procedure. OSCE 2004, supra note 167, at 27-34.
201 DeNicola, supra note 198 (citing U.N. MISSION IN BIH, JUDICIAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, THEMATIC REPORT X: SERVING THE PUBLIC—THE
DELIVERY OF JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 32 (2000),
http://www.hjpc.ba/docs/jasp/pdf/TR%20X%20delivery%20of%20justice%20%20delays.pdf) (noting that BiH’s inquisitorial system is a product of an “old legal
philosophy”).
202 Interview with a Legal Adviser in Bosn. & Herz. (January 2009). Our
interviewees seem to disagree with DeNicola regarding the fact that local drafters
were directed by international or foreign players into drafting mixed procedure.
Rather, they suggest that many of the relevant changes were established out of
personal and professional conviction. Cf. DeNicola, supra note 198.
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Within the same country there are courts of different levels, which
illustrate different models of interaction. Because these courts appear
to operate within the same domestic culture, one might assume that
any differences in domestic action are indeed attributable to different
modalities of interaction with the ICTY.
At the turn of the millennium, the ICTY was severely
criticized for failing to have an impact on critical justice issues,
including its non-provision of assistance to the reform of the justice
systems in the region, and lack of involvement in preparing the local
prosecutors and courts to carry out investigations and trials regarding
war crimes.203 A decade later, it might be fairer to say that the ICTY’s
engagement with domestic institutions arrived too late, but overall
was, and remains, of some value.204
An analysis of the impact of the ICTY on the judicial
institutions in BiH, namely the WCS and entity courts, reveals a
significant difference in the extent and tone of interaction. The WCS
has been much more closely associated with the ICTY than the entity
courts, which have been reluctant to accept external influence and to
interact with international actors.
Thus, at the BiH state level, dramatic reforms have taken
place since the end of the war, especially since the completion
strategy was put in place. These reforms include the establishment of
the WCS within the State Court and the adoption of criminal and
criminal procedure codes. International elements played a key role in
promoting and shaping these reforms. The role of the ICTY has
varied from one aspect to another.
First and foremost is the establishment of the WCS which is
directly, although not exclusively, related to the progression of the
completion strategy. The latter not only has precipitated the transfer
of cases and evidence, but also know-how and expertise.
Tolbert, supra note 46, at 12.
David Talbot & Aleksandar Kontic, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia: Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts, and
Lessons for the ICC, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 135, 160 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009).
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Consequently, BiH has been able to assume the responsibility of
sharing with the ICTY the burden of trying war related offences,
largely in accordance with international standards. However,
international influence has been, at least at the outset, a by-product of
the ICTY’s and other international institutions’ concerns and goals
rather than the consequence of a conscious effort at modelling the
domestic system. Thus, for example, the interest in establishing the
WCS and in the transfer of cases to BiH, as well as the empowering
of domestic institutions, are the consequence of the ICTY’s
completion strategy and shaped by its needs.
Quantitatively, the impact of the ICTY is in some aspects
very immediate but of little long-term significance, and of more
lasting value in others. An example of the former is the transfer of
cases from the ICTY to the WCS under Rule 11bis, as well as the
transfer of files in which no indictment had yet been issued. At this
level, one could say that the prosecution patterns of the WCS are
directly related to the ICTY’s work. However, one must acknowledge
that because this will only occur once in the lifespan of the WCS, it
does not by itself hold the promise of the WCS following ICTY
prosecuting policy. A more interesting influence is illustrated by the
fact the primacy of the WCS over entity courts, and by the criteria it
adopted to determine which cases should be channelled to which
domestic jurisdiction, which is expressly in pursuance of the ICTY’s
policy. The WCS also emulates the ICTY in the subtle adoption of
gradated sentencing depending on the characterization of crimes.
On the normative level, the state of BiH and the WCS has
followed the ICTY in a variety of manners. First, they adopted,
through legislation and jurisprudence, various international legal
doctrines. The WCS also interprets domestic instruments in light of
ICTY jurisprudence and follows the ICTY in procedural issues.
In contrast to the close links between the WCS and the
ICTY, the impact of the ICTY on entity institutions has been much
less marked. The impact of the ICTY on their capacity is not only
limited, but also mostly unintended. Very little funding is directed
toward the entities and there is little focus on nurturing their
institutions. If anything, this disregard has led to antagonism in the
entities that has negatively impacted institutional capacity. The
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entities’ resistance is directed not only against the ICTY but also
against the State Court, which, despite its domestic legitimacy, has
failed to impose its standards on entity courts. The role of the WCS
in channelling cases, as it is being discharged, has also been cited as
detrimental to the empowerment of entity institutions.
Generally speaking, entity institutions are characterized by
their resistance to prosecution. On the normative level, it is notable
that parties and judges in entity courts do not usually cite
international or foreign jurisprudence, and the decisions of these
courts are often at odds with international jurisprudence. For
example, important substantive legal doctrines developed by the
ICTY such as command responsibility have been disregarded, if not
outright rejected. ICTY jurisprudence on procedural issues has not
fared much better, as demonstrated by the fundamental controversy
on the applicability of post-conflict law in entity courts.
The schism between entity institutions and the ICTY is partly
attributable to practical constraints. The ICTY is much less accessible
to entity institutions than it is to the WCS. First there is the language
barrier, which only in recent years the ICTY has been laboring to
overcome. In addition, there is a gap in international funding which
leaves the training initiative almost exclusively reserved to the WCS.
It has been suggested that better results could have been obtained if
the international activity directed at empowering domestic authorities
had begun earlier or if more attention had been paid both to the
potential influence of the ICTY’s practice on domestic authorities
and to the domestic constraints which international efforts should
accommodate. For example, ICTY case law and investigative material
could have been accessible at an earlier stage, and training initiatives
could have been more accurately designed for the relevant audience’s
needs.
It may be argued that the issue is not technical incapacity or
misdirection of international resources, but, instead, a more profound
issue. Particularly in RS, where there has not effectively been a postconflict change of government, domestic institutions are not keen to
undertake prosecutions and the trickle-down effect of the
international tribunal has been therefore very limited. The reluctance
to engage in post-conflict criminal justice is politically-grounded.
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External engagement incentivises some actors and alienates others,
particularly the Serb community.205
The WCS’s susceptibility to ICTY influence is strongly and
directly related to its hybrid nature, owing to the circumstances of its
establishment, namely through institutional and normative dictates of
the High Representative. In other words, the WCS is a partner in the
international mechanism largely because it is the product of
international intervention in BiH. We should therefore not be blinded
by the apparent success of the WCS. It was made possible by the
strong international influence, which effectively circumvented the
political obstacles standing in the way of accountability
mechanisms.206 It would be more accurate to describe the
international effect over domestic institutions as dependant on the
capacity to impose, rather than as a spontaneous ripple effect. While
the limitations of extrapolating from the BiH case study should not
be underestimated, an important lesson to be drawn by those
designing international tribunals as catalysts for domestic action is the
importance of engaging with potential political obstacles to preempt
their obstruction of even the best-planned legal framework.

David Kaye, External Actors and Domestic Accountability,
Presentation at the First Annual Minerva Jerusalem Conference on Transitional
Justice: The Potential Role of Transitional Justice in Ongoing Conflicts, Jerusalem
(Nov. 13-15, 2011).
206 See also Talbot & Kontic, supra note 204, at 160.
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THE ARAB SPRING’S FOUR SEASONS:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM
Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud *
INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, public demonstrations erupted
throughout the Middle East against autocratic regimes, igniting a
regional political transformation known as the Arab Spring. While
some of these demonstrations were peaceful, others escalated into
domestic uprisings and civil and international wars. Depending on
events, modern international criminal and humanitarian law provided
certain protections to vulnerable populations. However, international
law did not provide a uniform degree of protection to civilians and
combatants who faced similar circumstances. Post-Arab Spring, some
countries have been relatively stable while others continue to face
internal conflicts; most notably, the violent civil war in Syria
continues to this day.
This article argues for a uniform standard of protections for
all populations affected by armed conflict, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Part I presents four legal typologies under current
international humanitarian and criminal law using rules codified in
* Jillian Blake is a J.D. graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School, 2011, and an M.A. graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, 2006, and currently practices law at a non-profit organization
in Alexandria, Virginia. Aqsa Mahmud is a J.D. graduate of the University of
Michigan Law School, 2011 and currently practices law as a government attorney in
Washington, D.C. The authors contributed equally to this work and would like to
thank Professor Julian Mortenson for his comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions.1 It evaluates each of
five major Arab Spring uprisings (Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and
Libya) and describes the legal protections that applied in each
country’s revolution or rebellion. Part II analyzes the differences in
protection, focusing on the distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts under current law, which affords a
significantly lower degree of protection during civil conflicts. Given
the substantial number of non-international armed conflicts in the
modern era, we argue for a uniform standard of protections for all
armed conflicts. Part III shows that current sovereignty trends are
moving away from the concept of an absolute sovereign in favor of a
responsible sovereign who adheres to international standards. This
trend is incompatible with current international law, which provides a
minimal level of protection during civil war, and could therefore
shield sovereigns from liability for mass atrocity crimes. Finally, Part
IV of this article offers solutions to appropriately minimize outdated
sovereignty norms and eliminate unjustified distinctions in the
international legal system using lessons from the Arab Spring. These
solutions include eliminating the distinction between noninternational and international armed conflict in international
humanitarian law and promoting International Criminal Court (ICC)
membership in Arab states.
I. THE FOUR SEASONS: REGIME OF PROTECTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
International humanitarian law (“IHL”)2 and international
criminal law (“ICL”) afford certain protections in the event of an
armed conflict, genocide, or crimes against humanity. IHL applies in
the event of an armed conflict, characterized as either international or
1 The Hague Conventions signed in 1899 and 1907 codified many of the
rules related to warfare. “Although the Fourth Hague Convention retains modern
currency, today’s rules of IHL are largely founded on the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949, drafted on the heels of World War II and supplemented by their two 1977
Protocols.” Beth Van Schaack & Ron Slye, A Concise History of International
Criminal Law: Chapter 1 of Understanding International Criminal Law 17 (Santa
Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-42, 2007).
2 International humanitarian law is also commonly referred to as law of
armed conflict (LOAC) or law of war.
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non-international in nature. Depending on its classification, specific
protections apply to civilians affected by and combatants taking part
in the conflict. ICL imposes criminal liability on individuals who
commit certain offenses, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Crimes against humanity include murder,
extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, torture, or rape against a
civilian population. Notably, crimes against humanity are distinct
from war crimes because they do not need to be committed as part
of an armed conflict.
This section outlines an analytical framework to determine
current international protections for various conflict scenarios and
evaluates each of five Arab Spring countries within the framework.
We present four levels of protections based on the occurrence of
crimes against humanity, existence of an armed conflict, and whether
the conflict is international or non-international in nature. We
selected these criteria due to their importance in guiding current
application of international law and relevance to the Arab Spring.
The four legal seasons of the Arab Spring are: (A) outside the scope
of international protections (Tunisia); (B) international criminal nonwar crime protections (Bahrain and Egypt); (C) non-international
armed conflict protections (Syria); and (D) international armed
conflict protections (Libya). This framework will be useful in
analyzing the international legal protections that apply to various
revolution or rebellion situations, especially in relation to each other.
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The Arab Spring’s Four Seasons: Layers of Legal Protection3
Season A
Tunisia

Season B
Egypt & Bahrain

Season C
Syria

Season D
Libya

Domestic Law
Int’l Human
Rights Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human Rights
Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human
Rights Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human Rights
Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Non-Int’l Armed
Conflict Law

Non-Int’l Armed
Conflict Law
Int’l Armed
Conflict Law

A. Tunisia: Outside the Scope of International Criminal and
Humanitarian Legal Protections
1. Background
On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor set
himself on fire in protest against harsh treatment by authorities,
starting the first Arab Spring revolution.4 Following his
demonstration, riots broke out in the city of Sidi Bouzid and
continued throughout the new year,5 as protestors rallied across the
country over socioeconomic and political issues.6 On January 12,
2011, rioting spread to the capital of Tunis, and a national curfew was
3 Note that each Season adds to the degree of protections from previous
Seasons. For example, Season B includes Season A protections but adds
international criminal law protection. Notably, when the various legal bodies
conflict, one may trump; for example, international humanitarian law will trump
international human rights law as lex specialis.
4 THE ‘SPARK’ THAT STARTED IT ALL, ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH &
STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163144
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
5 Tunisia: 11 die in new clashes after weeks of unrest, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 9,
2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/09/tunisia-clashes-weeksunrest.
6 ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, POLITICAL
TRANSITION IN TUNISIA 4 (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21666.pdf.
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imposed.7 Reports emerged of police firing on protestors and some
protestors being abused in detention,8 with the abuse rising to a level
“that may [have] amount[ed] to torture.”9 On January 14, 2011,
President Zine el-Abedine ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, and an
interim government took control until future elections.10 In October
2011, Tunisia held elections that put the new National Constituent
Assembly into power.11
2. Classification
The Tunisian revolution (also referred to as the “Jasmine
Revolution”) qualifies as “Season A”—outside the scope of ICL and
IHL—because no armed conflict took place and the government’s
actions fail to meet the standard for international criminal liability.
Although at times violent,12 clashes between demonstrators and
security forces did not reach the degree of intensity found in armed
conflict.13 Furthermore, protestors in Tunisia were for the most part
unarmed and lacked centralized organization required for an armed
conflict.
The government’s attacks against civilians are unlikely to
meet the requirements for crimes against humanity. Crimes against
humanity are defined as certain enumerated offenses committed as

7 ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, TUNISIA: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
AND
POLICY
ISSUES
2
(2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155560.pdf.
8 Id. at 1-2.
9 WORLD REPORT 2012: TUNISIA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2012),
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-tunisia.
10 Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee
Tunisia as protesters claim victory, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-countryprotests.
11 Although Tunisia continues to face transitional challenges, the scope
of our analysis focuses on the events leading up to the first transition of power
during the Arab Spring revolutions. See ARIEFF, supra note 6, at 2.
12 ARIEFF, supra note 7, at 2; Tunisia: 11 die in new clashes after weeks of unrest,
supra, note 5.
13 See infra Part II.C.1, Season C for an in depth discussion of factors
determinative of an armed conflict legal classification.
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part of a widespread attack against civilians.14 According to the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute, Article 7, crimes
against humanity include:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.15

14

See infra Part II.B.
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For acts to be considered “crimes against humanity,” they
must be committed as “part of a widespread or systematic attack,
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.”16 The population must be predominantly civilian to be
characterized as such for crimes against humanity liability.17
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the existence of a “widespread or systematic
attack” can be determined by a variety of factors, including the “the
number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation
of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of crimes.”18 In
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, the ICTY noted that
[t]he existence of an acknowledged policy targeting a
particular community, the establishment of parallel
institutions meant to implement this policy, the
involvement of high-level political or military
authorities, the employment of considerable financial,
military or other resources and the scale or the
repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the
violence committed against a particular civilian
population are among the factors which may
demonstrate the widespread or systematic nature of
an attack.19
According to the United Nations, 300 people died in the
Tunisia uprising, and 700 were injured between December 17, 2010
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 38544, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
16 Id.
17 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, para.
638(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf
[hereinafter
Tadic Judgment].
18 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 95 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kunaj020612e.pdf.
19 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
para. 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf.
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and January 14, 2011.20 While the government unlawfully killed many
people during the uprising, the crimes did not reach the level of
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims,” articulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu.21 However, there is no clear
standard for how many victims meet the “widespread” requirement,
and the analysis is largely subjective.22 Therefore, there may be
reasonable disagreement on this point.
Furthermore, there was no indication of a “systematic”
attack, such as a plan or policy, by the government. The actions of
the Tunisian government during the revolution were not part of a
“continuous” policy, but rather a short-term, uncoordinated response
to a domestic uprising. Because of these requirements for crimes
against humanity liability, the actions of the Tunisian government
during the Arab Spring do not meet the international definition of
crimes against humanity.
3. Protections
Of the countries to be discussed in this paper, Tunisia
suffered the fewest casualties and related crimes during the Arab
Spring. Because the case of Tunisia was outside the scope of ICL and
IHL, domestic law and applicable international human rights law
governed the revolution. Any international protections under
customary international law would still apply as well as any human
rights agreement to which Tunisia is a party;23 however, this paper
focuses on international criminal and humanitarian protections as

See 300 people died in Tunisian uprising—UN, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
May 22, 2011, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/7989/300-people-died-in-tunisianuprising—un.
21 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580
(Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf
22 See Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements
of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 315 (2000).
23 For example, Tunisia is a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
20
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codified under the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions as
interpreted by international courts and other authoritative bodies.
B. Egypt and Bahrain: International Criminal Legal Protections
1. Background
a. Egypt – The revolution in Egypt began on January 25, 2011
with a series of mass demonstrations in Cairo and other cities,
demanding an end to President Hosni Mubarak’s almost 30-year
rule.24 The government blamed the uprising on the officially banned
Muslim Brotherhood opposition faction.25 According to independent
observers, however, the discontent with Mubarak was extensive and
caused by popular discontent with government corruption and
economic grievances.26
By February, the unrest had resulted in 900 deaths, Mubarak
was forced to resign, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) took control of the country.27 SCAF claimed to work on
behalf of the protestors, restoring justice and establishing a new
political order.28 In March 2011, a new constitution was approved
with 77 percent support which included provisions on presidential
term limits, judicial oversight for elections, and changes in
presidential candidate qualifications. In late 2011 and early 2012, the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were elected to a
majority of the seats in the new Parliament.29 In June 2012, Mubarak
24 THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION, EGYPT-ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH &
STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2159613
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
25 Kareem Fahim, Violent Clashes Mark Protests against Mubarak’s Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26egypt.html?pagewant
ed=all.
26 Id.
27 THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION, supra note 24.
28 JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33003, EGYPT IN
TRANSITION 7 (2011) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171381.pdf.
29 See Egypt News—Revolution and Aftermath, Topic Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/
index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). See also JEREMY STAPP, CONG. RESEARCH
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was tried by an Egyptian court and found guilty and convicted as an
accomplice in the murder of unarmed protestors during the
uprising.30 However, a few months later, an Egyptian court granted
an appeal from Mubarak and ordered a retrial.31 Egypt continues to
face transitional challenges post-Arab Spring—the country’s first
democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was ousted by the
military in July 2013.32
b. Bahrain – The Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain was inspired,
in part, by the success of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt.33 In midFebruary 2011, demonstrations erupted in the capital Manama against
the monarch King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.34 According to
international affairs expert Jane Kinninmont, “[a]t the heart of the
uprising [the “Pearl Revolution”] were long-standing grievances over
the distribution of power and wealth—including calls for a fully
elected parliament, an elected government, and an end to the
gerrymandering of elections and corruption.”35 The government
immediately responded with a brutal crackdown, firing on civilians
and detaining opposition leaders.36 One month after the Pearl
SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: BACKGROUND ON U.S. RELATIONS (2014).,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
30 David D. Kirkpatrick, New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for
Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/world/middleeast/egypt-hosni-mubaraklife-sentence-prison.html?pagewanted=all.
31 Abigail Hauslohner, Egyptian court overturns Hosni Mubarak’s life sentence,
orders retrial, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201301-13/world/36312073_1_hussein-salem-retrial-order-adli.
32 Ben Wedeman, Reza Sayah & Matt Smith, Coup topples Egypt’s Morsey;
deposed
leader
under
‘house
arrest,’
CNN.COM,
Jul.
4,
2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests.
33 Lamis Andoni, Opinion, Bahrain’s contribution to the Arab Spring, ALJAZEERA, Aug. 30, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/20118301473301296.html.
34 BAHRAIN,
ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH & STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163172
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
35 JEAN KINNINMONT, BAHRAIN: BEYOND THE IMPASSE 1 (2012),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20E
ast/pr0612kinninmont.pdf.
36 Cynthia Johnston & Frederik Richter, Four killed in Bahrain clashes as
Mideastseethes, REUTERS, Feb. 17, 2011,
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Revolution began, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa authorized Saudi
troops to enter the country to help put down the revolt.37 By March,
security forces had suppressed the demonstrations, making it the only
Arab Spring country to effectively put down its uprising through use
of force.38
The suppression came at a high cost to human rights.
According to an independent commission, the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry, security forces used excessive force in the
campaign, including torture.39 Almost 3,000 people were imprisoned,
and sixty-four percent of detainees (1,866 individuals) reported being
tortured.40 The commission found that thirty-five people died during
the protests and five detainees were tortured to death.41 According to
Human Rights Watch, Bahrain’s police continue to torture and beat
detainees.42
2. Classification
The Egyptian and Bahrain revolutions qualify as “Season
B”—outside the scope of IHL, but within the scope of ICL. Egypt
and Bahrain are distinguishable from “Season A” and Tunisia
because crimes committed during the uprisings were more
widespread and systematic. The repression in Egypt produced three
times as many casualties as in Tunisia. According to a “high-level
[Egyptian government] inquiry,” police killed almost 900 people
during the uprising and “used snipers on rooftops overlooking
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-protestsidUSTRE71F41K20110217.
37 Simon Tisdall, Arab spring uprisings: the scorecard, THE GUARDIAN, May
23, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/23/arab-spring-uprisingsthe-scorecard.
38 Bahrain
News-The Protests, Topic Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bahrai
n/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
39 Nada Bakri, Torture used on Protesters in Bahrain, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/middleeast/reportdetails-excessive-force-used-against-bahrain-protests.html?hp&_r=0
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Bahrain police ‘continue to torture detainees’, BBC, Apr. 29, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17887731.
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Cairo’s Tahrir Square to shoot into the huge crowds.”43 As many as
1,000 people were “disappeared” during the Egyptian revolt, and
Egyptian armed forces reportedly tortured and killed individuals
“across the country.”44 While the Tunisian government repressed and
killed civilians during the Jasmine Revolution, the crimes committed
by the Egyptian government were significantly more widespread,
thereby meeting the chapeau elements for crimes against humanity.
In Bahrain, torture was widespread and systematic during,
and in the wake of, the Pearl Revolution, meeting the requirement for
crimes against humanity liability. There were a large number of
victims, and torture was part of a continuous government policy. The
report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry found
government agencies “followed a systematic practice of physical and
psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to
torture, with respect to a large number of detainees in their
custody.”45
IHL and war crimes protections, to be discussed in the
following “Season C” and “Season D” sections, do not apply because
the revolutions in Egypt and Bahrain did not rise to the level of
armed conflicts. No international armed conflict (IAC) existed
because the government forces did not engage the armed forces of
another state directly or by proxy. Neither situation qualified as a
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) because the opposition
forces lacked the required organization or the situations were limited
in their intensity and protractedness. In Bahrain, the opposition was

Report: Egyptian police responsible for almost all of 900 deaths during 2011
uprisings
and
protests,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Mar.
13,
2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/report-egyptian-police-killed-900-arabspring-uprising-article-1.1287782.
44 Evan Hill & Muhammed Mansour, Egypt’s army took part in torture and
killings during the revolution, report shows, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/egypt-army-torture-killingsrevolution.
45 REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT MISSION OF INQUIRY para.
1238 (2011), http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
.
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mainly composed of the youth protest movement46 with dispersed
leadership hosting varying goals.47 The opposition never gained
significant control over Bahraini territory, unlike the opposition
groups in other Arab Spring revolutions.48 In Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood represented a highly organized opposition group;
however, it did not engage in extended fighting with the Egyptian
government and took power only after Mubarak resigned and
through the electoral process. In both situations, the violence was
limited in its duration: in Bahrain, the fighting lasted for two months,
and, in Egypt, it lasted for 18 days. The number of casualties in both
situations were significantly less than those in Syria and Libya to be
discussed in the next sections and which qualify as armed conflicts.
Uprisings in Bahrain and Egypt also lacked other factors
indicative of an armed conflict. For example, the fighting did not
spread throughout the country for a long period of time, the Security
Council did not issue resolutions on the conflicts, and opposition
forces had limited access to military-grade weapons.
3. Protections
ICL criminalizes and protects against defined acts rather than
providing a series of blanket protections triggered by exogenous
circumstances, such as an armed conflict. However, enforcement of
ICL protections remains a concern. For example, because most Arab
states are not party to the Rome Statute,49 they are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction except in the case of Security Council referral.
Furthermore, even if the state is party to the Statute, the government
Bahrain youth movement calls protest on Wednesday, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2011,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/bahrain-protests-marchidUSLDE72F16620110316; Barbara Surk & Reem Khalifa, Group: Bahrain detains 5
top
opposition
activists,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
17,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/16/AR2011031600375.html.
47 Reese Erlich, Bahrain’s opposition split over violence, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.dw.de/bahrains-opposition-split-over-violence/a16461501.
48 Id.
49 The only Arab states that are party to the Rome Statute are Jordan,
Comoro Islands, Djibouti, and Tunisia (which recently joined in 2011).
46
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is unlikely to refer its own leadership to the ICC for charges related
to the successful suppression of a revolt. In the case of Egypt, former
President Mubarak is currently being tried with other former highlevel officials in domestic courts for killing unarmed protestors.
However, Egypt is not party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC has
no jurisdiction over Mubarak’s violation of international criminal law
without referral by the Security Council. In Bahrain, the government
was able to put down its opposition movement, thereby effectively
insulating itself from prosecution. Arguably, crimes against humanity
were committed in both instances yet neither situation was
prosecuted under ICL.
C. Syria: Non-International Armed Conflict Legal Protections
1. Background
The Arab Spring came to Syria on March 15, 2011, with
protests in the city of Deraa against the Ba’ath Party and demands for
the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad.50 Grievances against the
regime included rampant corruption, lack of political freedoms, high
unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, and
repressive security forces.51 In reaction, the government deployed its
military to put down the uprising, and the government reportedly
fired on civilians,52 used disproportional force,53 and expelled foreign
50 Arab
uprising:
Country
by
country
Syria,
BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309 (last updated Dec. 16, 2013).
51 JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 1 (2012),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/195385.pdf.
52 See
‘Defected Syria security agent’ speaks out, AL-JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/06/201168175624573155.html
(last modified June 8, 2011); Opposition: 127 dead as Syrian forces target civilians,
CNN.COM,
April
7,
2012,
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0407/middleeast/world_meast_syria-unrest_1_homs-and-hama-syrian-observatorynetwork-of-opposition-activists?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST.
53 See JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, THE
STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA IN 2011 13 (2011),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle_For_Syria.pdf.
(providing a detailed account of military action by the Syrian government through
the end of 2011).
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journalists and news organizations from the country.54 With a strong
crack down on protestors, the conflict became increasingly
militarized between the Syrian government and opposition forces.55
As the fighting continued and escalated, international legal
bodies described Syria to be on the “brink” of non-international
armed conflict.56 By May 2012, the President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared that fighting in at least
two places was at the level of armed conflict of a non-international
character.57 The next month, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous stated that the Syrian
situation could be called a civil war.58 By June 2013, an estimated
100,000 people had been killed in the war and one-third of the
causalities were civilians.59 In an August 2012 report, the U.N.
Human Rights Council commission of inquiry on Syria found
reasonable grounds to believe that Government
forces . . . had committed the crimes against humanity
of murder and of torture, war crimes and gross
violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, including unlawful
killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual
violence, indiscriminate attack, pillaging and
destruction of property. . . anti-Government armed
54 Silencing global coverage, Syria detains, expels reporters, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (July 14, 2011), http://cpj.org/2011/07/silencing-global-coveragesyria-detains-expels-rep.php.
55 Joe Sterling, U.N.: Syria more ‘militarized’ amid abuses from regime, resistance
forces, CNN.COM, May 24, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html.
56 Syria: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=211 (last updated
July 13, 2012).
57 Id.
58 Louis Charbonneau & Dominic Evans, Syria in civil war, U.N. official
says, REUTERS, June 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/ussyria-idUSBRE85B0DZ20120612.
59 Alan Cowell, War Deaths in Syria Said to Top 100,000, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0.
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groups did not reach the gravity, frequency and scale
of those committed by Government forces . . . .60
U.S. President Barack Obama and European allies have called
for a U.N. resolution condemning the Assad regime and imposing
sanctions.61 However, as of January 2014, Russia and China have
vetoed three such resolutions, claiming that sanctions would pave the
way for military intervention.62 Because of Russian and Chinese
opposition, the Security Council is unlikely to issue an authorization
for economic sanctions or use of force for third-party intervention.63
According to U.S. government analysts, “[t]he popular-uprisingturned-armed-rebellion against the Assad regime . . . seems poised to
continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias
locked in a bloody struggle of attrition.”64
International concern over Syria increased when reports
surfaced in May 2013 that chemical weapons had been used in Syria.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed that the
intelligence community “assesses with some degree of varying
confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a
small scale in Syria . . . .” Turkey also voiced its belief that “the
[Assad] regime has used chemical weapons.”65 Medical teams
provided blood samples and eyewitness accounts about victims to the
chemical attacks.66 U.N. investigator Carla Del Ponte also

60 Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 15, 2012).
61 Julian Pecquet, Russia, China veto U.N. sanctions Against Syria, THE HILL
(July 19, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-eastnorth-africa/238941-russia-china-veto-us-backed-syria-resolution-for-a-third-time.
62 Id.
63 Michelle Nichols, Russia, China veto U.N. Security Council resolution on
Syria, REUTERS, July 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/ussyria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719.
64 SHARP & BLANCHARD, supra note 51, at 1.
65 Syria ‘Ready’ to Allow U.N. Chemical Arms Probe, NUCLEAR THREAT
INITIATIVE (May 10, 2013), http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/syriangovernment-ready-allow-un-chemical-armsprobe/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1.
66 Interview by Christiane Amanpour with Zaher Sahloul, President of
the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), in Turkey (April 29, 2013, 5:11 PM
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commented on “strong concrete suspicions but not yet
incontrovertible proof” that opposition forces may have used the
chemical agent sarin.67 In response, United States and the United
Kingdom officials claimed to have found no evidence to support the
opposition’s use of chemical weapons.68
By summer 2013, the evidence of chemical weapons use
prompted the United States government and its allies to consider
military intervention absent Security Council authorization.69 Before
any action was taken, Russia proposed with Syrian consent, that Syria
join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and commit to the
elimination of its chemical weapons stockpile.70 Syria joined the CWC
in October 2013,71 de-escalating the confrontation and option for
intervention proposed by the United States.72
2. Classification
The Syrian revolution and subsequent civil war qualify as
“Season C” –IHL protections apply for a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC). Syria is distinguishable from “Season A” (Tunisia)
and “Season B” (Egypt and Bahrain) in terms of the intensity of the
violence and organization of the oppositional groups, which rose to
the level of an armed conflict.73

ET), http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/29/american-doctor-gives-proofof-chemical-weapon-use-to-u-s/.
67 Patrick J. McDonnell, U.N.’s Carla del Ponte says Syrian Rebels may have
used
sarin,
L.A.
TIMES,
May
6,
2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/06/world/la-fg-wn-un-syria-rebelschemical-weapons-20130506.
68 Anne Gearan, U.S. skeptical on reported use of chemical weapons by Syrian
rebels, WASH. POST, May 6, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0506/world/39054114_1_chemical-weapons-syrian-government-assad-regime.
69 Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud, A Legal ‘Red Line’? Syria and the Use of
Chemical Weapons in Civil Conflicts, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 244, 249-50 (2013).
70 Id. at 250.
71 Paul Adams, Syria chemical weapons: OPCW plea for short ceasefires, BBC,
Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24516303.
72 Blake & Mahmud, supra note 69, at 250.
73 See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
30,
2005),
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For IHL protections to apply, the situation must first qualify
as an armed conflict. There is no “widely accepted definition of
armed conflict in any treaty.”74 However, all armed conflict “has
certain minimal, defining characteristics that distinguish it from
situations of non-armed conflict or peace.”75 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the
ICTY found that armed conflict “exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State.”76 NIAC excludes “conflicts in which two
or more States are engaged against each other . . . [and] conflicts
extending to the territory of two or more States.”77
International courts have defined characteristics of NIAC
including the “intensity of the conflict and the organisation of the
parties to the conflict.”78 In Prosecutor v. Hardinaj, the ICTY elaborated
on the first criterion of organization. The Trial Chamber summarized
“several indicative factors, none of which are, in themselves, essential
to establish whether the ‘organization’ criterion is fulfilled.” These
. . . include the existence of a command structure and
disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group;
the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf [hereinafter Limaj
Judgment].
74 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010).
75 Id. at 2.
76 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm
[hereinafter
Tadic
Interlocutory Appeal].
77 See INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 2 (2006),
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20
of%20NIAC.pdf (“When a foreign State extends its military support to the
government of a State within which a non-international armed conflict is taking
place, the conflict remains non-international in character.”).
78 Tadic Judgment, supra note 17, at para. 562. See also THE HAGUE
CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2010).
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group controls a certain territory; the ability of the
group to gain access to weapons, other military
equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to
plan, coordinate and carry out military operations,
including troop movements and logistics; its ability to
define a unified military strategy and use military
tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and
negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire
or peace accords.79
The ICTY Judgment identified factors for evaluating the
second criterion of intensity, including
. . . the number, duration and intensity of individual
confrontations; the type of weapons and other
military equipment used; the number and caliber of
munitions fired; the number of persons and type of
forces partaking in the fighting; the number of
casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the
number of civilians fleeing combat zones.80
In addition, U.N. Security Council resolutions on the
situation may indicate the existence of an intense conflict.81 However,
none of the listed factors “are, in themselves, essential to establish
that the criterion [of intensity] is satisfied.”82
The situation in Syria meets the definition of NIAC because,
first, it is confined within the territory of one state 83 and Syria is the
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 60
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf [hereinafter Haradinaj
Judgment].
80 Id. at para. 49.
81 Haradinaj Judgment, supra note 79, at para. 49; Limaj Judgment, supra
note 73, at para. 90.
82 Haradinaj Judgment, supra note 79, at para. 49.
83 While the vast majority of fighting has been confined within the Syrian
State, some fighting has spilled over into Turkey and Lebanon. See Jose Tracey
Shelton, Syria Conflict Continues to Spill Over into Turkey, GLOBAL POST, Oct. 12, 2012,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/syria/121012/syria-turkey-border-clashes-tensions-assad-fsa; Josh Wood,
79
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only state party to the conflict.84 Additionally, organized groups
engaged in intense fighting characterize the conflict. According to
military analyst Joseph Holliday at the Institute for the Study of War,
“the armed Syrian opposition [the Free Syrian Army] is identifiable,
organized and capable, even if not unified.”85 The Free Syrian Army
(FSA) is an overwhelmingly Sunni umbrella group “nominally
headquartered in Turkey” with ties to three major Syrian militias: the
Khalid bin Walid Brigade, the Harmoush Battalion, and the Omari
Battalion.86 Additionally, “insurgents have been able to maintain
control of key terrain near Damascus and central Homs.”87 Both the
Syrian government and FSA forces also face opposition from alQaeda-linked armed insurgent groups that have complicated and
intensified the civil war.88
The fighting has been ongoing for more than three years,
outlasting any other Arab Spring uprising in terms of sustained,
Sectarian Conflict Kills 17 in Northern Lebanon Spillover of Syrian Civil War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/world/middleeast/syriaconflict-spills-over-to-northern-lebanon.html; Joe Parkinson & Maria Abi-Habib,
Syria Fight Spills Over Borders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303815404577333292759
268460.
84 Turkey and Israel have been minimally involved in the conflict,
launching air strikes and artillery attacks within Syria. These attacks have been
relatively isolated incidents and not significant enough to classify the conflict as
international. See Isabel Kershner & Michael R. Gordon, Israeli Airstrike in Syria
Targets Arms Convoy, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/middleeast/syria-says-it-was-hit-bystrikes-from-israeli-planes.html; Seyhmus Cakan & Kadir Celikcan, Turkey strikes
back at Syria after mortar kills five, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-syria-crisisidUSBRE88J0X720121003.
85 JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, SYRIA’S ARMED
OPPOSITION 6 (2012),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.
pdf.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 3.
88 Khaled Yacoub Oweis & Arshad Mohammed, Syria rebels push al Qaeda
back;
U.S.
open
to
Iran
role,
REUTERS,
Jan.
5,
2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/05/us-syria-crisisidUSBREA040DG20140105.
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intense fighting. Both sides are reportedly using military-grade
weapons89 and reports by the media and government sources cite the
use of chemical agents. The government has “relied on artillery
attacks and air power” as well as tank ground attacks.90 It has used
multi-barrel rocket launchers, which opposition forces have also
accessed—likely by stealing them from government weapons
caches.91 Opposition forces are also launching pipe bombs made
from parts taken from unexploded government bombs.92 Recently,
the government has been using cluster bombs, which are inherently
more indiscriminate than conventional bombs.93 Additionally,
chemical weapons likely have been used in the conflict by
government forces and possibly by rebel forces.
The number of deaths, refugees, and material destruction
from the conflict has been devastatingly high. In July 2013, the civil
war had claimed the lives of over 100,000 people94 and the U.N. had
registered 1.8 million refugees from Syria.95 In September 2012, the
opposition group Syria Network for Human Rights “estimated more
than 2.9 million homes, schools, mosques, churches and hospitals
89 David Enders, Access to heavy weapons changing dynamics of Syrian conflict,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 1, 2012,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12/01/3699940/access-to-heavyweapons-changing.html.
90 Variety of Weapons Increases in Syrian Conflict (NPR radio broadcast Oct.
27, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/27/163760135/variety-of-weapons-increases-insyrian-conflict).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 C.J. Chivers, Syria Unleashes Cluster Bombs on Town, Punishing Civilians,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/world/middleeast/syria-uses-clusterbombs-to-attack-as-many-civilians-as-possible.html?_r=0. See generally Cluster
Munitions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/category/topic/arms/cluster-munitions
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
94 Syria death toll now about 100,000, says UN chief Ban, BBC, July 25, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760.
95 Patrick J. McDonnell, Don’t reject refugees from Syrian civil war, U.N. tells
world, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-wn-un-syrian-refugees20130717,0,5018699.story.
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had been damaged or destroyed since the uprising began in March
2011.”96 Although the Security Council has not authorized military
action or sanctions, it has issued resolutions condemning the actions
of the Syrian government on the Turkish border.97 Furthermore, the
U.N. Human Rights Council has condemned Syria for war
atrocities.98
The Syrian government has received military support from
Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.99 The opposition received military
support from Saudi Arabia100 and non-military assistance from the
United States,101 France, and the United Kingdom102 prior to the
recent reports of chemical weapons use. In response to chemical
weapons allegations, the United States stated a change in policy from
providing only humanitarian aid to providing military support as
well.103 In July 2013, the U.S. was moving weapons to Jordan with

96 Conflict has left Syria a shell of its former self, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/26/world/la-fg-syria-destruction-20121127.
97 UN condemns Syrian attack on Turkish town, BBC, Oct. 5, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19840022.
98 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 15, 2012).
99 See Zayn Knaub, Why is Hezbollah in Syria?, SMALL WARS J., (Nov. 19,
2013),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-is-hezbollah-in-syria;
Will
Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, INST. FOR THE STUDY
OF WAR, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria; Terry
Atlas, Russia increases Syria Arms while joining push for talks, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct.
31, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/russia-increases-syriaarms-while-joining-push-for-talks.html.
100 C.J. Chivers & Eric Schmitt, Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with
Croatian
Arms,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/middleeast/in-shift-saudis-are-saidto-arm-rebels-in-syria.html.
101 Syria conflict: John Kerry extends U.S. aid to rebels, BBC, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21612130.
102 Ashley Fantz, UK joins France in supporting Syrian rebel coalition,
CNN.COM, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/20/world/syria-civilwar/.
103 Syria:
U.S.
‘to
arm
rebels’
–
latest,
TELEGRAPH,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10120064/SyriaUS-to-arm-rebels-live.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
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plans to arm “small groups of vetted Syrian rebels . . . .”104 This
change in policy, however, would not internationalize the civil war,
changing it from NIAC to an international armed conflict (IAC).
Internationalization may occur when a foreign state provides
support to an insurgent group against the local government.105 Both
the ICJ and the ICTY have articulated tests for determining state
control, respectively called the effective control test and the overall
control test. In Nicaragua v. U.S., the ICJ held that, for “conduct to
give rise to legal responsibility . . . it would in principle have to be
proved that the state had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed.”106 In Tadic, the ICTY espoused its overall control
test that requires that the state: “i) provided financial and training
assistance, military equipment and operational support as well as; ii)
participates in the organization, co-ordination or planning of military
operations.”107 In the case of Syria, U.S. and allied military support to
the opposition would not internationalize the conflict under either
test. Both tests require a degree of control by the foreign state over
the planning of military operations. Sending military supplies, by
itself, fails to satisfy either test.
In Syria, crimes against humanity and widespread torture have
also triggered ICL liability. According to the Public International Law
and Policy Group, “[i]n Syria, mass atrocity crimes are being
committed on a scale not seen since Kosovo, Rwanda, and

Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, & Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Begins
Shipping Arms to Syrian Rebels, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323419604578569830070537040
.html.
105 Sylvain Vité, Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law:
legal concepts and actual situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 71 (2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf.
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
107 Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, para. 198
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf.
104
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Darfur.”108 Government and opposition forces have both committed
international crimes, including unlawful killing and torture, with the
United Nations reporting that the government’s abuses are more
widespread and serious.109 Human Rights Watch reports it has
identified at least 27 torture centers run by Syrian government
intelligence agencies as of 2012.110
Violations of the Geneva Conventions during the civil war
would also trigger war crimes liability. War crimes are the most
serious violations of IHL,111 triggering ICL liability and possible
prosecution by the ICC.112 The Rome Statute mirrors the Geneva
Conventions IAC-NIAC distinction in its criminalization of war
crimes. The Statute sets out four categories of war crimes which
include serious violations of: the four Geneva Conventions; the laws
and customs of international armed conflict; Common Article 3; and
law and customs of non-international armed conflict.113
3. Protections
As a NIAC, the Syrian conflict triggers Article 3, common to
all Geneva Conventions. If Syria were a member of the 1977
Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949—which it is not—additional protections would apply.114 In
PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
SYRIA:
THE
LEGAL
BASIS,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
(2012),
http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/PILPGThe-Legal-Basis-for-Humanitarian-Intervention-in-Syria.pdf.
109 Update 4-Syrian govt forces, rebels committing war crimes –U.N., REUTERS,
Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/15/syria-crisis-un-rightsidUSL6E8JFA3220120815.
110 Syria: Torture Centers Revealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 3, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/03/syria-torture-centers-revealed.
111 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 76, at para. 128.
112 AMERICAN UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A DISCUSSION GUIDE 12 (John Cerone & Susana SaCouto eds.)
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
113 Knut Dormann, War Crimes under the Rome States of the International
Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of the Crimes, 7
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 341, 343-45 (2003).
114 Common Article 3 is the only provision applicable to noninternational armed conflict unless another arrangement is agreed to by the parties.
108
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addition to NIAC protections, the parties’ conduct also triggers
individual criminal liability under ICL115 including war crimes liability.
Common Article 3 (“CA3”) is a blanket provision that
promises humane treatment by prohibiting the most egregious of
conduct. In certain situations, Protocol II may also apply and go
beyond CA3 to address distinct groups of people and prohibit certain
military conduct. CA3 is the only provision in the Geneva
Conventions to address armed conflict that is non-international in
nature.116 Under CA3,
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of any armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de
combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
NIAC may trigger additional protections depending on the state’s status as a party
to other treaty regimes. Examples of other treaty regimes include the 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols; the 1997 Ottawa
Convention banning anti-personnel land mines; the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention; and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and its
1999 Second Protocol.
115 See discussion infra in Season Two analysis, Part II.B.
116 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field at 48 (“ . . .
Article 3 . . . is only applicable to them until such time as a special agreement
between the Parties has brought into force between them all or part of the other
provisions of the Convention.”) [hereinafter Commentary to Geneva Convention
I].
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(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and
cared for.
Protocol II provides additional protections to CA3 but has a
narrower scope of applicability.117 While Syria is party to the Geneva
Conventions, it is not party to Protocol II. Protocol II is triggered in
the following situations:
The conflict is between the armed forces of a Party
and “dissident armed forces”;
The dissident armed forces are “under responsible
command”; and
These dissident armed forces “exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations” and
adhere to the Protocol.118

“[W]here the conditions of application of the Protocol are met, the
Protocol and common Article 3 will apply simultaneously, as the Protocol’s field of
application is included in the broader one of common Article 3. On the other hand,
in a conflict where the level of strife if low, and which does not contain the
characteristic features required by the Protocol, only common Article 3 will apply.”
Commentary to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) 4457 [hereinafter Commentary to Additional Protocol II].
118 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol II)
art. 1, Dec. 12, 1977 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. See
117

186

2014

Blake & Mahmud

3:1

Protocol II expands the list of fundamental guarantees for
persons not taking part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.
These include:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder as well
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or
any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”119
Where it applies, Protocol II provides the civilian population
a “general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations.”120 It promulgates the following rule: “The civilian
population, as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of

Qualification of Armed Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed_conflict.php
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
119 Additional Protocol II, supra note 118, at art. 4(2).
120 Id. at art. 13.
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.”121
D. Libya: International and Non-International Armed Conflict Legal
Protections
1. Background
The dictator Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya since he seized
power in a military coup in 1969. During Gaddafi’s rule, U.S.-Libyan
relations deteriorated, and the Libyan government allegedly
committed a number of state-sponsored acts of terrorism against U.S.
nationals including the 1988 Lockerbie bombings.122 The regime also
pursued weapons of mass destruction, but changed its position in
2003, leading to a lifting of international sanctions.123 Still, there was
little domestic political change in Libya during this period, and
tensions intensified between the Gaddafi government, the Libyan
Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), and the Muslim Brotherhood.124
The Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt provided a
catalyst for a domestic revolution in Libya in February 2011.125
Protests broke out in eastern region of Cyrenaica and spread to
Benghazi and the capital of Tripoli.126 On February 17, the
opposition movement, called the National Conference for the Libyan
Id. at art. 13.2
CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33142,
LIBYA:
TRANSITION
AND
U.S.
POLICY
15,
16
(2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf; Ian Black & Peter Beaumont,
Gaddafi ordered Lockerbie bombing- ex-minister, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/23/gaddafi-lockerbie-bombingminister-libya.
123 BLANCHARD, supra note 122, at 16.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Protests in Libya: Blood in the Streets, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Feb. 20,
2011, 16:40),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/02/protests_libya. See also
Maggie Michael & Bassem Mroue, Libya Protests: Tripoli in Open Revolt, Pro-Gaddafi
Gangs Terrorize Capital, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/26/libya-protests-tripolire_n_828586.html.
121
122
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Opposition (an umbrella group made up of several anti-Gaddafi
groups),127 declared a “Day of Rage” protest.128 By the next day,
sources reported that the opposition movement had taken over areas
of Benghazi and Cyrenaica.129 The Gaddafi regime reacted violently
to the calls for reform, vowing to track down and kill protestors
“house by house.”130 Human rights groups reported that the
government killed hundreds of civilians including women and
children in the initial crackdown against protestors.131 According to
media reports, Gaddafi also indiscriminately bombed areas with
helicopters and warplanes.132 At the end of February, the United
Nations passed a resolution to freeze the assets of Gaddafi and his
affiliates and send the matter to the ICC for investigation.133 In
March, the Security Council passed another resolution that
authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, demanded an end to attacks
against civilians, and authorized member States to take all necessary
measures to protect civilians in danger in Libya.
Following U.N. authorization, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France led a NATO coalition against Libyan

127 CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD & JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33142, LIBYA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157348.pdf.
128 THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION, ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH AND STUDY
GUIDE, http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163152
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
129 BLANCHARD & ZANOTTI, supra note 127, at 1.
130 Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Gaddafi’s Grip on the Capital
Tightens
as
Revolt
Grows,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
22,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=1&.
131 Fahim & Kirkpatrick, supra note 130; Nick Meo, Libya protests: 140
‘massacred’ as Gaddafi sends in snipers to crush dissent, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/833593
4/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html.
132 Richard Spencer, Libya: Muammar Gaddafi fires on his own people, THE
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 21, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/833934
7/Libya-Muammar-Gaddafi-fires-on-his-own-people.html.
133 Security Council imposes sanctions on Libyan authorities in bid to stem violent
repression,
U.N.
NEWS
CENTRE
(Feb,
26,
2011),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37633#.unIO2lGmDww.
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government forces, known as Operation Unified Defender.134 By
August, the opposition was able to attack Gaddafi strongholds, and
the Libyan National Transitional Council had killed Gaddafi and
established control over Libyan territory.135 By November 2011,
NATO forces had withdrawn from Libya.136
2. Classification
The conflict in Libya qualifies as “Season D”—IHL
protections apply for IAC and NIAC, and ICL protections also
apply. An IAC generally refers to an armed conflict between states or,
as previously discussed,137 an internal armed conflict that is
internationalized by foreign state intervention, as was the case in
Libya.
Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, an
IAC exists in the case of “declared war or of any other armed
conflict . . . between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by them.”138 A state does
not have to formally declare war, nor do all parties to the conflict
have to recognize the armed conflict for the situation to qualify as an
international armed conflict and trigger IHL protections.139
The conflict between the Libyan government and domestic
rebel forces met the organization and intensity requirements of a
NIAC. Beginning in February 2011, the situation could be classified
as a NIAC due to the organization and intensity of the fighting
134 Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Stavridis, NATO’s Victory in Libya: The
Right
Way
to
Run
an
Intervention,
91
FOR.
AFF.
(2012),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-gstavridis/natos-victory-in-libya; NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector, NATO
OTAN (Feb./Oct. 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm.
135 Id.
136 UN Security Council votes to end Libya operations, BBC, Oct. 27, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15481143.
137 See infra Part III.C(2) (discussing internationalization of an noninternational armed conflict).
138 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article 2 is common to all
Geneva Conventions.
139 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 32.
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between the Libyan government and opposition forces.140 The rebels
were organized under the National Conference for the Libyan
Opposition and, within the first days of the conflict, gained control
of significant areas of Libyan territory.141 Both sides employed
military-grade weapons, including “automatic weapons, rocketpropelled grenades, and heavy machine guns.” The government has
also used tanks and surface-to-air missiles.142
As the conflict continued and the government’s abuses came
to light, the Security Council authorized U.N. members to take all
means necessary to protect civilians.143 By the end of March, NATO
forces had taken international military action in Libya, which
internationalized the civil conflict by direct intervention. IAC
protections were triggered once fighting between NATO and the
Libyan government commenced, while NIAC protections applied to
the conflict between the government and domestic opposition forces.
In August, the opposition forces took control of Tripoli and held the
Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte by October 2011.144 This marked the
initial de-escalation of the revolution and eventual end of both armed
conflicts.
The conflict in Libya can be described as a “mixed” IACNIAC conflict. Between February and November 2011, Libya was
engaged in both non-international and international armed
conflicts.145 The revolution against Gaddafi began in February 2011
as a non-international armed conflict; in March 2011, with NATO’s

140

See infra Season Three discussion on organization and intensity criteria,

Part II.C.1.
CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD & JIM ZANOTTI, supra note 121, at 1.
Harriet Sherwood & Xan Rice, Gaddafi troops captured in Tunisia while
fighting intensifies in Misrata, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/29/gaddafi-troops-captured-intunisia.
143 S.C. Res. 1973, paras. 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
144 Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 358 (2012).
145 Libya: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY OF
INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_stat
e=128 (last updated Feb. 28, 2012).
141
142
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intervention, the conflict became a mixed IAC-NIAC. In November,
when NATO forces withdrew and the National Transitional Council
consolidated power, the situation returned to a conflict of a noninternational nature. By February 2012, there was no longer an armed
conflict of either type in Libya.
3. Protections
The conflict between the Gaddafi regime and NATO forces
triggered IAC protections under the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I. IAC triggers the highest degree of protections
for civilians and combatants under IHL. Separately, the conflict
between the Libyan government and rebel forces triggered NIAC
protections.146
IAC law affords protection to the wounded and sick,
prisoners of war (POWs), and the civilian population. During IAC,
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I regulate the
conduct of warfare.
First, the Geneva Conventions provide protections for the
sick and wounded of the armed forces during both land and naval
conflicts.147 Such personnel are regarded as “ ‘hors de combat,’ [and]
from that moment sacred and inviolable.”148 Under the Conventions,
they
shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties
to the conflict in whose power they may be, without
any adverse distinction founded on sex, race,
nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other
similar criteria. Any attempts upon their lives, or
violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited;
See infra Part II.C.3.
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
148 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 132.
146
147
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in particular, they shall not be murdered or
exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological
experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without
medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions
exposing them to contagion or infection be created.149
Second, the Geneva Conventions require state parties to
protect POWs. POW status is specifically reserved for combatants
taking part in international armed conflict. POWs must be “humanely
treated” and “[a]ny unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war
in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach
of the present Convention.”150 The Third Geneva Convention
forbids “physical mutilation or . . . medical or scientific experiments
of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his
interest.”151 The Convention also maintains a standard of humane
treatment for combatants during the time of captivity.152 POWs are
protected from physical and mental torture for purposes of
information153 and have the right to complain about the conditions of
their captivity.154
Finally, the Conventions protect civilians and civilian objects
under the rule of distinction. As a rule, “the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objects and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”155 Civilians are protected from being the “object of
Geneva Conventions I, supra note 147, at art. 12; Geneva Conventions
II, supra note 147, at art. 12.
150 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III].
151 Id.
152 See id. at arts. 13, 17-18, 26, 29, 78.
153 Id., at art. 17.
154 Id., at art. 78.
155 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I),
arts. 48-52, Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I].
149
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attack . . . [and] [a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population . . . .”156
As a general rule, “the right of Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”157 Under
article 35 of API,
(2) [i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. (3)
It is [also] prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment.158
Military strategy must also take into account the principle of
proportionality. As applied,
the attack must be directed against a military objective
with means which are not disproportionate in relation
to the objective, but are suited to destroying only that
objective, and the effects of the attacks must be
limited in the way required by the Protocol;
‘moreover,’ even after those conditions are fulfilled,
the incidental civilian losses and the damages must
not be excessive.159
If faced with several options “for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and
to civilian objects.”160

156
157
158
159
160

Id. at art. 51(2).
Id. at art. 35(1).
Id. at art. 35.
Id. at art. 51(5); Commentary to Additional Protocol I, 624-25.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at art. 57(c)(3).
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III. JUSTIFIED AND UNJUSTIFIED DIFFERENCES IN PROTECTIONS
UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law did not apply to the Arab Spring in a
uniform manner. Although IHL protections only applied in Libya
and Syria, ICL offered a baseline of protection for civilians facing
egregious government attacks in Egypt and Bahrain. For the armed
conflicts in Libya and Syria, IHL provided a lower degree of
protection for civilians and combatants in Syria’s civil war than in
Libya’s international conflict. This distinction is unjustified because it
assigns a different weight to human integrity based on the sovereign
status of the parties to the conflict. In addition, it does not reflect the
reality that NIAC poses an equivalent, if not greater, threat to
affected populations and the international community. A lesser
protection regime also provides the opportunity for abuse during
NIAC. Furthermore, the dual system of a mixed conflict creates
practical problems of legal compliance and enforcement.
A. ICL v. IHL: A Justified Distinction
Distinctions between international criminal (“Season B”) and
humanitarian (“Season C” and “Season D”) legal protections under
the current regime are justified. ICL (non-war crime) liability applies
irrespective of an armed conflict. It prohibits large-scale violations
against the civilian population, including crimes against humanity and
genocide. In contrast, IHL protections are triggered by the existence
of an armed conflict. It provides a set of protections specific to
armed conflict that address combatants, prisoners of war, and
civilians through the principles of distinction and proportionality.
ICL protections are better suited to situations that do not rise
to the level of an armed conflict. During an armed conflict, IHL
recognizes legally permissible killings while providing protections to
persons not taking part in hostilities. For example, CA3 prohibits the
killing of individuals not taking part in the conflict, and IAC goes
further, requiring that attacks be carried out in a manner “expected to
cause the least danger to civilian objects.”161 In situations of non-

161

Id. at art. 57.
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armed conflict, IHL would not apply; however, ICL protections
trigger criminal liability for widespread or systematic attack against
the population. ICL liability depends on the impact on the affected
population without any reference to military calculations.
The distinction between international criminal and
humanitarian legal protections is justified. ICL protections are
important intermediary protections between basic international
human rights protections and international protections exclusive to
the time of war.
B. IAC v. NIAC: An Unjustified Distinction
The distinction between IAC (“Season C”) and NIAC
(“Season D”) in IHL is unjustified. Protections are assigned based on
the sovereign status of the parties, ignoring the factual reality that
NIAC threatens vulnerable populations as well. Thus, the IAC-NIAC
distinction is unjustified because it fails to provide a uniform legal
standard of protections against potential atrocities. This is illustrated
by the comparison of Libya and Syria, which did not merit the same
protections under current international law.
While IHL affords a lesser degree of protections in Syria, the
civil war poses a greater threat to the population and international
security than the Libyan conflict. Libya and Syria both experienced
prolonged periods of violence. In Libya, the IAC lasted for eight
months; and, by October 2011, the combined casualties for the IAC
and NIAC were estimated at 25,000.162 By July 2013, the Syrian
conflict had been ongoing for more than two years with a death
count exceeding 100,000 including more than 36,000 civilians.163 The
Syrian civil conflict has greatly destabilized the region, creating almost
two million refugees,164 drawing in mercenaries and foreign
162 Ian Black, Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new
government,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Jan.
8,
2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualtieslower-expected-government.
163 Syria
death toll tops 100,000, TELEGRAPH, Jun. 26, 2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10142892/Syriadeath-toll-tops-100000.html.
164 McDonnell, supra note 95.
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fighters,165 and heightening sectarian violence.166 Despite the
seriousness of the civil conflict, IHL affords a lesser degree of
protection in Syria than the Libyan armed conflict.
Under the Geneva Conventions, CA3 is the only provision
that applies in Syria.167 CA3 does not govern the conduct of warfare
or distinguish the wounded combatant from the general population.
In the absence of a POW status, Common Article 3 protects the
captured combatant from inhumane treatment and unfair
prosecution; however, the individual remains vulnerable to national
laws against treason and other crimes. In effect, CA3 is a
compromised text, weighing the concern for human integrity against
the state’s interest in sovereign authority to govern its internal
affairs.168 It “merely provides for the application of the principles of
the Convention and not for the application of specific
provisions . . . .”169 Under CA3, the Syrian government is held to
general principles and allowed greater flexibility relative to IAC in its
conduct against perceived threats.
In contrast, the Libyan armed conflict triggered an extensive
number of provisions that, unlike CA3, are more specific, practical,
and less vague.170 As a rule, IAC requires the parties to distinguish
Bassem Mroue, Assad says Syria is fighting foreign mercenaries, TORONTO
STAR, May 16, 2012,
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/05/16/assad_says_syria_is_fighting_f
oreign_mercenaries.html.
166 See AMB. FREDERIC C. HOF, RAFIK HARIRI & ALEX SIMON, THE
CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN SYRIA’S
CIVIL WAR: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATION
(2013), http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20130325-syria-report.pdf.
167 See Commentary to the Geneva Conventions I, supra note 116.
168 See id. at 48. “It [art. 3] at least ensures the application of the rules of
humanity which are recognized as essential by civilized nations and provides a legal
basis for charitable interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross
or any other impartial humanitarian organization—interventions which in the past
were all too often refused on the ground that they represented unfriendly
interference in the internal affairs of a State.”
169 Id.
170 Id. at 150 (comparing Article 15 with Common Article 3, which
provides general principles of protection without specific provisions as to the
parties responsibilities and conduct in achieving the protections).
165
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between civilians and military objects and “direct their operations
only against military objectives.”171 Civilians are protected from being
the “object of attack . . . [and] [a]cts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population . . . .”172 Furthermore, IAC limits the means of warfare 173
and requires military action to adhere to the principle of
proportionality.174 IAC protections also give legal status to the
wounded and sick and “lay down the actual steps to be taken for
their benefit from the moment they fall on the battlefield.”175 POW
status also applies to captured combatants and confers a series of
protections that maintain a standard for humane treatment during the
time of custody.176
In Nicaragua, the ICJ referred to CA3, which applies in Syria,
as “rules which, in the court’s opinion, reflect . . . ‘elementary
considerations of humanity.’”177 Protocol II (which applies to certain
non-international armed conflicts) embodies, to an extent, the
principle of distinction,178 but, as the Commentary points out,
“[u]nlike Protocol I [related to international armed conflict], which
contains detailed rules, only the fundamental principles on protection
for the civilian population are formulated in Protocol II . . . .”179 Even
these fundamental protections may not apply in Syria because Syria is
not party to Protocol II. Although courts and states can interpret and
apply rules of IAC to NIAC as customary law,180 the codified regime
at the core of IHL protections still differentiates the situation and the
applicable protections. There is significant disagreement over the
Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at arts. 48-52.
Id. at art. 51(2).
173 Id. at art. 35.
174 Id. at art. 51(5); Commentary to Additional Protocol I at 624-25.
175 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 150
(discussing art. 15).
176 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, at arts. 13, 17, 18, 26, 29,
78.
177 Nicaragua, supra note 106. The ICJ views Common Article 3 as
reflecting the “elementary considerations of humanity” referred to in its prior 1949
opinion of Corfu Channel, Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (April 9).
178 See infra note 194.
179 Commentary to Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, at 4762.
180 See INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 77.
171
172
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substance of customary international law, creating ambiguity in
possibly applying and enforcing IAC protections in NIAC. The IACNIAC distinction is mirrored in ICL war crimes liability established
by the Rome Statute.
The IAC-NIAC distinction is also subject to abuse. During
NIAC, the government or opposition forces may take advantage of
the less restrictive protections regime, especially if the state is not a
party to subsequent agreements that regulate the conduct of war. In
Syria, for example, President Assad used cluster bombs against the
oppositional forces with significant impact on the civilian population.
The legal argument against the use of cluster bombs is stronger under
IAC either because they violate articulated rules of distinction or
because many states have banned their use,181 but this protection is
less clear in NIAC.182 Because Syria is not party to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions, the government might legitimately argue their use
is permissible under the current legal regime. A similar analysis
applies to the use of chemical weapons. At the start of the current
conflict, Syria was not a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention(CWC), which prohibits the use of chemical weapons,
and it did not join the CWC until October 2013.183 Although IHL
regulates the use of weapons during IAC,184 it does not include a
similar provision for NIAC unless agreed to in arrangements beyond
the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to the potential for abuse by government forces,
current international law leaves “little incentive for insurgent forces
to comply with laws of war . . . [and] granting the privileges to
insurgents might promote greater reciprocity on their part.”185 NIAC
offers few protections for and restrictions on the opposition group.
This increases the likelihood that the opposition will also commit
atrocities and ignore basic humanitarian concerns. In the case of
See Additional Protocol II, supra note 118, at art. 13.
See id.
183 Blake & Mahmud, supra note 69, at 250.
184 Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at art. 35.
185 James G. Stewart, Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international
humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict, 85 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 313, 347 (2003),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850_stewart.pdf.
181
182
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Syria, the opposition has allegedly committed human rights abuses
for which it should be held accountable. Elimination of the IACNIAC distinction would promote greater compliance on both sides,
offering greater protections and incentive for adhering to
international law.
The continuation of a dual system of protections also poses
theoretical and practical problems. Situations that trigger both sets of
protections, the so-called “mixed conflict,” create confusion and
complicate the application of IHL. For example, Libya hosted both
an NIAC and IAC, creating a dual system of law within a single
conflict. To determine the applicable protections regime, each
engagement would require a separate evaluation and classification as
part of the international or non-international armed conflict. Mixed
conflicts may further complicate the analyses in situations when
opposition forces of each armed conflict physically mix during an
altercation. Furthermore, the current system creates virtuous and
vicious cycles of protections. For example, when the international
community decides in favor of intervention (as was the case in
Libya), the internationalization of that conflict leads to a greater set
of protections. On the other hand, in Syria, the international
community’s failure to act has led to lesser protections because the
conflict remains non-international. These cycles are also problematic
because they give bodies such as the Security Council or NATO
considerable power in determining the legal protections that apply to
a conflict, instead of creating standing and determinate legal regimes.
Yet, the most apparent flaw of the dual system is its assignment of
two protections regimes in the same conflict, in which one set of
protections arbitrarily gives a different weight to human integrity
depending on the sovereign status of the oppositional force.
Ultimately, the IAC-NIAC distinction assigns a different weight to
human integrity depending on the sovereign status of the parties to
the conflict. In Tadic, the ICTY argued that the different weight given
to human integrity under current IHL was unjust. The court asked:
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or
ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of
hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary
suffering when two sovereign states are engaged in
200

2014

Blake & Mahmud

3:1

war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or
providing the same protection when armed violence
has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign
state? If international law, while of course duly
safeguarding the legitimate interests of states, must
gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is
only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy
should gradually lose its weight.186
A dual system of law in a mixed conflict is avoidable if the
NIAC is “internationalized,” thereby applying one protections regime
to both conflicts. However, one must apply a burdensome and
uncertain test on whether or not the conflict has met the criteria to
be “internationalized”—a standard which international courts
continue to debate. For example, Syria already exhibits some factors
of foreign involvement that suggest a future internationalized
conflict. However, the transition from NIAC to IAC is a gray area
and difficult to determine. Eliminating the distinction between IAC
and NIAC would also resolve the internationalization dilemma by
rendering it a moot point and making universal application of IHL
less complicated and contentious.
Finally, the international character of modern civil conflicts
justifies a collapsed single protection regime. This would reflect the
reality of domestic conflict and its contribution to international
destabilization. For example, although Syria is involved in a
traditional civil war, numerous foreign states have been affected.
Regional security concerns have prompted the direct involvement of
Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon. In addition, the refugee situation has
impacted Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. The Syrian
conflict is not an isolated situation. Foreign alliances currently play a
role in providing military and non-military assistance to both parties
to the conflict.

186

Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 76, at para. 97.
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IV. THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM
In the latter part of the twentieth century, international legal
trends have transformed the concept of state sovereignty. Current
analysis of the Arab Spring demonstrates that sovereignty norms in
ICL and IHL must be interpreted in light of these changes. The next
section describes the foundations and transformation of state
sovereignty and argues that the current problems in applying IHL
and ICL to the Arab Spring are attributed to an undue preference for
traditional and outdated conceptions of sovereignty. The Geneva
Conventions were ratified in the 1940s and the Rome Statute in the
1990s. They preceded the changing conceptions of sovereignty in the
latter part of the twentieth century and the emergence of the
Responsibility to Protect movement in the beginning of the twentyfirst century, respectively. IHL and ICL should be understood in light
of changing contexts and the international understanding of
sovereignty. Given the continued occurrence of armed conflict in the
modern era and the international community’s changing
understanding of sovereignty, we must re-evaluate the current
treatment and application of IHL and ICL protections. International
protections should be a uniform standard of protections that apply to
all populations affected by conflict, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.
A. IAC-NIAC Distinction Incompatible with Sovereignty Trends
The problems identified in this Article stem from the same
conceptual source: sovereignty. The IAC-NIAC distinction reflects
the traditional sensitivity of a state’s right to govern its domestic
affairs without intrusion. The drafting history shows that states
vehemently opposed a single protection regime for armed conflict
(IAC and NIAC), fearing that internal insurgencies would take
advantage of international protections from domestic action and gain
legal status.187 Historically, as the Commentary points out,
Commentary to the Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at art. 3,
para. 60. The last sentence of Article 3 prohibits such protections from conferring
legal status on the belligerent group. This “meets the fear—always the same one—
that the application of the Convention, even to a very limited extent, in cases of
civil war may interfere with the de jure Government’s lawful suppression of the
187
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“[a]pplications by a foreign Red Cross or by the International
Committee of the Red Cross have more than once been treated as
unfriendly attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the country
concerned.”188
Similarly, ICL protections are also limited because of
sovereignty concerns. The Rome Statute is a consent-based
document, consistent with the Westphalian model in that states are
only bound to the international law to which they agree.189 Many
countries, including the United States, Israel, and most Arab states
are not party to the Rome Statute. This creates practical enforcement
issues. Similarly, Security Council action and ICC referral are based
on the consent of the five permanent members (P5). As noted by
international legal scholar Andrew Guzman,
[a]ny issue that is of truly global importance will affect
each of the P5 members in a different way and a
resolution can only be adopted if each of them
believes it to serve their interests . . . The need to
focus on areas where the P5 can agree limits the
Council to a relatively small subset of the world’s
problems.190
B. Foundations of Sovereignty
Traditional sovereignty or “the conception that a state must
have control of its external policies and be free of external authority
structures is an essentially European invention, dating from the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”191 with the signing of the Treaty

revolt, or that it may confer belligerent status, and consequently increased
authority, upon the adverse Party.”
188 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 116, at art. 3,
para. 39.
189 For a recent argument that consent should be minimized in
international law, see Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747
(2012).
190 Id. at 780.
191 Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the
United States, 40 JCMS 743 (2002),
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of Westphalia.192 At the time, Hugo Grotius, the “father of
international law”193 conceived of “an authentic law of nations which
was based on the ‘mutual consent’ of sovereigns acting in the context
of a ‘great society of States.’”194 The paradox of this system, however,
was that “sovereignty created the territorial state and the international
system.”195 This system would be held together by states that were
each independent and did not have to answer to a higher authority.
Stephen Krasner identifies several sovereignty typologies
including Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.
According to Krasner, Westphalian sovereignty is the idea that a
“state has the right to determine its own authority structures, which
implies that states should avoid intervening in each other’s internal
affairs.”196 International legal sovereignty is the idea that “juridically
independent territorial entities merit recognition and with it such
rights and privileges as membership in international organizations.”197

http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic162929.files/B_Political_Integration/K
eohaneIroniesOfSovereignty.pdf.
192 While the peace of Westphalia was a significant watershed moment in
the international system and for the codification of traditional sovereignty norms
“[it] was not a clear break with the past: political entities with exclusive control over
a well-defined territory existed well before the Peace…” Stephen D. Krasner,
Westphalia and All That, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993),
http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS362/KrasnerIdeasForeignPolicyWe
stphalia.pdf.
193 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1609, 1609 (1995).
194 Mark W. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius, in
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 391, 396 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed.,
1993) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 20 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., The Classics of International Law vol. 2) (1913)).
195 FRANCIS M. DENG, SADAIKIEL KIMARO, TERRENCE LYONS,
DONALD ROTHCHILD & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY
11 (1996).
196 Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights 71 (Univ. of Denver
Hum. Rts. & Welfare Working Paper, Paper No. 21, 2004),
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2004/21-donnelly-2004.pdf.
197 Stephen D. Krasner, The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 69, 70-71 (2005).
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The United Nations Charter, the foundational document of
modern international law, enshrines both concepts of sovereignty
and also sets their limits. Article 2(4) of the Charter upholds the
notion of Westphalian sovereignty, asserting that states “shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . .”198
Chapter VII of the Charter then limits that sovereignty by giving
power to the Security Council to take military and non-military action
against a member to “restore international peace and security.”199
Article 2(1) of the Charter codifies international legal
sovereignty, stating that the United Nations is “based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”200 State membership in
the United Nations necessarily enhances international legal
sovereignty by recognizing each state as an independent and
legitimate legal entity, able to enter into treaties and conventions and
participate in the General Assembly, Security Council, and other
U.N. bodies. Chapter II of the Charter then sets out mechanisms and
justifications for limiting international legal sovereignty by expelling
members from various U.N. committees or from the U.N. itself.201
C. Transformation of Sovereignty: The Fading of the Westphalian
Model
In the latter part of the twentieth century, international trends
have transformed the concept of sovereignty and have eroded the
prominence of Westphalian sovereignty. States have acceded to
international regimes that promote universal standards, agreed to the
jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and authorized nongovernmental bodies to monitor and enforce states’ commitments. In
exercise of their legal sovereignty, states have consented to external
authorities and thereby weakened the Westphalian model. These
international trends are illustrated in the fields of human rights,
international security, and the creation of international criminal
courts.
198
199
200
201

U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
Id., at art. 39.
Id., at art. 2(1).
Id., at arts. 3-6.

205

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

1. Human rights
In the twentieth century, human rights protections have
gained universal standing with states that have acceded to agreements
and joined organizations that promote global norms for human
rights.202 States “enter into such [human rights] accords with the full
understanding that in so doing they might limit their own autonomy
by altering domestic views about legitimate behavior, authorizing
external monitoring of internal practices, or creating third-party
adjudication procedures that give individual citizens, not just states,
legal standing.”203 Each is evidence to the fact that the state no longer
enjoys the exclusive right to define humane treatment under its
jurisdiction.
2. International security
International security institutions illustrate states’ consent for
an international body to take coercive measures against a sovereign.
Under Art. 42 of the United Nations Charter, “[s]hould the Security
Council consider that measures provided for in Art. 41 [use of unarmed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.” Such
enforcement actions are exceptions to Art. 2(7) and the limitations on
intervention in “matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state . . . .”204 States have also agreed to support
the Council’s decisions, even if they are non-permanent members or
took no part in the vote. This further violates the Westphalian
system, which promotes the state’s external authority and “prohibits
governments from agreeing to rules defining a process, over which it
does not have a veto, that can confer obligations not specifically
provided for in the original agreement.” Beyond supporting the

202

STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 110-

12 (1999).
203
204

Id. at 106.
U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
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Council’s decisions, some states have supported military intervention
absent Security Council authorization for humanitarian reasons.205
3. International criminal courts
The enforcement of international criminal law has made
significant progress in the twentieth century with the creation of
international courts and tribunals.206 Following World War II, the
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, called for a “trial of war
crimes whose offenses have no particular geographic location.”207
This established the Trial of German Major War Criminals, known as
the Nuremberg Trial, and, in Asia, the Allied Forces established a
similar proceeding known as the Tokyo Tribunal. Both tribunals
exercised jurisdiction over individuals charged with crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These adjudications
enforced the principle of individual liability for international crimes208
and international adjudication, independent of the state where the
crimes occurred or the nationality of the actors.
In the 1990s, the United Nations created tribunals to address
the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.209 In both cases,
See infra Part IV.D (discussing humanitarian intervention and the
emerging norm of responsibility to protect).
206 The 1919 Treaty of Versailles included provisions for an international
tribunal and domestic military courts (of the Allied and Associated Powers) to try
German officials. The enforcement of such provisions was unsuccessful. However,
the Netherlands refused to extradite the Kaiser, and the other provisions of the
Treaty were unsuccessfully enforced. See BETH VAN SCHAAK & RON SLYE, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 23-25 (2007) (referring to
arts. 227-28 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles).
207 London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
208 Judgment of Nuremberg Tribunal (also cited in the Rome Statute). In
its judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that “crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can international criminal law be enforced.”
209 The ICTY was established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993), and the ICTR was established by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The United Nations also assisted in the establishment
of criminal tribunals for atrocities associated with Cambodia, East Timore, and
Sierra Leone.
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the Security Council cited the situation “to constitute a threat to
international peace and security,” a clear reference to its Chapter VII
powers and the states’ assent to international action in domestic
affairs. The tribunals function under the procedures and substantive
rules of their respective Statutes and outside the domestic judicial
system. Both Statutes include general provisions for a fair trial; 210
reference to the international standard of due process under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;211 and an
appeals process with interlocutory review and a separate Appeals
Chamber.212 The Statutes include substantive provisions that assign
individual criminal responsibility,213 and the tribunals exercise
personal, territorial, and temporal jurisdiction.214 The tribunals have
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts.215 However, they take
precedence over domestic proceedings,216 and national adjudication
does not bar the tribunal from initiating a subsequent proceeding.
Whereas the ICTY and ICTR are limited to their respective conflicts,
the ICC is “a permanent institution and shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern . . . .”217

210 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 15, Annex to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/sid/135 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
211 Id. at art. 21. See also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, art. 14, Annex to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994),
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement
(adopting the rules of procedure and evidence of the ICTY) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
212 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 25(1). See also ICTR Statute, supra
note 212, at art. 12 (stating the original intention for the ICTR to share the same
Appeals Chamber as created under the ICTY Statute).
213 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 7; ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at
art. 6.
214 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at arts. 6, 8; ICTR Statute, supra note
212, at arts. 5,7.
215 ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at art. 8(1); ICTY Statute, supra note
211, at art. 9(1).
216 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note
212, at art. 8(2) (granting concurrent jurisdiction with “primacy over the national
courts of all States.”).
217 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at art. 1.
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The creation of international criminal courts arguably violates
a state’s Westphalian sovereignty by giving power to an entity outside
of the state’s control. First, the courts are created by third parties,
whether by a coalition of states or an international organization such
as the United Nations. The trial is generally outside the state’s judicial
system, and its procedures are established through external
documents (Charters and Statutes) also adopted by third parties.
Second, these tribunals create substantive changes to the state’s penal
system. They impose international standards and assign individual
liability, prosecuting conduct for which there may not be a domestic
equivalent.218 Third, international courts exercise jurisdiction over the
individuals of or conduct that occurred in a particular state that
would otherwise fall under the state’s sovereign jurisdiction.219 The
tribunals and courts take precedence over national proceedings, a
stark contradiction to the traditional notion that a state has primary
authority to govern its own affairs.
D. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The emergence of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) represents
a culmination of the decline of traditional notions of Westphalian
sovereignty in international law. It is a recent doctrine that highlights
the importance of humanitarian protections against absolute
sovereignty. The IAC-NIAC distinction is incompatible with this
notion that humanitarian protections are not secondary to
sovereignty concerns.
Responsibility to Protect is an emerging norm that recognizes
(1) the jus cogens, or fundamental nature of the
prohibition against atrocity crimes; (2) historical state
practice regarding humanitarian intervention; and (3)
218 See London Agreement, supra note 208, for the definition of “crimes
against humanity.”
219 See ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at arts. 1, 5-8 (establishing the
competence of the tribunal, personal jurisdiction, individual criminal responsibility,
territorial and temporal jurisdiction, and concurrent jurisdiction); S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 210 (establishing a tribunal “for the prosecution of persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 . . .”).
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opinio juris, or state belief, that when atrocity crimes
are unchecked within a state, the threat to
international stability is so great that states can
justifiably use force for the limited purpose of
stopping these crimes.220
At the 2005 United Nations World Summit, “Heads of State
and Government unanimously endorsed the Responsibility to
Protect, pledging to never again abandon people threatened by the
crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing.”221 The Summit, first, affirmed the view that, “[w]hen
individual states fail to protect their own populations, they have no
sovereign right to nonintervention.”222 It also “set a new standard for
the United Nations and the international community as a whole:
Failure to take action to protect populations from genocide and other
atrocities is failure to fulfill a clearly acknowledged duty.”223 Of
importance, R2P challenges the sovereign right of nonintervention
that is the primary characteristic of the Westphalian model. The IACNIAC distinction fails to reflect the current understanding that
traditional sovereignty has given way to universal standards and
protections.
According to Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the
end of the twentieth century:
A major intellectual requirement of our time is to
rethink the question of sovereignty—not to weaken
its essence, which is crucial to international security
and cooperation, but to recognize that it may take
more than one form and perform more than one
function. This perception could help solve problems
both within and among states. And underlying the
rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a
dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all
PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., supra note 108, at 7.
Id.
222 Alicia L. Bannon, Comment, The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World
Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 (2006).
223 Id. at 1162.
220
221
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humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate
involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole.
It is a sense that increasingly finds expression in the
gradual expansion of international law.224
V. SOLUTIONS
A. International Humanitarian Law Solutions
Populations affected by armed conflict should benefit from
the same regime of heightened protections. This requires the creation
of one protection regime for all armed conflict that corrects the
existing flaws. Armed conflict should be evaluated under a uniform
standard, irrespective of its international nature, to determine
whether or not the situation triggers IHL protections. This analysis
should consider such factors that infer an adverse effect on the
population and need for a protections regime. Second, the same
protections regime should apply to all populations in armed conflict.
For the purposes of IHL protections, we propose that
“armed conflict” be defined as the following:
(a) conflict between two or more organized armed forces
under the responsible command of authorities, with the
ability to exercise control over the territory, engaged in
fighting of some intensity; or
(b) a conflict between two or more states, or declared war
between two or more states.
Subpart (b) embodies the traditional notion of international
armed conflict. It reflects the situation of imminent or actual conflict
where a hierarchal command (the state) intends to use, or has already
used, armed force.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOR. AFF. 99
(1992),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48466/boutros-boutrosghali/empowering-the-united-nations.
224
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Subpart (a) eliminates the distinction between IAC and NIAC
in favor of criteria that indicate a situation of intense violence and
need for international protections. This standard incorporates the
elements of armed conflict, irrespective of the parties’ status as
sovereign states. It requires the existence of two or more organized
armed forces under the responsible command of authorities. The
criterion of a responsible command “implies some degree of
organization of the insurgent armed group or dissident armed
forces . . . . It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of
planning and carrying out sustained and concerted operations, and on
the other, of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto
authority.”225 The existence of an armed force with an identifiable
command distinguishes the armed conflict from internal disturbance
and does not affect the state’s ability to handle insurgencies or
situations of unorganized violence.226 Subpart (a) also requires the
authorities to have “the ability to control the territory.” This criterion
assures the ability of all parties—whether states or opposition
forces—to enforce the rules of war.
A significant level of organization and territorial control for
the insurgent party is required. This is “likely to exclude internal
disturbances, riots, and terrorist activities from the scope of a single
body of international humanitarian law.”227 Subpart (a) also depends
on a threshold level of violence. This reflects the key value of IHL as
a protection of human life during a period of vulnerability and
potential threat.
Under the proposed definition, a situation that meets either
Subpart (a) or (b) is an armed conflict and triggers traditional IAC
protections. The protection regime should, however, contain the
caveat that the triggering of protections does not affect the legal
status of the parties. This alleviates the historical concern that
application of international protections confers legal status on rebel
forces equivalent to that of a state. Under the proposed analysis,

Commentary to Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, at 4463.
Stewart, supra note 186, at 345-46 (referring to Brazilian government’s
suggestion for APII threshold).
227 Id. at 346.
225
226
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armed conflict would trigger IAC protections, rendering CA3 and
Protocol II obsolete.
Indeed, the proposed analysis reflects the international
community’s finding that IAC-like protections and principles should
apply to NIAC. For example, the Manual on the Law of Noninternational Armed Conflict details the rules and protections that
apply during NIAC; however, many of these principles are extensions
of IAC protections interpreted by courts as customary international
law and applied to all armed conflict, including NIAC.228 Courts and
other authoritative bodies have recognized that certain aspects of
IAC are customary law for NIAC; however, which aspects apply to
NIAC remains unsettled. These developments demonstrate a
recognition that the IAC-NIAC distinction is unjustified, but at the
same time, the distinction remains a significant feature of treaty and
customary international law.
B. International Criminal Law Solutions
The undue preference for traditional sovereignty norms must
also be minimized in the current enforcement of ICL and at the ICC.
While ICC enforcement has thus far taken place in African conflicts,
the Arab Spring’s call for major judicial reform might provide a
catalyst for the Middle Eastern countries to join ICL institutions. ICL
enforcement could be achieved by promoting ICC membership
within the Arab League. Furthermore, the creation of a regional or
other independent ICC referral mechanism would encourage Arab
nations to join and make the process less politicized.
It is fitting that Tunisia, the country that set the Arab Spring
in motion, has also been the first Middle Eastern country to ratify the
Rome Statute post-Arab Spring.229 As countries in the region deal
domestically with judicial reform issues in the coming years, ICC
228 For example, the principle of military necessity is not found in
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II. However, the ICTY has found the
principle to apply based on customary international law. See INT’L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 77.
229 Daniel Makosky, Tunisia Ratifies Rome Statute, Joining ICC, JURIST (Jun.
25, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/tunisia-ratifies-rome-statutejoining-icc.php.
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membership could aid in “national judicial reform, spurring
spates . . . to enact legislation that reflects a responsibility to ensure
accountability for grave crimes at the national level. In turn, civil
society monitors [can] ensure that governments follow through on
their commitments to combat impunity, and advance good
governance and rule of law.”230
The Arab League, with international assistance, might also set
up an ad hoc war crimes tribunal to prosecute war criminals in Syria,
the site of the most serious of the Arab Spring’s war crimes, after the
conflict has ended.231 Such an institution would be similar to the
ICTY or ICTR, or hybrid courts, and could provide a realistic
alternative to embracing international law within Arab institutions in
the absence of widespread acceptance of ICC jurisdiction.232 U.N.
investigators are currently compiling information on international
criminal violations in Syria.233 Given the scale of atrocities already
committed, the international community must identify a proper
forum for future prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring has been called “the world’s first true
human rights revolution: the young protestors of the Arab street
Leila Hanafi & Haidi Sadik, ICC Membership Can Protect Arab Spring
Gains, MUFTAH (Jan. 3, 2013), http://muftah.org/icc-membership-can-protectarab-spring-gains/.
231 A proposed statute for an international tribunal to prosecute Syrian
war crimes has been drafted by a group of international experts led by the Public
International
Law
and
Policy
Group.
See
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2013/1003/Revenge-or-retribution-Is-itpossible-to-prosecute-war-crimes-for-Syria.
232 Aryeh Neier, An Arab War-Crimes Court for Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/opinion/an-arab-war-crimes-courtfor-syria.html?_r=0.
233 Stephanie Nebehay, UN investigators urge ICC trials for Syria’s war
criminals,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Feb.
18,
2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0218/UNinvestigators-urge-ICC-trials-for-Syria-s-war-criminals; Ian Black, Syrian leaders
should face justice at ICC, UN says, GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/18/syria-murder-torture-chargesicc.
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spoke the language of democracy and human rights, and the
international community responded with the same lexicon.”234 The
Arab revolutions and international legal trends demonstrate the
global advancement and acceptance of universal human rights values
in the past sixty years. The idea that foreign intervention is justified
against states committing mass atrocity crimes against its own people
has gained widespread support. Still, international law continues to
provide inconsistent protections during armed conflicts based on the
sovereign status of the parties, and ICL continues to face
enforcement problems. While these issues are difficult to resolve, the
international community can take certain actions to correct these
concerns. These include the elimination of the unjustified distinction
between IAC and NIAC and promotion of increased ICC
membership. Time and again, the international community has
promised “never again” in the wake of the world’s most horrific
atrocities. The international community must address the flaws in its
current legal regime if it is to stand beside its promise.

Rosa Brooks, Lessons for International Law from the Arab Spring, 28 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 101 (2013).
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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
RESOURCE CURSE
Patrick J. Keenan*
INTRODUCTION
Determining why some countries have prospered and others
have failed to grow has puzzled scholars and policymakers for
decades and remains an important question to the millions of people
in the developing world. A particularly vexing part of the problem
has to do with countries that are rich in exploitable natural resources
like oil, natural gas, or minerals. These countries have tended to grow
more slowly than countries without similar resources. This
phenomenon, often called the resource curse, has been the focus of
sustained attention by scholars from many disciplines who have
attempted to identify whether, how, and why the resource curse
exists and how it might be reversed or ameliorated. To a poor
country, a source of sustained revenue can look like free money: the
country simply needs to extract the resource from the ground and sell
it, which should cause the country grow more quickly and fare better
than countries without similar resources. In too many places, reality
has proven far different.1 But resource wealth does not inevitably
* Patrick Keenan, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of
Law.
For a thorough discussion of the literature on the resource curse, see
Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD POL. 297
(1999). Ross reviews the literature and concludes that there “is now strong evidence
that states with abundant resource wealth perform less well than their resourcepoor counterparts, but there is little agreement on why this occurs.” Id. at 297. Two
relatively early books remain important for their discussion of individual countries
and the lessons they draw from these case studies. For discussion of the relative
importance of mineral endowments and their often-negative effects on
macroeconomic performance, see RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING
DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS (1993).
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cause harm. There are certainly success stories of countries that have
turned resource wealth into sustained economic development.2 What
explains the difference in outcomes?
Determining the effect of a country’s resource wealth on its
economic development is an important strand of development
scholarship. As scholars have considered the effect of resource
wealth, it has become clear that institutions are a principal factor in
determining whether a country develops quickly or slowly (or at all). 3
Some scholars go so far as to argue that “institutions rule” with
respect to economic development;4 that is, that institutions are the
most important factor in general and with respect to states rich in
natural resources.5 For my purposes, it is not necessary to argue or to
prove that institutions are the principal determinant of economic
Auty examines in detail six highly resource-dependent countries and finds that
resource wealth can have a negative effect on growth under particular policy
conditions. Terry Lynn Karl, in the book THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS
AND PETRO-STATES (Stephen D. Krasner et al. eds., 1997), finds similar results in
countries dependent on the sale of oil, albeit for somewhat different reasons.
2 See, e.g., Ragnar Torvik, Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed
While Others Do Not?, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 241, 245-46 (2009)
(comparing resource-rich countries which have not been affected by the resource
curse to those which have).
3 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7771, 2000) (arguing “that differences in
institutions account for roughly three-quarters of the differences in income per
capita” in former colonies). For an accessible and comprehensive analysis of
economic development scholarship and history, see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES
A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND
POVERTY (2012). Acemoglu and Robinson consider both individual cases and
large-n econometric analyses to conclude that countries “differ in their economic
success because of their different institutions, the rules influencing how the
economy works, and the incentives that motivate people.” Id. at 73.
4 Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography
and Integration in Economic Development (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9305, 2002) (finding that the quality of institutions is the principal
determinant of a country’s income, more important than geography—which
includes resource endowment—and market integration).
5 A recent study by Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15836, 2010) confirms earlier
conclusions and, based on a review of recent literature, identifies institutions as the
most important factor.

217

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

growth to the exclusion of other factors.6 Instead, I argue that
institutions are important and warrant critical analysis.
In countries with robust and well-functioning institutions,
there is ample evidence that it is possible to turn the revenue flowing
from the exploitation of natural resources into lasting economic and
social development.7 In countries whose institutions function less
well, the presence of resource wealth either does not help as much as
would be expected or even harms the country’s prospects for
development. Although there is still considerable debate about which
institutions are most important and why, there is no longer much
6 There are, of course, other factors that affect economic development.
For example, there are many scholars who argue that geography plays a significant
role in determining a country’s economic development, perhaps the most
important role. For example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Paul Collier, and their co-authors
argue that at “the root of Africa’s poverty lies its extraordinarily disadvantageous
geography, which has helped to shape its societies and its interactions with the rest
of the world.” David E. Bloom et al., Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in
Africa, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 207, 211 (1998). See also John
Luke Gallup et al., Geography and Economic Development, 22 INT’L REG’L SCI. REV.
179, 194 (1999) (showing empirical linkages between geographic factors, such as
transport costs and intrinsic productivity and long-term economic growth). As
might be expected, there has long been robust debate between the geography-first
camp and the institutions rule camp and which factor is most important. Compare
Rodrik et al., supra note 4, at 4 (arguing that “the quality of institutions trumps
everything else”), with Bloom et al., supra note 6 (arguing that geography
predominates and about how to determine which factor is most important). See, e.g.,
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 271,
296-98 (2004) (arguing that “the existing research strategy” has not proven the link
“between institutions and economic growth”). See generally Simeon Djankov et al.,
The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003) (considering the
connections between geography, institutions, and growth in the context of a
number of other relevant causal factors). It is not my objective to determine which
single factor is the most important in determining economic development. It is
enough to show, as the evidence clearly does, that institutions are vitally important
and do affect economic development in general and in the context of resource-rich
economies.
7 For a discussion of various policy interventions to address the resource
curse, see ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds.,
2007). The book’s contributing authors consider policies to address the political
and economic components of the resource curse and draw on success stories to
demonstrate that it is possible to transform resource wealth into sustained
economic development.
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debate that institutions are central to the problem of development in
general and to the effect of resource wealth on development in
particular.8
To this point, the scholarship on economic development and
the exploitation of natural resources has arrived at a rough consensus
on two issues. The first is that the resource curse is a demonstrable
phenomenon, and the second is that weak institutions are an
important causal factor. Having verified that the symptoms are real
and identified some of their causes, the next step is to arrive at a
viable course of treatment.
The principal contribution of this Article is to show that, in
many cases, international institutions—as opposed to domestic
institutions—are promising mechanisms by which to address the
problem. This argument is both an attempt to push the scholarly
conversation forward by moving from a cause to treatment and to
offer a corrective to a common problem in the policy literature. Most
policymakers have focused almost entirely on the reform of domestic
institutions as the way to address the problems associated with the
resource curse. Given the trajectory of development scholarship, it is
unsurprising that scholars and policymakers have focused primarily
on domestic institutions. The scholarship on the causes of the
resource curse has identified domestic institutional failures as a
principal driver of the resource curse. Scholars argue that the failures
of domestic institutions cause the resource curse and that fixing
domestic institutions is the best way to address the problem. I argue
that it is a mistake to assume that because domestic institutional
failures are the principal cause of the problem, their reform should be
the principal focus of policymakers. In many instances, the
weaknesses of domestic institutions are self-perpetuating, and
focusing on them can amount to either a missed opportunity or
actually contribute to harm. Instead, I argue that international
8 See, e.g., Halvor Mehlum et al., Institutions and the Resource Curse, 116
ECON. J. 1 (2006) (finding that institutions are key to determining the economic
success of resource rich countries); Ivar Kolstad, The Resource Curse: Which Institutions
Matter?, 16 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 439 (2009) (arguing that private sector
institutions are more important than public sector institutions with respect to the
resource curse).
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institutions, even if they are not a principal cause of the problem, can
be a viable second-best solution. Indeed, given the state of domestic
institutions in many resource-rich developing countries, international
institutions may represent the most plausible mechanism by which to
address the problem.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I review the
relevant literature on the resource curse and the role of institutions in
economic development. There are two principal schools of thought
within the institutions literature. One approach holds that the most
important institutions are those that affect the choices faced by
people and firms in the private sector. These scholars argue that
countries prosper when institutions push entrepreneurs to pursue
productive activity instead seeking to garner a greater share of the
rents from existing commercial activity. The second approach holds
that institutions that affect the behavior of political leaders matter
most because they determine how resource revenue is distributed and
the extent to which leaders are accountable to citizens. I do not
attempt to resolve this debate. Instead, I show that both explanations
are plausible, and, more importantly, that my argument works
regardless of which approach is the more accurate.
In Part II, I show the various kinds of institutional failures
that are associated with poor economic growth; that is, what it is that
institutions do or fail to do that contributes to growth or stagnation.
These failures come in many forms, of course, but I focus on two
clusters of problems. First, in many states, weak domestic institutions
permit public officials to play dual roles in resource revenue
decisions. In their official roles, they make commercial decisions on
behalf of the state, and, in their private capacities, they serve as
shareholders or principals in companies that do business with the
state on the same projects over which they have official control.
Officials are thus policymakers and private actors in the same
transaction. This permits officials to personally enrich themselves and
their families. Second, the domestic institutions of many resourcerich states are weak enough to permit public officials to distribute
resource revenue in ways that benefit themselves or their political
allies but do not contribute to the state’s long-term growth or
improve the lives of citizens. This revenue distribution problem takes
many forms, but, at its core, it is about how public officials choose to
220
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use the revenue that comes from the sale of what are, after all, assets
owned by the state.
In Part III, I identify the international institutions that either
help or could help to ameliorate the resource curse in resource-rich
countries under the right conditions. These institutions do the work
of constraining the choices or influencing the behavior of the
relevant public and private actors involved in the exploitation of
natural resources. In this part I have two principal goals, one
doctrinal and one theoretical. The doctrinal goal is to demonstrate
that my approach is plausible and could succeed by specifying the
legal or institutional mechanisms that could serve as substitutes for
functioning domestic institutions. These include tools to place limits
on the ability of officials to play dual roles, force the disclosure of
relevant information to citizens or others, and reduce the incentives
that officials have to use resource revenue in self-serving or
inefficient ways. The theoretical goal is to anticipate and respond to
potential objections to my approach. The strongest of these
objections is that it is an affront to the sovereignty of developing
states to use international institutions to accomplish what should be
core domestic functions. Nonetheless, because international
institutions are already involved in resource extraction transactions,
their use as substitutes for failing domestic institutions is appropriate.
I. THE RESOURCE CURSE AND INSTITUTIONS
In this Part, I address two principal issues: what is the
resource curse and how does it affect poor countries, and what role
do institutions play in economic development, particularly with
respect to resource-rich states. First, scholars have long worked to
determine the factors that contribute economic development,
including attempting to determine how the presence of exploitable
natural resources affects a country’s development prospects. Some
countries have used the revenues from resources to expand their
economies and become solidly developed (or begin on a clear path
toward development). Others appear to have foundered despite
influxes of wealth from resources.
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The second objective of this Part is to identify what
institutions actually do in the context of natural resource
development. What do institutions provide to a country, or from
what do they protect it? Do they educate people so they can
participate in governance or economic activity? Do they protect the
country from avaricious bankers or politicians? Do they protect the
country from elites attempting to dominate the economy? Because
almost anything could be an institution when considered at a
sufficiently general level—political parties, social clubs, the criminal
law—I first specify that I mean those entities and regulations that
shape political and economic behavior with respect to natural
resources. I argue that institutions provide successful states with a
cluster of essential goods and that when these goods are not
provided, states struggle to develop in the first place or to sustain
gains made under different conditions.
A. The Resource Curse
Countries rich in natural resources grow more slowly than
similar countries without the resources.9 For years, development
economists argued that resource endowments were critical to the
long-term economic development of countries.10 Countries that had
been blessed with more natural resources were expected to develop
more quickly than states not similarly blessed. Then scholars began to
note an anomaly: some countries that should have prospered if the
conventional wisdom were true were in fact floundering. What was
sometimes called “the paradox of plenty” was the finding that more
wealth produced less welfare for many people in poor countries.11 In
the policy literature using country studies and analyzing the
There is a vast literature on the resource curse and its causes and
consequences. For a comprehensive survey and analysis of its many strands, see
MICHAEL L. ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS (2012). Ross’s book presents the empirical evidence
that resource wealth is associated with slower development and other social ills and
analyzes the various hypotheses for why this is true.
10 See, e.g., AUTY, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the conventional view that
resource abundance was positively associated with economic development).
11 See Karl, supra note 1 (arguing that the oil and commodity booms of
the 1970s and 1980s should have led to development in many poor countries but
did not).
9
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connections between resource abundance and wealth over a relatively
short time frame, scholars demonstrated that resource wealth did not
quickly or inevitably lead to economic development in countries in
which it should have had the extant theories been valid.12 Later, in
econometric analyses of many more countries over a longer time
period, scholars began to demonstrate the full extent of the problem.
Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, in a now-famous article,
showed that there is a “statistically significant, inverse, and robust
association between natural resource intensity and growth.”13 Sachs
and Warner examined the growth rates of 97 resource-dependent
countries and found that, even after controlling for other variables,
growth was slower, on average, in more heavily resource-dependent
states than in states less dependent on resource wealth.14
Since the path-breaking work of Sachs and Warner and
others, scholars have identified a number of other problems that
appear more likely in resource-dependent countries than in countries
less dependent on resources: there is a higher likelihood of conflict,15
there is more official corruption,16 corrupt rulers stay in power
longer,17 and there is a greater likelihood of a misallocation of
12 See, e.g., ALAN GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988)
(assessing the success or failure of oil exporting countries Algeria, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela during the oil boom of
the 1970s).
13 Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5398,
1995).
14 Id. at 2 (comparing “each country’s annual growth rate between 1970
and 1989 in relation to the country’s natural resource-based exports in 1970,
measured as a percent of GDP.”).
15 See generally Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, A Theory of Civil Conflict and
Democracy in Rentier States, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 571, 584 (2006) (presenting
empirical results showing that greater “resource wealth increases the expected
payoff from both elections and conflict”).
16 Aaron Tornell & Phillip R. Lane, The Voracity Effect, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 22, 23 (1999). Tornell and Lane argue that where political and legal
institutions are weak, unconditioned wealth can produce “a more-thanproportional increase in redistribution” of wealth from resource rents. Id. at 42.
17 See Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing
World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 238 (2004) (finding that “[o]il
dependence is a positive predictor of durability, but at the same time is negatively
related to democracy, another positive predictor”).
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resources.18 To be sure, these ills are not unique to resourcedependent countries, and there is no evidence that resource
abundance is the sole cause of all of these problems. Regardless, the
finding that resource-dependent countries fared worse than similarly
constituted countries without the blessing of resource wealth is
robust. Once scholars had demonstrated that the problem exists, the
next issue was to determine why this was so. In the following parts, I
address this question. First I review the literature on institutions and
their role in economic development. Then I address the relationship
between institutions and the resource curse.
B. Institutions and Development
Institutions are the controls by which individuals and
societies regulate themselves. They shape the incentives faced by a
politician who must choose between enriching himself at the public’s
expense and investing in his nation. They guide a bright young
graduate who must choose between developing a productive new
business and seeking a way to reap more for herself from an existing
enterprise.19 In recent decades, scholars of various disciplines have
studied the role of institutions in economic development,20 and have
tested their theories empirically.21 In this Part, I lay out what I mean
by institutions and discuss what institutions do for societies,
particularly those institutions most relevant to economic
development.
I use a definition of institutions adopted largely from the
work of Douglass North. Institutions are the agreed-upon rules that
See, e.g., James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, White Elephants, 89 J.
PUB. ECON. 197, 198 (2005) (describing decisions by the government of Zambia to
place manufacturing plants in locations that would ensure support from voters
even though the locations were not served by reliable transportation networks and
alternative locations were available).
19 See generally MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS (2004);
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY (2005).
20 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development?
Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829, 830 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Rodrik et al., supra note 4.
18
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people use to structure their interactions.22 Included in this are formal
rules, such as laws or regulations, explicitly created to facilitate
exchange.23 Also included are non-formal “codes of conduct that
underlie and supplement formal rules.”24 This definition is sufficiently
broad as to accommodate constraints, rules, and incentives for all
manners of human interaction. Indeed, Nobel-prize winning political
scientist Elinor Ostrom, in her work on institutions, argues that
institutions organize interactions “within families, neighborhoods,
markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and
governments at all scales.”25
In addition to comprising the rules or processes by which
interactions are governed, my definition of institution necessarily
implicates the structures through which those rules are made and
enforced. By this I mean that institutions include both the rules of
the game and the mechanisms by which those rules are developed,
contested, and enforced. In this way, my conception of institutions is
consistent with that of Robert Keohane, for whom institutions
include the rules of the game and the “formal organizations” in
which these rules find expression.26 An important implication of my
conception of institutions is that it accounts for the way interactions
actually occur in international (and domestic) affairs: there is constant
negotiation and re-negotiation of the rules of the game, which is
affected by and affects the organizations in which the negotiations
take place.
A second implication of my conception of institutions is that
it accounts for the ways that the rules of the game affect those
involved in the game. This problem is necessarily and inevitably
contingent on the actors involved, the kinds of rules in place, and the
issues at stake. For my purposes, the most convincing account of
enforcement comes from Andrew Guzman’s work on international

22 NORTH, supra note 19, at 4 (“Institutions include any form of
constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction.”).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 OSTROM, supra note 19, at 4.
26 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L
STUD. Q. 379, 384 (1988).
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law.27 Guzman argues that what matters is to identify, to the extent
possible, how international law—the immediate focus of his
attention— “changes the behavior of states.”28 My focus is therefore
not on enforcement, that is, specifying the precise mechanism by
which a particular rule is imposed on actors. Instead, my focus is on
the ways that institutions might influence the behavior of states and
other actors.
At this level of generality, institutions could be almost
anything, and it is not my objective to develop a positive theory of
institutions. Instead, I focus on a subset of institutions that are most
relevant to economic development, particularly in resource-abundant
countries. The problem is significantly more complicated in
developing countries with exploitable natural resources. But, at its
core, the phenomenon is the same: how to mediate among
competing desires to achieve the best outcome. Institutions play the
role of self-control. They channel the incentives faced by disparate
actors, each of whom might have different objectives and desires.
In the view of Douglass North, institutions are the principal
determinant of economic growth.29 Dani Rodrik and his co-authors
argue that institutional quality does more to explain economic
development than the other available hypotheses.30 One need not go
that far, of course, to conclude that institutions are critically
important. For my purposes it is enough to conclude, in the words of
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, that dysfunctional
institutions “keep poor countries poor and prevent them from
embarking on a path to economic growth.”31

See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
28 Id. at 22.
29 NORTH, supra note 19, at 107 (arguing that institutions “are the
underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies”).
30 Rodrik et al., supra note 4, at 5 (arguing, based on econometric analysis,
that “institutional quality emerges as the clear winner of the ‘horse race’” among
geography, integration, and institutions in determining economic development).
31 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 398. But cf. Ha-Joon Chang,
Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History, 7 J. INST’L. ECON. 473,
475-77 (Oct. 2010) (arguing that scholars have paid insufficient attention to
27

226

2014

Keenan

3:1

The more difficult task is to identify which institutions are
most important and the work those institutions do to help or harm a
country. Of greatest interest to scholars concerned with economic
development is that subset of institutions that regulate economic and
political activity. In states that benefit from the presence of natural
resources, there are institutions that mediate citizen and state
interactions with respect to commercial activity and the development
of state or public resources and that provide points of access for
citizens to assert their values and hold their leaders accountable. The
failure of such institutions can undermine a state’s opportunity for
economic development. Even more important, the failure of such
institutions can lead to increased human suffering, exploitation, or
degradation. When people have few legitimate opportunities to
influence their governments, they suffer.
C. The Work Institutions Do
Not every resource-rich country fails to develop, and scholars
have attempted to identify what factors must be present in addition
to resource abundance to lead to the problems described above.32
Increasingly, scholars have identified dysfunctional institutions as a
principal cause of the resource curse because of the role institutions
play, or fail to play, in society.33 What is more difficult is to identify
causality in determining whether institutional quality causes economic or whether
economic development causes institutions to improve).
32 See, e.g., Torvik, supra note 2 (reviewing empirical literature on the
existence of the resource curse and theoretical literature on explanations for its
presence or absence).
33 There is a robust literature on the causes of the resource curse. The
first set of scholarly explanations addresses the effects of resource booms on
exchange rates and non-resource sectors of the economy. See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER,
THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 39-40 (2007) (reviewing the macroeconomic arguments
for the resource curse); Michael Bruno & Jeffrey Sachs, Energy and Resource
Allocation: A Dynamic Model of the “Dutch Disease,” 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 845, 846
(1982) (describing the effects of resource booms on various sectors of the
economy). Later studies concluded that, in most cases, there was scant empirical
support for these explanations. See Erwin H. Bulte et al., Resource Intensity, Institutions,
and Development, 33 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1029, 1030 (2005) (reviewing the
literature and concluding that there “is little empirical support for the Dutch
disease as an explanation for the resource curse”). More recently, scholarly
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those features of institutions that do the important work. Scholars of
the roles of institutions argue that at their most basic, institutions
operate as ways to allocate power, whether political, social, or
economic.34 That is, institutions provide the rules and the forum by
which actors seek, keep, and contest power. For my purposes, what
matters is not to develop a full, positive theory of all that institutions
do. Instead, my goal is to show the ways that institutions affect
economic outcomes in the presence of resource wealth.
What are the institutional failures that most contribute to the
negative effect of resource wealth? Institutions come in all types, but
two main types of institutions are relevant to the use or misuse of
resource wealth.35 One set of institutions includes those that
principally affect the private sector. Put simply, private-sector
institutions are those that would affect the decisions an entrepreneur
might make when deciding where to apply her talents and energy: the
protection of property rights, the fair resolution of disputes, and the
like. The second are those that principally affect the public sector.
Public-sector institutions are those that ensure the accountability and
responsiveness of political leaders, including the role of these leaders
in the distribution of resource revenue.
Scholars who attribute more explanatory power to the role of
private institutions posit two states of affairs. In each there is the
presence of valuable and exploitable natural resources. Entrepreneurs
are faced with a choice between productive activities, those that will
grow the pie, and rent-seeking activities, those that allocate to the
entrepreneur a bigger share of the pie without increasing its size. One
leading study terms these institutions “grabber-friendly” and
“producer-friendly” institutions36 and argues that the “combination
explanations of the resource curse have begun to converge around institutions as
the most important variable. See, e.g., Mehlum et al., supra note 8, at 1 (reviewing the
literature and previous studies and concluding that “the dangerous mix of weak
institutions and resource abundance causes the resource curse”).
34 See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 218 (2006) (arguing that “institutions
influence the allocation of future political power” and provide mechanisms by
which to “lock in” or context political power).
35 Kolstad, supra note 8, at 439-40.
36 Mehlum et al., supra note 8, at 2-3.
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of grabber friendly institutions and resource abundance leads to low
growth,” whereas “[p]roducer friendly institutions” can “help
countries take full advantage of their natural resources.”37 On this
account, the quality of institutions determines the relative appeal of
productive or rent-seeking activities, and entrepreneurs faced with a
choice between the two typically behave rationally and choose the
more profitable route.38 Better institutions lead to more production
and better economic growth because entrepreneurs choose that
route; worse institutions cause entrepreneurs to choose a less
productive path.
Scholars who give more weight to the role of public sector
institutions instead focus on the choices faced by politicians.39 These
scholars argue that “bad economic policies” lead to low growth,40 and
that the bad policies stem from the decisions made by politicians in
resource-rich countries.41 To explain this outcome, these scholars
focus on the role that political institutions play in shaping or
constraining the behavior of politicians. In this model, politicians face
a choice: distribute resource revenue in a way that promotes fair and
long-term development, or distribute revenue in a way that increases
the politician’s chances of staying in power.42 States with institutions
that make it difficult or impossible for the politician to choose the
self-serving distribution of revenue fare better than states whose
institutions permit such distribution.
There is no consensus yet as to which of these two
approaches is the more viable, but there is empirical support favoring
the private sector explanation.43 For my purposes, what matters most
is not to declare a winner but to recognize the vital role institutions
play and to identify those essential functions that might be
approximated by outside institutions. Political institutions constrain
Id. at 16.
Kolstad, supra note 8, at 439.
39 James A. Robinson et al., Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79 J.
DEV. ECON. 447, 449 (2006).
40 Id. at 448.
41 Id. at 466.
42 Id.
43 Kolstad, supra note 8, at 441 (arguing that “only private sector
institutions matter empirically”).
37
38
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or embolden politicians, who set policies that can push entrepreneurs
in a productive, pro-growth direction or in an unproductive, growthinhibiting direction. The decisions made by individual entrepreneurs
can either exacerbate existing problems, leading to worse policies and
less accountability, or they can lead to more growth and more
accountability. In the end, once revenue started flowing in many
resource rich countries, the result was a gross mis-deployment of
human capital and public resources because the incentives facing
individuals and leaders were insufficient to push them into
productive work or use of public resources.
II. THE EFFECTS OF WEAK OR DYSFUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
After years of prospecting, oil companies confirmed in 2006
that there were billions of barrels of oil reserves in the ground under
Uganda.44 This prompted the mix of hope and fear that is not
uncommon when oil or other valuable natural resources are
discovered in developing countries. What should be a windfall is now
widely seen as a mixed blessing at best and a curse at worst. When oil
production began in Ghana in 2010, the president felt compelled to
reassure the nation and the international community that he would
“ensure that it becomes a blessing not a curse.”45 Indeed, one leading
pastor in Ghana told the Financial Times that he had prayed that
Ghana would never discover oil because of his fears that oil would
harm the country.46 Citizens and leaders in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe expressed
similar concerns when oil was discovered in their countries. It is no
longer surprising when resource wealth makes a country worse off. In
Josh Kron, Uganda’s Oil Could be Gift that Becomes a Curse, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world/africa/ugandawelcomes-oil-but-fears-graft-it-attracts.html?_r=0.
45 Ghana Enters New Era With Oil Field Launch, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a785790-0877-11e0-80d900144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw.
46 William Wallis, Let the Good Times Roll, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/235d95a2-3972-11e0-97ca00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (quoting Pastor Mensa Otabil as stating,
“For years I prayed we would never find oil. I don’t think it will help us to develop
the work ethic we need to structure a viable, productive society. I think people
would most likely become very corrupt because there are no barriers.”).
44
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this Part, I analyze the types of harms done by resource wealth in
countries with weak institutions. It is important to specify the harms
because only by identifying the particular harms is it possible to target
solutions to these harms. Think of these harms as types of cancer:
without knowing the particular type of cancer, it would be difficult
for doctors to select the appropriate medicine to treat the illness most
effectively.
Weak or dysfunctional institutions permit leaders to engage in
all manner of mischief with the wealth they receive from the sale of
natural resources. I argue that this mischief can usefully be divided
into two rough categories: personal enrichment at public expense and
distributing legitimately obtained revenue in ways that are damaging
to the political or economic life of the country. There is, of course,
substantial overlap between the categories, and it is certainly true that
these categories do not represent the sum total of the activity that
contributes to the resource curse. Nonetheless, the categories are
useful for two purposes. First, they help disaggregate types of
behavior to locate more precisely how that behavior is harmful. For
example, the harms that come from investing in wasteful but
politically popular infrastructure projects, like building a grand new
stadium in an impoverished country, are different from the harms
caused when a leader steals revenue that should accrue to the state.
These categories, imperfect as they may be, are helpful for an
additional reason as well. The objective of this Article is to identify
international substitutes that might do some of the work that is
usually performed by domestic institutions. The international
mechanisms available to combat outright theft are different than the
mechanisms available to influence domestic decisions about the
distribution of legitimately-obtained state wealth. Relatedly, the
categories help to anticipate the normative justifications for and
objections to the idea of using international institutions to affect core
domestic functions, such as restricting a country’s ability to determine
how to spend its own money on its own people, and to the particular
mechanisms that I propose.
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A. Personal Enrichment at Public Expense
It is, of course, no longer surprising to learn that leaders of
resource rich countries enrich themselves at the expense of their
citizens.47 The more challenging questions center around how leaders
enrich themselves, how it affects citizens, and what can be done
about it. In many countries the best way to become wealthy is to
either hold political power or be related to someone who does. This
is not, of course, limited to developing countries or to countries of
any particular region of the world. But in places where political
power, or proximity to it, is the exclusive path to wealth, the problem
takes on added importance. How do political leaders enrich
themselves, and why does it matter? There are perhaps as many ways
for autocrats to enrich themselves as there are autocrats, but several
general patterns stand out. What unites these various mechanisms is
that they persist in large measure because of weakened domestic
institutions. In this Part, I outline the ways that autocrats are able to
enrich themselves and the effects of this behavior. The goal of this
Part is not to provide a comprehensive account of corruption or
quasi-corruption. Instead, my goal is to provide the backdrop against
which to argue that weak domestic institutions are subject to gross
exploitation that affects citizens, and that international institutions
might provide a mechanism by which to mitigate these harms.
When the president of a country in which the citizens have
little power to hold their leaders accountable wants to enrich himself,
he has plenty of options. Some autocrats put themselves or their
family members in a position to profit personally from state
endeavors, by, for example, putting their children on the boards of
corporations that profit from business with the state. Others take
handsome signature bonuses, ostensibly legal side payments to state
officials for their signatures on public-private contracts. Others place
family members or close associates in controlling positions in key
industries. This might happen by, for example, requiring that foreign
corporations wishing to extract oil or natural gas enter into joint
ventures with local companies, and then awarding the joint venture
See, e.g., Show Us the Money: Africa, oil and the West, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 1, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21561886 (describing widespread
corruption in the oil and gas industries in Africa).
47
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contract to a company owned by their children or close allies. This is
the path of the family of Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the president of
Equatorial Guinea.48 President Obiang’s relatives held official
positions which allowed them impose taxes to benefit themselves and
exploit their connections to the president for their personal benefit.49
Others manipulate domestic regulation to make it difficult to
determine how much revenue is coming in to the state’s treasury.
This is path of the leaders of Angola, who created a financial
structure for the nation’s oil wealth so opaque and convoluted that it
is virtually impossible for outsiders to determine how much has been
stolen from the national treasury.50
None of these paths to enrichment would be as possible
without weakened or dysfunctional domestic institutions. If there
were a rigorous and independent domestic securities regulatory
system, then autocrats would find it much more difficult to engage in
securities manipulation or fraud. A stringent corporate governance
regime would make it more difficult for autocrats to place their
children or cronies in vital positions in joint ventures or other firms
that stand to profit from doing business with the government. An
48 See, e.g., Xan Rice, Mansions, Memorabilia and Personal Log Tax, FIN.
TIMES, June 19, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca5d3de0-b93b-11e1b4d6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting that Equatorial Guinea’s
president’s son spent approximately $315 million on houses, cars, and memorabilia,
such as Michael Jackson’s white glove, using funds amassed when he served as
Minister of Forests at an official salary of $82,000 per year; he reportedly assessed a
personal tax on every log exported). See also United States v. One White Crystal
Covered Bad Tour Glove & Other Michael Jackson Memorabilia, No. CV 11-3582GW(SSx), 2012 WL 8467453 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012).
49 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Taint of Corruption is No Barrier to U.S. Visa, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
16,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/us/17visa.html?pagewanted=all (reporting
connections between President Obiang’s family and the state oil and forestry
industries).
50 See, e.g., Extracting Oil, Burying Data: Energy Companies are Fighting Efforts
to Reveal Payments to Governments, THE ECONOMIST, Feb 23, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21548214 (describing difficulty in determining
how much revenue the government receives from the sale of state oil reserves);
John Reed, Angola Oil Loan Likely to Raise Transparency Issues, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2005,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a70afe4e-39b4-11da-806e00000e2511c8.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting on corruption in the financing
of oil production in Angola).
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informed and engaged electorate might operate as a check on
autocrats who wished to sell off vital state assets at below-market
rates under terms that enrich themselves personally.
1.

Public officials and private companies

In most developing countries, oil and other natural resources
are treated as state assets. That is, they belong to the state and can be
sold only by the government.51 Because states are not in the business
of developing oil wells or titanium mines, they typically sell the rights
to exploit natural resources to private companies. The actual
exploitation of the resource is conducted by a complex web of
companies, usually involving one or more private companies, a stateowned company, and multiple subcontractors. This complex
structure results in opportunities for state officials to insert
themselves or their families into the private ownership structure so as
to enrich themselves from the sale of state assets. Public officials
have two principal ways to help themselves. First, they help
themselves politically by doing business with companies headed by
potential political supporters. Second, they can directly benefit
themselves or their families by ensuring that some or much of the
revenue flows to them.
A recent investigation into the labyrinthine structure of the
oil industry in Equatorial Guinea illustrates the political dimensions
of the phenomenon. Equatorial Guinea is a small country in West
Africa sitting on substantial oil reserves and a well-deserved
reputation for corruption.52 People seeking to work in the oil industry
in that country actually work for sub-contractors, not the oil

51 See generally Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal, Rethinking the
Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints, 9
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 241 (2006) (discussing the state ownership of resources and its
effect on the resource curse). See id. at 259 (arguing that state ownership and state
control over natural resources significantly contributes to the resource curse).
52 See Equatorial Guinea: Country Outlook, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT: COUNTRY VIEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2012), available at Gale Global Issues in
Context A305990653 (predicting a “difficult business environment” caused largely
because “corruption among public officials will remain rampant”).
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companies themselves.53 Because these subcontractors determine
who receives the most lucrative jobs in a desperately poor country,
they play a role with substantial economic and social importance. The
investigation of the industry found that some of the most powerful
employment agencies were owned by, among others, the president’s
brother (who was also a general in the Army), the president’s son
(who was also the Secretary of Mining and Energy), the president’s
uncle (who was also a general and Minister of Security), and the
president’s father-in-law (the former Minister of Mining).54 These
officials, operating through private companies doing business with
the state they represent, are the gateway through which anyone
seeking employment in the oil sector must pass. Decisions regarding
the sale of the country’s assets are made to ensure that those in
power remain in power. They are not made to facilitate broad-based
economic development.
The case of Angola illustrates the problem of direct personal
enrichment from the sale of state assets. Sonangol is the company
responsible for the exploitation of all of Angola’s substantial oil and
gas reserves.55 In this capacity, it manages all 40 of the onshore and
offshore concession blocks—the geographically defined areas in
which companies with a license are permitted to extract and sell oil.
Sonangol, acting on behalf of the state, sells the rights to exploit oil
and gas for each block to one or more companies in a kind of
auction. The result is that each of the 40 blocks has a different set of
owners, and all of the blocks are owned by multiple companies. For
example, block two is owned in shares by Petrobras, Chevron,
Somoil, Poliedro Oil Company, Kotoil, and a subsidiary of Sonangol

53 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WELL OILED: OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
20
(2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0709web_0.pdf.
54 Id.
55 See Petroleum Activities Law, No. 10/04 (2004) (Rep. of Angola),
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/attachments/other/Angola%20Petroleu
m%20Activities%20Law,%202004.pdf. Under Angolan law, Sonangol is the sole
concessionaire for oil and gas exploration and exploitation rights, which means that
the company is the only entity with author to sell the state’s petroleum assets.
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itself.56 To be sure, the fact that blocks are owned in shares by
multiple owners is not itself indicative of wrongdoing. However, the
complex nature of the system leaves it vulnerable to abuse by officials
wishing to obscure their role in the transaction. In early 2012, the
former head of Sonangol, which is solely responsible for the
awarding of concession rights, disclosed that he had for years held an
ownership interest in a private company which had been involved in
a lucrative oil exploitation contract with the state. 57 Manuel Vincente,
the former head of Sonangol, disclosed that the head of the
president’s military police agency and the minister for state economic
cooperation also held stakes in the same company.
2. Opacity in national accounting
States with abundant natural resources and weak institutions
often provide little information about how much of the resource they
possess or how much they receive in payments for the resources they
sell. This problem takes multiple forms. First, some countries restrict
information and decision making authority to a small coterie of
individuals, often including relatives or close allies of government
officials who are charged with overseeing the industry. This means
that very few people, and no one outside the influence of top
officials, has information about the value of the resource being sold
or the revenue that has come into the country’s treasury. In Angola,
for example, auditors appointed by the International Monetary Fund
estimated that approximately 50% of the revenue that should have
been received under existing contracts had disappeared from the
national treasury.58 Even assuming the original contracts represented
fair value for the oil, the state could account for only half of the
revenue it was supposed to have received.
See
Sonangol
Oil
Concessions
Map,
SONANGOL
EP,
http://www.sonangol.co.ao/wps/portal/epNew/atividades/concessions/mapacon
cessoes (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
57 Tom Burgis & Cynthia O’Murchu, Angola Officials Held Hidden Oil
Stakes, FIN. TIMES, April 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/effd6a98854c-11e1-a394-00144feab49a.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw.
58 See Justin Pearce, IMF: Angola’s ‘Missing Millions,’ BBC, Oct. 18, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2338669.stm (reporting that the IMF found
nearly $1 billion had “disappeared” from the Angolan treasury in the previous
year).
56
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The problem of opacity manifests itself in other ways as well.
In Nigeria, government officials charged with negotiating oil and gas
exploitation leases regularly agreed to terms that were well below
market rates.59 In effect, officials sold Nigeria’s natural resources at
rates far below the amount those resources would have fetched if
sold in a transparent auction. This is a distinct harm from that
discussed above. In the previous example, the problem was that
revenue to which the state was contractually entitled did not actually
flow to the state; it was either stolen by corrupt officials, returned to
the oil companies, or not accounted properly accounted for. In this
instance, the problem is that the theft was built into the contract.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report that identified the below-market
contracts also identified a number of instances in which the officials
who executed these contracts received large signature bonuses, which
were not disclosed or properly accounted for.60
When ExxonMobil was awarded a lease to extract oil from
three blocks off the coast of Nigeria, the company was required to
pay a “signature bonus” of approximately $600 million.61 In Angola,
when Sonangol negotiated the sale of lucrative oil blocks off the
coast of the country, it obtained a signature bonus of $10 million
from the companies awarded the contract.62 Signature bonuses are
payments made after an agreement is concluded but before any of the
natural resource is extracted. The size of the payment is determined
by the presumed value of the resource to be exploited, but the

59 Joe Brock, Exclusive: Nigeria Loses Billions in Cut Price Oil Deals,
REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-nigeriaoil-idUSBRE89N0VV20121024.
60 Id.
61 Tom Burgis, Groups to Dig Deep for Nigerian Leases, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/355075c0-e80d-11de-8a0200144feab49a.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting that ExxonMobil was required
to pay a signature bonus “of as much as $600m after securing a new 20-year lease
to three blocks”).
62 Tom Burgis & Cynthia O’Murchu, Spotlight Falls on Cobalt’s Angola
Partner, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1225e3de854d-11e1-a394-00144feab49a.html#axzz2rF7FuPQ7
(reporting
that
the
companies Nazaki Oil & Gaz and Cobalt International Energy had paid a signature
bonus to Sonangol as part of a deal to secure rights to exploit oil in offshore fields).
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payment must be made regardless of whether the project succeeds or
fails.63
As the law is currently interpreted, signature bonuses do not
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United Kingdom’s new
anti-bribery statute, or the OECD’s anti-corruption provisions.
Moreover, under the appropriate conditions, signature bonuses can
help to balance one of the challenges inherent in the sale of the right
to exploit natural resources. The state selling the resource wants as
much money as possible up front. The company buying the right to
exploit the resource wants to pay as little as possible until it is certain
of the quantity, quality, and marketability of the resource.64 Because it
is an upfront payment, the signature bonus is a potentially useful way
to account for the risks faced by each party.
The principal problem with signature bonuses is that, because
they are difficult to trace and account for, they can be used for
expenses that would be difficult to justify if subjected to public
scrutiny or robust political checks.65 For example, after officials in
Angola received a $900 million signature bonus from the sale of
several oil exploration licenses in 1999, officials apparently spent
much of the money on weaponry for use in the country’s civil war. 66
Again, it is not the fact of the bonuses that causes the problem.
See Peter Cramton, How Best to Auction Oil Rights, in ESCAPING THE
RESOURCE CURSE 114, 126 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=cramton
(defining a signature bonus as an “upfront payment determined in auction for the
right to explore and develop the block during the license period”).
64 See, e.g., John McMillan, Promoting Transparency in Angola, 16 J.
DEMOCRACY 155, 159 (“[U]se of signature bonuses is not a sign of corruption; it is
sound auction design.”).
65 See Henri E. Cauvin, I.M.F. Skewers Corruption in Angola, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/30/world/imf-skewerscorruption-in-angola.html (reporting on leaked IMF report stating that at least $100
million in bonus payments were not entered in the country’s accounts). See also
Angola 2002 Article IV Consultation: Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Feb. 19, 2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2002/021902.htm (urging Angola to include
in the national treasury account “the total amount of signature oil bonuses”).
66 Jedrzej George Frynas & Geoffrey Wood, Oil & War in Angola, 90
REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 587, 595 (2001).
63
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Instead the problem is the institutional failures that allow officials to
use the bonuses without meaningful scrutiny or accountability.
B. Internal Revenue Distribution
States rich in resource revenue must determine how to
distribute the revenue from the sale of resources. The most basic goal
is to turn a non-renewable resource into permanent improvement—
transforming today’s dollars into future development. But resource
wealth also raises many other distributional questions. How much
should be spent on people living near the extraction site and how
much on people living far from it? How much should be devoted to
the current generation and how much to future generations? How
much should be reinvested in the enterprise and how much extracted
to diversify the state’s financial portfolio? Weak institutions permit
officials to use resources inefficiently.
1. Investment in unnecessary or inefficient projects
Many resource-dependent economies make substantial
investments in infrastructure and the domestic economy, even in the
presence of corruption and mismanagement. In one survey of
resource dependent economies, the author found that investment
projects, along with the state payroll, represented one of the two
largest expenditures for the state.67 Thus, the problem is typically not
that the state is underinvesting in the domestic economy or in
infrastructure. The problem is that the state is making the wrong
kinds of investment decisions. Too often, politicians invest in
inefficient projects that on their face seem more designed to fail than
to succeed. In the field of development economics there is a small
but interesting literature on what are often called white elephants;
that is, expensive but unnecessary projects whose completion is
unlikely or would actually be socially harmful.68 Put somewhat more

Frankel, supra note 5, at 23.
The term “white elephant” apparently comes from a story told about
the kings of Siam. As the story goes, “the kings of Siam were accustomed to make
a present of one of the animals to courtiers who had rendered themselves
obnoxious in order to ruin the recipient by the cost of its maintenance.” OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 134 (2d ed., vol. V, 1989).
67
68

239

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

formally, these are projects “with a negative social surplus.” 69 An
example from Nigeria illustrates the point. In the 1970s, the
government of Nigeria set out to build Africa’s largest steel plant, 70
but it was not fully operational as late as 2010.71 The problem
continues today. Consider a recent example from Ghana. In the leadup to the presidential elections in late 2012, the government used the
revenue from Chinese investment in the resource sector to finance a
number of major infrastructure projects that had little to commend
them other than their potential political payoff.72
White elephant projects are undertaken not because there is
convincing evidence that they will be socially useful or economically
efficient, but because they provide a payoff to the politicians who
champion them.73 For example, in Zambia, the government ordered
the construction of brick factories far from the places where
construction would take place, causing the cost of bricks to skyrocket
because of transportation costs. Contractors quickly stopped using
bricks and began to use concrete blocks. The brick factory was
eventually shuttered.74 Thus, the problem was not that the
government failed to invest in development projects—it had actually
invested heavily in the brick factory—or that the project itself was
without any value. Instead, the problem was that the institutions that

Robinson & Torvik, supra note 18 (developing a typology of white
elephant projects).
70 See NICHOLAS SHAXSON, POISONED WELLS: THE DIRTY POLITICS OF
AFRICAN OIL 22 (2007) (“[Nigeria’s leaders] spent recklessly: building a new
national capital in Abuja and pushing ahead with the giant Ajoakuta steel project, a
class of white elephant that was supposed to be Africa’s biggest steel plant yet
ended up consuming billions of dollars without producing any steel”).
71 Teresa Daban & Jean-Luc Helis, A Public Financial Management
Framework for Resource-Producing Countries 11 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/10/72,
2010) (“Ajoakuta steel mill built in the 1970s absorbed over US $3 billion yet is not
fully operational on a commercial basis”).
72 Political
Storm Over Chinese Gas Contracts, 6 AFRICA-ASIA
CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 2012, http://www.africa-asia-confidential.com/articlepreview/id/823/Political_storm_over_Chinese_gas_contracts.
73 Robinson & Torvik, supra note 18, at 201 (arguing that white elephant
projects are undertaken because their “inefficiency” is particularly politically
beneficial to those who promote them).
74 Id.
69
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should have pushed the government to favor social welfare or longterm development over their own political gain failed to work.
2. Politically-motivated revenue distribution
In many developing countries, particularly those with
substantial natural resources, the number of public employees is far
greater than would otherwise be warranted. Many political leaders
have the power to increase or decrease public employment numbers
as they see fit. One extreme example is Kuwait. One recent study
found that 91 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force (that is, Kuwaiti
citizens) worked in the public sector.75 The problem of political
patronage is by no means limited to developing countries or those
rich with natural resources. Indeed, one study argued that many cities
in the United States use public employment as a way to distribute
wealth to politically favored groups.76 But the problem is pronounced
in developing countries,77 and it can have particularly bad
consequences in resource-rich countries.78 One reason politicians
hand out public sector jobs is that the practice can operate as a kind
of political insurance. That is to say, politicians can stay in office
longer if they distribute at least some of the revenue from resources
through public employment. For this to happen, two conditions must
be true. First, incumbent politicians must desire to remain in office.79
Second, citizens must have relatively few opportunities for
75 Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh & Paul Segal, Anatomy of an Oil-Based
Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait 19 (Kuwait Program on Dev., Governance,
and Globalization in the Gulf States, Research Paper No. 13, 2011) (noting that
91% of Kuwaiti nationals work in the public sector and that 98% of private sector
jobs are held by non-Kuwaitis).
76 See Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, Redistributive Public
Employment (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6746, 1998).
77 See Alan Gelb et al., Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic
Growth, 101 ECON. J. 1186 (1991) (showing that the size of public sector
employment relative to total non-agricultural employment was far higher in
developing countries than in industrialized countries).
78 See Karl, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the political benefits of
expanding the public payroll).
79 James A. Robinson et al., Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79 J.
DEV.
ECON.
447,
449
(2005),
http://www.feemweb.it/ess/ess07/files/bulte6_ln.pdf (modeling the behavior of politicians who
wish to be reelected or remain in power through other means).
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employment, a reality in developing countries by definition. Under
these conditions, politicians can distribute public sector jobs to
favored groups as a strategy to ensure that they remain in power.80
The harms from this activity can take a number of forms.
One harm is that it leads to a misallocation of human capital. A
rational worker is forced to choose between receiving his or her full
share of resource rents in the public sector and foregoing that share
in the private sector.81 A second harm is that the economy as a whole
may become inefficient because there are more workers than are
necessary and those workers face little incentive to work hard
because their jobs are virtually certain.82 As with the other problems
described above, it is institutional weakness that permits political
leaders to make self-serving decisions with little regard for social
welfare or long-term economic development.
III. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DOMESTIC
INSTITUTIONS
To this point I have argued that resource wealth can help or
hurt a country depending largely on the quality of its institutions. I
have also shown the kinds of institutional failures that lead to
harmful outcomes. These include permitting officials to monopolize
information about national assets and revenue, arrogate to
themselves dual business and public roles in resource transactions,
and distribute resource wealth capriciously. In this Part, I argue that
these domestic institutional failures can and should be addressed by
See RICHARD M. AUTY, RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 134 (2001) (arguing that patronage jobs are an efficient way to
distribute rents from resource revenue).
81 See Paul Segal, How to spend it: Resource wealth and the distribution of resource
rents,
51
ENERGY
POL’Y
340,
345
(2012),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/middleEastProgramme/kuwait/docu
ments/Segal.pdf (arguing that workers “face the following choice: be unproductive
in the public sector and be rewarded with oil rents, or be productive in the private
sector and not be rewarded with oil rents.”).
82 See id. (reporting on a study showing that Mexico’s state-owned oil
refineries “are among the least efficient in the world, partly because they employ six
times the number of people as US refineries of comparable size and complexity,
without higher levels of production.”).
80
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international institutions. Whether by design or happenstance,
international institutions already have a profound effect on the
domestic institutions of every state. There is an extensive literature
on this issue, with which I do not engage here except to note that
there is nothing particularly unusual about recognizing the domestic
effects of international law and institutions.83 What is new is the
attempt to develop more fully a theory of how and why international
institutions can and should serve some of the functions of domestic
institutions. To suggest that international law should operate as a
substitute for robust and effective domestic institutions is to
acknowledge at the outset the deep flaws present in the domestic
institutions of the states at issue. It is also to accept that international
institutions are inevitably imperfect and incomplete. Nonetheless,
concluding that international institutions are imperfect does not
undermine my argument that they can be a substitute for domestic
institutions under the right conditions.
The objective of this Part is two-fold: to demonstrate that my
approach is possible at a doctrinal level and to make the normative
case for the use of international institutions when domestic
institutions are inadequate. At the doctrinal level, I argue that the use
of international institutions is an appropriate and potentially useful
tool to address the resource curse in developing countries. I have
already discussed what I mean by institutions as a general matter, but
it bears explaining what I mean by “international institutions.” For
my purposes, the term “international institutions” is a broad
placeholder that means almost anything that is not a purely domestic
institution of the target country. The term “international institutions”
should be understood broadly to include both independent bodies
such as the United Nations, disaggregated groups, substantive rules,
and the like. Included in this would be measures that are created by
83 See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (showing that, through the
lens of human rights, international norms and obligations—what I have labeled
international institutions—have had a profound effect on the human rights practices
of many countries). Simmons’s work is a kind of corrective to the arguments made
by some scholars and others that international norms have not had a profound
effect on the actions of states. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (purporting to show that treaties do
not affect human rights practices of states).
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super-national bodies (or groups of states) such as the International
Criminal Court—an entity that exists apart from any particular state
with its own juridical personality and rules. My definition also
includes the substantive law the ICC applies. I also include national
statutes or regulations that are applied across borders. For example,
this can include the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
regulates the conduct of U.S. corporations and those international
corporations trading on U.S. stock exchanges who do business
outside the U.S. The substantive rules and enforcement institutions
are not themselves international, but they reach across borders and
affect the substantive behavior of persons and entities outside the
U.S.84
Adopting such a broad definition means, of course, that there
are myriad entities, laws, and regulations that could fit my argument.
In this Part, my goal is to identify institutions that are plausible. That
is to say that the institutions I analyze can be used without radical
overhaul and are meant to show the mechanics of my proposal. I do
not argue that the set of institutions I have identified is the only, or
even the optimal, set of institutions for this purpose. Indeed, one of
the goals of this Article is to open a scholarly conversation on the use
of international institutions when domestic institutions fail to fulfill
their purpose. Thus my doctrinal objectives are largely illustrative.
I build the normative case on two blocks. I argue that states
owe positive obligations to their citizens, particularly with regard to
the use of non-renewable state-owned resources. When states or their
leaders use these resources for anything other than the benefit of
citizens, states have failed to fulfill important duties. Thus the first
normative building block is the notion of state obligation and
stewardship. Next I argue that, because international institutions are
already involved in the mechanics of the resource curse, the use of
international institutions to address the resource curse is entirely
appropriate. For example, state officials who pocket signature
bonuses move the money through the international banking system.
They rely on international corporations as joint venture partners to
For a full discussion of transnational law, including its international
and domestic dimensions and origins, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational
Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 745-47 (2006).
84
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exploit the resources that make them rich and on international
lenders to finance their vanity projects.
Before moving on, one caveat is in order. I have argued that
the reform of international institutions is a plausible second-best
approach to preventing or mitigating the effects of the resource
curse, but there is some evidence that international measures may be
a first-best approach, at least for some of the countries affected by
the resource curse. In some resource-rich countries, politicians can
reshape institutions to make it easier for them to capture as much of
the resource wealth as possible.85 There is significant debate about
how this might occur,86 but three possible explanations stand out.
First, governments with enough wealth can use the wealth to mollify
potential opponents or otherwise reduce domestic opposition.87
Second, governments with sufficient wealth might deliberately
interfere with the formation of opposition groups to ensure their
own survival.88 Finally, because political leaders enforce as well as
make the law, they can manipulate the enforcement of the law to
avoid the consequences of their own misdeeds.89 I do not attempt to
resolve this issue here, but it is nonetheless instructive to note that
See Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325,
333-36 (2001) (arguing that state-controlled concentrated wealth can permit elites
and political leaders to modify existing institutions to insulate themselves from
accountability).
86 Indeed, there is debate about whether it occurs at all. See, e.g., Stephen
Haber & Victor Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of
the Resource Curse, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that “increases in
natural resource income are associated with increases in democracy).
87 See, e.g., Ricky Lam & Leonard Wantchekon, Dictatorships as Political
Dutch Disease (Econ. Growth Ctr., Yale Univ., Working Paper No. 795, 1999), cited
in Ross, supra note 85, at 333.
88 See, e.g., NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE
POLITICS OF PERMANENT CRISIS 1979-1999 (2001).
89 See, e.g., E. Woodrow Eckard, Are Autocratic Rules Also Inside Traders?
Cross-Country Evidence, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 13, 20 (2005) (arguing, based on
econometric analysis of 101 countries, that autocratic governments manipulate the
regulatory regime to create opportunities for political leaders to enrich themselves).
See also GREENPEACE, CONNING THE CONGO: LOGGING SECTOR REV. (2008),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet2/report/2008/7/conning-the-congo.pdf
(documenting
manipulation
of
accounting and tax regulations to hide official profiteering).
85
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what I have labeled a second-best may well be first-best in some
circumstances.
The approaches outlined below fit into two broad categories
that are ordered roughly by the degree to which they would infringe
on the sovereignty of the target country. First, I argue that
international institutions can function as collectors and disseminators
of information that could be used by an informed and empowered
population to hold their leaders accountable. Information is a
necessary but certainly not sufficient ingredient in addressing the
resource curse. Citizens often simply do not know how much money
an oil company is paying for the oil it takes, who receives the money,
or how much the resource is truly worth. International institutions
often possess or could easily require or facilitate the disclosure of this
information.
Second, I argue that there are international institutions that
could be used to make access to markets and finance conditional on a
state’s compliance with certain norms or regulations. Put slightly
differently, states that refuse to disclose how much they receive from
oil companies should not be permitted to sell their products using
international markets or should be ineligible for participation in
international lending or insurance regimes. This approach represents
a greater intrusion on the target state’s sovereignty because the state
would be required to change its behavior or face exclusion from
external sources of finance or markets. Nonetheless, the behavioral
change is minimal because it merely requires compliance with existing
norms or regulations. It is already a violation of international norms
for government officials to personally benefit from the sale of state
assets or for a state treasury to fail to record payments for the sale of
state assets.
A. The Uses of Information
Perhaps the least intrusive international response would be to
require entities involved in transactions to gather and disseminate
information about their activities. Scholars and policymakers have
long argued that transparency can be a useful tool in the fight against
official corruption, regardless of whether the country is affected by
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the resource curse.90 Entities from the International Monetary Fund
to the World Bank to Transparency International have long called for
more transparency as a way to fight corruption.91 My general
approach is therefore not unique. What is different is my argument
that international institutions can play an important role in the
process.
Most theories about the utility of transparency focus on the
causal pathways by which transparency might reduce corruption. One
prominent argument is that officials are less likely to engage in
corrupt behavior when there is a greater likelihood that they will be
found out.92 One strand of this argument is that officials will be
deterred if they fear their reputations will suffer if they are exposed as
corrupt.93 Another strand holds that transparency works because
officials are more likely to be caught by law enforcement, and if
caught, proof of their crimes will be more readily available.94
Regardless of which of these approaches is correct, transparency is
likely to work only when the information ends up in the hands of an
entity (or population) with the power to hold corrupt leaders
accountable.95 For this to happen, those who receive the information
90 For a thorough discussion of the causes and consequences of
corruption, including analysis of the uses of transparency, see SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
REFORM (1999) and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978).
91 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption:
Transparency, Competition, and Privatization, Note No. 75, PUB. POL’Y PRIVATE
SECTOR
(April
1996),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11627/multi0pag
e.pdf?sequence=1 (summarizing best practices with respect to reducing
corruption).
92 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 91.
93 See, e.g., Gerald Anselm Acquaah-Gaisie, Curbing Financial Crime Among
Third World Elites, 8 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 371, 377 (2005) (arguing
that the “fear of exposure can act as a deterrent” to official misconduct).
94 See Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Is Transparency the Key to Reducing
Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?, 37 WORLD DEV. 521, 523 (2009) (arguing that
under “non-transparent circumstances proof is more difficult to generate and
corrupt officials are able to buy their way out of punishment”).
95 See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 64, at 161-66 (describing the ways
policymakers and citizens used information about official corruption and oil
revenue in Angola to push for reforms).
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must have the capacity to process it and have the means to affect the
behavior of those engaging in corrupt behavior.96
At the doctrinal level, what matters is to identify how and
where information can be obtained and disclosed.97 I highlight two
approaches: disclosure of information about financial movement and
transactions, and disclosure of substantive information about a
company’s supply chain or other business practices.
It is almost impossible to move money around the world
without leaving at least some trace.98 That commercial and financial
transactions leave a trail is neither new nor particularly noteworthy in
the context of law enforcement or those seeking civil redress or the
enforcement of contracts. In most instances, this trail consists of the
information gathered by entities that facilitate or regulate such
transactions, including banks, regulatory agencies, securities

96 See Kolstad & Wiig, supra note 96, at 529 (arguing that the “impact of
transparency therefore depends on the level of education of an electorate, the
extent to which key stakeholders have the power to hold a government to account,
and the private or collective nature of the goods about which information is
provided”).
97 There have been attempts to harness information in similar ways. For
example, the conflict minerals provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act are an attempt to do this. For a full treatment of this
issue, see generally Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information
Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129 (2011). Similarly, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative attempts to harness the power of information to modify the
conduct of corporations and governments. See generally Clare Short, The Development
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 7 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 8
(2013).
98 See, e.g., Caterina Giannetti & Nicola Jentzsch, Credit Reporting, Financial
Intermediation and Identification Systems: International Evidence, 33 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN.
60, 64 (2013) (describing various international regulations regarding the obligations
of financial institutions to verify the identity of those using the financial system).
But see NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE DAMAGE OF
OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX HAVENS (2011) (describing the many ways that
participants in the financial system can obscure or hide their transactions).
Nonetheless, my point is not that the system is perfect. Instead, I argue that there is
information available that could be used for the purposes I describe.
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exchanges, and the like.99 This financial trail is perhaps best thought
of not as a uniform, unbroken line but as a pointillist representation
of a line: a series of discrete points, which take on the shape of a line
only when viewed together. Each point might represent the arrival of
money in a bank or the registration of a securities transaction with a
regulatory or trading house. Regardless of what they are, most of the
points exist through the compulsion, either direct or indirect, of the
law. Regulatory bodies gather information using legal tools. Trading
houses do the same. Institutions that ostensibly operate privately—
such as banks—are nonetheless subject to investor protection
regulations and other laws that compel them to gather information.
Each point in the series is both an example of the law of that
jurisdiction regulating the conduct of a non-citizen and an
opportunity to gather or obscure information. Both of these issues
are relevant to my argument. Recent efforts to recover the proceeds
of corruption illustrate the potential of using bits of information
gathered from seemingly disparate sources. Using information
gathered from financial regulators, customs houses, corporations, and
international institutions, litigants have been able to recover some of
the money stolen by Frederick Chiluba, the former president of
Zambia, and his associates.100
Recent legislation in the United States illustrates the second
model: requiring entities to assemble and disclose information about
their own operations.101 As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),102 the U.S.
99 See generally Jackie Johnson, Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT
Prepared?, 15 J. FIN. CRIME 7 (2008) (describing information gathering requirements
imposed by financial regulators after Sept. 11, 2001 to promote anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and finding that significant
work remains to be done despite the improvements in tracing funds).
100 See Jeffrey Simser, Asset Recovery and Kleptocracy, 17 J. FIN. CRIME 321,
322-23 (2011) (describing the history of efforts to recover funds stolen by Chiluba
between 1991 and 2001).
101 For a more extensive treatment of this issue, see Christiana Ochoa &
Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United
States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129, 137-41 (2011)
(arguing that requiring companies to assemble and disclose information was a
means to promote transparency and reduce corruption).
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173.ENR, § 1502, Conflict Minerals.
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Congress included provisions designed to address the ongoing
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict minerals
provisions, and the regulations that implement them, require
manufacturers to determine whether there are any materials
“necessary to the functionality or production of a product”103 which
they manufacture that originate in the DRC or any country with
which it “shares an internationally recognized border.” 104
Importantly, these provisions do not prohibit the use or sale of
conflict minerals. Instead they require companies to gather
information about their practices and disclose this information to
regulators and the public. Thus the use of U.S. markets is
conditioned on the disclosure of information about the participant’s
financial practices.
I argue that international institutions are a plausible secondbest approach, but there is some evidence that, with respect to
transparency, they may be more effective than domestic institutions.
Broadly speaking, transparency can occur in two ways: through
mechanisms controlled by the targeted actor or through mechanisms
outside of that actor’s control. For example, freedom-of-information
laws are controlled by the source of the information. A free press is
outside the control of the source of the information.105 In an
empirical analysis of transparency reforms, scholars found that the
transparency measures under the control of the source of
information are less effective at reducing corruption than similar
measures that are outside the control of the source.106 This suggests
that transparency measures under the control of international
institutions (and independent from domestic actors) may be more
effective than purely domestic measures.

Id. at § 1502(2)(B).
Id. at § 1502(e)(1).
105 See Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough:
Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 301, 305
(2010) (arguing that “who controls the release of information” is an important
variable in determining the efficacy of transparency as an anti-corruption tool).
106 Id. at 316.
103
104
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B. Conditional Access to Markets
One way to address the problem would be to be recognize
and capitalize on the conditional nature of access to markets and
financial systems. The international financial system is not an entity
unto itself; it is made up of many connected networks, each of which
is governed by the national law of one or more states. Access to the
financial system is conditional in every case. Firms that wish to raise
capital on U.S. exchanges are permitted to do so only if they comply
with certain regulations. Firms that wish to raise capital in the City of
London must comply with U.K regulations.107 For example, in the
United States the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) plays
this role. OFAC is a part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that
enforces trade and economic sanctions involving foreign individuals
and groups believed to be involved in various kinds of illegal
activities.108 Because OFAC is an enforcement mechanism—it
executes presidential directives or statutory requirements—the
analogy is not perfect, but it is instructive nonetheless. OFAC
identifies individuals who, by their actions or position, are considered
to be ineligible to do business in the United States or use the U.S.
financial system in their dealings. Similarly, access to U.S. consumer
markets is conditional. Companies whose products are made with
forced labor, for example, are prohibited from selling their products
in the U.S. What I propose is to expand the categories of persons
who would be subject to heightened scrutiny or outright prohibitions
on access to markets. What follows are examples of and justifications
for the kinds of categories I propose.
1. Prohibit dual roles in transactions
Politicians often enrich themselves by participating in the
same project as both private citizens looking to make money and
107 See, e.g., Peter Johnstone & George Brown, International Controls of
Corruption: Recent Responses from the USA and the UK, 11 J. FIN. CRIME 217, 219-25
(2004) (describing various regulatory and statutory obligations of those using the
U.S. and U.K. capital markets).
108 See Mission of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-ofForeign-Assets-Control.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
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public officials charged with pursuing the public good. Consider
again the example from Angola. In his official role, Manuel Vicente
was head of Sonangol, the Angolan national oil company. In this
capacity he was charged with constructing the best possible
arrangement for Angola to exploit its vast oil reserves. In this role he
was selling an asset owned by the country with the goal of
transforming oil into long-term development. In his private capacity,
he had a stake in one of the companies purchasing the very same
state-owned asset he was selling in his official capacity.109 In
Equatorial Guinea, public officials, who were close relatives of the
president, were, in their private capacities, owners of companies that
contracted with the state oil company.110
The phenomenon of public officials using official positions
for personal gain is not unheard of in wealthy Western countries.111
But the problem is particularly troublesome in resource-rich
developing countries.112 The principal check on this kind of official
behavior is political. Politicians who abuse their public positions can
simply be voted out or otherwise removed from office. This check
works only with an informed, empowered electorate, which is absent
in most developing countries suffering from the resource curse. In
Angola, most citizens do not have the information to hold official
accountable, and even if they did there are few opportunities for
them to do so.

See Tom Burgis et al., Interactive: Angolan Oil Connections, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03293b62-84c4-11e1-a3c500144feab49a.html#axzz2rjxc08vT. Vicente had a private stake in a company
named Aquattro, which was a shareholder in Nazaki, which was one of four
companies that purchased the right to exploit the oil in blocks 9 and 21.
110 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 20.
111 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Political Corruption and Democratic
Structures, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 25, 35-40 (Arvind K. Jain
ed., 2001) (describing and measuring corruption in advanced democracies).
112 See, e.g., Hazel M. McFerson, Extractive Industries and African Democracy:
Can the “Resource Curse” be Exorcised?, 11 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 335, 340-41 (2010)
(using various quantitative indicators to demonstrate high levels of corruption in
resource-rich developing countries).
109
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2. Reduce patronage opportunities
One of the causal pathways by which the resource curse
affects poor countries is that politicians engage in patronage. That is,
they use their official positions to reward supporters by providing
civil service jobs or investing in politically useful but socially
inefficient projects. To mitigate this effect, it would be useful to
reduce opportunities for politicians to directly distribute public
benefits in a way that accrues to their benefit. This could be
accomplished by reducing the decisional authority of individuals and
restricting spending choices.
Perversely, international institutions seem to encourage, or at
least facilitate, this behavior. Consider the ways that international
institutions encourage or require corporations and countries to
interact. It is considered an international best practice for companies
and countries to engage in what are often called multi-stakeholder
dialogues. These are opportunities for identified stakeholders—those
affected by a resource extraction project, for example—to negotiate
the contours of the project. There is something intuitively appealing
about requiring a large corporation to sit down with community
leaders before beginning a project that will affect the community.
And there is some evidence that these dialogues can make projects
more efficient and reduce their social costs. The problem comes
when the government names the stakeholders and designates the
local businesses or leaders who will participate in the process.113 This
is a perfect patronage opportunity: in exchange for a seat at the
bargaining table or a share of the proceeds, local leaders might
reward the politicians who nominate them with political loyalty or
with acquiescence in an inefficient or even harmful project.
Domestic institutional failures make this possible. Patronage
and other types of abuse are more likely to occur when the control of
a complex transaction is vested in a very small handful of officials
who play multiple roles in the transaction. This is a distinct problem
See, e.g., Ivar Kolstad & Tina Soreide, Corruption in Natural Resource
Management: Implications for Policymakers, 34 RES. POL’Y 214, 218 (2009) (describing
the ways that politicians can manipulate multi-stakeholder dialogue process for
political advantage).
113
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from the dual public/private issue discussed separately. One way this
issue comes about is that officials who are charged with determining
the optimal process by which to exploit resources are the same
officials who are charged with assessing the success or failure of the
project. Put slightly differently, those charged with maximizing
returns are also given the authority to monitor how well they are
doing their job. A second way the issue comes about is that officials
who are charged with selling state assets also run the auctions at
which those assets are sold.
The harms are similar in both instances. The problem of dual
roles—even when both are ostensibly for the benefit of the public—
makes self-serving behavior possible and therefore more likely.
Consider an example. Chad and Cameroon signed an agreement to
extract oil in Chad and transport it through a pipeline in Cameroon
for sale on the international markets.114 Officials in Cameroon had to
determine how to compensate the communities affected by the
pipeline and attendant activity. Those same officials were charged
with determining how well the original plan worked, including
seeking information from those affected, hearing complaints from
citizens, and assessing the environmental impacts of the project.
These officials were, in effect, grading themselves. There was little
incentive for critical assessment of the initial plan or for identification
of corrective measures for problems that arose.
The second, and perhaps more significant problem, has to do
with information. As discussed separately, mechanisms that require
the production of information that can be used by citizens or other
interested parties to hold the government accountable are an
important tool. When officials are charged with monitoring
themselves, they have no incentive to produce or disseminate
information, particularly information critical of their own conduct.
One way to address these concerns is to provide a place at the table
in any investment dispute for people who are not directly involved in

See generally Scott Pegg, Can a Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse?
Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 105 AFR. AFF. 1 (2005) (describing the
legal and policy apparatus created to address potential revenue distribution
problems in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project).
114
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the transaction but who represent the true owners of the asset for
sale.
C. Complications and Objections
The claim that international institutions can operate as
substitutes for domestic institutions is open to a number of
objections, two of which I address here. The first is that taking my
approach seriously would undermine the sovereignty of resource-rich
states. The second objection is that, because institutional failures
occur everywhere, not simply in resource-rich countries, and
international institutions are far from perfect themselves, there is not
sufficient justification to substitute international institutions for
domestic institutions.
1. Sovereignty
The first and most important objection is that my argument is
nothing more than neo-colonialism under a different name because it
advocates foreign intrusion into what should be purely domestic
concerns. The concept of sovereignty is both a foundational concept
of international law and affairs and an idea subject to varied and
changing definition. For my purposes, sovereignty is the principle
that there is a sphere of domestic authority into which external forces
may not interfere without permission.115 The protected domain was
never absolute,116 and it is even more difficult to define in light of the
development of human rights law.117 But even if contours of
sovereignty are not susceptible to precise definition, the core concept
remains important: countries expect to have unchallenged authority
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
20 (1999) (defining various strands of sovereignty, including Westphalian
sovereignty: “the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures”).
116 See Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (describing the history
of variations in state control and claims of authority over territory).
117 See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990) (arguing that the advent
of universal human rights norms has modified traditional conceptions of
sovereignty).
115
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over their domestic affairs, including the use of natural resources
found in their territory. My argument does intrude on this domain. I
argue that international institutions should be used, for example, to
require states to make substantively different decisions with regard to
how they distribute the revenue from the sale of state assets. Instead
of spending state revenue on building a new soccer stadium, the state
would be required to invest in ways with a greater likelihood to
improve the welfare of citizens. In this way, my argument, and the
objections to it, bears some resemblance to the arguments over the
attachment of conditions to development assistance. In the 1980s
and 1990s, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
among other international financial institutions, sought to promote
economic policy reform based on what was called the “Washington
Consensus.”118 To accomplish these policy objectives, the
International Monetary Fund required countries wishing to avail
themselves of the IMF’s resources to adopt reforms in line with the
Washington Consensus.119 One objection to the practice of
conditionality was that it intruded on the sovereignty of the recipient
states.120 Put another way, the problem was that the policies required
by international financial institutions were those which should have
been the prerogative of the recipient country, not an international
institution.
The sovereignty issue is important but it does not defeat my
argument. I do not attempt to arrive at a theory of optimal social

118 The set of policy prescriptions comprising the Washington Consensus
was first assembled in an article by John Williamson in What Washington Means by
Policy Reforms, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED
(John Williamson ed., 1990).
119 See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human
Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 50 (arguing that “the IMF is able
to exert greater influence over those Member States who need or expect to need its
financial assistance” by converting “advice” into “conditionalities attached to IMF
financing”); Moises Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?, 118
FOREIGN POL’Y 86, 90 (2000) (describing the ways the IMF and the World Bank
required countries to adopt the Washington Consensus reforms as a condition of
receiving development or financial assistance).
120 See, e.g., Douglas Zormelo, Is Aid Conditionality Consistent with National
Sovereignty? (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper 95, 1997) (surveying the
sovereignty-based arguments regarding aid conditionality).
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investment.121 Instead my goal is to identify ways to set broad
boundaries outside of which countries should not go with respect to
how they spend state assets. Conditions on wealth transfers,
including resource extraction contracts, are ubiquitous.122 It is
instructive to note that, in the end, the Washington Consensus
collapsed not because of the sovereignty objection, but because it
failed to achieve its stated objectives.123 Conditions are a mechanism
by which owners of a resource—in this case, the citizens who
ultimately own oil or minerals or the like—can affect the behavior of
those who wish to use those resources. Lenders do not just give away
money for any purpose; instead they inquire about the purpose and
incorporate ways to discipline recipients if they use the money for
improper purposes. Similarly, I argue that when international
institutions are involved in any way in a resource extraction
transaction, they are providing a benefit for which they can
appropriately request something in return.
Related to this is a second response. International institutions
are already associated with every resource extraction transaction. I
argue that these institutions amount to tools necessary for the
execution of resource extraction transactions. Participants include
corporations registered and regulated in the U.S. and around the
world, financial institutions whose accounts are used to transfer
funds, and courts and other dispute resolution institutions used to
enforce contracts in the event of a dispute.124 My argument is that
121 There is no shortage of attempts to develop such a program using
revenue generated from resources. See generally MINERAL RENTS AND THE
FINANCING OF SOCIAL POLICY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Katja Hujo
ed., 2012). In her concluding article, Katja Hujo summarizes the various ways that
development schemes financed by resource wealth can negatively affect a country
and the policy interventions best capable of preventing these harms. Id. at 318-31.
122 In previous work I showed the prevalence of conditions on wealth
transfers, including development assistance, foreign direct investment, and resource
extraction contracts. See Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects
of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 84, 110-17 (2009).
123 See generally Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a
Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973 (2006) (surveying the evidence of
reform failures and analyzing possible reforms).
124 See, e.g., Timothy L. O’Brien, At Riggs Bank, a Tangled Path Led to
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/us/at-

257

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

these institutions should use their involvement to benefit local people
and avoid permitting others to use them to do harm.
2. The Fallibility of International Institutions
The next objection is actually a cluster of related points.
Some argue that there is nothing magical about what I have called
international institutions. Recall that my definition includes
institutions in one country that regulate or otherwise affect the
behavior of actors in other countries. The objection would be that
institutions do not function perfectly in any country, and even robust
institutions are subject to capture by interest groups, incompetence,
and weakness in the face of political pressure or particularly
sophisticated schemes to avoid regulation or to defraud. I do not
argue is not that international institutions are a panacea for every ill.
Instead, I contend that weak domestic institutions provide
opportunities for unaccountable political leaders to enrich
themselves, and that this enrichment harms the citizens of the
country. International institutions are not a panacea, but do have a
role to play in mitigating these harms.
A second strand of this objection would be that international
institutions have a poor track record with respect to developing
countries.125 There is undoubtedly evidence to support this objection,
but the fact that past efforts have not worked is not, standing alone,
sufficient reason to abandon any attempt at reform. I do not argue
that international institutions are, in a first-best world, preferable to
robust domestic institutions. Instead, I argue that international
institutions, particularly legal institutions, are a workable second-best
option that might mitigate the harms caused by domestic institutions.
Citizens in poor countries plagued by corrupt leadership are unlikely
riggs-bank-a-tangled-path-led-to-scandal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing
the involvement of Riggs Bank in laundering money for corrupt foreign dictators
including Augusto Pinochet and Teodoro Obiang).
125 For a thorough treatment of the history of foreign assistance failures,
see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS
TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006).
Easterly argues that attempts by international institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank to aid poor countries and encourage them to adopt pro-growth
policies have done much more harm than good.
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to object to international regulations that make their leaders more
accountable and less likely to enrich themselves by impoverishing the
country. Over the long run the locus of institutional control matters:
external regulation might undermine internal efforts to develop
strong regulatory institutions. But in the short to medium term,
citizens, particularly the poorest citizens, surely are less concerned
about the locus of institutional control than they are about having
opportunities to better themselves.126
The final strand is that the kinds of institutional failure I have
described occur in every country to at least some extent. These
phenomena are not unique to developing countries, resourcedependent economies, or any other narrow group of countries.127 It is
important to recognize that even if there is not a difference in kind
among countries with respect to the types of institutional weaknesses
that I describe, there is a difference in degree. There is ample
evidence that many developing countries, particularly those rich in
natural resources, have a higher incidence of corruption, less
transparent and less effective corporate governance, and a greater
centralization of control over the business and technical aspects of
resource exploitation. My focus is on those states in which the
available evidence suggests that weak domestic institutions are
subject to exploitation that significantly affects citizens who are
already struggling.

126 This is a version of an argument I made in an earlier article. See Patrick
J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts to Citizens be Treated
Differently than Debts to Other Creditors?, 49 VA. J. INTL. L. 431, 453-64 (2009).There I
developed a theory of what states owe their citizens and specified the sources and
contours of these obligations.
127 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1996)
(surveying the causes and consequences of corruption in countries around the
world); Kenneth J. Meier & Thomas M. Holbrook, “I Seen My Opportunities and I
Took ‘Em:” Political Corruption in the American States, 54 J. POL. 135 (1992) (analyzing
the scope of and explanations for corruption in the United States); James C. Scott,
Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142 (1969)
(showing the effects of systems of political patronage on governance in the United
States).
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion that the resource curse is caused in large part
by weak domestic institutions represents a significant advance in the
literature on economic development. At first glance the solution
seems to follow from the problem: address the resource curse by
fixing domestic institutions. But when that is not possible or is likely
to be a slow process, there are good reasons to use international
institutions to do some of the work of domestic institutions, at least
in the short and medium terms. Particularly with respect to legal
institutions, there are a number of ways to apply insights from the
development economics literature to mitigate the effects of the
resource curse and allow citizens of poor countries to reap more of
the benefits of the countries’ wealth.
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THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM: WILL BASEL III
HAVE A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON LIMITING
FUTURE FINANCIAL TURMOIL?
Erin Pentz*
INTRODUCTION
Although international economies have faced financial
turmoil many times over the last century, the 2008 financial crisis
brought catastrophic bank failures not seen since the Great
Depression.1 Regulatory agencies responded swiftly to identify the
source of the developing crisis and establish new rules to reduce
vulnerability in the banking sector and prevent future crises.2 With
the endorsement of the G-20 Leaders,3 the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision established the Basel III capital requirements to
be implemented by all member nations4 by January 1, 2018.5

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University.
1 See Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(July
11,
2012,
11:52
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-the-great-recession-bring-backthe-1930s.
2 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision at the 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision:
Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
3 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the
Dec. 2010 Meeting (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101201a.htm.
4 Member nations include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS
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This comment will consider the feasibility of international
banking regulations under Basel III as applied to varying economies.
Part I will address the rise of “Too Big to Fail” financial institutions
and their effect on international economies, which sparked the desire
for uniform international banking standards.6 Part II will summarize
historic international banking regulations and the failures of those
measures that have set the groundwork for development of Basel
III.7
Part III will discuss the post-recession stability of varying
economies, the level of pre-recession banking regulation in each of
those economies, and the path each is taking to implement the Basel
III standards.8 In Part IV, this comment will evaluate whether Basel
III’s uniform application of banking regulation across highly differing
economies is feasible or productive.9
This comment concludes that Basel III is unlikely to have a
major impact on the ability of financial sectors to weather economic
storms. As a baseline measure, Basel III may hinder increased efforts
for stability because its minimums are set with an eye towards
concerns of competitiveness in the international marketplace.
Historical practices show that changes to minimum capital
requirements may be useless without strong financial regulation and
diverse banking sectors.
I. “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL”
The Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Stefan Walter summarized the general causes of banking
crises as “excess leverage, too little capital of insufficient quality, and

AND BANKING SYSTEMS

1 n.1 (Dec. 2010) (rev. June 2011), [hereinafter BASEL III],
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
5 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 10.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV.
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inadequate liquidity buffers” to weather economic downturns.10 In
the United States, Washington Mutual’s failure in 2008 was record
breaking.11 With assets of $307 billion, but only about $188 billion in
deposits, Washington Mutual simply had insufficient liquidity to
outlast the collapse of the U.S. housing market.12
The U.S. government did nothing to prevent the failure of
Washington Mutual.13 However, in his speech in 2010, Walter
recognized that some troubled banks could not be allowed to fail;
some were simply “too-big-to-fail.”14 Certain financial institutions in
both the U.S. and abroad15 have become so interconnected with the
global financial system that failure could have repercussions that
extend to the entire international banking system.16 Additionally, in
nations with established insurance protocols to protect consumer
deposits—for example, the United States’ Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)—some financial institutions have become so
large that available insurance funds may not adequately cover
10 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
11 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm; Eric Dash & Andrew R.
Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure in U.S. History, STARTRIBUNE, Sept.
25, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y.
12 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm.
13 Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure
in
U.S.
History,
STARTRIBUNE,
Sept.
25,
2008,
http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y
(Regulators
brokered an emergency sale of nearly all of the bank’s assets, rather than injecting
substantial sums of taxpayer dollars to prevent collapse).
14 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
15 The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom chose to
nationalize Bradford & Bingley before it failed due to over-leveraging because
failure may have harmed the banking system as a whole. Treasury to Nationalise B&B
Bank,
BBC
NEWS
(Sept.
28,
2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7640143.stm.
16 Dash & Sorkin, supra note 13.

263

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

depositor losses in the event of the institution’s bankruptcy.17 If one
of these large financial institutions failed, agencies like the FDIC
would be forced either to seek additional funds from the government
or to allow consumers to suffer.18
One solution for governments facing the potential failure of a
“Too-Big-to-Fail” institution has been for the government to inject
capital, occasionally in substantial proportions, into the flailing
institutions.19 In 2008, the government revived Citigroup, a U.S.
financial institution with 200 million customers and branches in over
100 countries, by injecting the bank with $45 million in capital.20
First, the U.S. government attempted to recruit Wachovia, another
major financial institution, to help Citigroup reduce risky assets and
acquire low-cost funding.21 When the deal fell through, concerns
about the effect of Citigroup’s potential bankruptcy inspired the U.S.
to infuse millions in taxpayer dollars into the bank.22
In the European Union (E.U.), governments are prohibited
from injecting funds into the private sector.23 However, the extreme
repercussions of the failure of “Too-Big-to-Fail” institutions has led
to certain exceptions, such as the German banking sector’s injection
of $4.8 billion into the failing IKB Deutsche Industriebank.24

Economists predicted that if Washington Mutual had not been seized
and the FDIC was forced to insure consumer’s deposits, the funds available would
not have been adequate. Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26,
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm.
18 Id.
19 See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL
ST. JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122747680752551447.html.
20 Id.
21 Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
2,
2007,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f370000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP.
22 Enrich, supra note 19.
23 Buck, supra note 21.
24 German banks, public and private, recognized the need to protect IKB
or risk the reputation of the entire industry. They feared a perception of
“insufficient risks standards” at German banks and reduced trust in the German
banking system. Buck, supra note 21.
17
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When possible, governments have facilitated mergers to
avoid bailing out failing institutions using taxpayer dollars.25 When
successful, mergers can help increase funding or decrease liquidity
shortfalls by diversifying capital, as was the hope in the proposed
Citigroup-Wachovia merger.26 In other instances, mergers can simply
allow larger, more stable banks to absorb the assets and liabilities of
failing institutions while increasing their own market share, as was the
case in the United Kingdom based Lloyd’s TSB-Halifax Bank of
Scotland merger.27
One final solution, although utilized less frequently than
other options, is the nationalization of failing banks. In 2007, the
United Kingdom (U.K.) temporarily nationalized Northern Rock
Bank after all other stabilization options seemed ineffective.28
Taxpayers footed the bill to rescue the bank at a cost of nearly £55
billion.29
Although the government injection of capital, the facilitation
of mergers, and the nationalization of private banks prevented the
failure of major financial institutions during the Great Recession of
2007-2009, the problems within the banking industry became the
problems of the entire financial system due to the interconnectivity
of the system.30 These problems have had long-lasting impacts on
national economies.31

25 See Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm.
26 Enrich, supra note 19.
27 Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm.
28 Northern Rock to be Nationalized, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7249575.stm.
29 Id.; see also Michael Steen & Peter T. Larsen, Dutch Alter Terms of Fortis
Bail-out, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f93a9b0891ad-11dd-b5cd-0000779fd18c.html - axzz2H3FnY7f9 (discussing the Dutch
government’s nationalization of banks Fortis and ABN Amro, after attempts to
facilitate mergers failed to save the floundering institutions).
30 See generally Jill Treanor, Toxic Shock: How the Banking Industry Created a
Global
Crisis,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
7,
2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/08/creditcrunch.banking.
31 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 1.
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II. THE BASEL ACCORDS: RESPONSES TO CRISES
A. The Basel Committee’s Purpose
The Basel Committee on Baking Supervision (BCBS) is one
of several committees within the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).32 The BIS is not a consumer bank, but rather serves central
banks to aid in establishing monetary and financial stability and
international cooperation.33 BCBS was created to develop guidelines
and supervisory standards for financial institutions and is best known
for its development of international standards on capital adequacy.34
The BCBS does not possess any actual legal authority; rather, it
develops best practices and makes recommendations to supervisory
leaders to help implement those initiatives endorsed by member
nations.35
B. Historic Basel
In 1988, the BCBS introduced a framework, known as the
Basel Capital Accord or Basel I,36 designed to manage credit risk in
major financial institutions through the establishment of minimum
capital requirements.37 The initial iteration called for a minimum
capital ratio38 of eight percent.39 Basel I was never intended to be a

32 About
BIS,
BANK
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
33 Established in 1930, BIS is the world’s oldest international financial
institution. Id.
34 About
the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2012).
35 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee
and its Membership 1 (2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
36 With the introduction of new iterations of the Basel Capital Accord,
this first framework has become known as Basel I. About the Basel Committee, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct.
7, 2012).
37 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 35, at 2.
38 Established by factoring capital to risk-weighted assets (with risk based
on the credit risk of the borrow). Id.
39 Id.
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static, long-term solution.40 Its evolution began in 1991,41 and its first
amendment was published in 1995.42
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Basel I’s development
continued with the addition of measures to manage market risk and
improve evaluation of capital adequacy.43 Basel II was released in
2004.44 The new framework focused on three main “pillars”: (1)
minimum capital requirements; (2) supervisory review of an
institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and (3)
effective use of disclosure to encourage discipline and sound banking
practices.45 Under Basel II, the minimum capital requirement
remained at eight percent.46 However, unlike under Basel I, the BCBS
required half of the total capital under Basel II to consist of Tier 1
capital—the purest and most adequate form of capital (i.e.
shareholder capital).47 Basel II also assigned more stringent risk
weights to certain forms of investments and long-past-due loans.48
Although implementation of Basel II effectively began in
2004,49 the Great Recession began only a few short years later in
2007.50 The causes of the Great Recession are many, but prominent
commentators attributed bank failures to the insufficiency of capital
Id. at 3.
Some critics argue that even early evolution could not save a scheme
that was doomed to fail due to its crudely define risk categories and unfortunate
incentives to increase risk, effectively reducing the capital banks actually held.
Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 609, 612 (2012).
42 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 35, at 3.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Just as under Basel I. See supra Part I.
47 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 12 (2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf.
48 Id. at 27, 33 (assigning a risk weight of 150% to consumers whose
credit is rated lower than a B- and to past due loans with less than 20% equity).
49 See Basel II: Revised International Capital Framework, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (for
a detailed breakdown of the implementation timeline).
50 See supra Introduction.
40
41
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on bank balance sheets coupled with over-leveraging and insufficient
liquidity buffers to weather downturns.51 Thus, the very problems
that BCBS intended to avoid by introducing far-reaching
international banking regulation were the causes of a crisis three years
after Basel II’s implementation began.52 The result was the failure of
443 financial institutions in the U.S. alone.53
C. Basel III
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the BCBS returned to the
drawing board.54 Intent on “raising the resilience of the banking
sector”, committee members took a five-fold approach to regulation:
(1) raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital
base; (2) enhancing risk coverage; (3) supplementing the risk-based
capital requirement with a leverage ratio; (4) promoting
countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers; and (5)
addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness.55 Specifically, Basel
III made adjustments to the minimum capital requirement.56
Although the total capital57 remained at eight percent,58 Tier 1
Capital59 overall was raised to six percent, and Common Equity Tier
1 Capital60 was raised to at least four-and-a-half percent of riskStefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
52 Id.
53 Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/didthe-great-recession-bring-back-the-1930s.
54 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2.
55 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2-5, 7.
56 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
57 Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital. BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
58 As in Basel I and Basel II. See supra Part II.B.
59 Tier 1 Capital consists of Common Equity Capital, and instruments
issued by the bank that meet the criteria outlined in Basel III, which may include
subordinated instruments or those instruments with nearly negligible credit risk.
BASEL III, supra note 4, at 15-17.
60 Common Equity Tier 1 capital consists of common shares, stock
surplus, retained earnings, and other accumulated income. BASEL III, supra note 4,
at 13.
51

268

2014

Student Work

3:1

weighted assets.61 Basel III also established “stress testing”
measures.62
Basel III’s main focus has been the rise of “Too-Big-to-Fail”
institutions.63 The BCBS worked with the Financial Stability Board
(FSB)64 to determine which financial institutions met the status of
“Too-Big-to-Fail”, or termed more specifically, “Systemically
Important Banks”65 (SIBs), upon which Basel III will have the most
significant impact.66 In November of 2011, the FSB released a list of
29 SIBs, including eight U.S. banks, seventeen European banks, three
Japanese banks, and one Chinese bank.67 The BCBS comment
regarding SIBs recognized that some institutions are so large that
individual operating procedures must be conducted with an eye
towards the potential impact on the entire international banking

BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
BASEL III, supra note 4, at 46.
63 Agustino Fontevecchia, The 29 Global Banks that are Too Big to Fail,
FORBES
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/04/the-worlds-29-mostsystemically-important-banks/.
64 The FSB was established to enhance cooperation among national and
international supervisory boards and financial institutions. Membership spans the
G20 countries, and the intent is to address vulnerabilities and develop and
implement regulations and policies in the interest of advancing financial stability.
The mandate of the FSB focuses on assessing vulnerabilities, promoting
coordination, monitoring and advising markets and policies, and undertaking joint
actions to plan and develop guidelines. About the FSB: Overview, FIN. STABILITY
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2013).
65 Defined as: “Financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure,
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. To avoid
this outcome, authorities have all too frequently had no choice but to forestall the
failure of such institutions through public solvency support.” Fontevecchia, supra
note 63.
66 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Dealing with
Domestic Systemically Important Banks: Framework Issued by the Basel
Committee (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bis.org/press/p121011.htm.
67 Fontevecchia, supra note 63.
61
62
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system.68 For these 29 banks, BCBS created higher loss absorbency
standards, which range from additional Common Equity Tier 1
Capital of one percent to two-and-a-half percent greater than the
non-SIB standard, depending on the size and systemic importance of
the institution.69 The BCBS also discouraged these institutions from
becoming even more systemically important.70
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
A. Canada
The Canadian economy is one of the fifteen largest in the
world (while occasionally breaking into the top ten).71 And yet, not
one of its banks failed during the Great Recession.72 In fact, the
Canadian economy survived the Great Recession relatively
unscathed.73
One of the potential sources of Canadian economic stability
may be the drastic difference between the Canadian banking system

Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency
Requirement: Cover Note (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207cn.pdf.
69 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Measures for
Global Systemically Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision (June 25, 2011), http://www.bis.org/press/p110625.htm.
70 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency
Requirement: Rules Text (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
71 Kevin Carmichael, A Middling Grade for Canada in Latest Economic
Ranking,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/amiddling-grade-for-canada-in-latest-economic-ranking/article612747/.
72 Mark Perry, Due North: Canada’s Marvelous Mortgage and Banking System,
AM. (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/february/duenorth-canadas-marvelous-mortgage-and-banking-system.
73 “In 2008, the World Economic Forum ranked Canada’s banking
system the healthiest in the world. America’s ranked 40th, Britain’s 44th.” Fareed
Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/02/06/worthwhile-canadianinitiative.html.
68
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and other industrialized nations.74 First, the Canadian banking system
consists of five major banks out of a mere 82 banks in the entire
country.75 These 82 banks benefit from great diversity across
geographic regions.76 Because of the concentration of banks,
coordination between the banks and regulators is facilitated.77
Substantial discussions regarding best banking practices and
brainstorming on methods to weather downturns are feasible and
likely.78
Second, the Canadian mortgage market has built-in
protections that advance the stability of the banking system.79 For
example, all mortgages in Canada are “Full Recourse” mortgages,
meaning that a borrower remains fully responsible for any mortgage,
even if the home has been foreclosed upon.80 This provides a lesser
incentive for borrowers to walk away from mortgages81 while
ensuring that lending institutions retain the ability to recoup all
mortgage liabilities.82 Additionally, Canadian mortgage insurance is
more widespread than in the U.S.,83 giving Canadian banks a
guarantee of repayment for a significant portion of all mortgages.
Finally, Canadian banks fix interest rates for only five years at a time
for mortgages,84 retain a large portion of originated loans on their
Perry, supra note 72.
Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6,
2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/02/06/worthwhilecanadian-initiative.html.
81 Economies not using full recourse mortgages incentivize the borrower
to walk away from his home and his loan when times become tough. Id.
82 Interestingly, home ownership in Canada is 69%, as compared to
homeownership in the U.S. at 67.2%. Perry, supra note 72.
83 Roughly half of all Canadian mortgages carry mortgage insurance; yet,
in the U.S. pre-Great Recession, mortgage insurance was found on only fifteen
percent of all mortgages and typically only on high leveraged mortgages with less
than twenty percent equity. Id.
84 Because rates are fixed for only a short time, every five years an
adjustment to interest rates occurs, allowing the interest rates on mortgages to
adjust with market conditions. Id.
74
75
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own balance sheets,85 and engage in the subprime mortgage market to
a lesser degree than banks in other major economies.86
Additional sources of Canadian economic stability lie in the
Country’s pre-Great Recession regulation of its banks. Canadian
banks have maintained a strong regulatory framework since the
economic crisis in the early 2000s.87 They are regulated on a federal
level by four major regulatory agencies: The Department of
Finance,88 the Bank of Canada,89 the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI),90 and the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation.91 Each agency has a specific focus or area of expertise.92
In addition, non-national banks are regulated by agencies at the
provincial level.93 Canada also has several committees that facilitate
collaboration between the regulatory agencies, both federal and
provincial, so that all issues and regulations are addressed between
the sister agencies on both a regional and national scale.94 Most
importantly, however, is the “sunset clause” which causes all federal
financial regulations to lapse every five years, ensuring that each of
the above named agencies review financial legislation periodically for
soundness.95
Canadian banks service sixty-eight percent of the mortgages they
originate; therefore, they have a continued interest in the risk associated with each
loan they write. Id.
86 Id.
87 During that same time period, however, U.S. and E.U. banks were
loosening banking regulations to stimulate economic growth following the
recession of 2001. Zakaria, supra note 80.
88 The Department of Finance is responsible for the overall stability of
the financial system and overarching financial sector legislation. FIN. STABILITY
BOARD,
PEER
REVIEW
OF
CANADA
9
(Jan.
30,
2012),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120130.pdf.
89 The Bank of Canada assesses risk and provides liquidity to the
Canadian financial system. Id.
90 OSFI is the regulator and supervisor of federal Canadian financial
institutions. Id.
91 The Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation insures deposits of
financial institutions. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 10.
94 Id. at 10-11.
95 Id. at 11.
85

272

2014

Student Work

3:1

To increase stability further, Canadian regulatory agencies
have mandated significant minimum capital requirements since
1999.96 At that time, banks were required to meet or exceed seven
percent Tier 1 capital ratios and ten percent total capital ratios.97
Additionally, OSFI reserved the right to direct a bank to increase its
capital through institution-specific requirements.98 Regulatory
agencies also required Canadian banks to limit leverage to twenty-toone,99 and in 2009, Canadian banks were typically leveraged below
that rate at eighteen-to-one.100
Overall, no one element has led to the strength of the
Canadian economy. Certainly the development of a strong regulatory
framework, the self-protecting practices of the lending market, and
the comparatively high capital requirements101 in the banking sector
had a major impact on the stability of Canadian financial institutions.
Nonetheless, Canada, as a member of the G-20, is taking steps to
make changes following Basel III’s adoption.
The OSFI established a plan to complete its interpretation of
Basel III requirements by the end of 2012 and began implementation
in the first fiscal quarter of 2013.102 In its plan, all deposit-taking
institutions were required to meet the seven percent Tier 1 target.103
Although Canadian deposit institutions were previously required to
meet a seven percent Tier 1 minimum, OSFI recognized that some
institutions may have fallen below the minimum as a result of
pressure from international financial instability.104 OSFI, therefore,

Id. at 12.
Id.; Compare supra Section III.B. and III.C. for a discussion of Basel II
and Basel III capital requirements.
98 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 12.
99 Id.
100 Zakaria, supra note 80.
101 See supra Section III. As compared to the overall requirements under
the Basel models.
102 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Basel III Implementation – Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Requirements (Feb. 1,
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/cptlq_e.pdf.
103 Id.
104 Id.
96
97
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recognized that banks should continue to “maintain prudent earnings
retention policies and avoid actions that weaken their capital
position.”105 Additionally, OSFI acknowledged that its current
leverage ratio calculation did not necessarily conform with the Basel
III rules, but intended not to take steps to alter its own ratios and
monitoring until the Basel III leverage ratio was finalized.106 Finally,
OSFI made no plans to begin implementation of the liquidity
coverage ratio until BCBS deemed such actions necessary.107 Rather,
OSFI planned to work with small banks and foreign bank branches
to determine how the new metrics established under Basel III might
work with their operations.108
In addition to the minimum capital requirements, OSFI
addressed the quality of capital necessary under Basel III. It planned a
mandatory requirement that all non-common share capital
instruments contain a provision in their contract terms that allows for
the conversion to common share capital upon a triggering event.109
Specifically, OSFI established regulations allowing the mandate of a
full and permanent conversion of the class of capital if OSFI
determines that the financial institution’s viability has ceased or the
Canadian government has decided to support the financial institution
for any other reason.110 OSFI also encouraged financial institutions to
confirm the quality of capital with OSFI111 prior to issuing
questionable capital instruments.112 Additionally, financial institutions
Id.
Id.
107 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 15.
108 Id.
109 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Non-Viability
Contingent
Capital
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nvcc_e.pdf.
110 Id.; see also John Greenwood, Canadian Banks Stronger Than They Look:
OSFI,
FIN.
POST
(May
8,
2013),
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/05/08/osfi-canadian-banks-strongerthan-they-look/.
111 Although such action is encouraged, OSFI has no current intention to
make confirmation of quality of capital mandatory. Press Release, Office of the
Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada, Non-Viability Contingent Capital (Aug.
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nvcc_e.pdf.
112 Id.
105
106
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are instructed to redeem any capital instruments that do not meet
Basel III standards at their regular redemption dates, rather than
waiting for regulatory events to trigger redemption.113
The BCSB and FSB did not include any Canadian banks on
the SIB list.114 As a result, OSFI and other Canadian regulatory
agencies were not required to establish heightened minimum capital
requirements for its largest financial institutions.115 Overall, because
Canada has no SIBs, already has substantial minimum capital
requirements for financial institutions, and intends to make no
additional changes until Basel III liquidity and leverage ratios are
finalized, Canadian financial institutions will be in substantial
compliance with Basel III goals from its implementation in the first
fiscal quarter of 2013.
B. Switzerland
Switzerland has long been known as one of the safest places
in the world for affluent individuals to store their wealth.116 Prior to
the Great Recession, Swiss banks held assets worth more than six
times the country’s overall gross domestic product (GDP).117 In
comparison, U.S. banks held assets totaling a mere seventy percent of
Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Treatment of Non-qualifying Capital Instruments (Feb. 2011), http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nqcibIII_e.pd
f.
114 See supra Part II.C.
115 See supra Part II.C. Although no Canadian banks were included on the
SIB list, the OSFI designated all of Canada’s six largest banks as domestic
systemically important banks. These six banks are subject to a 1% risk-weighted
capital surcharge and subject to continued supervisory intensity and enhanced
disclosure requirements. Stephen B. Kerr, Canadian Banks Come to Grips with Basel
III,
LEXOLOGY
(Oct.
10,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f72b-005e-43b0-b3660a52f62cda12.
116 Craig Whitlock, Banking Crisis Has Made Even the Swiss Uneasy, WASH.
POST,
Oct.
15,
2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/10/15/ST2008101500708.html.
117 Stefan Theil, What the Swiss Did Right, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/12/27/how-switzerland-savedits-banking-industry.html.
113
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its GDP during the same time period.118 The sheer size of the Swiss
banking sector compared to the Swiss economy substantiates the
importance of financial stability to the country.
Two major banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, dominate the Swiss
banking sector.119 Together, UBS and Credit Suisse held $2.85 trillion
in assets before the Great Recession, totaling more than four times
Switzerland’s GDP at the time.120 UBS and Credit Suisse operate
internationally and focus on investment banking and wealth
management, with half of the wealth management assets coming
from foreign clients.121 The Swiss banking sector is also composed of
cantonal banks122 and other regional banks that operate
domestically.123
In 2008, when the Great Recession began and international
financial institutions began failing, the Swiss government looked to
UBS and Credit Suisse as possible sources of economic instability.124
Because of the size of the two banks, Swiss agencies recognized that
the Swiss economy was simply not large enough to bail out the banks
if they failed125 and feared that collapse in either could throw the
entire country into financial turmoil.126

Id.
FIN. STABILITY BOARD, PEER REVIEW OF SWITZERLAND 9 (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_250112.pdf.
120 In 2011, the assets of UBS and Credit Suisse totaled more than twice
Switzerland’s GDP, a sharp reduction from 2007-2008 dominance. Id.; Whitlock,
supra note 116.
121 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9 n.3.
122 Cantonal banks operate within Switzerland’s individual cantons, or
states, typically servicing only individual cantons and owned either entirely or in the
large majority by the canton. As of early 2013, 24 cantonal banks exist. Cantonal
Banks,
CANTONAL
BANK,
http://www.kantonalbank.ch/e/gruppe/kantonalbanken/index.php (last visited
Jan. 4, 2013).
123 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9.
124 Whitlock, supra note 116.
125 Theil, supra note 117.
126 Whitlock, supra note 116.
118
119

276

2014

Student Work

3:1

In the same time period, as a result of aggressive expansion to
its investment banking business, UBS found itself in trouble.127 The
bank quickly secured billions in capital from new share offerings and
injections from international investors and governments,128 but the
effort was insufficient to stabilize the bank.129 As a result, the Swiss
government took additional steps to secure the bank.130 The Swiss
central bank nationalized $54 billion131 of UBS’s assets and
recapitalized the remaining private assets.132 UBS did not fail as a
result of the financial crisis, but public perception of the bank did not
recover from the negativity surrounding its instability.133
Credit Suisse also suffered major losses as a result of the
financial crisis.134 However, unlike UBS, a capital injection from
international investors was sufficient to prevent the need for
government intervention.135
The smaller Swiss banking institutions did not face similar
struggles during the financial crisis.136 Instead, they were able to gain
market share at the expense of UBS’ and Credit Suisse’s questionable

Id.
Id.
129 Theil, supra note 117.
130 Id.
131 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.16,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
132 Theil, supra note 117.
133 See Whitlock, supra note 116.
134 Totaling $19 billion in comparison to UBS’s $53 billion in losses from
2007 until 2009. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 11 n.10.
135 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.
16,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4 2013).
136 See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT.
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL
MARKET
SUPERVISION
15
(Sept.
14.
2009),
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Documents/Finanzmarktkrise-undFinanzmarktaufsicht_e.pdf.
127
128
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stability.137 Cantonal banks, in particular, were well capitalized, had
higher quality capital than the two largest banks, and in some cases,
had their liabilities fully guaranteed by their cantons.138 Each of these
factors led to stability during the crisis.
Three agencies regulate the Swiss financial market.139 The
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is the
supervisory and regulatory authority responsible for the financial
industry.140 It was created in 2007 but did not receive full power until
2009.141 FINMA works in conjunction with the Swiss National Bank
(SNB), the nation’s central bank in charge of monetary policy,142 and
the Federal Department of Finance (FDF), the nation’s ministry of
finance in charge of policy.143
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Swiss regulatory
agencies moved quickly to ensure the stability of its two largest banks
and to begin tightening banking regulations concerning capital
minimums and adequacy.144 During this time, FINMA mandated
quarterly “stress-testing” to determine risk within each institution.145
FINMA, working with SNB, also set new capital standards for the
two major banks, requiring each institution to hold ten percent Tier 1
Common Equity capital by 2018.146 Additionally, UBS and Credit

FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT.
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL
MARKET
SUPERVISION
15
(Sept.
14.
2009),
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Documents/Finanzmarktkrise-undFinanzmarktaufsicht_e.pdf.
138 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7.
139 See id. at 10.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 FINMA, Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Financial
Stability Between the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA and
the
Swiss
National
Bank
SNB
1
(Feb.
23,
2010),
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/mofu/source.
143 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 10.
144 Id. at 12.
145 Id. at 25
146 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP.,
Oct. 4, 2010,
137
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Suisse will be mandated to increase their current total capital
requirements to nineteen percent after including nine percent
contingent convertible bonds.147 Contingent convertible bonds are
newly developed instruments that would commit their holders to buy
shares from the banks in times of dire financial straits.148 For cantonal
and smaller banks, the Basel III framework’s eight percent minimum
capital requirement is expected to be adopted into Swiss law, with
complete implementation by 2019.149
The Swiss Bankers Association predicted in 2010 that Swiss
authorities would pressure international agencies like the BCBS to
adopt strict standards equal to those the Swiss agencies previously
adopted.150 When the Basel III requirements were subsequently
approved, however, swift acting Swiss agencies were forced to
confront the reality that such extreme differences in regulations could
have a negative impact on the Swiss financial sector.151 UBS and
Credit Suisse’s heightened capital requirements could easily impact
Switzerland’s international competitiveness in an already competitive
market.152
Through the fourth quarter of 2012, UBS struggled greatly to
remain competitive in its investment banking business, experiencing a
$2.3 billion loss in the third quarter of 2012.153 The bank also
announced plans to lay off more than 10,000 workers over a threeyear period.154 Credit Suisse faced similar problems and potential
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banks_get_stricter_rules_than_Basel_III.html?cid=28464
958.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 14.
150 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS
BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 5, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banking_regulation_leads_the_field.html?cid=28472592.
151 Tim Devaney, Global Crisis Squeezes Swiss Banks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2012,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/4/global-crisissqueezes-swiss-banks-as-regulations-/?page=all.
152 Allen, supra note 150.
153 Devaney, supra note 151.
154 Id.
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restructuring, but with a smaller investment banking business, the
pressure to drop the entire business segment was not as great as that
which UBS faced.155 This deteriorating effect on risky investment
banking may likely have been well within the Swiss regulators’
intentions when it implemented more stringent capital regulations
than those adopted under Basel III.156
In addition to its struggling investment banking business,
UBS stopped paying dividends, hoping that holding onto retained
earnings would help it secure the required minimum capital.157 Credit
Suisse, reporting solid progress towards the new capital minimum
goals, continued to pay dividends to its shareholders.158
Unfortunately, the bank lagged far behind competitors abroad when
using Basel III159 standards to evaluate capital adequacy.160 Although
some approaches to valuation projected Credit Suisse’s 2012 Tier 1
capital above the benchmark required by Swiss law after full
implementation in 2019, financial services firm Barclays applied new
capital adequacy standards to Credit Suisse’s assets and projected just
under six percent adjusted capital.161

Id.; see also David Jolly & Chad Bray, Credit Suisse to Streamline and
Shrink,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct
24,
2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/credit-suisse-profits-rise-but-resultsfall-short-of-expectations/?_r=1.
156 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP.,
Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banks_get_stricter_rules_than_Basel_III.html?cid=28464
958.
157 As of June 2012, UBS held seven-and-a-half percent Tier 1 capital
under Basel III’s capital adequacy standards. Julia Werdigier, Switzerland and Britain
Gird
Against
the
Storm,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
14,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/global/british-plan-offers-morefunds-to-banks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
158 Id.
159 As opposed to earlier Swiss standards.
160 Peter Eavis, Why European Bank Buffers May Not be Quite What They
Seem, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/whyeuropean-bank-buffers-may-not-be-quite-what-they-seem/.
161 Id.
155
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Although Swiss banking is synonymous with safety, the
structure of the industry showed stability issues that may have
remained hidden without the widespread international financial
turmoil of the Great Recession. Switzerland’s quick action was likely
facilitated by its small regulatory system and may have aided the
country in warding off major problems. Yet, such swift action may
reduce industry competitiveness in the future when Swiss banks vie
for business against institutions following Basel III’s requirements. 162
Furthermore, implementation may prove to be a burdensome if not
impractical task.
C. European Union
The European Union’s financial industry saw some of the
earliest turmoil during the Great Recession.163 In fact, as early as
August 2007, Deutsche Bank and other private German lending
institutions were forced to inject $4.8 billion in capital to save the
struggling IKB Deutsche Industriebank.164 Shortly thereafter in
September 2007, the Bank of England provided emergency aid to
Northern Rock.165 Since those initial rescues, and as recently as June
of 2012,166 E.U. member countries chose to rescue major banks
within their financial sector.167 The size and importance of many

See UBS Profits Slide, Risk Assets High Ahead of Stress Tests, IFA
MAGAZINE, Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.ifamagazine.com/news/ubs-profits-sliderisk-assets-high-ahead-of-stress-tests-286230.
163 See Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f370000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP.
164 Id
165 EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON
REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR 5 (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/highlevel_expert_group/report_en.pdf.
166 Alan Wheatley, Proud, Too-Big-to-Fail Spain Ponder Bank Rescue,
REUTERS, June 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-spaineurope-outlook-idUSBRE85619U20120607.
167 Landon Thomas & Nelson Schwartz, In Euro Zone, Banking Fear Feeds
on
Itself,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
6,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/business/global/in-euro-zone-bankingfear-feeds-on-itself.html?hp&_r=0.
162
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European banks means that countries cannot allow banks to fail
without compromising the stability of the E.U.’s entire economy.168
The framework of the European banking sector is
complex.169 Although the E.U. is made up of seventeen independent
banking systems using a singular currency,170 since the adoption of
the Euro, financial integration across member states increased up
until the Great Recession.171 The European banking sector as a whole
is large, even when compared to other major financial
powerhouses.172 Banking sector assets are five times as great in the
E.U. than in the U.S., and make up about 350% of the E.U.’s
GDP.173 The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are home to
the largest banking sectors when measured by total assets. 174
Additionally, the size of individual financial institutions within the
E.U. is great—half of the world’s thirty largest banks when ranked by
total assets are in the E.U.175 Specifically, fifteen of the twenty-nine
SIBs176 are located in E.U. member countries.177 However, the E.U. is
not made up exclusively of large financial institutions, as Europe is
home to more than 8,000 banks with smaller institutions comprising
a quarter of total banking assets in the E.U.178
Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
4,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/worldbusiness/04regs.html.
169 See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11-19.
170 Angelo Young, Danger from European Banks’ Too-Big-To-Fail Syndrome
Keeps Growing: Report, INTERNATIONAL BUS. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.com/danger-european-banks-too-big-fail-syndrome-keepsgrowing-report-790102.
171 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11, 30.
172 Id. at 13.
173 Id. at 11-12.
174 Id. at 12-13.
175 France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom each have banking markets
dominated by large domestic banks, while countries such as Austria, Germany, and
Spain, have more, smaller banks. Id. at 18.
176 See supra Part II.C.
177 Agustino Fontevecchia, The 29 Global Banks That Are Too Big to Fail,
FORBES,
Nov.
4,
2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/04/the-worlds-29-mostsystemically-important-banks/; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 38.
178 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 34-35.
168
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The integration of the E.U. financial network across member
countries increases need for a stable banking industry because failure
in any of the major banks within a single member country raises the
likelihood of economic crisis affecting multiple member countries.179
As a result of such overlap and potential repercussions of bank
failures, E.U. governments recognized the compelling need to inject
funding into the private sector, even though such action violates
traditional E.U. policy.180 In addition, in 2010, the E.U. chose to
create the European Banking Authority (EBA).181 The E.U. had a
predecessor advisory group,182 but the EBA is the first body with the
power to create a singular E.U. rulebook that will be binding on all
E.U. banks.183 In December of 2012, the E.U. also agreed to expand
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) supervisory power to include
direct supervision of the largest 100 to 200 banks in the E.U.184
Previously, banks were overseen primarily by national regulators.185
Under the agreement, smaller banking institutions would remain
subject to their current regulators.186 The aim of ECB in its improved

Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
4,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/worldbusiness/04regs.html.
180 Buck, supra note 163.
181 Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L331), 12-47 http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:01:EN:HTML.
182 About
us, COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS,
http://www.eba.europa.eu/Aboutus.aspx.
183 Matthew Elderfield, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland
and Alternative Chairman of the European Banking Authority, Address to the 4th
CDU/CSU Congress in the Bundestag: European Banking Regulation and the
Eurozone Crisis (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.bis.org/review/r120327f.pdf.
184 James Kanter, European Leaders Hail Accord on Banking Supervision, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/business/global/euleaders-hail-accord-on-banking-supervision.html?_r=0.
185 Such a set up proved ineffective when dealing with a financial sector
that has become integrated across national borders. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra
note 165, at 107.
186 Under the agreement, the ECB at its discretion could step in and take
over supervisions of any bank in the E.U., if deemed necessary. Kanter, supra note
184.
179
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state is to create uniformity and reduce the domestic political
influences that permeated the national banking regulation scheme.187
Leading up to the Great Recession and in response to the
Basel I and II frameworks, the E.U. passed two directives designed to
implement minimum capital requirements.188 These directives were
known as Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) I and II, and were
packages of non-binding legislation designed to implement the
various aspects of Basel I and II.189 Each directive established a
minimum and total common equity requirement of two percent,190
and each required no countercyclical buffer and no capital
conservation buffer, but permitted banks to use their own internal
risk models to calculate risk weights.191 Additionally, because CRD I
and CRD II were directives, they were not binding.192 Rather, they
were merely legislative acts that set out goals for each EU state to
achieve, and member states were permitted to diverge significantly in
their own individual implementations.193 In fact, some member states
chose a transitional opt-out of the standards.194 Moreover, leverage
ratios in European banks often exceed thirty-to-one, and in some
cases, are as great as fifty-to-one.195

187 Peter Gumble, Too European To Fail? New E.U. Banking Safety Net Takes
Shape, TIME, Dec. 17, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/12/17/too-europeanto-fail-new-eu-banking-safety-net-takes-shape/.
188 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 68-69.
189 Capital
Requirements Directive: Repealed Legislation, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/repealedlegislation_en.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
190 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11.
191 Id. at 69.
192 See,
Regulations, Directives and other acts, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014), for a brief overview of European law.
193 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 71.
194 CRD II was passed after the transitional opt-out for CRD I, but still,
several member states did not meet the implementation requirements CRD II. Id.
195 Colin Barr, Europe: The New Wall Street?, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/06/news/europe.leverage.fortune/index.htm.
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Under the E.U. legislation implementing Basel III, CRD IV,
the capital requirements generally follow those outlined by BIS.196
Total capital requirements under the legislation are eight percent, a
total of four-and-a-half percent of which must be common Tier 1
capital.197 The E.U. differs from Basel III requirements in that the
percentage of Tier 1 capital must be gradually increased until it
reaches six percent by 2019.198 The legislation also permits member
states, in coordination with the E.U., to require higher levels than
those established under CRD IV.199 Unlike previous regulations,
however, the E.U. will enforce the law as a mandatory regulation,
rather than a directive, to reduce the ability of national regulators to
diverge or reduce the weight of the proposal.200 Although the
percentages of capital remain consistent with the aims of Basel III,
the E.U. legislation does diverge on certain details.201 Specifically, the
E.U. counts as Tier 1 capital lesser types of capital202 than those
supplied under Basel III and places a maximum on the capital ratio
that member states may impose on their banks.203
Even though the E.U. took steps to increase the stability of
its financial sector by increasing union-wide banking regulations for
the first time since the formation of the E.U., it failed to meet a
major benchmark in Basel III implementation.204 The E.U.’s new
minimum capital rules would complement the creation of the
banking-union and create a measure for the ECB to enforce through
196 Compare BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2, with EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
supra note 165, at 69.
197 Commission Regulation 575/2013, art. 92, 2013 O.J. (L176) 64;
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 69.
198 Commission Regulation 575/2013, art. 92, 2013 O.J. (L176) 64.
199 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165 at 70.
200 Geoffrey Smith, EU’s Proposal to Implement Basel III Undermines Spirit,
WALL
ST.
JOURNAL,
July
28,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576472393933772876
.html; see Commission Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L176) 1.
201 Id.
202 Such as deferred tax assets and minority interests. Id.
203 Id.
204 See Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
12,
2012
6:11AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html.
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its new supervisory powers.205 However, the E.U. failed to pass Basel
III regulation by the January 1, 2013 deadline established by BIS. 206
Although the E.U. legislature recognized the need for stronger
regulation of the banking industry, given the systemic importance of
the many E.U. banks, passing new minimum capital measures before
other competitive nations (such as the U.S.) could have compromised
the recovery of the E.U. financial sector and may have been the
major cause for the delay.207 The regulation was adopted on June 27,
2013 with implementation set to commence on January 1, 2014 and
full implementation to be reached by 2019.208
IV. IS UNIFORMITY POSSIBLE?
Enacting capital requirements for financial institutions across
industrialized nations seems to be the most basic step in preventing
the recurrence of financial turmoil similar to that of the Great
Recession. Establishing minimum capital levels for banks, with
increased requirements for large, systemically important institutions,
may help institutions weather the storm of financial strife so that
banks do not go bankrupt or suffer bank runs.209
Several major problems exist with Basel III. Because Basel III
is a recommendation of best practices, introduced with no legal
Id.
Id.; The U.S. and fifteen other members of the Basel Committee also
failed to meet the deadline. Lianna Brinded, Basel III: Less Than Half of Nations Meet
Deadline for New Bank Capital Rules, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/420179/20130103/basel-iii-capitalrequirements-committee-regulation.htm.
207 Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH, Nov.
12,
2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html; see also Eric Vidal, EU’s
Barnier Says U.S. Should Respect Basel III, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/us-eu-banksidUSBRE90U0D520130131.
208 See Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package, EUROPEAN
BANKING AUTH., http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementingbasel-iii-europe (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
209 See supra Part II.C.
205
206

286

2014

Student Work

3:1

authority from BCBS, countries may modify the terms or fail to
implement the measures altogether. The E.U.’s passage of directives
concerning Basel I and II and national failures to adopt such
measures are a stark example of the ineffectiveness of
recommendations lacking legal authority.210 As mentioned above,
after the directive implementing Basel I and II, some E.U. member
states failed to follow through with their own regulations by taking
advantage of a transitional opt-out period. Still many E.U. member
states failed to ever follow through with implementation of the new
regulations.
Basel III implementation may face difficulties similar to Basel
I and II in the E.U. The initial deadline for Basel III implementation
to begin was January 1, 2013. Sixteen members of the G-20 did not
meet that benchmark.211 However, one year later, the majority of the
G-20 took steps to implement some form of Basel III regulation,
with most becoming effective on January 1, 2014.212
Of those member nations that chose to follow through with
implementing Basel III regulations, the risk remains that the intent of
Basel III will be diluted by changes at the national level. Switzerland
has stepped up the recommendations of Basel III.213 However, by
acting ahead of the final Basel III recommendations, Swiss banks
may face a disadvantage in competitiveness.214 Nations slow to follow
through with implementation may recognize the Swiss setback and
set standards below those recommended under Basel III to protect
the competitiveness and recovery of their own banking institutions.
Further, the E.U., although adopting the minimum ratios, intends to
The E.U. proposal for Basel III implementation will likely take the
form of a mandatory regulation to correct the problem of previous iterations. See
supra pp. 22-23.
211 Brinded, supra note 206.
212 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on
Implementation of the Basel Regulatory Framework 4-13 (2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs263.pdf.
213 See supra pp. 17-18.
214 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS
BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 5, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banking_regulation_leads_the_field.html?cid=28472592.
210
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diverge from Basel III’s capital adequacy standards.215 The E.U. will
accept lesser forms of capital than those suggested by Basel III as
Tier 1, diluting the effectiveness of the minimum Tier 1 capital ratio
established by the BCBS.216
Finally, the minimum recommendation may be deceiving as a
baseline measure because it may ultimately function as a maximum
requirement. Switzerland recognized the need for greater
requirements than those suggested by Basel III in order to protect its
massive institutions and the media responded with concerns
regarding competitiveness.217 Conversely, it is speculated that the
E.U.’s delay in passing a final measure concerned the feared lack of
competitiveness with the U.S. market due to the U.S.’s failure to meet
the same deadline.218 Thus, many nations may look to the actions of
their peers and focus on competitiveness rather than stability,
choosing not to enforce minimums above those established under
Basel III even if such a choice is made at the expense of their
financial sector’s stability.
The Canadian financial sector is a great example of the
positive effects of maintaining certain levels of capital has on the
stability of a financial industry. As discussed in Part IV.A, Canadian
regulations leading up to the Great Recession required Tier 1 and
overall capital ratios just above those established by Basel III. In
effect, the Canadian banking sector experienced no bank failures and
managed to thrive while the international economy floundered. 219
Alternatively, the E.U. member states stand as a prime example that
bank failures or necessary rescues may occur when capital minimums

See supra pp. 22-23.
Additionally, the E.U. proposal of a maximum capital ratio is
troubling in light of the stabilizing aims of Basel III because banks should not be
discouraged from favoring stability over competitiveness in a systemically
important industry. See supra pp. 22-23.
217 Allen, supra note 214.
218 Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH (Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html; see also supra, Part III.C.
219 See supra p. 9, notes 72-74.
215
216
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and liquidity are insufficient to weather downturns in related financial
markets and economies.220
Conversely, although Swiss regulators have traditionally gone
above and beyond recommended standards, including those under
Basel I,221 Swiss banking institutions struggled to maintain stability
during the Great Recession.222 In Switzerland, it was not the lack of
capital alone that worried regulators. Rather, the sheer size of Swiss
major banking institutions and the perceived inability of the
government to bail out the institutions if they failed caused concern.
It took a combination of international investors, nationalization of
assets, and recapitalization of private assets to secure the fates of the
largest institutions, even with minimum capital safeguards.223
Establishing minimum capital requirements may be a step
towards stabilizing banking sectors,224 but those measures alone, as
evidenced by Switzerland’s struggles, are insufficient to offer broad
protection to the banking industry. From an analysis and comparison
of the Canadian, Swiss, and E.U. financial industries, certain other
factors appear to be necessary for long-term stability.
Using Canada as a blueprint, it appears that emphasis on a
strong regulatory framework, control of the size of institutions, and
strong coordination between institutions and regulators is necessary
for resiliency in the banking industry.225 Both Switzerland and the
See supra pp.19-20.
Press Release, Swiss Federal Banking Commission, Implementation of
Basel
II
in
Switzerland
(Apr.
2004),
http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/e/archiv/2004/20040429/Referat_Z_E.pdf.
222 See supra Part III.B. (discussing the Swiss banking crisis in 2008).
223 See supra Part III.B.
224 The author recognizes that capital adequacy and minimums are not
the sole focus of Basel III, however, points out that the “five-fold approach” of
Basel III (raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base;
enhancing risk coverage; supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a
leverage ratio; promoting countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers;
and addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness) focuses on these measures as
the saving grace of the regulation.
225 No doubt, the use of “sunset clauses,” strict lending laws favoring
creditors, and diversified financial institutions contribute to the strength of the
industry. See discussion supra Part III.A.
220
221
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E.U. seem to have recognized the importance of strong financial
regulatory bodies, with each creating a new regulatory agency in the
wake of the Great Recession.226
Further, the Great Recession has brought about financial
institutions larger than those pre-Recession due to buyouts and
mergers.227 Because half of the world’s SIBs lie in Europe, the
stability of the region’s financial sector may be increased by the
reduction of such systemically important institutions.228 Basel III
acknowledges the necessity of regulating SIBs;229 however, if the E.U.
fails to take major steps towards regulation and size limitation, the
presence of so many major institutions could prove destructive to its
long-term financial stability.230 Switzerland has already taken major
steps to protect its two largest institutions, but long-term monitoring
will likely be necessary for its continued stability.231
One final element to long-term stability may rest less on the
regulations placed on the financial industry and more on the actions
and goals of the industry itself. Canadian banks, for instance, seem to
focus on the good of its economy and the long-term viability and
success of its financial industry as the primary goals. Competitiveness
in, and dominance of, the international financial sector appear not to
be major focuses of business in Canada.232 In contrast, Switzerland
and the E.U. both have concerns about international competitiveness
as a result of new minimum capital and liquidity requirements,
appearing to deemphasize the resiliency and long-term viability of
their banking sectors. Although the Canadian difference may be a
cultural one, it should be a role model for other nations struggling to
keep their banking industries and economies afloat.

226
227
228
229
230
231
232

See supra Parts III.B., III.C.
See supra Part I.
See supra pp. 20-21.
See supra pp. 8-9.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
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CONCLUSION
As international economies began to suffer financial distress
as a result of the Great Recession, the Bank for International
Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
gathered with leaders of the G-20 to modify international banking
standards to secure the stability of financial institutions. With the
agreement known as Basel III, the Basel Committee recommended
that members of the G-20 agree on national regulations with
increased minimum capital and liquidity requirements for banks
within their countries to help prevent future banking failures and the
resultant impact such failures have on individual economies.
Although some nations, such as Canada and Switzerland met the
January 1, 2013 deadline, others, such as the E.U. and U.S. failed to
do so.
Basel III, in its most basic form, appears to be a strong
solution and response to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Upon
examination of divergent economies and a study of pre-Recession
banking regulation, it becomes clear that standards which focus on
capital and liquidity alone are not sufficient to prevent struggles in the
banking sector. The measure, although agreed upon by members of
the G-20, is plagued with difficulties that will limit its effectiveness.
The ability of nations to dilute the recommendations or fail to
implement the regulations altogether will likely have a detrimental
effect on the sufficiency of Basel III. Additionally, earlier iterations
have failed to prevent financial crises, and it is unlikely the third
iteration will be any different without substantial changes to national
financial regulation as a whole. Although any strengthening of the
financial industry may provide some benefit to national economies,
Basel III is unlikely to provide significant protections from future
crises if economies face instability on par with that of the Great
Recession.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PROTECTION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES:
HOW THE FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION LIST SATISFIES
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aaron L. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the attacks perpetrated against the United
States by a foreign terrorist organization on September 11, 2001,
President Bush avowed that “[t]errorist attacks can shake the
foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the
foundation of America.”1
President Bush’s declaration highlights the twin role of
government in safeguarding the nation and upholding its
foundational liberties. Unfortunately, these goals are sometimes at
odds. Vital U.S. anti-terrorism laws have been criticized for unduly
infringing upon fundamental constitutional rights. This Comment
will explore one of these controversial laws—the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations List—and assess whether Congress effectively
balanced its duty to protect the nation’s security and liberty in
authorizing such legislation.
The Foreign Terrorist Organization List was created by
Congress in response to the 1993 terrorist attack at the World Trade
Center and the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, 2014
1 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to
the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001).
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City.2 Buried within Section 1189 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),3 Congress authorized the
Secretary of State to designate international groups that threatened
the U.S., its citizens, and its interests, as “Foreign Terrorist
Organizations” (FTOs).4 The purpose of Section 1189 is to
stigmatize5 and punish6 rogue organizations, and “prevent persons
within the [U.S.] . . . from providing material support or resources.”7
In this way, Section 1189 offers the U.S. government an
effective legal tool to impede terrorist organizations that threaten
U.S. national security interests.8 Critics argue, however, that the
legislation is unconstitutional because Section 1189 does not compel
the Secretary of State to provide listed organizations adequate notice
or a hearing as required by the Fifth Amendment.9 This comment
Threat of Terrorism: Hearing on Terrorism Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 1995 WL 247423, (1995) (noting the statement of Sen. Specter,
Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, who stated “I am committed, as I believe is
every Senator on this Committee and in this body, to taking any and every step
necessary to assure that there is never another devastation like Oklahoma City”).
3 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) [hereinafter “AEDPA”]
4 Id. (finding that international terrorism is a serious and deadly problem
that threatens the vital interests of the U.S.).
5 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE
“FTO LIST” AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2003) [hereinafter “CRS REPORT”].
6 H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, pt. 2, at 38 (1995) (stating that “the
fundamental purpose of this legislation, then, is to provide our law enforcement
agencies – within carefully prescribed constitutional boundaries – with the tools
necessary to prevent and punish criminal terrorist enterprises”).
7 AEDPA § 301(b).
8 BARACK OBAMA, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, (June 28, 2011) (finding that these organizations make it
their purpose to undermine the security and stability of the U.S.),
http://1.usa.gov/19TulpH. See also RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33600, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, THREAT, POLICY, AND RESPONSE 3-4
(2007) [hereinafter “CRS REPORT 2”] (explaining that “policy and counterterrorism
analysts are concerned that economic and political tensions throughout the Middle
East might allow FTOs to gain power, legitimacy, and political clout, and if that
comes to pass, the risks to American interests and security would be heightened
substantially”).
9 Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH.
2
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seeks to quell this criticism by demonstrating that the FTO
designation procedures satisfy contemporary due process standards.
Part I reviews the procedural background and history of
Section 1189. Part II describes the “what” and “when” requirements
of procedural due process. Part III discusses a series of cases
challenging FTO designation on procedural due process grounds.
Finally, Part IV covers due process in light of those decisions, and
concludes that Section 1189 complies with Fifth Amendment
standards.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE FTO LIST
A. The Purpose of the FTO Compared to Other U.S.-GovernmentMaintained Terrorist Lists
The FTO List is one of several terrorism lists maintained by
the U.S. Government. While there is an overlap between lists, each
possesses a unique scope and purpose within the context of U.S.
national security.
The FTO List is limited to foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activities that “threaten American security.”10 Section 1189
authorizes the Secretary of State to identify and designate the
organizations in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of Homeland Security.11 Consequences of designation are
social, financial, and legal.12

L. REV. 125, 167 (2004) [hereinafter “A Double Due Process Denial”); see also Eric
Broxmeyer, The Problem of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 439, 441 (2004).
10 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004).
11 Id.
12 See infra Part 2.C (describing these consequences in detail).
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The State Department also maintains the State Sponsors of
Terrorism (SST) List.13 SST only applies to states that support acts of
international terrorism.14
A third list maintained by the State Department is the
Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).15 TEL impacts individuals and applies
strictly for immigration purposes, and authorizes the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Attorney General, to deny known members
of terrorist organizations entry to the U.S.16
The fourth list, the Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT)
List, originally targeted individuals or entities that threatened to
disrupt the Middle East peace process.17 Subsequent legislation,
however, expanded the SDT List to allow the President to regulate
international economic transactions during times of war or national
emergencies.18 Following the events of September 11, 2001, President
Bush exercised his presidential authority to create the Specifically
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) List.19 Together SDT and
SDGT freeze the U.S.-based assets of any person, organization, or
nation the President determines has planned, authorized, aided, or
engaged in hostilities or attacks against the U.S.20 The U.S.
Department of Treasury is in charge of managing SDT and SDGT.21

See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat.
503, § 6(j) (1979) (as amended).
14 As of July 31, 2012, the States listed as “sponsors of terrorism”
included Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE
COORDINATOR OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
2011 (2012), http://1.usa.gov/KnEtOF.
15 Uniting And Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) [hereinafter US PATRIOT Act].
16 Id.
17 See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 C.F.R. 5079 (1995) (citing International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)); 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
18 Id.
19 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 68 C.F.R. 10619 (2003).
20 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2001).
21 Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
NATIONALS LIST (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1ausowX (listing the organizations and
13
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In sum, the Executive branch maintains several avenues to
categorize and sanction terrorist organizations and activities.22
Among all lists, however, the FTO holds unique importance, “not
only because of the specific measures undertaken to thwart the
activities of designated groups but also because of the symbolic
public role it plays as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy.” 23
B. The Process of Designating FTOs
Section 1189 of the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary of State
to designate entities as “foreign terrorist organizations.” 24
Designation requires the Secretary to provide an administrative
record reflecting that (A) the organization is foreign, (B) the
organization engages in terrorist activity,25 and (C) the terrorist
activity directly threatens U.S. national security.26

individuals designated under the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s economic
sanctions regimes, which includes those entities designated as FTOs by the
Secretary of State).
22 See supra Part II.A. For more information on the lists and their
procedural safeguards and judicial oversight visit the State Department’s Bureau of
Counterterrorism, http://1.usa.gov/JOtuMZ.
23 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
24 Although the Secretary of State officially designates a group, a number
of agencies play important roles in helping the Secretary make the determination.
See id. at 2.
25 AEDPA at § 219(a)(1) (defining terrorist activities as: “activity which is
unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves any of the following: (I) The high jacking or
sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle); (II) The
seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another
individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the individual seized or detained; (III) A violent attack
upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title
18) or upon the liberty of such a person; (IV) An assassination; (V) The use of
any— (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b)
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of
one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property; (VI) A threat,
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The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (S/CT)
is tasked with monitoring the activities of suspected terrorist groups
around the world and identifying organizations that qualify for
designation under the Act.27 S/CT deems entities suitable for
designation based on whether the organization (1) has carried out any
terrorist attacks, (2) is planning or preparing to carry out possible
future acts, and/or (3) retains the capability and intent to carry out
such acts.28 The S/CT receives support in this endeavor from the
intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security.29
The S/CT’s reports and findings form the basis of the
administrative record, which is presented to the Secretary of State for
consideration.30 If approved, the request for designation passes to the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security for
independent evaluation and recommendation.31
Seven days before an organization is officially designated, the
Secretary is required to notify32 specified members of Congress of
“the intent to designate the organization . . . and the factual basis
therefore.”33 Congress may block a designation, but if no action is
taken the designation becomes final when notice is published, or
“listed,” in the Federal Register.34

attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing”). See also 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(2000 & Supp. I 2001) 2013.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004) (stating that activities threaten U.S.
national security interests when the activity impacts the “national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States”).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
31 Id.
32 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that notification occurs through
classified communication).
33 Id. (requiring notification to relevant congressional committees, the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the Majority and
Minority Leader, and the President pro tempore of the Senate).
34 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (requiring constructive, not actual, notice).
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C. Consequences of FTO Designation
The consequences of designation are manifold. First, the
Treasury Department may block or control the funds of the
organization and all known agents.35 Second, the Justice Department
may prosecute third parties that provide material support to the
designated entity.36 Third, known members of the organizations are
deported, denied visas, and summarily excluded from the U.S.37
Finally, designation as an FTO allows the U.S. Government
to exercise a form of soft power.38 By designating an entity as a
“terrorist organization,” the U.S. formally signals to the international
community that the U.S. is concerned with the named organization’s
activities.39 Often, other nations will then react pursuant to their own
law and jurisdiction to similarly curb the organization’s financing and
activities.40 This heightened international cognizance may also cause
private citizens to abstain from donating, contributing, or otherwise
engaging in economic transactions with the named organization.41
Consequently, designation is said to stigmatize and isolate the entity,42
acting as de facto economic sanctions.43
D. Removal from the FTO List
There are several ways an entity may be removed from the
FTO List. First, removal may be granted by an Act of Congress or at
the discretion of the Secretary of State.44

CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
Id. at 3.
37 Id.
38 See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS OF SUCCESS IN
WORLD POLITICS 5-11 (2004) (defining “soft power”).
39 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, FACT SHEET:
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (FTOs), (2010) http://1.usa.gov/KnGZ7r.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-3.
44 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4). Prior to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 designations were effective for two years at which time the
Secretary could choose to re-designate an organization or allow designation to
35
36
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Second, an organization may request judicial review “within
thirty days of publication in the Federal Register of a designation, an
amended designation, or a determination in response to a petition for
revocation.”45 The request must be made to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.46 The scope of
judicial review is limited to unclassified material in the administrative
record, but the government may also “submit, for ex parte and in
camera review, classified information.”47 The court may only overturn
a designation that was (A) “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”; (B)
“contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity”; (C)
in “excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation or short of
statutory right”; (D) “lacking substantial support in the administrative
record as a whole”; or (E) not made “in accord with the procedures
required by law.”48
Third, two years after the initial designation, an organization
may file a petition with the State Department requesting removal.49
The Secretary must review this request and respond within 180
days.50 A successful petition requires the organization to demonstrate
the circumstances of designation51 are “sufficiently different”52—i.e.,
the organization no longer engages in terrorist activities. If the
petition is rejected, the entity must wait two years before re-filing.53 If
lapse. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3801-03 (2004) [hereinafter IRTPA].
45 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1).
46 Id.
47 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(2); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th ed.
2009) (defining ex parte review as a proceeding conducted without both parties to
the suit being present; and defining an in camera review as a proceeding where the
Judge assesses confidential, sensitive, or private information outside the public’s
purview in order to determine what, if any, information may be used by a party to
the suit or made public).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2)-(3).
49 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(i). Notably, this procedure was not in the
original legislation, but was added by the 2004 Amendment. IRTPA, n. 9 §
7119(a)(2).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv).
51 See supra Part II.B.
52 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(iii).
53 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(ii).
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five years pass without review, the State Department must initiate its
own review of the organization’s status and determine whether
continued designation is justified.54
E. History of the FTO List
In October 1997, the State Department released the first
FTO List.55 Thirty entities were designated.56 In October 1999, the
first review occurred.57 Twenty-seven of the original groups were redesignated, three designations lapsed, and one entity was added.58
Two years later, in the wake of 9/11, the total number of designated
organizations grew significantly.59 At the time this comment was
published, fifty-seven groups were listed as FTOs and nine previously
designated organizations have been de-listed.60
II. THE CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS,
AND 8 U.S.C. § 1189
A. The Scope of Constitutional Protection
Prior to appearing before a federal court, a plaintiff must
demonstrate Article III standing.61 Standing “focuses on the party
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C).
CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that the first designations took
place about “eighteen months after the passage of AEDPA”).
56 Id.
57 Because the first review occurred before the 2004 amendment, the
Secretary was statutorily required to review designations every two years. See
IRTPA, at § 7119.
58 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting the group added in 1999 was
al-Qaeda because of its involvement in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Darr Es Salaam, Tanzania).
59 See
Bureau
of
Counterterrorism,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/index.htm.
60 Id.
61 State of Mich. v. U.S., 994 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that
“[s]tanding, which comes from Article III’s requirement that federal courts
determine only those issues that arise in a ‘case or controversy,’ is a threshold
requirement to any suit); see also U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 (stating, “The judicial
Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
54
55
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seeking to get his complaint before federal court and not on issues he
wishes to have adjudicated.”62 The elements of standing are: (1) injury
in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of, and (3) that the injury is likely redressed by a
favorable decision.63 When an entity challenges its designation as an
FTO, the repercussions of designation satisfy the first and second
element of constitutional standing,64 and the legislation’s removal
provision satisfies the third element.65
However, because Section 1189 only applies to foreign terrorist
organizations, the entity must demonstrate a fourth element—that it
has “come within the territory of the United States and develop[ed]
substantial connections with this country.”66 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has not clarified how “substantial” connections must
be to merit protection,67 the Court extends constitutional standing to
any alien that voluntarily and “lawfully enters and resides in this
country.”68
B. Qualifying Entities and Procedural Due Process
Once the foreign organization proves constitutional
standing,69 it may challenge its designation on Fifth Amendment due
process grounds.70 The Fifth Amendment does not, however, have
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of
another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).
62 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
63 Lujan v. Defendants of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
64 See supra Part I.C.
65 See supra Part I.D.
66 United States v. Verdugo-Urqueidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
67 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 202
(D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter “PMOI II”].
68 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
69 See supra Part III.A.1.
70 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
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fixed technical requirements; its standards vary depending on
particular situations and circumstances.71
In its most basic form, procedural due process mandates some
notice of the impending deprivation and some form of a hearing.72
When the notice and hearing must occur depends on the private
interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the value of
additional safeguards, and the government interest at stake.73 Also,
the type of notice and hearing depends on (1) if the notice was
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
opportunity to present their objections”;74 and (2) if the hearing was
“appropriate to the nature of the case” and “minimizes substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations.”75 Additionally, where due process
and national security concerns conflict, the U.S. government is
allowed wider latitude to act “because of the changeable and
explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact
that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot
CONST. amend. V. Importantly, the Due Process clause has both procedural and
substantive components. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545-546
(3d ed. 2006) (noting that procedural due process refers to “the procedures that the
government must follow before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property,”
while substantive due process asks “whether the government has an adequate
reason [or a sufficient justification] for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property”).
71 Verdugo-Uriqueidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (explaining that “the question of which
specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be applied in a particular context . . . can
be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular
circumstances of a particular case.”)).
72 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
The Supreme Court originally created the Matthews test to determine the
requirements of due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
However, recently, the Court uses the Mullane test instead of Mathews to examine
the sufficiency of notice. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006);
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 161-162 (2002) (stating, “the
straightforward reasonableness under the circumstances test of Mullane, not the
balancing test approach of Mathews, supplies the appropriate analytical framework
for the due process analysis.”).
73 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
74 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
75 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972).
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be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the
legislature . . . .”76
C. Section 1189 and the Due Process Debate
Section 1189 is facially constitutional because the legislation
requires the Secretary of State to provide designated organizations
some notice of designation and some opportunity for judicial review.77
Critics argue, however, that the legislatively prescribed notice and
hearing provisions are insufficient and inappropriate.78 Specifically, a
foreign organization is unlikely to actually receive notice of the
“pendency of the action,” and Section 1189 only requires
constructive notice—i.e., notice through publication in the Federal
Register.79 Moreover, the post-deprivation hearing fails to provide
putative organizations with a “meaningful opportunity to be heard”
because the U.S. government is not required to disclose all evidence
contained in the administrative record.80 Critics also question the
sincerity of the judiciary’s review, citing the court’s weariness to
second-guess the Executive branch in matters of foreign policy and
national security.81
This comment rebuts these assertions and demonstrates how
the FTO designation procedures comport with public policy and
practical due process considerations. In this manner, Section 1189
represents an effective balancing of national security interests and
core foundational liberties.

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
8 U.S.C. § 1189.
78 A Double Due Process Denial, supra note 9, at 167-172.
79 Id.
80 Id. (noting that the Secretary may rely on confidential evidence that
does not have to be disclosed to putative organizations in the administrative
record).
81 See, e.g., PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208-209; People’s Mojahedin Org. of
Iran v. State Dep’t, 613 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Circ. 2010) [hereinafter “PMOI V”]; In
re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter
“PMOI VI”].
76
77

303

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

III. SECTION 1189, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, AND THE CASE OF
THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
One organization—the People’s Mojahedin Organization of
Iran (PMOI)—has challenged its FTO designation on six different
occasions, most recently in May 2012. The PMOI cases provide
insight into how courts review a designated organization’s challenge,
and how Section 1189 satisfies contemporary procedural due process
requirements.
A. A Short History of the PMOI
The PMOI (also known as the Mujahedeen-e- Khalq (MEK))
is a Marxist-Islamic organization that was founded in 1963 in order to
overthrow the Shah of Iran and his Western-backed allies.82 At its
inception, the PMOI possessed a militant wing (the National
Liberation Army (NLA)) and a political front (the National Council
of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)).83
In the 1970s, the PMOI began an active, worldwide campaign
of propaganda and terror, claiming responsibility for bombing the
U.S. Information Service office in Iran (part of the U.S. Embassy),
the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S.
companies.84 According to the U.S. government, the PMOI also
played an important role in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran.85
In 1981, displeased with the new Islamic regime implemented
after the Shah’s fall, the PMOI began to attack Iranian security
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY
REPORTS
ON
TERRORISM,
(2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553. htm - MEK [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS] (noting that the founders were six leftist students from
Tehran University).
83 Id.
84 Id. (noting that the PMOI was also held answerable for the
assassination of U.S. military personnel and civilians working in the region, notably
the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran, members of the U.S.
Military Assistance Advisory Group, and an American Texaco executive).
85 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
82
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forces.86 The Iranian government responded harshly, executing the
organization’s original leadership and forcing the remaining known
members to flee to France.87
In 1986, France expelled the PMOI in an attempt to improve
relations with Iran.88 The organization relocated to Iraq, where it
found an ally in Saddam Hussein.89 Hussein provided the PMOI with
military bases and financial support.90 In return, the PMOI supported
Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War and the bloody crackdown on Iraqi
Shia and Kurds that rose up against Hussein’s regime.91
With Hussein’s blessing, the PMOI continued its campaign of
terror against the Iranian regime. In 1992, the PMOI attacked Iranian
embassies and consular missions in thirteen different countries;
including the Iranian mission at the United Nations in New York.92
In 1997, in response to the PMOI’s history of terror and violence,
the U.S. State Department designated the organization as an FTO in
the first FTO List.93
In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam
Hussein’s regime. Without Hussein, the PMOI lost its financial and
military support.94 In short order, the PMOI negotiated a cease-fire
and surrendered its heavy arms to coalition forces.95
As of 2011, the U.S. State Department estimates global
PMOI membership of between 5,000 and 13,500 persons scattered
throughout Europe, North America, and Iraq.96 The State
86 Id. (noting that “the [PMOI] instigated a bombing campaign, including
an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime
Minister’s office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials”).
87 Id.
88 ALBERT V. BENLIOT, IRAN: OUTLAW, OUTCAST OR NORMAL
COUNTRY? 101 (2001).
89 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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Department also officially recognizes that most of the PMOI’s
current efforts are political in nature—citing the entity’s “welldeveloped media communications strategy” and “active lobbying and
propaganda efforts.”97
B. The First Challenge: PMOI I
In 1997, the PMOI filed the first request for judicial review of
its designation as an FTO.98 In the complaint, the PMOI urged the
D.C. Circuit to assess the administrative record and decide whether
sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that the PMOI engaged in
“terrorist activities that threatened the national security of the United
States.”99
After reviewing the PMOI’s complaint,100 the court held the
administrative record contained sufficient evidence the PMOI was a
foreign organization that “engaged in bombing[s] and killing[s] in
order to further their political agenda.”101 Moreover, the court did not
find the presence of any actionable rights violation because the
PMOI lacked constitutional standing,102 and because the unique
procedures provided by AEDPA did not require an adversarial
hearing, general agency presentation of evidence, or advanced notice
provided to the entity.103

COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19
(D.C. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter “PMOI I”] (noting that, the PMOI’s designation was
considered alongside the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam because “the separate
petitions involved the same statute and similar claims”).
99 Id.; see also supra Part II.D.
100 The court noted that AEDPA limits the scope of its review to
evaluating whether the designation was arbitrary or capricious, contrary to a
constitutional right, in excess of authority, lacked support in the administrative
record, or violated procedures. See PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 22; see also 8 U.S.C. §
1189(b)(3); supra Part III.B.1.
101 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25.
102 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 22 (noting that similar to a foreign nation
opposing “an embargo on it for the purpose of coercing a change in policy” the
PMOI may not claim a constitutional right to due process).
103 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25.
97
98
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C. Satisfaction of Constitutional Standing: PMOI II
In 2001, two years104 after the court decided PMOI I, the
PMOI again requested that the D.C. Circuit review its FTO
designation.105 This time, the court determined that the PMOI passed
constitutional muster106 because its “alter-ego,” the NCRI, owned a
U.S. bank account and had “an overt presence within the National
Press Building in Washington D.C.”107
Having demonstrated constitutional standing, the court found
the PMOI had an actionable due process claim because FTO
designation stigmatized the PMOI,108 limited the mobility of PMOI
members already in the U.S.,109 and restricted PMOI access to its U.S.
bank accounts.110 The Fifth Amendment therefore required the
Secretary of State to provide the PMOI pre-designation notice, access
to any “unclassified items upon which [the Secretary] proposes to
rely,”111 and an opportunity “to present, at least in written form, such
evidence . . . to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate
the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations.”112

See supra Part II.D.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 195-196.
106 Id. (refusing to assess how “substantial” a connection there must be in
order to merit protection, but stating that the PMOI satisfies this requirement.).
107 Id. at 201 (reaching this conclusion despite the PMOI and NCRI’s
insistence that the two are separate entities).
108 Id. at 204, (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436
(1971) (finding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation
of one’s liberty)).
109 PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 204 (finding that if such individuals left the
country, they would be denied readmission).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 206 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-335 (holding that prior to
a deprivation, due process requires the government to weigh: the private interest
affected by the official action; the risk of “erroneous deprivation of such
interest . . . and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and “the government’s interest, including the function and fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail”)).
112 Id.
104
105
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Consequently, the court concluded that the PMOI’s due
process rights were violated because the government failed to
provide the PMOI with (1) an opportunity to file evidence that
rebutted the non-classified evidence, and (2) a meaningful
opportunity to be heard by the Secretary upon the relevant
findings.113 The court, however, refused to vacate the PMOI’s
designation due to U.S. foreign policy and national security
concerns.114 The court instead remanded the complaint and
instructed the Secretary to follow the procedures outlined herein.115
The Secretary complied with the order, and in 2001 re-designated the
PMOI as an FTO.116
D. The Use of Classified Information: PMOI III
On January 17, 2003, the D.C. Circuit again entertained the
PMOI’s request for judicial review.117 This time, the PMOI argued
the Secretary of State’s reliance on “secret evidence”—i.e., “the
classified information that the respondents refused to disclose and
against which PMOI could therefore not effectively defend”—
violated its due process rights.118 In support of its position, the PMOI
cited D.C. Circuit precedent that held “a court may not dispose of
the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.”119
The court acknowledged the persuasiveness of the PMOI’s
argument, but denied the PMOI’s appeal because holding otherwise
would violate constitutional separation of powers.120 The court
Id.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
115 Id.
116 See Re-designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg.
51,088 (Oct. 5, 2001) (re-designating PMOI and its aliases as FTOs).
117 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter “PMOI III”].
118 Id. at 1242.
119 Id. (discussing Abourzek v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-1061 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that “judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the
appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States courts”
and it is therefore a “firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the
merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions” except “in the
most extraordinary circumstances”)).
120 Id. at 1243.
113
114
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explained that “the Executive Branch has control and responsibility
over access to classified information and [a] compelling interest in
withholding national security information from unauthorized persons
in the course of executive business.”121 The court also emphasized
that courts are “often ill-suited to determine the sensitivity of
classified information.”122
E. We’re Different Entities: PMOI IV
On April 2, 2004, the PMOI, through the NRCI, again
requested judicial review of its designation.123 This petition contended
the PMOI and NRCI were separate entities, which made
simultaneous designation improper.124 The court disagreed, citing
substantial evidence on the record that the NCRI was “dominated
and controlled by” the PMOI.125
F. A Winning Argument: PMOI V
On July 15, 2008, the PMOI again requested the Secretary of
State review its FTO designation, citing a fundamental change in
circumstances.126 The request emphasized that since its designation as
an FTO in 1997, the PMOI had: (1) ended its military campaign
against the Iranian Regime; (2) renounced violence; (3) handed over
arms to U.S. forces in Iraq; (4) cooperated with U.S. officials at Camp
Ashraf and obtained “protected person” status for all PMOI
PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1242.
Id. (explaining that the role of the court is to determine “that process
which is due under the circumstances of the case”) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (explaining that “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”)); see also United States
v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that “[t]hings that did not
make sense to [a judge] would make all too much sense to a foreign counter
intelligence specialist . . . “).
123 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152
(D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter “PMOI IV”].
124 Id. at 157.
125 Id. at 159.
126 See In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of the Mujahedinel Kalq Organization (MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, 74 Fed. Reg. 1273, 1273-74 (Jan. 12, 2009) (hereinafter Review of
Designation).
121
122
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members under the Fourth Geneva Convention; (5) shared
intelligence with the U.S. government regarding Iran’s nuclear
program; and (6) been de-listed as a terrorist organization by the
United Kingdom and European Union.127
On January 12, 2009, the Secretary dismissed the PMOI’s
appeal without explanation, and re-listed the PMOI as an FTO the
following day.128 The PMOI then filed an appeal in the D.C.
Circuit.129
Citing the PMOI’s petition to the Secretary and the alleged
change of circumstances, the court held that the U.S. government
violated the PMOI’s due process rights130 because the Secretary’s
notice failed to (1) specify the unclassified material “on which the
Secretary proposes to rely” and (2) allow the PMOI an opportunity
for rebuttal prior to re-designation.131 The court again hesitated to
vacate the PMOI’s designation because of the realities of U.S. foreign
policy and national security.132 The court, therefore, remanded the
decision and allowed the Secretary 180 days to amend the
administrative record and provide the PMOI with an opportunity to
respond.133
G. The Government’s Failure to Respond: PMOI VI
The Secretary of State failed to comply with the court’s
order.134 Consequently, two years later, on May 8, 2012, the PMOI

127
128

PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 225.
PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 220; see also Review of Designation, supra note

124.
PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 226.
Id. at 228; see also supra note 123 (listing the alleged changed
circumstances).
131 Id. at 227-228.
132 Id. at 229.
133 Id. at 232 (Henderson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Secretary
needs not disclose any confidential information and the Secretary appears to
recognize the ambiguity of the record by “recommending a sua sponte
reexamination of the PMOI’s status in two years”).
134 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 834 (citing PMOI III, 613 F.3d at 225).
129
130
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petitioned the court to issue a writ of mandamus135 that ordered “the
delisting of the PMOI or, alternatively, required the Secretary to
make a decision on the PMOI’s petition.”136
In support of its petition the PMOI offered the following
evidence. In September 2010, two months after the court remanded
the case, the U.S. government provided the PMOI all unclassified
material contained in the administrative record and indicated that the
State Department would follow up with additional materially relevant
information.137 In October, the Department of Justice notified the
PMOI that the State Department was still updating the record but
had nothing more to add at that time.138 The Department of Justice
also requested that the PMOI respond to the September 2010
material by December 29, 2010, which the PMOI did.139 In April
2011, counsel for the PMOI met with officials from the Department
of Justice and the State Department and submitted further
information in support of its cause.140 In May 2011, the government
added ten documents to the record, and the PMOI responded to
each.141 On August 4, 2011, the Department of Justice informed the
PMOI that the declassifying process was complete and that the State
Department was working “as quickly as possible on their review of
the designation.”142 On September 27, 2011, two more documents
were added to the record, which the PMOI cited as duplicative.143
After this request, the Department of Justice did not ask the PMOI

A writ of mandamus requires that the requesting entity prove that the
Secretary had a duty to act and unreasonably delayed in acting. PMOI V, 613 F.3d
at 226.
136 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 834 (citing PMOI III, 613 F.3d at 225).
137 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 835.
138 Id. at 836.
139 Id.
140 Id. (describing that the “allegedly deteriorating conditions at Camp
Ashraf and letters and affidavits in support [of its petition were] written by
American and Foreign leaders”).
141 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 836.
142 Id.
143 Id.
135
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for any additional information, nor did the Secretary take any final
action on the PMOI’s petition.144
The court found these facts demonstrated that the Secretary
egregiously delayed in responding to the PMOI’s petition.145 Noting
the breach of a Congressional timetable “does not, alone, justify
judicial intervention,”146 the court held the Secretary’s twenty-month
failure to act “plainly frustrates the congressional intent and cuts
strongly in favor of granting PMOI’s mandamus petition.”147
The government responded by arguing that the “demands
placed upon the Secretary” should allow for greater flexibility.148 The
court found this unpersuasive, explaining, “Congress undoubtedly
knew of these demand[s]” and chose to limit the Secretary’s response
time to 180 days.149 Moreover, if the court upheld the Secretary’s
actions, it would effectively nullify the court order and insulate the
agency from review “by making it impossible for the petitioners to
‘mount a challenge to the rules.’ ”150
Despite strongly condemning the government’s actions the
court denied the writ and remanded the decision to the State
Department, citing U.S. foreign policy and national security
concerns.151 The court’s order warned the Secretary that any failure to
comply with this 180-day deadline would result in the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that sets aside the PMOI’s designation.152

PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 837.
Id.
146 Id. (citing In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
147 Id. at 837.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 838 (citing In re Core Communications, Inc.,
455 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating the Federal Communications
Commission’s inter-carrier compensation rules after finding six years passed
without the agency adhering to a court order)). In this case the court noted that the
Secretary’s inability to provide a decision within the last 600 days exemplifies the
nullification of the court’s decision and deprivation of an organization’s right to
judicial review under AEDPA. PMOI IV, 190 F.3d at 837.
151 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 836.
152 Id.
144
145
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H. De-Listing the PMOI
On September 28, 2012, three days before the court’s
deadline, the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson,
issued a media note stating that, effective immediately, the PMOI was
delisted as an FTO under Executive Order 13224.153 Pursuant to this
order, the organization’s property was no longer blocked, and U.S.
entities could “engage in transactions with the [PMOI] without
obtaining a license.”154
The Secretary explained the decision by citing the PMOI’s
“public renunciation of violence, absence of confirmed acts of
terrorism for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the
peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base,”155
as evidence of changed circumstances.156 The release also noted that
the State Department continued to have “serious concerns about the
[PMOI] as an organization,” and the Secretary of State’s decision did
not overlook the PMOI’s past—specifically, the organization’s
“involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and
an attack on U.S. soil in 1992.”157
IV. SECTION 1189 AND DUE PROCESS IN LIGHT OF THE PMOI CASES
There are three primary considerations when reviewing the
constitutionality of Section 1189 in light of due process requirements.
First, due process is not a fixed technical concept—requirements vary
depending on particular situations and circumstances.158 Second,
where an organization demonstrates constitutional standing, the
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Secretary, Delisting of
the
Mujahedin-e
Khalq
(Sept.
28,
2012)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm.
154 Id.
155 Id. Regarding Camp Ashraf, the press release also specifically noted
that the U.S. “has consistently maintained a humanitarian interest in seeking the
safe, secure, and humane resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, as well as in
supporting the United Nations-led efforts to relocate eligible former Ashraf
residents outside of Iraq.” Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. For a review of the holdings discussed, see infra Appendix.
158 See supra Part III.B.
153
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entity automatically possesses an actionable due process claim
because of the stigma that attaches to designation constitutes a legally
cognizable injury.159 Third, where due process rights and national
security interests overlap, courts permit the U.S. government wider
latitude in its actions.160 With these considerations in mind, the
remainder of this comment analyzes the PMOI cases in light of the
Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process clause.
A. Due Process and Section 1189: The Notice Requirement
Procedural due process requires that affected parties be given
notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.”161 In other words, the notice
must inform the recipient what is being proposed, and what must be
done to prevent the deprivation of rights.162 Post-deprivation notice
is only permissible where pre-deprivation notice is impractical or
impossible, and post-deprivation remedies exist.163
In the initial designation of an FTO, the U.S. government
provides notice of designation when the entity is “listed” in the
Federal Register.164 This post-deprivation notice informs the putative
organization of its designation and cites to Section 1189, which
outlines the proper methods of appeal.165 Requiring pre-deprivation
notice would plainly frustrate the purpose of Section 1189 because it
would inform putative organizations that the U.S. is investigating its
clandestine activities. The organization would then (1) tighten up its
network—which negatively impacts the ability of the U.S. to gather

See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 204, (citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436
(holding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation of
ones liberty)).
160 See id.
161 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
162 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
163 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (quoting Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981).
164 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
165 See, e.g., Review of Designation, supra note 124.
159
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information on the organization—and (2) withdraw all funds from
U.S. controlled banks.166
Alternatively, when re-designating an FTO, the Fifth
Amendment’s burdens adjust. Here, the U.S. government must
provide putative organizations with pre-deprivation notice and access
to all unclassified material on the record.167 Post-deprivation hearings
are not permissible because national security and public policy
concerns are diminished; the organization has already been notified
of its designation, and its assets are already frozen.
By applying a heightened standard for re-designated
organizations satisfying constitutional muster, the FTO designation
process properly conforms to the “what” and “when” notice
requirements of procedural due process.168 In fact, the Act’s
adaptability to particular situations and circumstances underscores
why due process is an adaptable concept.169
B. Due Process and Section 1189: The Hearing Requirement
The essence of the hearing requirement is to ensure that
designated entities are given a meaningful opportunity to “be heard in
[its] defense.”170 In order to satisfy this requirement, the hearing must
be commensurate with the interest affected, taking into account the
State’s administrative needs.171
In PMOI II, the court properly used the test developed by the
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge172 to determine whether due
166

See supra Part I.C. (discussing the purpose and consequences of

designation).
See id. (discussing PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 205).
See supra Part IV.B.
169 Verdugo-Uriqueidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (explaining that “the question of which
specific safeguards . . . are appropriate to be applied in a particular context . . . can
be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular
circumstances of a particular case.”)).
170 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
171 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 349.
172 While Mullane’s reasonableness standard could address all of these
concerns, the court in PMOI II applied the Matthews test. PMOI II, 251 F.3d at
167
168
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process is satisfied when a putative organization is given a postdeprivation hearing “in written form.”173 The Matthews test balances
(1) the private interest affected by the government’s action, (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest by the procedures
employed by the government as well as the probable value of any
additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interests,
including the administrative burden of any additional procedural
requirements.174 The weighing of these interests indicates that
procedural due process does not require the government to give
putative organization more than a post-deprivation hearing in written
form.
1. The private interest
Putative organizations always have at least two significant
liberty interests at stake.175 The organization has an interest in the
stigma that attaches to designation,176 and in the right of members to
travel or make contributions to its cause.177 However, in addition to
assessing the private interest at stake,178 Matthews also instructs courts
to consider (1) “the possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . .
benefits”,179 and (2) “the degree of potential deprivation that may be
created by a particular decision.”180

208; see also supra note 69. Further, the Matthews test is arguably better suited to
determine the specific factors that should be examined in conducting this particular
type of due process analysis. PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208; see also Broxmeyer, supra
note 9, at 464-65.
173 PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
174 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
175 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 113; Boddie, 401 U.S. at
380-81; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160-61.
176 See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 204, (citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436
(holding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation of
one’s liberty)).
177 See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 208.
178 See supra Part IV.C; cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 113, 113-14 (holding
that a “driver’s license may not be so vital and essential” as to be considered
“significant”).
179 Id. (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
180 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 341.
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An FTO’s deprivation lasts a minimum of two years and a
maximum of five.181 The degree of deprivation also varies from case
to case, depending on the putative organization’s presence and
membership in the U.S. Consequently, while the liberty interests at
stake might first appear to favor providing more than a postdeprivation hearing “in written form,” further exploration
demonstrates that this factor fails to provide a stable guide for the
type of hearing required or when the hearing should take place.
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation
“Procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of
cases.”182 In this manner, the “risk of erroneous deprivation” factor
focuses on the “fairness and reliability” of the procedure.183
Critics may point to PMOI VI as evidence that the FTO
designation process carries a high risk of erroneous deprivation. That
argument, however, ignores the PMOI’s long history of violence and
terror. During the 1970’s the PMOI bombed U.S. targets in Iran and
assisted in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.184 Further,
when the PMOI was first designated as an FTO in 1997, the
organization was only five years removed from a terrorist attack on
U.S. soil.185 Finally, the PMOI supported Saddam Hussein in bloody
crackdowns on Iraqi Shia and Kurds, and only reformed after
Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003.186
Meanwhile, the U.S. government expends a great deal of
resources and effort to ensure that C/ST, with the support of the
intelligence community and the Department of State, properly
identifies organizations that are foreign, engage in terrorist activities,
and threaten American national security.187 Section 1189 also employs
181 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C) (explaining that the State Department
must review designations every five years).
182 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 344.
183 Id.
184 See supra Part IV.A.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).
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procedural safeguards that permit the review of a designated
organization’s status every two years, and require review every five.188
Erroneous deprivations are atypical and highly unlikely because the
designation of an entity as an FTO follows carefully prescribed
procedures and is neither random nor arbitrary.
3. The government interest
The last Matthews factor assesses the government’s interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burden of any additional
procedural requirements.189
Trial type hearings are a massive expenditure both in terms of
time and resources. A Congressional Service Report on the FTO List
suggests that, “[i]t is a significant bureaucratic burden to ensure that
the designations are appropriately reviewed, investigated, the
administrative records updated, the appropriate agencies consulted,
and the public statement of renewal made every two years after the
initial designation.”190 Moreover, the number of designated
organizations has almost doubled since 1997, and continues to
grow.191
The nature of foreign affairs and the purpose of this
legislation also favor construing due process requirements in a
manner that grants deference to the “changeable and explosive
nature of contemporary international relations.”192 In other words,
the executive branch should be given a “brush broader than that it
customarily wields in domestic areas.”193 This ensures that the U.S.
government is not bogged down in administrative procedures when it
must react quickly to developments abroad.

8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C).
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 344.
190 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE
“FTO LIST” AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2003).
191 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
192 See supra Part II.B (citing Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17, 85).
193 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17, 85).
188
189
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4. What kind of hearing is appropriate and when should it occur?
In light of the small risk of erroneous deprivation and the
onerous burden of oral hearings (and because private interests may
vary substantially), the court in PMOI II was correct to suggest that
FTO designations satisfy the requirements of procedural due process
when putative organizations are given a post-deprivation hearing “in
written form.”194
The U.S. government has a considerable interest in fighting
terrorism.195 Similar to requiring pre-deprivation notice,196 requiring a
pre-deprivation hearing would allow an organization to withdraw its
funds and supporters from the U.S. This would frustrate the purpose
and effectiveness of the legislation.197 Moreover, the procedures
described herein provide designated organizations with the
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”198
C. Does the Use of Undisclosed Classified Information Raise Any
Due Process Concerns?
Closely related to the hearing requirement is the right of a
party to be confronted with the evidence against it. Critics argue that
the government’s reliance on ex parte and in camera submissions
impermissibly deprives organizations of due process.199 While there is
certainly some precedent and credence to this argument,200 the
importance of national security overrides any limited benefits of
disclosure.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (stating that deterring terrorism is
the purpose of the law); see also supra note 2.
196 See supra Part IV.A.
197 AEDPA at § 301(b).
198 Id. at 1242.
199 Reagan, 785 F.2d at 1061.
200 See PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1243 (emphasizing that “judicial
proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in
the adjudications of United States courts” and it is therefore a “firmly held main
rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in
camera submissions” except “in the most extraordinary circumstances”).
194
195
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In PMOI III, the court emphasized the importance of
allowing the Executive to control access to classified information,
and that courts are “ill-suited to determine the sensitivity of classified
information.”201 Perhaps more persuasive is the fact that the
organizations requesting access to classified materials are the very
organizations the U.S. government believes to be engaging in
operations adverse to U.S. interests. Requiring the disclosure of
classified information is akin to asking the U.S. to hand over its
secrets to the “enemy.” Not only would such a requirement frustrate
the purposes of the law, but it would also jeopardize national
security. Because of these considerations, the Supreme Court
properly recognizes that “confidentiality is essential to the effective
operation of our foreign intelligence services,”202 and the government
must be able to “tender as absolute an assurance of confidentiality as
it can.”203
While it is easy to consider the unfortunate organization that
is wrongfully designated, every organization listed as an FTO has
raised a legitimate flag in the eyes of the U.S. government. A
wrongfully designated organization should be able to demonstrate its
innocence without access to classified information, as exemplified by
the PMOI.204
CONCLUSION
Foreign terrorist organizations pose a real and constantly
evolving threat to U.S. national security. The AEDPA tempers that
threat by allowing the U.S. government to bring “legal clarity to
efforts to identify and prosecute members of terrorist organizations
and those who support them.”205 At the same time, the U.S. must not
lose sight of foundational principles upon which it was established.
As Justice Hand noted, “[j]ustice is the tolerable accommodation of
201 PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1242; see also Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623 (explaining
that “[t]hings that did not make sense to [a judge] would make all too much sense
to a foreign counter intelligence specialist. . . .”).
202 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
203 CIA v. Simms, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
204 See supra Part IV.F.
205 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
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the conflicting interests of society.”206 The government must walk a
fine line between protecting the rights of its citizens and protecting
their safety.
While there may have been initial due process concerns raised
by the enactment of Section 1189, the PMOI cases illustrate how the
FTO designation processes effectively balance the government’s twin
interests. If the government missteps, PMOI VI demonstrates that
the judiciary is willing to involve itself, remedy the deprivation, and
reset the precarious balance between freedom and security.

Philip Hamburger, The Great Judge, LIFE, Nov. 4, 1946, at 117
(quoting Judge Hand).
206
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Appendix: A Synthesis of the PMOI Decisions
Case

Year

Issue

Holding

PMOI I

1999

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held that FTO
designation procedures did not
require adversarial hearings or
advance notice because the
PMOI lacked constitutional
standing and the administrative
record contained sufficient
evidence.

PMOI II

2001

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court found (1) the
PMOI satisfied constitutional
standing, (2) the U.S.
government deprived the PMOI
of liberty and property, and (3)
the U.S. government did not
provide the PMOI with adequate
process. However, foreign policy
and national security concerns
required the court to remand the
complaint and afford the
Secretary of State an opportunity
to remedy these violations.

PMOI III

2003

Whether the
Secretary of State’s
reliance on classified
information violates
procedural due
process.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held the Act
only required disclosure of
unclassified information because
the executive branch has a
compelling interest in controlling
access to classified information
and courts are ill-equipped to
make such decisions.
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Appendix: A Synthesis of the PMOI Decisions (cont’d)
Case

Year

Issue

Holding

PMOI IV

2004

Whether the PMOI
and the NCRI are
separate entities,
making simultaneous
designation improper.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held that
substantial evidence on the
record demonstrated the NCRI
is controlled by the PMOI.

PMOI V

2009

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court held the
Secretary of State violated the
PMOI’s procedural due process
rights by failing to consider the
PMOI’s allegations of a change
in circumstances prior to redesignation. However, foreign
policy and national security
concerns required the court to
remand the petition and afford
the Secretary of State an
opportunity to remedy these
violations.

PMOI VI

2012

Whether a writ of
mandamus
is
an
appropriate remedy.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court condemned the
Secretary for failing to respond
to
the
PMOI’s
petition.
However, the court again
deferred to foreign policy and
national security considerations
and demanded the Secretary
respond to the petition within
180 days or the writ would be
granted.

Delisting
the
PMOI

2012

On September 28, 2012 the U.S. State Department
delisted the PMOI as a FTO.
.
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LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES:
THE BELFAST PROJECT LITIGATION AND
THE NEED FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO
RECOGNIZE AN ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN
THE UNITED STATES
Kathryn L. Steffen*
INTRODUCTION
“History must not be a weapon against those trying to
seize the opportunity of today to build a more
promising tomorrow.”1
Senator John F. Kerry
In the United States, we hail the freedom of expression and
the right to education as cornerstones of our democracy. Under our
belief system, academia is the oasis in an ever-changing world where
people from various backgrounds flock to freely exchange
information. Not only is this exchange of information intrinsically
valuable, but it also has extrinsic worth. History is compiled through
the shared experiences of others and becomes a guide to creating a
better future when new generations heed the lessons of the past.
However, the Supreme Court recently denied a controversial petition
for writ of certiorari, which presented the Court with an opportunity
to solidify and protect these ideals by recognizing a constitutional
privilege for academic researchers.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, 2014
1 John Kerry, Op-Ed, Irish Future Shouldn’t Get Lost in Violent Past,
BOSTON HERALD, April 4, 2012,
http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/category/congressionalaction/senator-kerry-op-ed-unedited/ [hereinafter Kerry Op-Ed].
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In 2001, researchers sponsored by Boston College began to
compile an oral history of “The Troubles,” a decades-long period of
violent political conflict in Northern Ireland.2 Through this oral
history, titled the Belfast Project, the researchers hoped to gain
insight into the thought processes of individuals who become
personally engaged in violent conflict by interviewing people who
took up arms during “The Troubles.”3 The interviewees’ participation
was conditioned on a strict promise of confidentiality.4
Based on its suspicion that the interviews contained evidence
of criminal activity,5 the United Kingdom requested that the United
States subpoena the controversial materials on its behalf, pursuant to
a mutual legal assistance treaty.6 Boston College and the individual
researchers involved in the Belfast Project challenged the subpoena,
asserting an academic privilege that would allow them to protect
confidential information from compelled disclosure.7 The First
Circuit denied the existence of this privilege,8 and the lead Belfast
Project researchers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari in November 2012.9 The Supreme Court denied the

2 In re Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012); United States
v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435, 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2012).
3 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831
F.Supp.2d at 440.
4 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (explaining that interviewees
were required to contract with Boston College to protect their anonymity).
5 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 452.
6 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12. Generally, mutual legal
assistance treaties allow for the state parties to exchange evidence and information
about criminal matters. BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS, 2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm.
7 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453.
8 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Moloney v. United States, No. 12627 (petition for cert. denied April 15, 2013).
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petition in April 2013,10 and the case returned to the First Circuit,
which limited the amount of interview materials to be surrendered.11
Anthony McIntyre,12 one of the lead researchers, also
petitioned the High Court in Belfast to protect the interviews from
compelled disclosure.13 The sitting judge dismissed the case upon his
belief that McIntyre’s life would not be jeopardized by satisfaction of
the subpoena, and McIntyre expressed his intention to appeal.14
This comment argues that compelling academics to disclose
confidential information significantly obstructs the free flow of
information that is essential to a thriving democratic society. Through
the lens of the Belfast Project controversy, this comment examines
the state of an academic privilege in American jurisprudence and then
advocates that the U.S. adopt the reasoning of the European Court
of Human Rights when the right to freedom of expression is
implicated. A license to disregard confidentiality agreements would
imperil all individuals involved in high-intensity research and would
threaten to tarnish the integrity of academic endeavors.
At first blush, the United States appears to be the ideal forum
to champion researchers’ rights. However, considering the applicable
law and the context of the Belfast Project, had certiorari been
granted, the Supreme Court likely would have found against the
researchers and declined to recognize an academic privilege. Instead,
this issue should be more favorably litigated in the United Kingdom,
where the European Convention on Human Rights applies. Finally, if
10 Boston College Project: PSNI Get Dolours Price Interviews Access, BBC, Apr.
15, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22158392.
11 The Belfast Project, Boston College, and a Sealed Subpoena, BOSTON COLLEGE
SUBPOENA NEWS, http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/ (last visited
January 8, 2013)(“The ruling reduced the amount of material to be handed over
from 85 interviews (roughly half of the archive) to segments of 11 interviews.”).
12 McIntyre’s role in the Belfast Project and the subsequent litigation is
explained in depth infra Part I.A.2.
13 McIntyre
Loses IRA Tapes Case, UTV (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.u.tv/News/McIntyre-loses-IRA-tapes-case/7a7ec609-006e-4608870e-a44a393e7104.
14 Id. This decision was based on Article 2 of the European Convention
of Human Rights, not on Article 10, the focus of this comment. At the time of
writing, there has been no update given about the anticipated appeal.
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the researchers are unsuccessful in both American and European
courts, the comment suggests that the U.S. Secretary of State should
decline to enforce the British authorities’ request because it
contravenes public policy.
I. THE BELFAST PROJECT
A. Purpose and Design of the Belfast Project
1. The purpose of the Belfast Project
In 2001, Boston College initiated its sponsorship of the
Belfast Project,15 an oral history project dedicated to gathering and
preserving the recollections of members of the paramilitary
organizations actively engaged in both the Republican and Loyalist
sides of the conflict during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland from
1969 forward.16
“The Troubles” refers to the violent conflict between the
Republican Nationalists and the Loyalist Unionists that plagued
Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1998,17 when the parties finally
reached the Good Friday Agreement.18 The seeds of “The Troubles”
were planted in 1920, when Great Britain granted home rule to
Northern Ireland, releasing it from its former dependence on
London.19 Protestant Unionists who wanted Northern Ireland to
remain unified with Great Britain comprised the majority of the
Northern Irish population.20 Contrarily, the Nationalist, mainly
Catholic, minority wanted to unite Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland to create an all Irish state.21 “Republican” and
Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Boston College has a
continued academic interest in Irish Studies. The College was also involved in the
peace process in Northern Ireland, following “The Troubles.”
16 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (1st Cir. 2012); Trs. of Boston
Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435 at 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
17 Lorenzo Bosi, Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional
Irish Republican Army, 1969-1972, 36 SOC. SCI. HIST. 347, 356 (2012).
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27.
19 Bosi, supra note 17, at 355.
20 Id. at 378.
21 Id. at 355, 378.
15
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“Loyalist” are the terms given to those sympathizers who were
prepared to use political violence to further their respective causes.22
Tensions erupted in 1969 when interactions between
Nationalist civil rights activists, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC),
and the Loyalist countermovement became violent.23 The violence
spread rapidly to Belfast, where Nationalists were a distinct
minority.24 There, the RUC and Loyalist mobs attacked the
Nationalist communities, hoping to quell an anticipated Nationalist
rebellion.25 Considering the worsening upheaval in Northern Ireland,
the British Government ended its longstanding policy of noninvolvement and deployed British troops to restore order in
Northern Ireland.26 The Republicans and Loyalists took up arms to
protect their interests, characterizing the tense and violent political
climate of Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement in
1998.27
In addition to creating a historical account of “The
Troubles,” the Boston College researchers also aspired to gain insight
into the personality and mindset of an individual who engages in
violent conflict.28 According to the project’s creators, the Belfast
Project is a vital step toward understanding not only the conflict in
Northern Ireland, but also the dynamics of conflicts worldwide.29

Id. at 378.
Bosi, supra note 17, at 355. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was
the state police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 until the initiation of the
Good Friday Agreement reforms, and it was closely associated with the British
government during “the Troubles.” Per the Good Friday Agreement, the RUC was
renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland in 2001. Royal Ulster Constabulary, in
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511633/Royal-UlsterConstabulary-RUC (last updated June 11, 2013).
24 Bosi, supra note 17, at 356.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. passim.
28 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440.
29 Id.
22
23
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2. The Belfast Project’s design evinces the importance of confidentiality
Because of the continuing sensitivity and danger
characterizing the conflict in Northern Ireland,30 the Belfast Project’s
structure was essential to its success.31 Ed Moloney, the journalist and
writer who initially proposed the project, entered into an agreement
with Boston College to become the project’s director.32 Moloney’s
contract required him to ensure that the interviewers and
interviewees signed and adhered to a strict confidentiality
agreement.33 The agreement prohibited all participants from
disclosing the existence and scope of the project without the
permission of Boston College.34 Furthermore, the contract mandated
that interviewers use a coding system when documenting their
research to protect the anonymity of interviewees.35 Only Ed
Moloney and Robert K. O’Neill, the librarian of the Burns Library
where the project was stored, had access to the coding system’s key.36
Therefore, they were the only persons able to identify the
interviewees.37

30 See id. at 441 (indicating that, because of the continued tensions in
Northern Ireland, the Belfast Project leaders determined that the interviews could
not safely be housed in Ireland). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9,
at 9 (discussing a report from the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, stating
that there are significant risks to the lives of people who are publicly revealed to be,
or suspected of being, paramilitary informants).
31 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (“In general, Boston
College believes that interviewees conditioned their participation on the promises
of strict confidentiality and anonymity”).
32 Id. at 440.
33 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4.
34 Id. at 4-5.
35 Id. at 5.
36 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440-41. Boston College’s Burns
Library of Rare Books and Special Collections houses many valuable documents.
Id. at 440. In July 2013, it was reported that Boston College might have lost the
coded keys to the Belfast Project interviews, rendering the interviewees
unidentifiable. Ed Moloney denies responsibility for the mistake. Jim Dee, Boston
Tapes Gaffe: Confessions May Be Useless After Identity Codes Lost, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
July 29, 2013, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northernireland/boston-tapes-name-gaffe-confessions-may-be-useless-after-identity-codeslost-29455178.html.
37 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
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In addition to Moloney and O’Neill, the Belfast Project
employed two researchers to interview members of paramilitary
groups associated with both sides of the conflict.38 Antony McIntyre,
the Lead Project Researcher39 who himself was a former member of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA),40 entered into a contract with
Moloney, which was governed by the same terms as Moloney’s
contract with Boston College.41 Under the contract’s terms, McIntyre
was likewise legally bound to protect the privacy of the project and
the identities of its subjects.42 By the project’s end in 2006, McIntyre
had conducted twenty-six interviews of individuals associated with
the Republican side of the conflict in Northern Ireland.43
Interviewees also contracted with Boston College to protect
their anonymity and the contents of their interviews.44 Specifically,
interviewees signed donation agreements, which transferred
possession and absolute title to their interview recordings and
transcripts to Boston College upon their deaths.45 The following
clause contained in the donation agreements restricts access to the
interview materials:
Access to the tapes and transcripts shall be restricted
until after my death except in those cases where I
have provided prior written approval for their use
following consultation with the Burns Librarian,
Boston College. Due to the sensitivity of the content,
the ultimate power of release shall rest with me. After
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 2.
40 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5.
41 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
42 See id. (explaining that Moloney’s contract prohibited him from
disclosing the existence or scope of the Belfast Project to anyone without the
permission of Boston College. Additionally, Moloney was required to use a strict
coding system to preserve the interviewees’ anonymity).
43 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (noting that the Belfast Project
ended in 2006. In total, the Belfast Project is comprised of a forty-one interview
series, each of which may contain multiple interviews with the same individual).
44 See id.
45 Id. (explaining that the donation agreement included a provision that
also transferred the rights to whatever copyright an interviewee may own in the
contents of the interview).
38
39
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my death, the Burns Librarian of Boston College may
exercise such power exclusively.46
Per the agreement, only the signing participant has the
authority to release information pertaining to his or her interview.47
Neither the interviewer nor Boston College was permitted to disclose
the identities of the participants or the contents of their interviews
until the interviewees either gave permission or died.48 Therefore, the
Belfast Project researchers assumed a duty of confidentiality to
protect the identities of the participants and the contents of the
interviews.
B. Litigation Surrounding the Belfast Project
In 2011, two sets of subpoenas requesting information related
to the Belfast Project were issued to Boston College49 on behalf of
the Police Service of Northern Ireland50 pursuant to the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom (US-UK MLAT).51 The US-UK MLAT, which was signed
in 1994, is a bilateral treaty intended to improve law enforcement
cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.52 A
request for a subpoena under the US-UK MLAT is a direct request
by the Executive Branch on behalf of a foreign power—in this case,
on behalf of the United Kingdom.53

46 Id. (noting that this quoted portion of the agreement was executed by
Brendan Hughes, a deceased interviewee). Although the other interviewees’
agreements were not part of the record, the First Circuit reasonably extrapolated
that each interviewee signed the same agreement.
47 Id. at 5-6.
48 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5- 6.
49 See id. at 3.
50 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1.
51 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12 (noting that the statutory
authority to be applied as the procedural mechanism for executing subpoenas
under the US-UK MLAT is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3512). Section 3512 was
enacted as part of the Foreign Evidence Request Efficacy Act of 2009. This is the
first court of appeals decision to interpret a mutual legal assistance treaty and §
3512 together.
52 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 442.
53 Id. at 452.
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According to the United Kingdom, the requested information
from the Belfast Project is connected to the abduction and murder of
Jean McConville, which occurred in 1972.54 McConville was believed
to be an informant to the British, making her a prime target for the
Republicans in Northern Ireland during “The Troubles.”55
The first set of subpoenas, issued in May 2011, requested the
recorded interviews and documents associated with interviewees
Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price,56 two former IRA members.57
The May 2011 subpoenas did not mention McConville specifically.58
Rather, the request stated that the materials were needed to assist the
United Kingdom’s investigation of alleged crimes.59 Boston College
supplied the information associated with Brendan Hughes because
his confidentiality was not at issue, as he died prior to the request. 60
However, the College moved to quash or modify the subpoena for
information related to Dolours Price, who was still living at the
time.61
Later, in August 2011, Boston College was served with
another set of subpoenas requested by the United Kingdom pursuant
to the US-UK MLAT, this time demanding the recordings,
transcripts, and records of all interviews containing information
about the death and abduction of Jean McConville.62 Boston College
promptly moved to quash the August 2011 set of subpoenas as well.63

Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
Id.
56 Id. at 3; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440.
57 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 11.
58 See Request From the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
59 Id. (listing the crimes under investigation as murder, conspiracy to
murder, incitement to murder, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment,
kidnapping, and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm).
60 Id. at 3.
61 Id.; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Dolours Price passed
away in January 2013. Paul Vitello, Dolours Price, Defiant I.R.A. Bomber, Dies at 61,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
25,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/europe/dolours-price-defiant-irabomber-dies-at-61.html.
62 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
63 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3.
54
55
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In support of its motions to quash, Boston College asserted
an academic privilege, arguing that the First Circuit has recognized
protections for confidential academic research material64 and that
those protections apply to the information at issue.65 Under the case
law of the First Circuit, a subpoena to obtain information from a
confidential source in a criminal case implicates First Amendment
concerns and, therefore, calls for a balancing of considerations before
it is executed.66 The general rule is that confidential information
cannot be compelled from a reporter or an academician unless it is
directly relevant to a serious claim made in good faith, and the same
information is not available from a less sensitive source.67 If these
threshold conditions are met, a court must then balance the
government’s need for the evidence against the risk of potential harm
to the free flow of information between informants and academicians
if confidentiality is broken.
The District Court of Massachusetts denied the existence of
an academic privilege, but proceeded to apply the case law of the
First Circuit to determine if the subpoenas should be executed.68 The
district court found that, although the targeted materials were indeed
confidential, they were relevant to a serious claim, requested in good
faith, and were not available from a less sensitive source.69 Next, the
district court conducted the balancing test and found that the
considerations weighed strongly in favor of disclosing the
confidential information to the government.70
Ed Moloney and Anthony McIntyre moved to intervene,
claiming an interest not only in defending their pledge of
confidentiality, but also in guarding their personal safety and the
63. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 457.
69 Id. at 456.
70 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (noting Boston College appealed
the order regarding the August subpoenas, but it did not appeal the order regarding
the May subpoena requesting the interviews of Dolours Price. Presently, the
Boston College portion of the litigation is over, and only Moloney and McIntyre’s
claims continue); Tr. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 457.
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safety of their sources.71 The district court denied the motion to
intervene on the ground that Moloney and McIntyre did not have a
private right of action under the US-UK MLAT.72 Furthermore, the
district court concluded that Boston College adequately represented
any interests that Moloney or McIntyre may have relating to their
involvement in the Belfast Project.73
After the district court denied their motion to intervene,
Moloney and McIntyre filed an original complaint, which the district
court dismissed for the same reasons it denied their motion to
intervene.74 Moloney and McIntyre appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, challenging the district court’s denial of their
motion to intervene75 and the dismissal of their original complaint.76
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as it
pertained to a private right of action.77 The Court held that Moloney
and McIntyre could not assert a legally cognizable claim under the
US-UK MLAT because the treaty specifically disclaims the existence
of a private right of action upon which relief can be granted.78
Furthermore, the First Circuit dismissed Moloney and McIntyre’s
claim of academic privilege under the First Amendment, holding that
the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), was controlling.79

Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 458.
Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 7, 8 (explaining that Article 1 of
the US-UK MLAT specifically states that the Treaty is intended solely for mutual
legal assistance between the United States and the United Kingdom, and that the
Treaty does not give rise to a right of private action on the part of an individual to
obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request).
73 Id. at 7.
74 Id. (assuming arguendo that Moloney and McIntyre had standing, the
District Court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim).
75 Id.
76 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4.
77 Id. at 20.
78 Id. at 13.
79 Id. at 16 (noting that, in Branzburg, the Supreme Court rejected the
existence of a reporters’ privilege. Branzburg is developed in sufficient detail in Part
II).
71
72
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In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that a reporter does not
have the privilege to withhold information from criminal justice
authorities in the face of a grand jury subpoena, even if the reporter
has promised confidentiality to his source.80 Although Moloney and
McIntyre were not claiming a press privilege, the First Circuit has
established that academic researchers are entitled to the same
protections that the law provides for journalists.81 Moreover, the First
Circuit found that the rationale behind Branzburg, although it involved
a reporter being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, applied to
Moloney and McIntyre’s action under the US-UK MLAT.82
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the government’s
interest in law enforcement outweighed the risk that compelling the
press to disclose confidential sources would freeze the free flow of
communication.83 Similarly, the First Circuit explained that the USUK MLAT serves the strong law enforcement interests of the United
States and the United Kingdom, and the court agreed with the district
court’s holding that compelling the information from the Belfast
Project would not severely inhibit the success of the Belfast Project
or future academic endeavors.84

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). See also Request from
the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
81 Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir.
1998)(“Academicians engaged in pre-publication research should be accorded
protection commensurate to that which the law provides for journalists[]”).
82 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
83 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
84 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19. Branzburg and its progeny took the
risk of the potential chilling effect into account and came to the same
determination. In its application of the balancing test, the district court gave weight
to the fact that the Belfast Project concluded in 2006, arguing that the subpoena
would not inhibit the Belfast Project researchers to gain information.
80
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II. ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Supreme Court Denied the Existence of a Journalists’
Privilege
1. The background of Branzburg v. Hayes
To fully understand the progression of the Belfast Project
litigation, one must first understand the important precedent set by
the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes. In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide four separate appeals, each of
which raised the proposition that the confidentiality of a reporter’s
sources is privileged under the First Amendment.85 Specifically, the
reporters asserting the privilege in Branzburg argued that their First
Amendment rights were abridged when they were required to testify
to confidential information before grand juries.86
Two of the four appeals heard in Branzburg concerned
publications by Petitioner-Branzburg, a staff reporter for a daily
newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.87 On two occasions,
Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify before grand juries in
Kentucky, and he moved to quash the subpoenas each time on the
grounds that, if required to testify, he would be forced to disclose
information revealed to him in confidence.88
In Branzburg’s first controversial story, he recounted his
observations of two individuals synthesizing marijuana into hashish. 89
Shortly after the story’s publication, Branzburg was subpoenaed to
testify as to the identities of the drug users before the grand jury. 90
Although he appeared before a county grand jury, Branzburg refused
to name the individuals he saw in possession of the drugs. 91
Branzburg claimed that his refusal to answer was authorized by the
85
86
87
88
89

See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668-70.
Id. at 667; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-36 (Ky. Ct. App.

1970).
90
91

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 346.
Id.
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in addition to
other laws.92 The trial court disagreed and required Branzburg to
answer.93 Thereafter, Branzburg sought prohibition and mandamus
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the
court denied his petitions.94
Branzburg’s second appeal was sparked by a later story
describing the use of drugs in another Kentucky town.95 While
researching the story, Branzburg spent two weeks interviewing drug
users.96 Once more, Branzburg was summoned to appear before a
county grand jury to testify about the statutory violations concerning
the sale and use of drugs, to which he was made privy.97 Branzburg’s
motion to quash the subpoena was denied.98 Branzburg then
petitioned the court of appeals for writs of prohibition and
mandamus, as he had in his earlier case concerning the use of drugs.99
Again, Branzburg’s petitions were denied.100
The next judgment under review in Branzburg was In re
Pappas.101 Petitioner-Pappas was a television newsman and a
photographer for a Massachusetts television station.102 Pappas was
called to New Bedford, Massachusetts, to report on civil disorders in
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 347.
The other laws under which Branzburg sought relief were the Kentucky reporters’
privilege statute (Ky.Rev.Stat. § 421.100) (1962)) and several sections of the
Kentucky Constitution.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 668-69 (explaining that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
interpreted Kentucky’s reporters’ privilege statute to afford a reporter the privilege
of refusing to disclose the identity of an informant, but held that the statute did not
authorize a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally,
including the identities of those persons he had observed).
95 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d 748, 749
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
96 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
97 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d at 749.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 670.
100 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 671.
101 Id. at 672.
102 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass.
1971).
92
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the area, which were related to activity of the Black Panther Party. 103
Pappas gained access to the Black Panther headquarters in the area,
where he recorded and photographed a prepared statement read by
one of the group’s leaders.104 The Black Panther leaders admitted
Pappas to their meeting place on the strict condition that he
promised not to disclose anything he heard or saw inside of the
headquarters.105
Two months later, Pappas was called before a county grand
jury as part of an investigation into the criminal acts during the
period of civil disorder on which he had reported in New Bedford. 106
Although he appeared and willingly answered questions regarding his
name, address, employment, and observations outside of the Black
Panther headquarters, Pappas refused to testify about his
observations during his stay inside the headquarters.107 Like
Branzburg, Pappas claimed that he, as a reporter, had a First
Amendment privilege to protect confidential information he received
in the course of investigative work.108 After Pappas refused to answer,
he was served with a second summons to appear before the grand
jury and to provide all evidence connected to the matters about
which he was questioned.109 Pappas claimed a First Amendment
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672, 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298, 299.
While reviewing Pappas’ case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took
judicial notice that, in July 1970, New Bedford, Massachusetts, was rife with civil
disorder, which included “street barricades, exclusion of the public from certain
streets, and similar turmoil.”
104 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298. The
Black Panther headquarters was located in a boarded-up store. The streets
surrounding the store were barricaded, but Pappas was eventually able to enter the
area.
105 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d. at 298 (noting
that, per his agreement with the Black Panthers, Pappas was at liberty to
photograph and report the anticipated police raid).
106 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672-73, 674. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts did not have a record of the hearing below, but the court assumed
that the grand jury investigation at issue was an effort to identify and indict those
responsible for the criminal acts that occurred during the period of civil disorder in
New Bedford.
107 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298.
108 Id.
109 Id.
103
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privilege and moved to quash the subpoena, but the trial court denied
his motion.110
Reviewing Pappas’ appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts specifically rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit in
Caldwell v. United States, described below, and held that reporters do
not have a constitutional privilege authorizing them to refuse to
appear and testify before a court or a grand jury.111 Additionally, the
court reaffirmed its prior holdings that testimonial privileges must be
limited.112 According to Massachusetts’s precedent, the principle that
the public has a right to every man’s evidence has traditionally
outweighed competing interests.113 Furthermore, the court went on to
conclude that any adverse effect on the free flow of news by
requiring reporters to testify would be indirect, theoretical, and
uncertain.114
Finally, the last decision under the Supreme Court’s review in
Branzburg was the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Caldwell.115
Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, had written stories
covering the Black Panthers and other black militant groups in
California.116 In a fact pattern similar to that surrounding the Belfast
Project litigation, Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify before a federal
grand jury regarding various potential criminal violations committed
by the militants.117 The first summons served on Caldwell ordered
him to bring all notes and tape recordings from his interviews with
the officers and spokespeople of the Black Panther Party regarding

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673 (noting that, in contrast to Kentucky,
Massachusetts did not have a statutory reporters’ privilege at the time of Pappas’s
motion.)
111 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03.
112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674.
113 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 299-300.
114 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302)
115 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675.
116 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675; Caldwell v. U.S., 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th
Cir. 1970).
117 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675-76, 677. Possible violations included
threats against President Nixon, assassination, conspiracy to assassinate, and
interstate travel to incite a riot.
110
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the organization’s aims, purposes, and activities.118 After Caldwell
objected to the scope of the subpoena, the government modified its
request, calling only for the reporter to appear before the grand
jury.119
Caldwell and The New York Times moved to quash the
subpoena, arguing that, if required to testify, Caldwell’s working
relationship with the Black Panther Party would be destroyed,
effectively suppressing essential First Amendment freedoms by
chilling the flow of communication between the press and the
militants.120 The District Court denied the motion to quash121 but
instituted a protective measure allowing the journalist to refuse to
disclose confidential information in the absence of a showing by the
government of a compelling and overriding interest in disclosure.122 A
second subpoena was issued, and Caldwell filed another motion to
quash, which was subsequently denied.123
In the face of the order, Caldwell refused to testify before the
grand jury and was held in contempt of court.124 Caldwell appealed
the contempt order, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
requiring a journalist to testify before a grand jury would dissuade
informants from communicating with him in the future.125
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential chill to the
free flow of information as a threat great enough to require the
government to show necessity before compelling a reporter to appear
before a grand jury.126

Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76.
120 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 676; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1084.
121 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 677.
122 Id. at 678; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1083.
123
. Id. (noting that, during the time the district court was reviewing
Caldwell’s first motion to quash, the grand jury’s term expired, and a new grand
jury was convened. After the second grand jury was assembled, the second
subpoena was issued to Caldwell. Caldwell’s new motion to quash was submitted
on the prior record).
124 Id.
125 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1084.
126 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 697; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1085-86.
118
119
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding that requiring a reporter to testify
would substantially deter future communications between the media
and informants marked a stark split from the perspectives of the
appellate courts in Branzburg I, Branzburg II, and Pappas, which found
that any negative effect of requiring a journalist to disclose
confidential information on the free flow of communication was
tenuous and indirect.127 The Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari to address the disputed journalists’ privilege claimed by
Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell.128
2. Summary of the argument for a privilege before the U.S. Supreme
Court in Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court considered the newsmen’s
contention that a reporter should not be required to appear or testify
before a grand jury or at a trial unless the government sufficiently
shows that: (1) the reporter is privy to evidence relevant to the crime
under investigation; (2) the evidence is not available from another
source; and (3) the government’s need for the evidence is sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake. 129
Journalists Petitioner-Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and RespondentCaldwell each refused to respond to grand jury subpoenas and testify
about evidence relevant to criminal investigations.130 Generally,
citizens are not exempt from answering a grand jury subpoena;131
however, a constitutional provision may authorize a citizen to refuse
to appear and testify.132
The Branzburg journalists submitted that the First
Amendment freedom of the press authorized their refusal to appear
and testify before a grand jury because, if they were forced to
respond and divulge confidential sources, future informants would
withhold important, newsworthy information.133 Essentially, if
journalists could be required to divulge their confidential sources,
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

See id. at 671, 674, 679.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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then sources would not come forward with information.134 Without
the participation of informants, newsworthy information would be
unavailable for dissemination to the public, placing a burden on the
free flow of communication in violation of the First Amendment.135
3. Why the Branzburg majority refused to recognize a journalists’
privilege under the First Amendment
To arrive at its conclusion that journalists do not have a
constitutional privilege to keep confidences in the face of a grand jury
subpoena, the Court first reviewed other, well-accepted limitations on
the freedom of the press.136 For example, journalists do not have the
right to violate the liberties of others,137 nor may journalists publish
any story they wish with impunity.138 Although the journalist’s task is
to disseminate news to the public, the journalist is not granted special
access, constitutional or otherwise, to judicial conferences, grand jury
proceedings, or crime scenes.139
Despite these limitations, the Majority was compelled to
acknowledge the importance of the freedom of the press in the
United States and in American jurisprudence.140 The Court
recognized that newsgathering is indeed protected by the First
Amendment.141 In fact, the court asserted that the freedom of the
press would be eviscerated without the protection of the First
Amendment.142 However, the Majority determined that PetitionerSee id.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
136 See id. at 683-86.
137 Id. at 683. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), the
Supreme Court held that the Associated Press was bound by the standards of the
National Labor Relations Act.
138 Id. at 683-84 (elaborating that, for example, the press may be subject
to liability for circulating knowing or reckless falsehoods. In such cases, journalists
may be held responsible for compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover,
journalists may also be criminally prosecuted for publications of this nature).
139 Id. at 684-85. Notably, the press may also be prohibited from
publishing information about trials if such publications threaten to prejudice a
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.
140 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
141 Id.
142 Id.
134
135
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Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and Respondent-Caldwell’s claims did
not implicate the First Amendment because (1) the journalists were
not subject to any restraint on the contents of their publications, (2)
they were not forced to publish stories they wished to conceal, and
(3) they were not penalized for the contents of their publications.143
The fact that the journalists were not prohibited from using
confidential sources in their task of newsgathering was also crucial to
the Court’s decision.144 Although the journalists’ access to
confidential informants was not explicitly restricted, the Court did
not find that requiring journalists to appear before grand juries would
pose a significant threat to the newsmen’s access to information from
confidential sources.145
Rather than recognizing the utility of receiving important
information from confidential sources and crediting legitimate
reasons for an informant’s desire for discretion, the Majority’s
perception was that informants seek confidentiality chiefly to avoid
criminal prosecution.146 The Majority failed to see the utility in
transmitting controversial news to the public and failed to give
adequate import to a journalist’s integrity in his attempts to keep a
confidence.147
In situations where the confidential informant is not a
criminal offender but has knowledge of illegal activity, the Court
posited that the informant may want to protect his reputation, keep
his job, or avoid becoming involved in criminal litigation.148 In its list
Id.
Id. at 681-82.
145 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693 (“[T]he evidence fails to
demonstrate that there would be a significant construction of the flow of news to
the public. . . .”).
146 See id. at 691 (“The preference for anonymity of those confidential
informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their
desire to escape criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is
hardly deserving of constitutional protection”).
147 See id. at 692 (“Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct
of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about
crime than to do something about it[]”).
148 Id. at 693.
143
144
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of considerations, the Majority also casually noted that the informant
may fear for his personal safety, but failed to acknowledge the reality
of this concern and how it could affect the free flow of information
between informants and the media, and, in turn, between the media
and the public.149
Reaching its holding, the Majority was unwavering in
concluding that the public interest in prosecuting a crime outweighs
any interest the public may have in receiving information obtained
from a confidential informant.150
III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
Unlike the Branzburg Majority, the Council of Europe has
recognized that the interest in protecting confidentiality may
outweigh other concerns, including the prevention of crime.151 The
Council of Europe’s main purpose is to achieve unity152 between its
forty-seven member nations.153 In furtherance of its progressive
goals, the Council of Europe developed the European Convention
on Human Rights to promote and protect the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the citizens of its member nations.154 The
Convention is a binding international agreement,155 and all member

Id.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
151 See generally Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413.
152 European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Article 10].
153 Impact in 47 Countries, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://human-rightsconvention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/ (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014).
154 Article 10, supra note 152.
155 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A GUIDE TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT 1998 5 (Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs ed., 3d ed. 2006),
http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-rights/human-rights/pdf/act-studyguide.pdf.
149
150
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nations, including the United Kingdom, have ratified or acceded to
it.156
The Convention both enshrines the fundamental rights that
are guaranteed to all citizens and is legally binding, similar to the Bill
of Rights of the United States Constitution.157 When an individual
feels that his rights under the Convention have been violated or
restricted, he can lodge an application with the European Court of
Human Rights.158
1.

A journalistic privilege exists under Article 10 of the Convention
on Human Rights

Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights protects the
individual’s right to express himself. Specifically, Article 10 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
156 Council
of Europe Human Rights Convention Website,
http://human-rights-convention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-onhuman-rights/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
157 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; accord European Convention on Human
Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. For more on the European
Convention on Human Rights and its role in European courts, see Frank Murray,
Boston College’s Defense of the Belfast Project: a Renewed Call for a Researcher’s Privilege to
Protect Academia, 2 INT’L J. ACAD. RES. BUS. AND SOC. SCI. 1, 18-19 (2012).
158 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 155, at 5. The
European Court of Human Rights is located in Strasbourg, France. Before lodging
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant must first
exhaust all available state remedies. The applicant has six months from the date of
the final domestic court decision to petition the European Court of Human Rights.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 6 (undated),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf.
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formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights
of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.159
Relevantly, the European Court of Human Rights has
interpreted Article 10 to protect journalists from being compelled to
disclose the identities of their sources.160 Furthermore, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has specifically
declared that Article 10 protects a journalist’s right to maintain the
confidentiality of his sources.161
2. Analyzing a cause of action under Article 10.
Like the Branzburg Court,162 the European Court of Human
Rights noted in Goodwin v. United Kingdom that compelling journalists
to disclose the identities of their confidential sources could have a
chilling effect on the free flow of communication between the media
and the public.163 However, the European Court of Human Rights
found the threat to be more palpable, explaining that the important
public watchdog function served by the press would be undermined

Article 10, supra note 152.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57974.
161 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 4TH EUROPEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
ON
MASS MEDIA POLICY 35 (Council of Europe ed., 1994),
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlo
bGet&InstranetImage=411463&SecMode=1&DocId=517420&Usage=2.
The
Committee of Ministers enumerated this Principle at the 4th European ministerial
Conference of Mass Media Policy in 1994.
162 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693.
163 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
159
160
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if journalists were unable to obtain accurate and reliable information
from sources who wish to remain unnamed.164
When evaluating a cause of action under Article 10, the
European Court of Human Rights will first look to the facts of a
particular case to determine if a public authority has interfered with
the applicant’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed under
paragraph 1 of Article 10.165 For example, in Voskuil v. The
Netherlands, the Court found that the Court of Appeal, a public
authority, interfered when it ordered the detention of the applicant in
an attempt to compel him to name his source for a news story.166
If the Court finds that a public authority has interfered with
the applicant’s right of expression, then the Court will proceed to
analyze the facts of the case under paragraph 2 of Article 10 to
determine if the interference was justified.167 Analysis under the
second paragraph of Article 10 requires an assessment of three
prongs.168 First, the Court will determine if law prescribed the
interference.169 In other words, the Court inquires whether the
government’s action had a lawful basis in domestic law.170
Second, if the Court determines that the government’s mode
of interference had an adequate basis in the relevant domestic law,
the Court will consider whether the interference pursued a legitimate
aim.171 According to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, the legitimate aims that justify interference with the
journalistic freedom of expression are set forth in the exhaustive list

Id. at 693. The Branzburg court did not find that requiring disclosure
would significantly obstruct the free flow of communication.
165 See id. at 496.
166 Voskuil
v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413.
167 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
496.
168 See Article 10, supra note 152.
169 See Article 10, supra note 152; see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 496.
170 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14.
171 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
498; See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
164
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contained in paragraph 2 of Article 10.172 A public authority need
only pursue one of the enumerated aims to satisfy this prong of the
test.173 Furthermore, the interference must have been foreseeable by
the applicant in light of the stipulated restrictions.174
Finally, the Court must determine whether the interference is
necessary in a democratic society.175 If the interference is necessary, it
must also be proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim
pursued by the restriction.176 If the limiting authority cannot establish
proportionality and relevance to an extent sufficient to override the
vital public interest in a free press, then interference is not necessary
in a democratic society, and the applicant’s rights under Article 10
will be deemed violated.177
According to case law from the European Court of Human
Rights, necessity is a difficult standard for the government to prove
when it restricts journalistic confidentiality.178 The Council of Europe
acknowledges that freedom of expression is a cornerstone of
democracy and declares that protecting the freedom of the press is an
important and fundamental requirement in this regard.179
In Goodwin, the European Court of Human Rights expressed
that the protection of journalistic sources is so essential to a free
press that an order compelling a journalist to disclose his source’s
identity must be justified by an overriding requirement in the public
interest.180 Restrictions on journalistic confidentiality require the
Court’s strictest scrutiny, and the scales weigh heavily in favor of

172
173

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,

498.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
498-500; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
176 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
177 See id. at 502-03.
178 See id. at 500-01.
179 Id. at 500.
180 Id.
174
175
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maintaining a free press.181 The test of necessity is fact-intensive, and
the court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
if the government’s reason for interfering with the freedom of the
press is both relevant and sufficient.182
3. What if the interference was intended to prevent crime?
The Convention considers the prevention of crime to be a
potential justification for restricting journalistic confidentiality.183
Although specified in Article 10, the goal of preventing crime or
disorder will not always justify a restriction on expression.184 For
instance, in Voskuil v. The Netherlands, a police officer informed a
journalist that the police staged a flood to gain access into an
apartment belonging to a group of individuals who were subsequently
prosecuted for arms trafficking after the officers’ entry revealed
weapons.185
The journalist was called as a trial witness for the defendants,
but he refused to disclose the identity of the police officer who had
tipped him off.186 When he refused, he was held in contempt and
sentenced to a detention for a maximum of 30 days.187 The journalist
then filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights,
alleging a violation of his rights under Article 10.188
Evaluating the journalist’s Article 10 claim, the Court
accepted the Government’s contention that it interfered to further
the prevention of crime, a legitimate aim under paragraph 2 of Article
10.189 The confidential information that the journalist held, the Court
explained, implicated the integrity of the Netherlands police force

181

Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500-

182

Id.
Article 10, supra note 152.
See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15-16.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 14.
Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
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183
184
185
186
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and contained facts that could secure the defendants a fair trial.190
Regardless, the Court held that the Government’s interest in the
informant’s identity could not overcome the journalist’s interest in
protecting his source’s confidentiality.191
The Branzburg Court differed fundamentally in its analysis of
journalistic privilege in the context of criminal activity. While the
European Court of Human Rights placed great significance on the
journalist’s integrity and livelihood, as well as the public’s right to
information,192 the Supreme Court was preoccupied with the source’s
motives behind his wish to remain confidential.193 The European
Court of Human Rights is willing to conduct the balancing of
interests under Article 10, even in the context of high stakes criminal
cases,194 but the Supreme Court in Branzburg tersely concluded that
the public’s interest in the prosecution of crime almost always
outweighs its interest in information.195
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM PRESENTS THE BEST AVAILABLE
FORUM TO SEEK PROTECTION OF THE BELFAST PROJECT MATERIALS
A. The Council of Europe Takes a More Practical Approach
Toward Protecting Freedom of Expression than the United
States
Although Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights
specifically protects journalistic freedom of expression,196 academic
privilege may properly be analogized to a journalistic privilege. Like
journalists, academic researchers are devoted to collecting and
analyzing information, then disseminating their findings to an
audience with the hope that the audience will be enriched as a
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
192 See id.
193 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
194 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 passim.
195 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
196 See Article 10, supra note 152; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7),
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483 passim; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
passim.
190
191
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result.197 The value of academic research, like the news, hinges on the
availability, reliability, and accuracy of sources.198 The U.S. Supreme
Court and the European Court of Human Rights agree that a free
press is a cornerstone of democracy.199 However, the two authorities
diverge in their perspectives on how to protect the press’s freedom of
expression.200
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court articulated that public
authorities must not place restrictions on the content of publications,
force journalists to publish stories against their will, or prohibit the
use of confidential sources.201 From the Supreme Court’s perspective,
requiring a journalist to disclose the identity of a confidential source
does not constitute a prohibition on the use of confidential
sources.202 Furthermore, the Branzburg Court and the First Circuit203
determined that compelled disclosure of a confidential source would
have only a theoretical and uncertain chilling effect on the free
exchange of information between the press and the public.204
The European Court of Human Rights takes a more practical
approach. Rather than accept at face value the fact that journalists
were not forbidden from obtaining information from confidential
sources,205 the Court stressed that, under Article 10, a journalist’s
right to use and keep a confidence is vital to a thriving, free press. 206
See Murray, supra note 157, at 3-9, for an in depth discussion of the
functions researchers perform in society, both historically and contemporarily, and
why an academic privilege is essential to the successful performance of these
functions.
198 See Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714.
199 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7),
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
200 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82; but cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
201 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82.
202 See id.
203 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19.
204 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at
302). Although it is quoting the Massachusetts decision here, the Supreme Court
adopts the proposition in its own analysis and conclusion on appeal.
205 But cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82.
206 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
496,500.
197
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While the United States federal courts have characterized the chilling
effect as an uncertain harm,207 the European Court of Human Rights
more accurately observed that if journalists were compelled to
divulge confidences, then sources who wish to remain anonymous
would be discouraged from coming forward with information,
thereby undermining the ability of the press to present useful and
reliable news to the public.208 For the press to be truly free, they must
be protected from the threat of compelled disclosure of their
confidential sources.
B. Applying Article 10 Jurisprudence to the Belfast Project
Litigation
When assessing whether a public authority’s attempt to
compel a journalist to disclose a confidential source violates Article
10, the European Court of Human Rights begins with the
understanding that a journalist’s right to keep a confidence is so
essential to democracy that the disclosure must be justified by an
overriding public interest.209 The law is positioned in favor of
nondisclosure, and the public authority must satisfy the difficult
standard of necessity.210 Regarding McIntyre’s application in Belfast,
the High Court based its analysis—and subsequent denial—of the
petition on Article 2 of the Convention, not Article 10.211 This
comment argues that the writ should have been decided in his favor.
Considering that it was not, the following analysis predicts how the
Court of Appeal or European Court of Human Rights would review
McIntyre’s Article 10 claim.

See In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at 302. For a detailed discussion of cases
addressing a scholarly privilege in the United States federal courts, see also Murray,
supra note 157, at 9-18.
208 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
500.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 500-01.
211 In the Matter of Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave to Apply
for Judicial Review, [2012] NIQB 65 (N. Ir.), http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/enGB/Judicial
Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2012/%5B2012%5D
NIQB 65/j_j_TRE8601FINAL-PUBLISH.htm.
207
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1. Applying the Article 10 test to the facts of the Belfast Project
Litigation
a. Did a public authority interfere with the Belfast Project researchers’
right to freedom of expression? - Yes, the government of the United
Kingdom interfered with the rights of Boston College, Moloney, and
McIntyre to keep the Belfast Project sources and interview materials
confidential when it requested the materials on behalf of the Police
Service of Northern Ireland.212
b. Was the interference prescribed by law? - Yes, the United
Kingdom, on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, was
acting within the bounds of domestic law when it interfered with the
researchers’ right to maintain confidentiality because it requested the
Belfast Project interview materials to pursue a criminal
investigation.213
c. Was the interference directed toward the pursuit of a legitimate aim? To meet this prong of the test, the Government must show (1) that it
subpoenaed the information in pursuit of the public interest214 and
(2) that the researchers could have foreseen the interference for that
particular purpose.215 Under Article 10, the prevention of crime or
disorder is a legitimate aim.216 In the case of the Belfast Project, the
United Kingdom requested the interviews on behalf of the Police
Service of Northern Ireland217 because the police suspected that the
materials contained information essential to the investigation of a
variety of crimes.218 Taken at face value, the prevention and
prosecution of criminal activity are clearly legitimate pursuits for the

212 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3; cf. Voskuil v. Netherlands,
2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14.
213 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3.
214 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15; Goodwin v.
United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 498.
215 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
216 Article 10, supra note 152.
217 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1.
218 Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
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good of the public. However, stating a legitimate motive does not
necessarily justify an interference with the right to free expression.219
Foreseeability on the parts of Moloney and McIntyre is more
challenging to establish. Considering the highly political nature of
“The Troubles” and the amnesty provision under the Good Friday
Agreement,220 the researchers could have reasonably concluded that
the Police Service of Northern Ireland would not attempt to
prosecute cold cases, such as the 1972 murder and abduction of
McConville.221 Furthermore, Moloney and McIntyre have described
the McConville situation as a “longstanding ‘non-investigation,’”
further supporting the proposition that they could not have foreseen
that the United Kingdom would request the interviews to inquire into
40-year-old crimes.222
d. Was the interference necessary in a democratic society? - An analysis
under Branzburg would have ended when the Government established
that its purpose for compelling disclosure was to prevent and
prosecute criminal activity.223 However, the European Court of
Human Rights takes the analysis a step further. In fact, the European
Court of Human Rights performs the very test that the petitioners
argued for in Branzburg: the government must show that its interest in
disclosure is compelling enough to outweigh the value of the
fundamental right to expression.224 In making this showing, the
Government must also establish that the level of interference is
proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and
that the information is not reasonably available from an alternative
source.225

219

See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,

502-03.
220 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27. Under the terms
of the Good Friday Agreement, almost all prisoners, including many who had been
convicted of murder, were released by the British government.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 26.
223 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
224 See id. at 680; cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur.
Ct. H.R. 483, 502-03.
225 Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
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This approach is similar to that adopted in Branzburg;
however, the European Court of Human Rights places greater weight
on the journalist’s right to nondisclosure.226 Moreover, the totality of
the circumstances must be carefully considered, with weight placed in
favor of protecting the right to freedom of expression.227 Regarding
the Belfast Project litigation, the U.S. District Court for
Massachusetts determined that the requested information was not
available to be readily obtained from another, less sensitive source. 228
Considering the secrecy shrouding the paramilitary groups involved
in “The Troubles,”229 the courts of the United Kingdom would likely
reach the same conclusion.
The main point of contention, however, is on the
proportionality of the request.230 The United Kingdom sought
information to aid in the investigation of crimes; however, the crimes
in question occurred in 1972—almost 40 years prior to the request.231
Additionally, the Police Service of Northern Ireland elected not to
pursue this particular investigation for a long period of time.232
Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement
between the United Kingdom and the IRA, many prisoners,
226 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
500-01.; but cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 ([W]e cannot accept the argument that
the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified
sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting
those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the
commission of such crimes in the future.”).
227 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 50001.
228 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 456.
229 See id. at 441. The code of silence is evident through the extreme
measures taken by the Belfast Project researchers to ensure that the participants’
identities would be concealed.
230 Anthony McIntyre himself claimed that the compelled disclosure
would disproportionately interfere with his right to life under Article 2 and his right
to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence under Article 10.
Statement Filed Pursuant to Order 53, Rule(3)(2)(a) of the Rules of the Court of
Judicature (NI) 1980 at ¶ 3(b)-(d), In re Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave
to
Apply
for
Judicial
Review,
[2012]
NIQB
65
(N.
Ir.),
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/99166414?access_key=keyjadvo5q2krzoyln48yc&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll.
231 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
232 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26.
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including those convicted of murder during “The Troubles,” have
been released.233
Contrary to the current, ongoing criminal activity at issue at
the time of the Branzburg litigation,234 the criminal activity at issue in
the Belfast Project litigation was long over, and the actors were given
amnesty in furtherance of the political peace process.235 The
participants came forward to share the ghosts of their past with the
hope of providing insight and preventing future harm.236 In fact, if
the United Kingdom truly wishes to prevent future harm, crime, and
disorder, then it should strive to protect the participants’ identities.237
The IRA, of which McIntyre, Hughes, Price, and many other
participants were members, enforces a strict code of silence.238 If the
interviewees are revealed to have breached this code, their own safety
and the safety of the researchers involved in the Belfast Project likely
will be threatened.239
Furthermore, the inevitable chill to the free flow of
information is startling. Although the aim of prosecuting and
preventing crime is venerable, the consequences are too great to
justify a violation of the researchers’ right to keep their sources
confidential. If the disclosure is compelled, the United Kingdom may
have clues about their 40-year-old investigation; however, in so
doing, they will have placed their own citizens in harm’s way,
compromised the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland,
inhibited the success of valuable research to prevent future conflict,
Id. at 26-27.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. passim.
235 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6; see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27.
236 See Request from U.K., 683 F.3d at 4 (noting that this was the goal of
the Belfast Project: to understand the minds of those engaged in violent conflict,
with the hope of preventing it in the future).
237 See Trs. of Boston Coll.,831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (explaining that tensions
still exist in Northern Ireland).
238 See id. (noting that interviewees conditioned their participation on
strict promises of confidentiality in order to protect their safety); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 (explaining that IRA members are forbidden from
sharing anything about IRA membership or operations with anyone, at penalty of
punishment at the hands of the Army).
239 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
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and tarnished the reputation of the Belfast Project researchers.240
Therefore, compelled disclosure of the Belfast Project participants’
identities is not necessary in a democratic society. Conclusively,
courts in the United Kingdom, which are bound by Article 10, should
find that the researchers’ Article 10 rights were violated.
V. FULFILLING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REQUEST CONTRAVENES
PUBLIC POLICY
If the researchers cannot protect the confidentiality of the
interview materials through the European court system, Article 3 of
the US-UK MLAT, which lists limitations on assistance, presents
another solution.241 Under Article 3, the United States may refuse its
assistance if the Attorney General, the treaty’s designated Central
Authority for the U.S., determines that the request, if granted, would
impair essential American interests or contravene United States
public policy.242 In this case, the United Kingdom’s request would
compromise the peace process in Northern Ireland, put the lives of
many at risk, and jeopardize the success of future academic
endeavors.243 Considering that the United States played a key role in
the Northern Ireland peace process and has a vested interest in the
safety and progress of British and American citizens, fulfilling the
United Kingdom’s request would impair the essential interests of the
United States and contravene public policy.244
Because the Belfast Project implicates foreign relations, it falls
under the purview of Secretary of State John Kerry. Secretary Kerry
has evinced a special interest in the Belfast Project litigation, both as
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 passim.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. 3,
Jan.
6,
1994,
T.I.A.S
No.
96-1202,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf [hereinafter US-UK
MLAT].
242 Id. art. 3.1(a), art. 2.2.
243 See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1 (expressing concern about the
consequences of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s request under the US-UK
MLAT).
244 See id. (acknowledging that the Good Friday Agreement was signed
under the “enormous leadership” of President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair).
240
241
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a Senator of Massachusetts and as the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.245 In January 2012, he urged former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to work with British authorities to
revoke their request for the Belfast Project materials.246 Senator Kerry
was concerned that the United Kingdom’s request would disturb the
fragile Northern Ireland peace process and offend the spirit of the
Good Friday Agreement because any crimes recounted in the
interviews would have occurred prior to the accords.247 In addition to
the inherent political dangers, Senator Kerry also acknowledged the
threats to the Belfast Project participants and academia in general: “It
is my great hope that the academic integrity of these documents is
maintained and that these transcripts remain confidential because for
some this has become a matter of life and death.”248
According to Senator Kerry, the US-UK MLAT is a “vital”
instrument; however, it was “never meant to be used as a method of
reaching far back into a difficult history and perhaps eroding a
delicate truce that could lead to more lives being lost.”249 Based on
his earlier statements, Secretary Kerry has acknowledged that
fulfillment of the United Kingdom’s request would contravene
important public policy concerns and impair the United States’s

See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, Mass. Senator
and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., to Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of
State
(Jan.
23,
2012),
http://htmlimg2.scribdassets.com/9nepmj1w8w1d29hd/images/1-c3ae96f326.jpg
[hereinafter Letter from John Kerry].
246 Letter from John Kerry, supra note 245. Secretary Kerry is not alone in
his efforts. Other members of Congress who have written to Secretary Clinton on
the matter include Congressman Ackerman, Congressman Crowley, Senator
Menendez, Congressman O’Flaherty, Senator Schumer, Senator Brown,
Congressman Pascrell, Congressman Rothman, Congressman Doyle, Senator
Lautenberg, Congressman Murphy, Senator Lugar, Congressman Critz, Senator
Casey, Congressman Sires, Senator Cardin, Congressman Neal, Congressman
Pallone, Senator Gillibrand, and Congressman Higgins. Congress, BOSTON COLLEGE
SUBPOENA NEWS, http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/congress/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2013).
247 See Letter from John Kerry, supra note 245; Kerry Op-Ed, supra note
1.
248 Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1.
249 Id.
245
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interest in a peaceful Northern Ireland.250 To protect the integrity of
the Belfast Project and the lives of those involved, Secretary Kerry
should work toward an agreeable resolution with the United
Kingdom that does not involve compelled disclosure of the
participants’ identities.
Although declining to enforce the United Kingdom’s request
would not create a constitutional privilege for academic researchers, it
would be a major step toward recognition of such a right. The
executive branch would demonstrate that the protection of
confidentiality in academic research could outweigh the prosecution
of crimes. Additionally, the decision would further legitimize
endeavors like the Belfast Project as important tools in American
culture, moving the standard of protection of researchers closer to
that for journalists.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe to recognize an academic privilege in the
United States. In their petition for certiorari, Moloney and McIntyre
indicated that the circuit courts have inconsistently applied Branzburg,
disagreeing whether and to what extent the First Amendment
protects against compelled disclosure of confidential information. 251
When the Belfast Project litigation was before the First Circuit
initially, Circuit Judge Torruella explained that he concurred in the
judgment of the First Circuit only because he was compelled to do so
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg.252
Although the Belfast Project will not be the vehicle for the
Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Branzburg, the controversy
surrounding the project indicates that the trend, both nationally and
internationally, is in favor of affording more, not less, protection to
journalists, academics, and other professionals who promise

250

See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, supra note

251

See id. at 13.
Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 20 (Torruella, C.J., concurring).
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confidentiality in exchange for information on important matters of
public interest.253
After examining academic privilege through the lens of the
Belfast Project, it is evident that compelling academicians to divulge
their confidential sources will inevitably and significantly obstruct the
free flow of information between researchers and their participants,
thereby depriving the public of valuable information. The protection
of academic confidentiality agreements is essential in two important
ways. Firstly, when individuals are encouraged to share their life
experiences in a safe, academic environment, researchers are able to
transmit the wisdom they glean to the public. Enlightening society
affords future generations the ability to learn from the mistakes of
the past and craft a better future. Simply put, if researchers cannot
promise anonymity to those informants who require it, then
informants will be hesitant to participate in studies, and researchers
will never be able to gather true and accurate information to
disseminate to the public.
Secondly, the safety of researchers and their sources hinges
on their ability to enter into and enforce confidentiality agreements.
As this comment has explained in its discussion of the Belfast
Project, research participants put themselves at risk when they share
their experiences regarding high-stakes, controversial, and dangerous
topics. Furthermore, academicians who conduct such projects also
expose themselves to peril. For endeavors like the Belfast Project,
confidentiality is virtually mandatory, not optional, for many research
participants. When considering claims such as those of Moloney and
McIntyre, courts should conduct the appropriate balancing test with
the understanding that an academic’s right to maintain confidentiality
is essential to a thriving, free society. If courts fail to do so, policy
makers must use the tools at their disposal to protect this vital
interest.

253

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 14.
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